Com. v. Smith, D. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S83022-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    DASHAWN L. SMITH                           :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 116 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 14, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-46-CR-0000745-2016,
    CP-46-CR-0000753-2016, CP-46-CR-0005110-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 09, 2018
    Appellant, Dashawn L. Smith, appeals from the judgment of sentence,
    in three separate criminal matters,1 entered on December 14, 2016. Upon
    review, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1    As noted by the trial court:
    First, [Appellant] appeals from his judgment of sentence[]
    entered on December 14, 2016, at docket CP-46-CR-005110-
    2013 (“5110-2013”), imposed following a stipulated non-jury
    trial on July 8, 2016, where he was convicted of persons not to
    possess firearms and possession with intent to deliver [a
    controlled substance (“PWID”)]. [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 and 35
    P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.]     [Appellant] has also
    appealed from his judgment of sentence entered on December
    14, 2016, at docket CP-46-CR-0000753-2016 (“753-2016”),
    imposed following a stipulated non-jury trial on September 26,
    2016, at which he was found guilty [PWID], criminal conspiracy,
    resisting arrest[,] and recklessly endangering another person
    [(“REAP”)]. [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, 18
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S83022-17
    We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of these cases as
    follows.    At docket 5110-2013, while on parole for an unrelated PWID
    conviction, Appellant violated several provisions of his parole in June of
    2013, including missing curfew, testing positive twice              for controlled
    substances, and giving his parole officer conflicting excuses for the alleged
    misconduct.     Additionally, when going through the metal detector at the
    parole office, Appellant’s parole officer saw Appellant with a cellular
    telephone and a stack of currency, despite the fact that Appellant had been
    unemployed for the prior seven months. Appellant’s parole officer and the
    officer’s supervisor searched Appellant’s cellular telephone and found
    incriminating evidence, including text messages indicating Appellant was
    selling drugs and other text messages discussing Appellant’s positive drug
    tests. Appellant was detained. In a search incident to that detention, the
    parole agents recovered $460.00 from Appellant’s person, which Appellant
    attributed to selling DVDs or t-shirts.         A subsequent search of Appellant’s
    apartment, on June 19, 2013, uncovered 932 individual baggies of heroin, a
    (Footnote Continued) _______________________
    Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, respectively.]
    Finally, [Appellant] has appealed from his judgment of sentence
    entered on December 14, 2016, at docket CP-46-CR-0000745-
    2016 (“745-2016”), imposed following his entry of a guilty plea
    on the same date to criminal trespass[, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503].
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/2017, at 2-3 (footnotes incorporated). However,
    this appeal only addresses issues related to the first two cases, 5110-2013
    and 753-2016, as set forth above.
    -2-
    J-S83022-17
    digital scale, unused baggies, and an unloaded .45 caliber handgun under
    the mattress in the bedroom belonging to Appellant. Prior to trial, on June
    15, 2016, the trial court held a suppression hearing and denied Appellant
    relief. On July 8, 2016, following a stipulated non-jury trial, Appellant was
    convicted of persons not to possess a firearm and PWID. On December 14,
    2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years and three months to
    14 years of imprisonment.
    At docket 753-2016, police saw Appellant enter an apartment building
    located at 3 West Fourth Street in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania on
    December 17, 2015.     They saw Appellant and a woman later identified as
    Appellant’s girlfriend, Melissa Griffin, enter the building together.   At the
    time, there was an active, outstanding warrant for Appellant’s arrest and one
    of the investigating officers knew Appellant carried a firearm in the past and
    believed he may be armed. Appellant eventually left the building alone, saw
    the police when they approached him, and fled.       While fleeing, Appellant
    discarded a cellular telephone and 14 individual bags of heroin.        Police
    arrested Appellant and applied for a search warrant for the apartment at 3
    West Fourth Street.   Before obtaining a search warrant, the officers decided
    to secure the apartment because Griffin was still inside and could destroy
    evidence. Police announced their presence, opened the unlocked front door,
    and Griffin came out of one of the bedrooms with her hands up. Police then
    conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, only looking in places where
    a person could hide. In doing so, police observed three cellular telephones
    -3-
    J-S83022-17
    and a stack of money in one room. In another bedroom, they saw items of
    drug paraphernalia. All of these items were in plain view and police did not
    confiscate them.         Instead, they awaited the search warrant for the
    apartment.     While in police custody, Appellant asked why the police were
    searching the residence at 3 West Fourth Street when he lived at 416 Vine
    Street.   Thereafter, the police applied for a search warrant for 416 Vine
    Street.   While executing the search warrants, police recovered over 1,200
    individually packaged bags of heroin totaling 24.5 grams. On September 26,
    2016, the trial court held a suppression hearing and denied Appellant relief.
    Appellant proceeded directly to a stipulated non-jury trial wherein he was
    convicted of the aforementioned charges. On December 14, 2016, the trial
    court sentenced Appellant to 27 months to six years of imprisonment and
    imposed this sentence consecutive to the sentence at docket number 5110-
    2013. A timely appeal followed.2
    ____________________________________________
    2   As the trial court noted, and appellate counsel concedes on appeal,
    counsel for Appellant filed a timely single notice of appeal challenging the
    judgment of sentence at all three docket numbers on December 28, 2016.
    See Appellant’s Brief at 14; see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/2017, at 1-2.
    Generally, taking one appeal from separate judgments is not acceptable
    practice and is discouraged. See Dong Yuan Chen v. Saidi, 
    100 A.3d 587
    ,
    589 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note and Pa.R.A.P. 512,
    Note. However, we have overlooked such procedural error when the trial
    court has addressed the issues pertaining to each order. 
    Id. Moreover, as
    discussed later, because Appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of
    his sentence at docket 753-2016 consecutive to the sentence imposed at
    docket number 5110-2013, the issues raised on appeal overlap. Each
    appeal also specifically challenges suppression. Had Appellant filed separate
    notices of appeal, this Court could have sua sponte ordered consolidation for
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -4-
    J-S83022-17
    On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
    1. [At docket 5110-2013, d]id [Appellant’s parole agent] have
    reasonable suspicion to engage in a warrantless confiscation
    and search of Appellant’s cellphone pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S.A.
    [§] 6153?
    2. Based on the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions,
    the trial court erred in denying the suppression of all evidence
    recovered from the properties located at 3 West Street and
    416 Vine Street [at docket 753-2016?]3
    3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the prohibition
    against nighttime warrants applied?
    4. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to
    consecutive sentences under the circumstances?
    Appellant’s Brief at 11.
    In his first issue presented, with regard to docket 5110-2013,
    Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying suppression of
    (Footnote Continued) _______________________
    appellate review.      See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (“…where the same question is
    involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the appellate court may,
    in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all particulars as if but
    a single appeal.) After receiving the notices of appeal, on January 6, 2017,
    the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied
    timely, raising issues related to docket numbers 5110-2013 and 753-2016.
    The trial court issued a single opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on
    March 29, 2017, addressing all of Appellant’s issues related to both cases.
    For all of these reasons we will overlook the procedural misstep of filing a
    single notice of appeal.
    3 Appellant’s statement of questions involved does not correspond with his
    subsequent argument. To avoid confusion, we have provided Appellant’s
    second issue as set forth in the argument section of his appellate brief. See
    Appellant’s Brief at 30 (complete capitalization omitted).
    -5-
    J-S83022-17
    evidence recovered from his cellphone and residence upon finding violations
    of the terms of his parole. Appellant’s Brief at 19-29.           More specifically,
    Appellant claims that once his parole agent witnessed a curfew violation and
    received    confirmation   that   Appellant   tested   positive     for     controlled
    substances, the investigation into the violations should have concluded. 
    Id. at 20.
        “Thus, Appellant asserts that two positive urines and a curfew
    violation, both of which were confirmed, would not give the parole agents
    the right to seize, and search his cellphone or his residence at that time
    because the two violations were no longer suspicions and had been
    confirmed prior to the search of the phone.” 
    Id. at 27.
    As such, Appellant
    argues that the subsequent search of his cellular phone and residence were
    illegal and the evidence obtained required suppression.
    Our standard of review for       challenges       to   the           denial    of
    a suppression motion is as follows:
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of
    a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
    the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the
    record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
    are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
    the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
    Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
    remains uncontradicted....Where the suppression court's factual
    findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these
    findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are
    erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the determination of
    the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error,
    the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an
    appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
    the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus,
    -6-
    J-S83022-17
    the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our
    plenary review.
    Commonwealth v. Haslam, 
    138 A.3d 680
    , 685–686 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (citation omitted).
    Upon review of the trial court opinion, the parties’ briefs, the facts of
    this case, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s factual
    findings in denying Appellant’s suppression claim are supported by the
    record.    The trial court first recognized that because Appellant was on
    parole, he had a diminished expectation of privacy and parole officers need
    only a reasonable suspicion that a parolee is violating the law in order to
    conduct a search of the parolee’s person or property.4 Trial Court Opinion,
    3/31/2017, at 7-8. The trial court considered the statutory factors set forth
    at 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6153 and determined the parole agent in this matter had
    the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the subsequent searches. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    The trial court found that the parole agent knew Appellant’s criminal
    history and was supervising him for a prior PWID conviction.          
    Id. at 9.
    When Appellant missed curfew, he provided conflicting statements about his
    ____________________________________________
    4  Appellant relies upon the United States Supreme Court decision Riley v.
    California, 
    134 S. Ct. 2473
    (2014) for the proposition that “there is an
    intimate expectation of privacy in the cellphone and it is not subject to a
    search without a warrant.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. However, we have
    specifically held that Riley is inapplicable, and a warrantless search of a
    cellular telephone is proper, when the search involves a parolee and the
    parole officer has reasonable suspicion to believe there was a violation of
    parole. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 
    174 A.3d 1147
    , 1156 (Pa. Super.
    2017).
    -7-
    J-S83022-17
    whereabouts. 
    Id. He tested
    positive for controlled substances, and did not
    have a prescription, which showed Appellant had access to illicit narcotics.
    
    Id. The parole
    agent also personally witnessed Appellant with a large sum of
    cash and a cellular telephone, even though Appellant was not employed.5
    
    Id. Section 6153
    only requires reasonable suspicion that the cellular
    telephone contained evidence of violations. There is simply no provision that
    a parole officer must stop searching once a suspicion is confirmed, as
    Appellant suggests. Moreover, despite Appellant’s claim that breaking curfew
    and testing positive for controlled substances were the only potential
    violations the parole agent was investigating, it is also clear from a totality
    of the evidence of record that the parole agent had the requisite reasonable
    suspicion to believe that Appellant was also procuring and potentially selling
    narcotics.    The facts here suggested drug dealing (i.e., lack of gainful
    employment coupled with possession of a cellular telephone and cash),
    which is a separate violation of parole from using narcotics and missing
    curfew.      Hence, the subsequent searches were proper and suppression
    unwarranted.      We conclude that there has been no error at docket 5110-
    2013 and that the March 31, 2017 opinion meticulously, thoroughly, and
    ____________________________________________
    5   Appellant does not challenge or address this determination.
    -8-
    J-S83022-17
    accurately disposes of Appellant’s issue on appeal.     Accordingly, we adopt
    its rationale as our own.
    In his second issue presented, Appellant claims the trial court erred in
    denying suppression of evidence recovered from 3 West Fourth Street and
    416 Vine Street at docket 753-2016.          Appellant’s Brief at 30.     More
    specifically, Appellant argues that police had a warrant for his arrest in an
    unrelated, alleged burglary and that the trial court erred “by finding that
    exigent circumstances were present that permitted the initial warrantless
    entry into 3 West Fourth Street that led to the observation of drug related
    materials and ultimately the search warrant that led to the finding of
    contraband.” 
    Id. Additionally, Appellant
    challenges the protective sweep at
    3 West Fourth Street alleging that, because he was arrested outside,
    Appellant claims there were no issues with officer safety or any risk of
    destruction of evidence inside “in this arrest for the alleged burglary.” 
    Id. at 31.
    He claims “[t]he [possibility that Appellant carried a] gun was known
    [by police] prior to going to the premises and, the discarding of drugs
    occurred outside the property with no indication the drugs were related to
    the property.” 
    Id. at 33
    (case citation omitted). Appellant posits that if the
    investigating officer “already knew prior to going into the property without a
    warrant that he would be looking for evidence of criminal activity such as a
    gun or drugs, he should have obtained the warrant before he went, or at
    least justified his reason for not being able to timely secure a warrant prior
    to engaging in the operation.” 
    Id. at 35.
    Appellant also argues that it was
    -9-
    J-S83022-17
    unreasonable for the police to conduct a protective sweep of 3 West Fourth
    Street. 
    Id. As such,
    Appellant argues:
    The trial court concluded that the items of contraband observed
    during the initial illegal foray into 3 West Fourth Street would
    support probable cause to issue the search warrants for the two
    properties[, 3 West Fourth Street and 416 Vine Street.] Thus, if
    [] the initial foray into the property [at 3 West Fourth Street]
    was not constitutional, then the items seized pursuant to the
    search warrant are the fruit of the poisonous tree and both sets
    of respective items confiscated from each property must be
    suppressed[.]
    
    Id. at 36.
    Here, the trial court first recognized that there is an exigency
    exception to the search warrant requirement.              Trial Court Opinion,
    3/31/2017, at 14-15.       The trial court then examined the 10 established
    factors regarding exigency and concluded that the exception to the warrant
    requirement had been met. 
    Id. at 15.
    Although police had a warrant for
    Appellant’s arrest in conjunction with an alleged burglary, they were also
    investigating illegal drug activity at that location. 
    Id. at 16
    (record citation
    omitted).     The investigating officer was aware that Appellant previously
    carried a weapon.        
    Id. Appellant fled
    from police and they recovered
    packets of heroin that Appellant discarded while fleeing the officers.      
    Id. Police were
    concerned that Melissa Griffin, who was still inside the residence,
    could destroy additional evidence.      
    Id. Thus, the
    trial court determined
    “that the initial entry into the residence was permitted pursuant to exigent
    circumstances.”    
    Id. The trial
    court then concluded that the police were
    - 10 -
    J-S83022-17
    justified in conducting a protective sweep of the property to ensure their
    safety and were not required to ignore the contraband seen in plain view.
    
    Id. at 17.
    The trial court found that police knew at least one other person
    was present and the protective sweep was limited to locating people inside
    the residence, in places where a person could hide. 
    Id. at 18.
    Based upon our standard of review, we discern no error or abuse of
    discretion in denying suppression at docket 753-2016. Police believed that
    Appellant could have been armed.       When they attempted to execute an
    arrest warrant, Appellant fled and discarded narcotics. It was reasonable for
    police to believe they would find additional evidence of narcotics in the
    residence Appellant recently exited and they knew that Griffin was still inside
    and could destroy evidence.     Moreover, police did not uncover a firearm
    upon Appellant’s arrest and, thus, recognized that their safety was still
    compromised.     Accordingly, exigent circumstances were present and a
    protective sweep of the property permissible.         Thus, suppression was
    unwarranted.   We conclude that there has been no error in this case and
    that the March 31, 2017 opinion meticulously, thoroughly, and accurately
    disposes of Appellant’s issue on appeal.     Again, we adopt its rationale for
    denying suppression.
    In his third issue presented, Appellant again challenges the trial court’s
    decision to deny suppression at docket 753-2016.           Appellant’s Brief at
    39-46. Appellant claims that the initial entry into 3 West Fourth Street, as
    well as the subsequent searches executed by search warrant of 3 West
    - 11 -
    J-S83022-17
    Fourth Street and 416 Vine, were conducted in violation of the prohibition on
    executing searches at nighttime.        
    Id. He claims
    that “[n]othing in the
    warrant explained why a nighttime search of either property was necessary”
    and the trial court erred by concluding “the nighttime search was
    appropriate due to fear of destruction of evidence and the fact that police
    were holding the location secure while waiting for the search warrant.” 
    Id. at 41.
    The trial court and the Commonwealth assert that Appellant waived
    this issue.     See Trial Court Opinion, 3/31/2017, at 21; Commonwealth’s
    Brief at 17. Upon review, we agree. We have previously determined:
    “[A]ppellate review of an order denying suppression is limited to
    examination                of              the precise basis under
    which suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief
    may be considered on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Little, 
    903 A.2d 1269
    , 1272–1273 (Pa. Super. 2006); Commonwealth v.
    Thur, 
    906 A.2d 552
    , 566 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“When a defendant
    raises a suppression claim to the trial court and supports that
    claim with a particular argument or arguments, the defendant
    cannot then raise for the first time on appeal different arguments
    supporting suppression.”).
    It    is    well-settled      law    that     motions
    to suppress evidence are decided prior to the
    beginning of trial. Moreover, pre-trial rulings on
    the suppression of     evidence    are    final.   In
    sum, suppression motions must ordinarily be made
    before the trial to the suppression court, they must
    be made with specificity and particularity as to the
    evidence sought to be suppressed and the reasons
    for the suppression, and the suppression court's
    determination is to be final, except in the case of
    evidence not earlier available.
    - 12 -
    J-S83022-17
    Commonwealth v. Metzer, 
    634 A.2d 228
    , 233 (Pa. Super.
    1993) (citations omitted).
    Although the burden in suppression matters is on the
    Commonwealth to establish “that the challenged evidence was
    not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights,” Pa.R.Crim.P.
    581(D), that burden is triggered only when the defendant
    “state[s] specifically and with particularity the evidence sought
    to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and
    events in support thereof.” Commonwealth v. McDonald, 
    881 A.2d 858
    , 860 (Pa. Super. 2005). Thus, when a defendant's
    motion to suppress does not assert specifically the grounds
    for suppression, he or she cannot later complain that the
    Commonwealth failed to address a particular theory never
    expressed      in    that   motion. 
    McDonald, 881 A.2d at 860
    ; Commonwealth v. Quaid, 
    871 A.2d 246
    , 249 (Pa. Super.
    2005) (“[W]hen a motion to suppress is not specific in asserting
    the evidence believed to have been unlawfully obtained and/or
    the basis for the unlawfulness, the defendant cannot complain if
    the Commonwealth fails to address the legality of the evidence
    the defendant wishes to contest.”).
    Commonwealth v. Freeman, 
    128 A.3d 1231
    , 1241–1242 (Pa. Super.
    2015). Upon review, Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion to suppress did not
    challenge the search of property based upon the time of night.             See
    Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 3/11/2016, (unpaginated) at 2, ¶ 5(a)-(g). Thus,
    we conclude that Appellant waived this issue.
    Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him
    to an aggravated range sentence at docket 5110-2013 and imposing it
    consecutively to the sentence at docket 753-2116.        Appellant’s Brief at
    49-50.    Appellant also argues that the trial court failed to consider
    “mitigating circumstances and salient rehabilitation factors[,]” including his
    “drug addiction” and “horrific childhood.”      
    Id. at 51
    and 61.   Appellant
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    J-S83022-17
    claims these failures resulted in him receiving unreasonable sentences. 
    Id. at 61.
    We have previously determined:
    It is well-settled that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary aspect
    of sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 
    20 A.3d 1215
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant
    challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an
    appellant's appeal should be considered as a petition for
    allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 
    932 A.2d 155
    ,
    162 (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v.
    Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    (Pa. Super. 2010):
    An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of
    his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a
    four-part test:
    [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
    whether appellant has filed a timely notice of
    appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the
    issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
    motion            to         reconsider            and
    modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.       [720];      (3)
    whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(f);      and     (4)    whether       there     is
    a substantial question that    the sentence appealed
    from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code,
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    
    Id. at 170
    (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    (Pa.
    Super. 2006)). Whether a particular issue constitutes
    a substantial question about the appropriateness of sentence is
    a question to     be     evaluated   on      a    case-by-case
    basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 
    784 A.2d 808
    , 811 (Pa.
    Super. 2001), appeal denied, 
    796 A.2d 979
    (Pa. 2002).
    Commonwealth v. Radecki, 
    2018 WL 989152
    , at *21 (Pa. Super. 2018).
    - 14 -
    J-S83022-17
    Here, the first three requirements have been met.     Appellant filed a
    timely appeal, preserved the issue in a post-sentence motion, and included a
    statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his appellate brief.   Thus, we
    turn to whether Appellant raises a substantial question to implicate our
    review.
    We have previously determined:
    We have found that a substantial question exists “when the
    appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing
    judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
    provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
    fundamental     norms     which    underlie   the   sentencing
    process.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 
    946 A.2d 103
    , 112 (Pa.
    Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    964 A.2d 895
         (Pa. 2009). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of
    questions presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement
    to      determine    whether      a    substantial     question
    exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 
    78 A.3d 1
    , 10 (Pa.
    Super. 2013), affirmed, 
    125 A.3d 394
    (Pa.2015).
    It is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of
    sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 1247
    , 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    *           *           *
    We consistently have recognized that excessiveness claims
    premised on imposition of consecutive sentences do not raise a
    substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v.
    Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 769 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc )
    (stating, “[a] court's exercise of discretion in imposing a
    sentence concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise
    a substantial question[.]”), appeal denied, 
    126 A.3d 1282
    (Pa.
    2015); see also Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 
    961 A.2d 884
    ,
    887 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2008) ; Commonwealth v. Pass, 
    914 A.2d 442
    , 446–447 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    *           *           *
    - 15 -
    J-S83022-17
    [However, a]s we explained in Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
    77 A.3d 1263
    (Pa. Super. 2013)]:
    A defendant may raise a substantial question where
    he receives consecutive sentences within the
    guideline   ranges   if   the    case     involves
    circumstances where the application of the
    guidelines would be clearly unreasonable,
    resulting in an excessive sentence; however, a
    bald claim of excessiveness due to the
    consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise
    a substantial question.
    
    Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1270
    (emphasis added).
    *               *      *
    We cautioned that although Dodge had raised a substantial
    question in his particular case, a defendant does not raise a
    substantial question “where the facts of the case [being
    reviewed] do not warrant the conclusion that there is a plausible
    argument that the sentence is prima facie excessive based on
    the criminal conduct involved.” 
    Id. at 1271.
    Radecki, 
    2018 WL 989152
    , at *22 (parallel citations omitted).
    Here, the facts of the cases do not warrant the conclusion that the
    consecutive nature of the sentences were prima facie excessive based upon
    the criminal conduct involved.6          Here, there were two separate criminal
    cases involving different crimes, one involving a firearm. We conclude that
    ____________________________________________
    6   We further note that the precedent we relied upon above addresses the
    imposition of consecutive sentences within the same criminal information.
    Here, however, Appellant challenges the consecutive nature of sentences
    imposed in two separate criminal informations. There is no precedent
    declaring that such sentences are contrary to sentencing norms or
    inconsistent with our Sentencing Code.
    - 16 -
    J-S83022-17
    Appellant failed to raise a substantial question regarding the consecutive
    nature of the sentences.
    However, “[w]e have held that a substantial question is raised where
    an appellant alleges the sentencing court erred by imposing an aggravated
    range     sentence   without   consideration    of   mitigating   circumstances.”
    Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    55 A.3d 1254
    , 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012). Thus,
    we will address the merits of Appellant’s claim that his aggravated range
    sentence imposed at docket 5110-2013 was excessive and an abuse of the
    trial court’s discretion.
    Our standard of review is as follows:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
    the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
    appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of
    discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal,
    the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion
    unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was
    manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
    bias, or ill-will.
    Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 
    805 A.2d 566
    , 575 (Pa.
    Super. 2002) (citations omitted). More specifically, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9721(b) offers the following guidance to the trial
    court's sentencing determination:
    [T]he sentence imposed should call for confinement
    that is consistent with the protection of the public,
    the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
    on the life of the victim and on the community, and
    the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
    In    every    case     where     a sentencing court    imposes
    a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines, the court must
    - 17 -
    J-S83022-17
    provide in open court a contemporaneous statement of reasons
    in support of its sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721; see
    also Commonwealth v. Eby, 
    784 A.2d 204
    , 205–206 (Pa.
    Super. 2001).
    The statute requires a trial judge who intends
    to sentence a defendant outside of the guidelines to
    demonstrate on the record, as a proper starting
    point, [its] awareness of the sentencing guidelines.
    Having done so, the sentencing court may deviate
    from the guidelines, if necessary, to fashion
    a sentence which takes into account the protection of
    the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant,
    and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates
    to the impact on the life of the victim and the
    community, so long as [it] also states of record the
    factual basis and specific reasons which compelled
    [it] to deviate from the guideline range.
    Commonwealth v. Gibson, 
    716 A.2d 1275
    , 1276–1277 (Pa.
    Super. 1998) (internal quotations omitted).
    When evaluating a challenge to the discretionary aspects
    of sentence    [],   it   is  important    to   remember      that
    the sentencing guidelines are advisory in nature. 
    Id. at 1277.
    If
    the sentencing court deems it appropriate to sentence outside of
    the guidelines, it may do so as long as it offers reasons for this
    determination. 
    Id. “[O]ur Supreme
    Court has indicated that if
    the sentencing court proffers reasons indicating that its decision
    to depart from the guidelines is not unreasonable, we must
    affirm       a sentence that        falls     outside       those
    guidelines.” 
    Id. (citations omitted,
    emphasis in original).
    
    Bowen, 55 A.3d at 1263
    –1264 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    Moreover, where the sentencing court had the benefit of reviewing a
    pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), an appellate court is required to:
    presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
    information regarding the defendant's character and weighed
    those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.
    A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for
    itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of
    - 18 -
    J-S83022-17
    engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that
    sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any
    extended or systematic definitions of their punishment
    procedure.        Having       been      fully     informed          by
    the pre-sentence report, the sentencing court's discretion should
    not be disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those
    circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the judge had
    any degree of awareness of the sentencing considerations, and
    there we will presume also that the weighing process took place
    in a meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the
    position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to
    apply them to the case at hand.
    Commonwealth v. Knox, 
    165 A.3d 925
    , 930–931 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (citation omitted).
    In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court had the benefit of
    PSI reports prior to sentencing.      Further, Appellant does not dispute the
    accuracy of those PSI reports. Thus, we presume that the trial court was
    aware of Appellant’s mitigating circumstances and considered them when
    fashioning its sentence. Moreover, upon review of the record, the trial court
    placed its reasons for its sentence on the record, first recognizing that
    Appellant had a “not-so-wonderful childhood” and chronicling his addiction to
    controlled substances, but ultimately concluding that he “led a life of
    committing rather serious crimes, crimes that pose a significant harm and
    danger to other people and to the community, crimes involving addiction,
    distributing heroin, a situation that costs society and the police time and
    money to a considerable degree [and] he admits to long-term selling of
    controlled substances for profit.” N.T., 12/14/2016, at 43. The trial court
    also stated that it believed a lengthy term of imprisonment was necessary to
    - 19 -
    J-S83022-17
    protect the public, because efforts at prior rehabilitation with Appellant were
    unsuccessful.    
    Id. For these
    reasons, an upward departure from the
    sentencing guidelines was not unreasonable and we discern no abuse of
    discretion in sentencing Appellant.
    Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s first two issues based on the trial
    court’s March 31, 2017 and adopt it as our own. Because we have adopted
    the trial court’s opinion, we direct the parties to include the trial court’s
    opinion in all future filings relating to our examination of the merits of these
    appeals, as expressed herein.         Moreover, Appellant waived his third
    appellate issue and we discern no sentencing error.           As such, all of
    Appellant’s appellate issues fail.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/9/18
    - 20 -
    Circulated 03/23/2018 08:55 AM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY (CO'UNTY PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL DIVISION33
    -···'I"' •. ,.   • OH• • . . ·····�·NO··�--...._.. _:.,._,.,-............
    ,,,.,. ..•                                                                               ,:,
    c; ...CP�4:6.:-.CR::.000Sl.10-201V
    CP-46-CR-000015 3�2016
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                                   CP-4'6-CR-000074-5.�201'6
    !:-. ....
    DESHAWN SMITH                                                            116 EDA 2016
    OPINION
    CARPENTER J.                                                           MARCH 29, 2017
    INTRODUCTION
    Appellant, Deshawn Smith (Smith"), has filed this counseled
    appeal from three distinct and separate judgments of sentence. Each of these
    three appeals at their respective docket numbers listed above ariŠe from three
    different set of events and facts and involve different crimes, despite the fact
    that sentencing on all three files occurred 011 the same day, December 14,
    2016,
    •ar two separate sentencing hearings. This Court notes that appellate counsel
    \\
    1\
    :�
    I;:: .
    has violated Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note which states, "lal party needs ro file only a                                                                    . :\
    ·1.
    j �·,.·
    sinele notice or appeal to secure review of prior non-final orders that are                                                                           l    -c,
    J�.':.
    made final by the entry of a final order, see K.ll. v. I.R., 82G A.2cl 863,
    87071. (Pa.
    2003) (following trial); Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 
    44 A.3d 27
    , 54 (Pa. 2012)
    I,>
    (summary judgment). Where, however, one or more orders resolves issues arisinp;
    on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment,
    _::�
    c ..�'flj
    �. ,}
    ...
    '..J I=
    separate notices 01' appeal must be filed. Commonwealth V. C-M.K.. 
    932 A.2d 111
    , 1 13 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single
    notice of appeal from order on remand for consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P.
    607 Of two persons' judgments of sentence.)" However, in this case appellate
    counsel filed a single appeal listing all three cases in his notice of appeal.
    While this practice is prohibited by the rules and this appeal may be quashed,
    this Court will address the merits ol" the three appeals in this 1925(a) Opinion
    given that the Superior Court may exercise its discretion to consider the
    merits of these appeals.
    First, Smith appeals from his judgment of sentenced entered on
    December 14, 2016, at docket CP-46£R-0005110-2013 ("5110-2013"),
    imposed following a stipulated non-jury trial on July 8, 2016, where he was
    convicted of persons not to possess firearms l and possession with intent to
    deliver. On appeal, Smith contests the denial of his suppression motion.
    Smith has also appealed from his judgment of sentence entered on
    December 14, 2016, at docket CP-46-CR-0000753-2016 ("753-2016"), imposed
    following a stipulated non-jury trial on September 26, 201 G, all which he was
    -·
    •.J.•I
    found guilty of possession with intent to deliver, criminal conspiracy, resisting
    ::��·�
    arrest and recklessly endangering another person.
    ,!,$
    .'i'                   Finally, Sillilll has appealed from his judgment of sentence entered
    ,..
    <    .
    '1.;',,
    OhDecember      14,                       docket : : .PA.ff·CR-00007 4.5�.2.0-1.6 ("745 201'")
    . '
    )'
    ;r··.:::         18 PA,C.S.A .. §6.105.(a)(l).
    �    .
    i.i;l�
    .35 P.S, ·§78(),-J. .l 3(�)(30) .
    ·J
    imposed foll(jwing his entry ot a guilty Plea on the same date to criminal
    trespass ß . Smith did not raise any issues in his court ordered concise statement
    of errors complained of on appeal relating to this guilty plea; therefore, all
    issues are waived in this regard, and this 1925(a) Opiflion focuses on Smith's
    convictions at dockets, 31.l0-2Ql 3 and 7532016.
    DOCKET 5110-2013 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    After the denial of Smith's motion to suppress on June 15, 2016,
    the stipulated non-jury trial held on July 8, 2016, established the following.
    On June 19, 2013, a search by parole agents of Smith's residence turned up
    the following items: numerous unused read baggies, a digital scale, 932
    baggies of heroin. (Negotiated Guilty Plea/Stipulated Bench Trial 7/8/16 p.
    13). The total weight of the heroin was 29.71 grams. 
    Id. at 16
    . In addition,
    parole agents found an unloaded black and silver Colt .45 caliber handgun
    underneath the mattress in the bedroom that belonged to Smith. 
    Id. at 16
    . If
    an expert in the field of narcotics were to have testified at trial, he or she would
    have opined that based the amount of heroin and the manner in which it was
    packaged, the scale was found, the unused baggies and the text messages
    =·�·
    •;,.I
    round on Smith's cell phone Smith possessed the heroin willi the intent to
    deliver. Ill, at 17.
    On December 14, 2010, Smith was sentenced 10 an aggregate term
    .,...,
    of six years, three months 10 14 years' imprisonment. A timely posvsentc:nce
    �.....
    i>.'1:•
    t·•·             18 Pa.C.S.A. §�503(a)(1J(i).
    motion wag filed, which was denied by way of an order entered on December 27,
    2016. A timely notice of appeal followed on December 28, 2016.
    Whether there was reasonable suspicion to seize and search Smith's cell
    phone and to search his residence.
    DISCUSSION
    I.There was reasonable suspicjon to seize and search Smith's cell phone and
    to search his residence.
    Smith contends that the motion to suppress was improperly
    denied. He argues on appeal that Agent Dominick lacked reasonable
    suspicion to seize and search hi$ cell phone and 10 search his residence,
    The suppression testimony given on June 15, 2016, established the
    following facts. Parole Agent Scott Dominick began supervising Smith in
    November of 2012, a month after Smith was paroled from his one-and-a-half
    to four year sentence for possession with intent to deliver. (Motion to Suppress
    6/15/16 5, 6). Agent Dominick reviewed the conditions and rules of regulations
    of supervision. 
    Id. at 7
    - 8. One of the special conditions was, "You shall
    achieve nepative results in screening tests randomly conducted by the Board
    to detect your use of controlled substances..." 
    Id. al 9
    - TO. Smith also had a
    .•·..·
    curfew of 8:00 p.m- tillliA 6:00 a.m. 
    Id. at 10
    l l .
    On June .1 1 , 2013, Agent Dominick did a curfew check of Smith's
    approved residence al 447 East Elm Street, Apartment E-103, Pottstown. Ill. at
    (�;
    Il. The agent arrived there at 10:05 p.m. 
    Id. at I
    l. Although Smith lived there with
    his girlfriend, his son and his sisler, only Smith's sister and son were at
    the apartment. Idž at    ] 2. Smith and his girlfriend were missing. 
    Id. at 12.
    Smith's sister told Agent Dominick that he was at Walmart with his girlfriend.
    
    Id. at 12.
    About two minutes later, as Agent Dominick was about to leave the
    residence, Smith's girlfriend entcred the house through a back door, as
    opposed to the front door. 
    Id. at 13.
    She told the agent that Smith was out front
    with the car, although she insisted she had driven the car. Icl. at 13. The agent
    asked her some follow up questions. 
    Id. Eventually, Agent
    Dominick left the
    residence in order to find Smith, which he did at about 1 0:13 p.m. out in the
    parking lot area of the apartment complex. 
    Id. at 13
    - 14. There was a car that
    was just leaving. Icl. at 14. In response tÔ the agent's questions, Smith told
    him that his friend had driven him. 
    Id. There were
    additional inconsistent
    statements told to the agent by Smith. 
    Id. As a
    result, Agent Dominick told
    Smith to report to Norristown the next day to discuss the curfew violation. 
    Id. The following
    day, on June 12, 2013, Smith reported to the
    Norristown office and was given an instant urine test. 
    Id. The test
    showed that
    Smith tested positive for Oxycodone. 
    Id. at 14
    - 15. Upon questioning, Smith
    rejleralecl that he had been jn the hospital, but gave a different version ol' events
    than lie had the previous night. I(l. at .1 5. He indicated thal lye might have been
    given something [here. 
    Id. at I
    S. Smith had no paperwork or prescription Ironm
    rhe hospital al thal time. [d. Therefore, Agent Dominick instructed Smith to report
    on June 19 th to provide the hospital paperwork.
    On June 19, 2013, Smith reported as instructed and did bring
    hospital paperwork that showed that he was in the emergency room on June
    th
    10        for a sore throat. 
    Id. at 16
    . Smith was given a prescription at the hospital,
    although it was not for a controlled substance. 
    Id. Agent Dominick
    gave Smith
    another urine test, which again testing positive for Oxycodone. 
    Id. In their
    ensuing
    ,   ...   conversation, Smith admitted taking Percocet and that he did not have a prescription
    for it. 
    Id. In addition,
    when Smith carne through security at the parole office, the
    agent: saw that he had a cell phone and a wad of money, which was seemed unusual
    because Smith was not employed in the seven months that Agent Domiliick had
    been supervising him- 
    Id. at 18.
    Although the agent did not know at that time how
    much money was in the wad. ,ld.
    Because of the missed curfew, inconsistent statements and the two
    positive tests of urine, Agent Dominick told Smith to wait in the lobby while
    he had a conversation with his supervisor, 
    Id. at 17
    18. Agent Smith reviewed
    the situation with his supervisor, Agent David Dettinburn. 
    Id. at 18,
    35 - 37.
    Together they decided to have a supervisor's conference, which is a meeting with the
    parolee, parole agent and the supervisor, to discuss the violations and determine how
    10 proceed. 
    Id. at 18
    - 19. During that conference, Smith's phone was searched by
    Ille supervisor, and he did find incriminating evidence. 
    Id. al: .19
    - 20, 37. For
    example Agent Dertinburn testified thal in the text messages where Smith was
    talking about his positive urine test he states, "Nar it's come up for perc again." Agent
    Det:tinburn believed this to be referring to his using drugs. 
    Id. at 40;
    see also, Exhibit
    "C-3", Cell Phone Exvraction Report. Also, Agent Detlinbtll'il testified further that
    the text messages read, "How many do you want?" 10 which i l was replied, "l need
    two." Agent Deltinburn believed this
    7
    to mean that someone ig requesting two bundles or baggies Of drugs from
    Smith. 
    Id. at 41,
    Further, the tests read, O Can I get six for 50? Pinky gonna
    come meet you cause I got my son." Agent Dettinburn testified that this means
    six bags for $50.00. rd.
    Smith was detained. 
    Id. at 20.
    He was also searched, at which time
    Smith was found to have        on his person. Jd. Slñith trjed to explain away the
    money. 
    Id. at 32
    - 33. He told the agent that the money was from selling DVD'g or
    tee shifts- Agent Dominick told this Court that at this point it became clear to
    him and his supervisor that Smith's residence would be searched, 
    Id. at 20.
                 Our appellate court's standard of review in addressing a
    challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
    whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record
    and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
    Because the
    Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, the appellate court
    may consider only Ille evidence of the Commonwealth and so nmuctð of the
    evidence ror the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context
    of the record as a whole. The suppression court's legal conclusions are binding
    011 an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court
    properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions ol' law of the courts
    below are subject to our plenary review. Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d
    (jA9,
    8
    654 (Pa. 2010) (citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted).
    Ag a general principle, a parolee has a diminished expectation of
    privacy by virtue of their status as the assumption of the institution of parole is
    -,
    I.,
    ,".·
    :.,,
    that the parolee is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law;
    therefore, reasonable suspicion to search a parolee's person or property is
    \/:,;.
    . ,. ..,
    .. t       sufficient. Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A,3d 530, 533 (Pa-Super. 2014) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Colon, 
    31 A.3d 309
    , 315 :Pa.Super·.2011) quoting
    Commonwealth v. Hunter, 963 A.2cl 545, 351-52 (Pa-Super. 2008)). A state
    parole agent's authority under the circumstances encountered in the instant
    case is governed by 61 Pa.C.S. § ·.6153- Supervisory S relationship to
    11
    offenders."
    The specific sections of the statute that apply to the conduct of Agent
    Dominick read as follows:
    (d) Grounds for personal search of offender.--
    (2)   A property search may be conducted by an agent
    if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real
    or other property in the possession of or under the
    control of the offender contains contraband or other
    evidence of violations of the conditions of
    supervision.
    (3) Prior approval of a supervisor shall be obtained
    for a property search absent exigent circumstances.
    NO prior approval shall be required ror a personal
    search.
    61 Pa.C.S.A §· 0153(
    The statute also provides a list of factors for consideration when
    9
    determining whether sucll reasonable suspicion exists:
    ,.,.....�
    ,.,                    (U) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search
    � •,_\
    '     .                     shall be determined in accordance with
    constitutional search and seizure provisions as
    i. ••
    applied by judicial decision. In accordance with such
    case law, the
    following factors, where applicable, may be taken into account:
    (i)      The observations of agents.
    (ii)     Information provided by others.
    (iii)    The activities of the offender.
    (iv)     Information provided by the offender.
    (v)      The experience of agents with the offender.
    (vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances. (vii) The
    prior criminal and supervisory history of the offender.
    (viii) 'The need 10 verify compliance with the
    conditions of' supervision.
    6153(
    61 Pa.C.S.A. S
    An examination of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
    at the suppression hearing, as applied to the factors listed above, led this Court
    to find that there was abundant reasonable suspicion of a parole violation in
    view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Agent Dominick's
    encounters with Smith. This Court considered Smith's criminal history. Smith
    was at the time being supervised on parole for a possession witli intent to
    deliver conviction. This Court also considered that Smith had two positive
    urine tests for drugs; Smith had violated his curfew; that there was a series of
    inconsistent statements about his whereabouts and conduct on the night of the
    curfew violation and that the observations of Agent Dominick of the wad of
    cash Smith had in his possession despite being unemployed just prior to the
    10
    search of the cell phone. These factors all supporled this Court's finding ol'
    reasonable suspicion to search Smith's cell phone. The search of the cell phone
    gave additional incriminating evidence that led Agent: Dominick's supervisor,
    Agent David Dettinburn to conclude tor all purposes that a search of [he
    residence was appropriate. Accordingly, based upon these considerations this
    Court found that Agent Dominick had the requisite reasonable suspicion to
    conduct the searches.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing analysis, the judgment of sentence imposed
    on December       2016 in regard to docket 5110-2013, Should be affirmed.
    11
    DOCKET 75.3-2016 - FACTIJAL AND PROCEDURAL..              HISTORY
    On September 26, 2016, a suppression hearing was held, at
    the
    ,, I
    conclusion of which suppression was denied. Directly after Smith's motion to
    suppress was resolved, Smith proceeded to a stipulated aon-jury tfia-l, where he was
    found guilty of the aforementioned charges. Smith filed a postsentence motion,
    challenging The discretionary aspects of his sentenceL The motion was deniecL
    Subsequently, a l'imely notice ot appeal was tiled, which gives rise to this appeal-
    ISSUES
    Issue seven as set forth in Smith's concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal seems to merge testimony from this case with an
    assertion of error from the previous case. It can't be discerned by this Court,
    the error that Smith wishes to have reviewed in Issue seven; therefore, it
    will not be addressed.
    1.    Whether there were exigent circumstances giving rise to a protective
    sweep of 3 West Fourth Street.
    ll.Whetherthere was sufficient orobable cause to issue a search warrant ror 3
    West Fourth Street and 416 Vine Street.
    Ill.   Whether the nighttime search was proper.
    IV.Whether live imposition of consecutive sentences was proper.
    DISCUSSION
    1. There were exigent circumŠtances giving rise to a protective sweep of 3 West
    Fourth Street.
    The Suppression Hearing established the following facts. Sergeant
    Edward Kropp, Jf., an experienced drug investigator, of the Pottstown Police
    Department, Community Response Unit was present when Smith was taken into
    Custody on December 179 2013. (Motion to Suppress/StipulateçI Bench Trial
    ,:,:
    .......
    '       9/26/16 op. 5 6). As Sergeant Kropp was walking back to his office at
    ,......    Pottstown Borough Hall he saw Smith sitting in the interview room. [d. at 7. Smith
    ·� . •
    ..,,
    who is familiar with the sergeant voluntarily said to him "How are you going to
    charge me with what was in that apartment? I don't even live there. J live at 416
    East Vine Street." Sergeant Klopp responded to Smith telling him to talk to the
    people attempting to interview him about that," and he continued walking to his
    office. 'd. 7 - 8.
    Smith had been arrested at 3 West Fourth Street, Pottstwon,
    Montgomery County. 
    Id. at 8.
    Sergeant Kropp was present for that arrest, where he
    was initially on surveillance of that properly. lc[. at 9- The sergeant had seen Smith
    go into the residence, by the time DetectÎve Kropp recognized it was Smith who he
    had know from a prior occasion, Smith was already inside. 
    Id. at 9,
    25. Detective
    Kropp decided to wait until Smith had come out or the residence because it was
    known [hal there was a firearm involved in his prior history; therefore, the police
    believed it to be safer 10 wait until Smith exited
    12
    the residence rather than making entry into an apartment with a potential for
    Smith to have a weapon, 
    Id. at 25.
    Upon seeing Smith leave, the police pulled up and Smith fled. 
    Id. at 13
            9. As he fled, Sfnith discarded his cell phone and heroin, 
    Id. at 9
    I O. The police
    knew that Smith'S co-defendant was still inside the residence, because Sergeant
    : r.�   Kropp watched her arrive with Smith but did not see her leave. Ids at 10.
    Once Smith was arrested, the police determined that they would
    seek a search warrant for the premises at 3 West Fourth Street. 
    Id. at 10
    .
    Sergeant Kropp wanted to secure the residence for the application of that
    search warrant. at 10. He knew there was another person present and he was
    concerned about the destruction of evidence. 
    Id. The police
    opened the door of the residence, which was unlocked.
    
    Id. at 10
    - l l. They announced "Police," and asked if anyone was present.              at
    I l . Eventually, Smith's co-defendant, Melissa Griffin said she was in the bedroom,
    and the police told her to come out with her hands up. [d.
    For safely, the police went inro every room ol' Ille apartment to
    ascertain il there were any other people present. Id- at 11 - 12. In doing this, they
    saw items of contraband and other items that would support probable cause. Id-
    at 13. For example, Detective Kropp observed that there were three cell phones
    and a of' money ill one room- 
    Id. 111 another,
    he saw items of paraphernalia.
    None of this seized. 
    Id. at .13
    14. However, they were in
    plain view and thé police put these observations into the body of the search
    warrant. 
    Id. at 23.
        ·•
    This was a nighttime search, and the police put the reasons for the
    search in the warrant. 
    Id. at 19.
                         At the conclusion of Detective Kropps's testimony and argument
    :'.
  • 68 A.3d 930
    , 935 (Pa.Super. 2013).
    Exigent circumstances arise only where "the need for prompt
    '.
    'f
    police action is imperative, either because the evidence sought to be preserved
    i$ likely to be destroyed or secreted from investigation, or because the officer
    must protect himself from danger ...s" Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.'2d l, 5
    ···,,t
    (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omittedL Various factors need to be taken into
    account to aSsess the presence of exigent circumstances; for example: (l) the
    gravity of the offense; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be
    armed; (3) whether there is a clear showing of probable cause; (4) whether
    there is a Strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being
    entered; (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not
    swiftly apprehended; (6) whether the entry is peaceable; (7) the timing of the
    entry; (8) whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (9) whether there is a
    likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to obtain a
    warrant; and (l O) whether there js a danger to police or other persons inside
    or outside ov the dwelling to require immediate and swift action. In analyzing
    exigent circumstances, courts must balance the needs ol' law enforcement
    against the rights and liberties of private citizens. Johnson 68 A-3d al 937
    (citation omitted). The Commonwealth bears the burden ol' presenting clear
    and convincing evidence Ihal [he circumstances surrounding the opportunity
    to search were truly exigent and thal the exigency was ill no way attributable
    to the decision by the police ro Forego seeking a warrant. Commonwealth v.
    Bostick, 
    958 A.2d 543
    , 556-557 · (Pa-super. 2008) (Citation omitted).
    Moreover, all decisions made pursuant to the exigent circumstances
    • >
    ·I,   I
    exception must be made cautiously because it is an exception that by its
    ...       nature can very easily swallow the rule unless applied in only restricted
    r"
    circumstances. 
    Id. at 557.
     ···.(                 In this case, an examination of the above delineated factors
    reveals that there were exigent circumstances in this case sufficient to justify
    the warrantless entry Of the police into 3 West Fourth Street, (Motion to
    Suppress/Stipulated Bench Trial 9/26/16 p, 26). The police were investigating
    Smith illegal drug activity in this location. The investigation into Smith was a part
    of an ongoing and larger investigation. 
    Id. at 25.
    Second, Smith was known by
    Detective Kropp to have a weapon in his past, and he believed on the night of the
    search, Smith might be jn possession of a weapon. 
    Id. at 23.
    This gave police
    urgency. Additionally, Detective Kropp observed Smith enter the property a 3 West
    Fourth Street with co-defendant Griffin. Smith had discarded heroin upon leaving
    the residence and fleeing from the police after they announced, "Police, Stop."
    There were about 14 bags of heroin that Smith discarded. Detective Kropp
    explained at the suppression hearing that he was concerned about the destruction of
    evidence because he knew that Griffin remained in the residence. Further, Smilll
    was apprehended a very short disvatvce from that location.
    Having concluded that the initial entry into the residence was
    17
    .,>
    permitted pursuant to exigent circumstances, we turn ro [he legitimacy of the
    protective sweep ol' the residence that ultimately uncovered drugs anddrug
    contraband. It ig well settled that "lu]nder emergent. circumstances, protective
    A,,t,
    sweeps are a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement."
    Commonwealth v. Witmani 
    750 A.2d 327
    , 335 (Pa.Super. 2000) A protective
    •',
    sweep is "a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and
    conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others." Maryland v, Buie,
    494 US. 325, 327, 110 s,CT. 1003, L.Ed.2c1 27 (1990). sets forth twolevels of
    protective sweeps. 
    Id. at 33
    4, 
    110 S. Ct. 1093
    . A properly conducted sweep is
    for persons. It cannot be used as a pretext for an evidentiary search. rt cannot
    be lengthy or unduly disruptive. It must be swift and target only those areas
    where a person could reasonably be expected to hide. Commonwealth v.
    Crouse, 
    729 A.2d 588
    , 598 (Pa.Super. 1999). Although the purpose of a
    protective sweep is to assure officer safety, police officers are not required to
    ignore contraband they encounter in the course thereof. -Commom� ealth v.
    1
    I
    
    Potts, 73 A.3d at 1275
    , 1282 (Pa.Super, 2013) ("If, while conducting a
    protective sweep, the officer should ... discover contraband other than
    weapons, he clearly cannot be required 10 ignore the contraband, and the
    Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances.");
    Crouse, 729 A .2cl al 593
    (evidence observed in plain view durinp; a protective sweep is admissible). In
    18
    ;'')'
    ,J
    IJ
    ,J
    
    Crouse, supra
    , our Superior Courv held that properly conducted protective
    sweeps violate neither the Fourth Amendment [tol United States Constitution
    nor Article l, Section 8 ov the Pennsylvania Constitution. "A protective sweep
    c   I
    is 'a quick and limit;ed search ol' premises, incident to an arresti and conducted
    to protect the safety of police officers or others.' " Commonwealth v. Taylor,
    '   .,    771 A.2d [261, 1267 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Marylann_yž                494 U.s. 325,
    327 (1990)).
    This Court found the search of 3 West Fourth Street was proper.
    There were exigent circumstances to support the protective sweep. The
    protective sweep and was limited to securing the premises and locating any
    persons inside. It is significant that the search immediately followed Smith's
    arrest as short distance away from this location. The police only looked in
    places where people could be. In addition, there may have been guns accessible
    to persons inside. They knew for a fact, that there was at least one other person
    was inside the residence. Therefore, the police entered the residence to conduct
    a protective sweep after exigent circumstances arose.
    ll.    There wa        'ficient nrob•thle cause to is ue a search warrant         West
    for
    Fourth Street and 416 Vine Street.
    Smith's second issue on appeal, asserts that the search warrants
    for both 3 West Fourth Street and 416 Vine Street lacked sufficient probable
    cause.
    The reviewñng court is not to conduct a de novo review of the
    19
    issuing authority's probable cause determination, but is simply to determine
    whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the
    decision to issue a warrant In so doing, the reviewing court must accord
    ·� ..   deference to the issuing authority's probable cause determination, and must
    view the information offered to establish probable cause in a commonsense,
    non technical manner. Comonwealth v. Gaglìardi, 
    128 A.3d 790
    , 794 (Pa.
    Super.
    2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.'2d 649, 655 (Pa. 2010)). This
    requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v.
    Galvin, 
    985 A.2d 783
    , 796 (Pa. 2009). The Court wjll consider whether the issuing
    authority correctly determined "given all of the facts and circumstances provided in
    the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the   er sonssupplying
    hearsay information, [that) there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
    a crime will be found in a certain locale." "It must be remembered that probable
    cause is based on a finding of the probability of criminal activity, not a prima lacie
    showing of criminal activity." Commonwealth v. Luton, 
    672 A.2d 819
    , 822
    (Pa.Super. 1996)(citing Commonwealth v. Baker 
    615 A.2d 23
    , 25 (Pa. 1992)).
    Moreover, "[i]f a substantial basis exists to support the magistrate
    l
    s probable cause finding, [the trial court] must uphold that finding even if a
    different magistrate judge might have found the affidavit insufficient to
    support a warrant." Jd. at 795 (quoting United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    ,
    20
    ..
    914 (1984); citing United States v. Miknevich, 
    638 F.3d 178
    , 182 (3rd Cir,
    2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Furthermore, "a
    magistrate's determination of probable cause 'must be based lup101Þ facts
    described within the four corners ol' the supporting affidavit.'" 
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Dukeman, 
    917 A.2d 338
    , 341 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    784 A.2d 182
    , (Pa. Super.
    In rhjs case, a fair reading of The affidavit Vor 3 Wesl Fourth Street
    presented 10      issuing authorily permitled the issuing authority 10 Find
    Iha( probable cause existed for the issuance Of the search warrant. The
    affidavit clearly states that the affiant, Officer Brandon Nf. Unruh, has the
    background and training in narcotics investigations. See, Exhibit "(I-I",
    Affidavit of Probable Cause for 3 West Fourth Street. The basis for the
    search warrant related to the charge of possession with intent to deliver.
    Based upon the information from four confidential informants, a controlled
    buy, evidence of drugs and other contraband found during the protective
    sweep of 3 West Fourth Street and information received from West
    Pottsgrove Police Department.
    In addition, the affidavit. for 3 West Fourth Street presented to
    the issuing authority permitted the iŠsuing authority to find that probable
    cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant. Both affiants, Officer
    Um-uh and Detective Timothy Roeder, have the background and training in
    narcotic investigations. The basis for the search warrant included information
    21
    from four confidential informants, a controlled buy, information received
    from Melissa Griffin, evidence and drugs and other contraband found during
    the protective sweep of 3 West Fourth Street and evidence found from the
    search of 3 West Fourth Street.
    A reading of both warrants demonstrates thal rhe police had good
    information Ihar Smith stayed at both locations, and spent tune there. The
    police did know of the relationship between Smith and Griffin. In the warrants
    the confidential informants established that Smith wag involved in an ongoing
    drug sale enterprise. These people had purchased drugs from Smith directly.
    Both warrants also contained the controlled buy ol' drugs from Smith and
    show
    22
    information demonstrating that smith traveled from one location to the other,
    The scarch of 3 West Fourth Street yielded a good amount of heroin,
    t: ..
    . ,,
    ii 11- �-
    -,         supporting the search of the Vine Street location.
    In addition, both affidavits set forth considerable reasons based on
    the extensive experience of the two affiants that support the conclusion that a
    ,I-.
    drug dealer such as Smith keeps guns, drugs and evidence ill locations where
    -he stays and lives. Therefore, this Court concluded that the iŠsuing authority
    had a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause to believe evidence of a
    crime, including contraband, would be found at both locations.
    111. The nighttime search was proper.
    Next, Smith contends that this Court erred ill finding that the
    prohibition on nighttime searches did not apply.
    Our Supreme Court has mandated           search warrant shall
    authorize a nighttime search unless the affidavits show reasonable cause for
    such nighttime search." Pa-R.Crim„P. 203(E). Due to the greater intrusion
    upon an individual's privacy occasioned by a nighttime search, some. greater
    justification than that required for a daytime search must be shown. See
    l?a.R.Crim.P. and Comment]. Put simply, llve affidavit for a warrant
    authorizing a nighttime search must show both probable cause and some
    reason why the search cannot wait unlit morning Commonwealth v-
    Bowmaster, 0
    1 A.3d 789
    , 793-794 (Pa.Super. 2014) (italics and citations
    omitted).
    .,                      However, to the extem that Smith challenges the nighttime aspect
    ol' the issuance ol' the search warrant, this issue is waived. Al the suppression
    hearing, Smith contested Smith's "statements made by [Smith], and the
    ),   .   search warrant in question and the manner of entry into the building before
    the search warrant." (Motion to Suppress/Stipulated Bench Trial 9/26/16 p.
    4). Appellate review of an order denying suppression is limited to an
    examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially was
    sought, and no new theories or relief may be considered on appeal.
    Commonwealth v, Little, 
    903 A.2d 1269
    , 1272-73 (Pa.Super.2006). Smith did not develop a specific
    argument
    regarding nighttime execution of the search warrant in his motion to suppress
    argued at the suppression hearing; therefore, it is waived. See Commonwealth
    v. Gordon, 
    328 A.2d 631
    , 642 (Pa.Super .1987) ("The raising of one particular
    theory in support of a suppression claim is not sufficient to preserve all other
    possible grounds for suppression of the same evidence")-
    Even if thiS claim is reviewable on appeal, it does not provide Smith
    with relief. This Court found that the nighttime search was appropriate,
    giving the reasons supplied to the issuing authority, including the fear of
    destruction of evidence and the fact that the policc were holding location
    secure while wailing for the search warrant.
    IV ..The imposition of consecutive sentences was proper.
    Last on appeal is Smith's contention that the imposition of
    consecutive sentences was excessive and did not lake into accounl his
    I..•
    rehabilitative needs.
    �-
    ...                     On December 14, 2016, a sentencing hearing was held on both
    ·�·1..,.
    ....f..,,
    Common Pleas dockel:s. 51              and 753-201 6. Al the sentencing hearing,
    "'-1-.\     the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective Michael
    Mark0ViCh, an
    18 year veteran of the Pottstown Police Department. (Sentencing 12/14/16 p. 6). In
    regard to the 2013 case, docketed at 5110-2013, Detective Markovich was involved
    in the June 9, 2013 search warrant, at which time he recovered 932 bags of heroin
    from Smith's re$iclence. Yd, at 7. The detectivc opined that in 2013 heroin was in
    Pottstown; however, it was thc epidemic that it is today and that at that time this was
    by far the most heroin packaged for sale that he and
    Sergeant Kropp as the arresting officers had ever seen. 
    Id. at 7
    . In 2015, when
    1290 bags of heroin were recovered in regard to docket 753-2016, Detective
    Markovich opined that although heroin had taken off ill Pottst0Vvrn and was
    now the drug of choice, the nearly 90 bundles and over 1200 bags of heroin
    that was recovered wa$ the most heroin that had been seized in Pottstown-
    
    Id. at 8.
    The detective explained how hard the heroin epidemic has hit
    Pottstown. 
    Id. at 8
    9.
    Next, the Commonwealth called Lieutenant Erik Echevarria to
    testify. Lieutenant Echevarria is a seasoned investigator having been with the
    Montgomery County Detective Bureau since 1999. 'd. at 11. At some point he was
    assigned 10 the Narcotic Enforcement Team, which oversees drug investigations
    25
    throughoul Montgomery County. in particular, the lieutenant oversaw the
    Povtstown territory, and was involved the 201 5 search and seizure of 1290 baggies
    or heroin with a street value of about 
    Id. at l?
    'i.•
    13. The lieutenant opined that other than seeing such large amounts from
    •·'2                                         a
    source city such as Allentown, Reading, Philadelphia, the seizure of that much
    ·'   heroin is an excessive amount in Montgomery County. Id- at 13 - 14, 15.
    After the Commonwealth concluded, Smith testified. He told this Court
    about his difficult childhood. Icl„ at 17 19. He also told this Court that he has a
    fot1Eyear•oId son that he tries to take of financially. 
    Id. at 20.
    Smith furtihe.r stated
    that when he gets out or jail he wants to get a legitimate job such as becoming a
    truck driver- 
    Id. at 21.
                          After argument from counsel, this Court imposed its sentence as
    follows. On docket 5110-2013, Smith was sentenced to an aggregate term of
    six years and three months' to 14 years' imprisonment. 
    Id. at 44
    - 43. Then at
    docket 753-2016, this Court sentenced Smith to a term of 27 months to six
    years. This latter sentence is to run consecutive to the former, with a total
    aggregate sentence of 1ght-and-a-half to 20 years' imprisonment. 
    Id. at 45.
                          On appeal, Smith contends his aggregate sentence of eight-and-ahalf
    years to 20 years' imprisonment is excessive, and that this Court erred in
    imposill}ž consecutive sentences. Smith argues that this Court failed to consider
    his rehabilitaljve needs.
    This is a challenge to [tie discretionary aspects ol' his sentence
    Ior which there is no automatic right to appeal. Commonwealth v. Marts, 889
    A,2d 608 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding thal challenge 10 the trial court's
    imposition of consecutive sentences is a challenge to the discretionary
    aspects of a sentence). Such appeals are granted at the appellate court's
    ..·
    .,   I
    discretion where there is a stihstanlial questlon.thal the sentence is nor
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 9781(b), A
    '   {
    substantial question is presented where a defendant. advances a colorable
    claim that the trial court's sentence is inconsistent with the Sentencing Code
    or fundamentally contradicts the norms which underlie the sentencing
    process. Commonwealth v. Cleveland, 
    703 A.2d 1046
    , 1048 (Pa.Super. 1997). The determination of what constitutes a
    substantial question must be evaluated on a case-bycase 'basis.
    Commonwealth
    v. Paul, 
    925 A.2d 825
    .Super.2007).
    In Commonwealth v. Austin, GG A.3d 798 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    our Superior Court has provided some guidance as to whether Smith's claim
    raises a substantial question.
    Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing
    court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or
    consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the
    same time or to sentences already imposed. Any
    challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily
    does not raise a substantial question" Commonwealth
    v. Prisk, 
    13 A.3d 526
    , 533 (Pa.Super.2011). see Commonwealth
    v. Hoag, 445 Pa.Super. 435, 
    663 A.2d 1212
    (1995) (stating an appellant is not entitled to a
    'volume discount" for his crimes by having all
    sentences run concurrently). In fact, this Court has
    27
    recognized "the imposition or consecutive, rather
    than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial
    question in only the most extreme circumstances,
    such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly
    harsh, considering Ille nature ol' the crimes and the
    length of imprisonment." Commonwealth v.
    Lamonda, 
    32 A.3d 3651
    372 :Pa.Super.2012) (en
    banc) (citation omitted).
    That is "in out' view, the key [0 resolving the preliminary
    substantial question inquiry is whether the decision 10
    sentence consecutively raises Ille aggregate sentence to,
    what: appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in
    lighl of     criminal conduct al issue in the case." PriŠk,
    13 A.'3d at 533 (quoting
    
    Magtromarino, 2 A.3d at 587
    ) (quotation markŠ omitted).
    
    Austin, 66 A.3d at 808
    - 809, Applying this case law to this case, it seems that
    Smith's issue does nor raise a substantial question.
    ,,,
    ''
    Even assuming our Superior Court determines that Smith does
    J.,,
    raise a substantial question, this claim lacks merit and should be rejected. The
    \   ..
    imposition ol' cOnsecutivc rather than concurrent sentences lies within the
    sound discretion of the sentencing court. Commonwealth v. 'ohnson, 961 A,2d
    877, 880 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citing, Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 
    878 A.2d 867
    ,
    873 (Pa.Super.2005). Factors to be considered when determining a defendant's
    sentence include the character Of the defendant and the particular
    circumstances of the offense in light of the legislative guidelines for
    sentencing. Commonwealth v. Scott, 
    860 A.2d 1029
    , 1032 (Pa.Super. 2004).
    The sentence imposed must be consistent with the protection of the public, the
    gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
    Id. Mental illness
    is clearly a factor that may be considered in sentencing. However, there
    is no mandatory reduction or modification in a defendant's sentence that could
    be imposed. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 867' A-2cÍ 1283, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005).
    Where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence
    investigation report, il will be presumed Thal lie "was aware ol' relevant
    information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those
    considerations along with mitigating stalulory factors." Commonwealth
    v.
    29
    Devers, 546 A.2d Il, [8 (Pa. 1988). Further, "lhlæanp; been IQ111y informed by
    the presentence report, thë sentencing court's discretion should riÕt be
    disturbed." Devers, 546 A."2d at 18; see also, Commonwealth v. Egan, 679
    t.,
    :,,.   A.2d 237, 239 (Pa.Super. 1996) (The court is required to place its reasons for
    the sentence on the record and this requirement can be satisfied by indicating
    it has reviewed a pre-sentence report). This Court placed its reasons for the
    sentence imposed on the record in relevant part as follows:
    Well, the Court does have the benefit of a lot of
    information concerning sentencing of this particular
    defendant, having heard the bench trial, receiving two
    presentence investigations and reports, which actually
    pretty much mirror each other except for the different
    factual patterns set forth for the criminal conduct. I
    have also reviewed the Sentencing Code and
    considered the information supplied today through
    counsel by way of testimony and argument.
    I will look at the presentence investigation and reports
    for a moment.
    At the time of these reports the defendant was 26
    years old. Two dependents are listed. High school
    diploma. He did indicate to the presentence
    investigator, as Mr. Flick said, with some candor that
    he started selling drugs at the age of' 14; that he sold
    heroin, crack cocaine and marijuana; that he sold
    drugs to support himself. He indicated it was an easy
    way to make money. He estimated he made
    approximately $60,000 in the year prior to his arrest.
    And he mirrors that in the other report also, where he
    admitted to selling drugs to support himself and his
    giflfriend, and using [he gun for protection.
    30
    Now, there is a criminal history and ill is somewhat
    significant. Ile first got in trouble as a juvenile,
    October He was adjudicated delinquent, receiving
    stolen property, conspiracy offense. 2G04
    .  ,..
    ,...:   the crime was possession ol' a weapon on school property.
    Del'enclanl was adjudicated delinquenl.
    Mr. Flick argues that he has no history of violence.
    That's a pretty serious offense with a great potential
    for violence, possessing a weapon on school
    property.
    He was adjudicated delinquent again in 2006 for a
    drug offense and disorderly conducU 2007, Drug Act
    possession; adjudicated delinquent. And later in
    2007, possession With intent to deliver, an ungraded
    felony. That's a significant crime for a juvenile. He
    then repeats as an adult.
    As an adult, 2008, criminal conspiracy. Placed on
    probation and later violated probation on two
    occasions at least, or three - two, I think. 2010, that's
    when he received his state prison sentence, two to four
    years, violation of the Drug Act, possession with
    intent to deliver, an ungraded felony.
    The fact that he's facing a pending state parole
    violation is not to his benefit. He knew he was on state
    parole when he committed the instant offense, and he
    knew what the state prison was ail about.
    The first offense we have is from June 2-13. He was
    convicted after that in 2014, false identification, a one
    year probation, He has a couple cases pending yet.
    His family situation and background are set forth. That
    was supplemented by the defendant's testimony today.
    We heard about his not-soAvonderfí11 childhood,
    being born Bronx, New York, and later bejng rajsecl
    in Pottstown.
    31
    The report also speaks about Melissa Griffin. They have
    been together some two years. She had been employed as
    ,j.',f•
    Certified Nursing Assistant. She's also the mother of
    I·•
    ...:J.    children of his, of daughter. Then he has a second child
    by a different lady.
    ,' 1L,
    The defendant admitted he started using marijuana on a
    r·:       daily basis al the age of 15. lie started using Percocet alid
    syrup at the age of 18. He said he used a lot of syrup every
    j(. �
    day, and eventually stopped the Percocet and syrup in
    2013, 2014. In 2007 he was using cocaine and Xanax on
    a daily basis.
    He did graduate from Pottsgrove High School in the
    Pottstown area. He attended the Western Montgomery
    County Technical School for part of the day. There
    were some problems With truancy and
    insubordination and assaultive behavior in school.
    The Court herc is dealing with a defendant, who has,
    Simply stated, led a life oc crime, He had led a life of
    committing rather serious crimes, crimes that pose a
    significant harm and danger to other people and to the
    community, crimes involving addiction, distributing
    heroin, a situation that costs society and the police time
    and money to a considerable degree. As indicated
    previously by this Court, he admits to long-term selling
    of controlled substances for profit.
    It $eemŠ fairly obvious that consecutive sentences are
    certainly justified here. These are a number of separate
    crimes. Most certainly, the separate crime of
    possessing a firearm without a license is the most
    serious offense. I think it's obvious that combing drugs
    and guns makes a dangerous situation more
    dangerous. Involving the situation that he was on state
    parole at the time, that certainly is not a mitigating
    factor. That is something that I think also works
    32
    : "»,
    ·t-1
    11
    against the defendant's argument for all concurrent
    .......               sentences.
    -,::ftl
    .'
    •• v
    He certainly presents an undue risk of committing
    new crimes when not incarcerated. Ile has a pattern ol'
    .'.r,1
    that already somewhat established. I Think he
    presents a clear and present danger of reverting to his
    1·� i                 criminal activity when released. Consecutive
    ;,; � �1
    sentencing is necessary 10 protect [lie public and
    ··-,1                 society from e defendant's criminal conduct. There is
    nothing that has been presented, although I have
    considered it all, including his childhood and his
    testimony, that convinces me that a concurrent set or
    sentences are appropriate. I have reviewed the various
    factors that I think are supportive or consecutive
    senrencing. In short, the length and breadth ol' this life
    ol' crime in
    the current criminal actiV1ty we are dealing with
    supports protecting the public through a series of
    consecutive sentences.
    (Sentencing 12/14/17 pp, 39 - 44. ThiŠ Court provided its rea$ons for the
    sentence it fashioned in Smith's case. Specifically, this Court considered
    the presentence investigation and reports, the testimony of both the
    Commonwealllf$ witnesses and that of Smith, the sentencing guidelines and
    sentencing code. This Court in particular addressed the need for consecutive
    sentencing as opposed to concurrent. Accordingly, this sentence is proper.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing analysis, the judgment of sentence imposed
    on December 14, 2016, should be affirmed.
    33
    BY THE COURT:
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    LOJL;,
    WILLIAM R. CARPE r•ER J.
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    PENNSYLVANIA
    38"' JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    Copies sent on. March 29, 2017
    By Interoffice Mail to:
    Court Administration
    Raymond Roberts, Esquire
    34