In the Matter of: J.C.-M., Appeal of: H.C. ( 2018 )

J-S56008-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF: J.C.-M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.C., FATHER : No. 745 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree April 4, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 26-AD-2018,
CP-22-DP-0000168-2015
IN THE MATTER OF: J.C.-M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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:
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APPEAL OF: H.C., FATHER : No. 748 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 4, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 27 AD 2018,
CP-22-DP-0000169-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2018
Appellant, H.C. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered in the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court, which granted the
petitions of the Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth
(“Agency”) for involuntary termination of the parental rights of A.M.
(“Mother”) and Father to their minor twin children, J.C.-M. and J.C.-M.
(“Children”), and changed Children’s reunification goal to adoption. We affirm.
In its opinion, the Orphans’ Court sets forth most of the relevant facts
J-S56008-18
and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to restate
them. Procedurally, we add Agency filed petitions on March 9, 2018, for
involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Children
and to change Children’s reunification goal to adoption. On April 3, 2018, the
court conducted a termination hearing, during which it heard testimony from,
inter alia, caseworker Jessica Jones, caseworker supervisor Heather Gutshall,
and Father.1 The court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to
Children and changed Children’s reunification goal to adoption on April 4,
2018.2 On May 1, 2018, Father filed separate as to each child timely notices
of appeal and contemporaneous concise statements of errors complained of
on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).3 This Court consolidated Father’s
appeals sua sponte on June 5, 2018.
____________________________________________
1 During the proceedings, the attorney-GAL represented Children’s interests
in supporting termination of parental rights. Because Children have been in
foster care since just after birth and were less than three years old at the time
of the termination proceedings, we can presume, absent any evidence in the
record to the contrary, that there was no conflict between Children’s best
interests and their legal interests. See In Re: T.S., ___ A.3d ___, 2018 WL
4001825 (filed August 22, 2018) (holding appointment of second counsel is
not required to represent legal interests of children, where children’s legal
interests and best interests do not diverge; due to their young age (less than
three years old), presumption exists that children were too young to express
subjective preferred outcome of termination proceedings; therefore attorney-
GAL could fulfill statutory mandate for appointment of counsel and represent
both best interests and legal interests of children).
2 Mother did not file notices of appeal and is not a party to these appeals.
3Father’s Rule 1925 statements were initially not scanned with the notices of
appeal; the trial court has since corrected that error.
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Father raises two issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF [FATHER] AS TO [CHILDREN]?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF [CHILDREN]
WOULD BE SERVED BY TERMINATING THE PARENTAL
RIGHTS OF [FATHER]?
(Father’s Brief at 6).
Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof
is on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
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grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165(2008)).
After a thorough review of the record, the brief of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable John F. Cherry,
we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The Orphans’ Court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
(See Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed June 19, 2018, at 1-10) (finding: when
Agency filed termination petition, Children had been in foster care for thirty-
two months, since birth; evidence Agency presented at termination hearing
established Father has been incarcerated during Children’s entire lives, with
exception of two to three months; Father presented no evidence he availed
himself of parenting resources while incarcerated, and although aware of
Children’s placement, Father failed to avoid criminal activity; Father has failed
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to satisfy care plan objectives, maintain contact with Agency, consistently
participate in proceedings, and provide releases and authorizations for
Children; further, Father acknowledged he has not provided Children parental
care since their birth; caseworker Ms. Jones testified Father must secure and
maintain stable housing to parent Children properly, which could take months
or years and prolong Children’s opportunity for permanency; Father failed to
present evidence of his plans for residence and employment upon his release
from incarceration; additional months of uncertainty would be detrimental to
Children; Children have known only foster parents as their parents and have
bonded well with foster parents, who also adopted Children’s older sibling;
evidence does not indicate Children have any bond with Father that, if broken,
would cause Children harm; Children would suffer, however, if they were
removed from foster parents’ home; Father also presented no evidence to
support his claim that Agency failed to consider family members as care or
adoption resources; record is devoid of evidence of identity of family
resources). The record supports the court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm
on the basis of the Orphans’ Court opinion.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/11/2018
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Circulated 10/02/2018 10:13 AM
INRE: IN THE CPURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DAUPHIN COUNTY. PENNSYLVANIA
J.C.-M.
: NO. 26 AD 2018/168 DP 2015
INRE:
J.C.-M. ; NO. 27 AD 2018/169 DP 2015 �
TRIAL COURT OPINION
This appeal follows the Decree of Aprill/, 2018, which terminated the parental rights of
("Father") and ordered a goal change to adoption of J.C.-M. and J.C.-M.,
("Children") .,
At the conclusion of the hearing on April 3, 2018, we set forth our findings and conclusions.
(Transcript of Proceedings, Termination of Parental Rights, April 3, 2018, pp. 33-
38)(hereinafter, "N.T."). We amplify those findings and conclusions with this Opinion.
A. FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
The Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth ("Agency") began contact with
Mother in 1999 related to housing, drug and alcohol, and mental health concerns. (N.T. p. 10).
Mother had nine children. None remain in her care. Id.Jessica Jones served as an Agency caseworker for this family from June 2015 through
October 2017. While the Agency worked with Mother regarding another child, J.C.-M. and
J.C.-M. were born positive for cocaine. (N.T. p. 11). On July 6, 2015, the Agency filed
Dependency Petitions regarding J.C.-M. and J.C.-M. and took emergency custody. On July 9,
· 2015, a Shelter Care hearing occurred and Children were placed in the temporary care and
I A, /lll, {"Mother") does not appeal the Decree issued on the same date which terminated her parental rights.
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custody of the Agency. Following an Adjudication and Disposition hearing on July 22, 2015, the
Court deemed the Children dependent.
Father resided in a half-way house at the time of Children's birth in July 2015. (N.T. p. 30).
The service objectives and Father's achievement of those are as follows:
1. Cooperate and comply with the Agency.
Father failed to maintain contact with the Agency. Father was released from
incarceration in July 2016 but received new charges which resulted in re-
incarceration. (N.T. p. 16; N.T. p. 31). During the period following his release,
Father left a voicemail which included inaccurate contact information. (N.T. p. 17).
Father did not present himself to the Agency. Id.
2. Attend meetings and hearings and sign releases.
Father attended only one out of ten court hearings in person and participated in one
hearing by phone while incarcerated. (N.T. p. 13).
J.,. Sign releases.
Father failed to consistently provide releases and authorizations. (N.T. p. 14; N.T. p.
31 ). Father refused to sign an authorization related to a change in the level of J.C.-
M. 's occupational therapy services, which necessitated the issuance of a Court Order
directing him to do so. (N.T. p. 19).
4. Notify the Agency within 24 hours of new residence or contact information.
See, paragraph 1, supra.
� Participate in all services provided or suggested by the Agency.
Father failed to corriply with this objective due to his incarceration and lack of
contact with the Agency.
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6. Obtain and maintai_n safe and stable housing.
Father has never presented a plan for stable housing. (N.T. p. 20),
7. Obtain and maintain a legal source of income in order to meet the Children's needs.
Father presented no evidence of income.
� Refrain from all criminal activity/comply with the expectations of Probation/Parole
On August 11, 2016, Father was charged with felony Aggravated Assault (18 Pa.C.S.
§2702). On August 29, 2016, Father was charged with two felony counts of Criminal
Trespass- Break into Structure (18 Pa. C.S. §3503), one felony count of Flight to
Avoid Apprehension (18 Pa.C.S. §5126) and one felony count of Escape (18 Pa.C.S.
§ 5121).
� Comply with all expectations of prison while at Dauphin County Prison.
Father presented no evidence of compliance with this objective.
fil Obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all recommendations.
Father presented no evidence of compliance with this objective.
1.L Provide urine screens
Father failed to provide urine screens. (N .T. p. 17).
On March 28, 2017, following a Permanency Review and Aggravated Circumstances hearing,
the Dependency Court found that the Children remained dependent and that aggravated
circumstances existed based upon Father's lack ofcontinuing contact with the Children.
Accordingly, the Agency was relieved of providing reasonable efforts toward reunification.
With the exception of two to three months, Father remained incarcerated during the
Children's entire lives. (N;T. pp. 13-14). He has never performed parental duties for the
Children. (N.T. p. 14). Father has written letters to the Children, although many letters ask only
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about one child. (N.T. p. 17; N.T. p. 18). Father requested, but was denied, a visit with the
Children at the Dauphin County Prison in that the· prison conditioned the visit on no contact.
(N.T. pp. 18-19). Father has made no request for progress or health reports regarding the
Children, Id.
Agency caseworker Ms. Jones testified that in order for Father to properly parent the Children,
it would be necessary for him to secure and maintain stable housing and employment, which
could entail months or potentially years. (N.T. pp. 20-21 ). Allowing Father additional time to
demonstrate such stability would place the Children's opportunity for permanency on hold for an ·
extended period of time. (N.T. p. 22).
The Children, now three years old, have known only the foster parents as their parents. (Id.).
They have bonded well with the foster parents, who have provided love, consistency and met all
of their needs. (N.T. p. 23). The foster family adopted the Children's older sibling. (Id.)
Father acknowledged that at no time since their birth has he provided the Children parental
care. (N.T. p. 32). Father testified that he anticipates release from incarceration on May 28, 2018.
(N.T. p. 29) ..
B. DISCUSSION
The Court properly exercised its discretion in ordering the goal change from reunification to
adoption.
The evidence establishes that a goal change to adoption and termination of parental rights
meets the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (b). Pursuant to§ 6351 (f) of the Juvenile Act,
... when considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile
Court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness
of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent
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of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goalfor the
children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child mightbe achieved; (6) the
child's safety; and whether the child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the last
twenty-two months.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-1089 (Pa. Super)(intemal citation omitted).
In review of the trial court's goal change, our Superior Court has explained,
In cases involving a court's order changing the [court-ordered]goal...to adoption, [the
Superior Court'sJ standard of review is abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial court
abused its discretion, [the Superior Court] must determine its judgment was manifestly
unreasonable, that the -court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While [the Superior Court] is bound by the facts
determine by the trial court, [it]is not tied to the court's inferences, deductions or
conclusions; [the Superior Court has] a responsibility to ensure that the record represents
a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate principles
to that record. Therefore, [theirJ scope of review is broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008)(citations omitted).
Here, at the time of the request for a goal change to adoption file March 9, 2018, the Children
had been removed from the home by Court Order for thirty-two months. The evidence, as cited
at length, supra, demonstrates Father's failure to comply with the family service plan.
Accordingly, we properly exercised our discretion in ordering the goal change to adoption.
The Agency met its burden of proving that statutory grounds exist for and that the children's best
interests require termination of Father's parental rights.
The standard of review governing the trial court's termination of parental rights is well settled.
Namely,
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
rights, [the Superior Court] is limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. See
In re K.C. W., 456 Pa.Super.I, 689 A2d 294, 298 (1997). Absent
an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary
support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Id.
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Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate
parental rights, [the Superior Court] must accord the hearing
judge's decision the same weight we would give to a jury verdict.
See In re Child M., 452 Pa. Super. 230, 681 A.2d 793, 800 (1996).
We must employ a broad comprehensive review of the record in
order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported
by competent evidence. See In re Matsock, 416 Pa.Super. 520, 611
A.2d 737, 742 (1992). In re C. S. 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa.
Super. 2000).
The Agency, as the party seeking termination, bears the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights. In re J. D. W. M, 810
A.2d 688, 690 (Pa. Super. 2002). The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
"testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to
a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Matter of
Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203�1204 (Pa. 1989).
· The Agency sought termination of Father's parental rights based upon the Adoption Act, 23
Pa.C.S. §2511 (a)( 1 ), (2), (5) and (8) , which provide:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
to a child or has refused or failed to perforrri parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent.
***
( 5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
period of at least six months,the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
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cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available
to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court
or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, .12 months or more
have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a)(l), (2), (5) and (8).
In considering whether the party seeking termination has satisfied these provisions, the
Appellate Court keeps in mind that a parent has an affirmative duty to work towards the return of
his or her children. In re Adoption ofJJ, 511 Pa. 590, 602, 515 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa.
1986). At a minimum, that "affirmative duty requires that the parent show a willingness to
cooperate with CYS to obtain the rehabilitative services necessary to enable the parent to meet
the duties and obligations inherent in parenthood." Id. In a termination proceeding, the trial
court must consider all the circumstances in determining whether a parent has fulfilled his
obligations; the court must further measure the parent's performance in light of what would be
expected of any individual under similar circumstances. Matter ofML. W.,
452 A.2d 1021, I 023-24 ( 'Po... >�·- I q g Z) � Further, the Appellate Court need only agree
with the trial court's decision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights. In re JE. 745 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. 2000). See also, In re JlR., 808 A.2d 934,
940 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2002). The Superior Court has explained:
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The statute permitting the termination of parental rights
outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care
that parents must provide for their children, and a parent who
cannot or will not meet the requirements within a reasonable
time following intervention by the state may properly be
considered unfit and have her parental rights terminated.
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation tothe needs of a
child. A child needs love, protection, guidance and support.
These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a
merely passive interest in the development of the child.
Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a
positive duty which requires affirmative performance.
***
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental
relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles
placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable time to perform one's parental
responsibiiities while others provide the child with his or her physical and
emotional needs.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008).
We find that clear and convincing evidence, cited in detail, supra, establishes grounds for
termination under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 Section (a)(8).The Children have been in the care, custody
and control of the Agency foster home for thirty-two months at the time of the filing of the
Petition.
As to the relevance of Father's incarceration in applying the statutory provisions, we
recognize that incarceration alone is not sufficient to support termination. In re l G., 93 9 A.2d
950 (2007). "Each case of an incarcerated parent facing termination must be analyzed on its own
facts keeping in mind, with respect to subsection (a)(2), that the child's need for consistent
parental care and stability cannot be put aside or put on hold simply because the parent is doing
what she is supposed to be doing in prison." In re E.A.P. 944 A.2d 79, 84 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Likewise, a parent's incarceration does not preclude termination of parental rights if the
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incarcerated parent fails to utilize given resources and to take affirmative steps to support a
parent-child relationship. In re D.JS., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999). Father presented no
evidence of parenting resources to which he availed himself during his incarceration.
Further, although aware of the Children's placement, Father failed to avoid criminal activity.
"Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in 'declining to yield to obstacles' his
[parental] rights may be forfeited." In re: Md!f'IUl '� A-�fHoilJ.11-(fvO F'tt.. ZIO/ltt; ·3'3( A. 4'. &5z1 �!75"
( 1tf'15). ..J ·
Best Interests Analysis
Having found that the Agency proved the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights
under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 Section (a)(l) and §2511 Section (a)(2), we undertake a separate "best
interests" analysis. 'Pursuant to Section 2511 (b ), a court must give 'primary consideration to the
[developmental, physical and emotional] needs and welfare of the child." In re J E., 745 A.2d
1250, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted). The statute provides,
Other considerations. - The court in terminating the rights of a
parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(]),( 6), or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the condition
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
In addition, while Section 251 l(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis, analysis of
the emotional bond, if any, between a parent and a child is a factor to be considered in determining
the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child under §251 l(b). In the
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Matter of K.K.R.-S., K.MR., K.A.R., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super 2008). The Superior Court has
explained:
Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved when inquiring about
the needs and welfare of the child. The court must also discern the nature and status of the
parent child bond, paying close attention to the effect of permanently severing the bond.
In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006).
The record is devoid of evidence of a bond with Father which, if broken, would cause
detriment to the children. Father has never lived with the Children. He would be a stranger to
them. We find that the Children would suffer if removed from the stable, caring and loving pre-
adoptive home to reside with a person they do not know.
We recognize that Father seeks additional time within which to prove that he can properly
parent after release from incarceration. However, we note that Father provided no testimony as to
plans for his residence and employment after release. We found compelling the testimony that
the process of Father achieving and maintaining stability could encompass many months or a
year. In deciding the issue of the best interests of a child, our appellate courts have noted that it is
essential to allow a child "a chance to have his fundamental needs met without the constant
insecurity that comes with knowing that someday, perhaps in the urtreasonably distant future, he
might again be wrenched away from his committed and capable caregiver." In re NC., 763 A.2d
913, 919 (Pa. Super. 2000). This Court has grave concerns about the impact upon the Children of
additional months of uncertainty and of potential removal from the foster home to live with a
father they do not know.
Finally, Father presented no evidence in support of his claim that the Agency failed to
properly consider family members as care or adoption resources. The record is devoid of
evidence of the identity of family resources.
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.for all of the foregoing reasons, the Decree of termination should be affirmed.
June�2018
Distribution:
Dauphin County Children and Youth, 1001 N. Sixth Street, Harrisburg, PA 17102
Heather Paterno, Esq., Guardian Ad Litem, P.O. Box 473, Hershey, PA 17033
Joseph Sembrot, Esq., 3631 N. Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110
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