Preisinger, P. v. Fox, H. ( 2015 )

J-S44027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PAUL J. PREISINGER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
HEATHER FOX AND CONSTANCE J.
LOUGHNER
No. 18 WDA 2015
APPEAL OF: HEATHER FOX
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 16, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No: AR-13-002323
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2015
Appellant, Heather Fox, appeals from the December 16, 2015
judgment entered against her and in favor of Appellee, Paul Preisinger, in
the amount of $10,000.00. We affirm.
The trial court recited the pertinent facts and procedural history in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:
[Appellee], a maintenance worker at Extended Stay
America, met Constance Loughner late in 2010 during a nine-
month period when Ms. Loughner resided there. [Appellee]
‘developed a loving, caring relationship’ with Ms. Loughner.
Around April 30, 2012, Ms. Loughner informed [Appellee] that
her daughter, [Appellant], was having financial difficulties.
[Appellee] offered to lend [Appellant] $10,000, and he promptly
provided Ms. Loughner a $10,000 check payable to [Appellant].
Ms. Loughner then promptly ended her romantic
relationship with [Appellee], and [Appellant] did not make any of
the scheduled loan payments. In June of 2013, [Appellee] sued
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[Appellant] and Ms. Loughner for breach of contract. The
dispute was first heard by a compulsory arbitration panel, and
when the award was thereafter appealed, I was assigned to
conduct the non-jury trial. Ms. Loughner died before the trial
and [Appellee] then dismissed her as a defendant and proceeded
against only [Appellant]. My verdict was in favor of [Appellee] in
the amount of $10,000.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/15, at 1-2.
The trial court denied Appellant’s post-trial motion and reduced its
verdict to a judgment on December 16, 2014. Appellant filed this timely
appeal. She asserts that the trial court erred in finding an enforceable
contract absent any evidence of consideration or of Appellant’s acceptance of
the alleged terms of repayment prior to her receipt of the $10,000.00 check
from Appellee. Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant argues the agreement was
between Appellee and Loughner.
We review the trial court’s non-jury verdict as follows:
Our review in a non-jury case such as this is limited to a
determination of whether the findings of the trial court are
supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
committed error in the application of law. Findings of the trial
judge in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and
effect on appeal as a verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed
on appeal absent error of law or abuse of discretion. When this
Court reviews the findings of the trial judge, the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the victorious party below
and all evidence and proper inferences favorable to that party
must be taken as true and all unfavorable inferences rejected.
The [trial] court’s findings are especially binding on appeal,
where they are based upon the credibility of the witnesses,
unless it appears that the court abused its discretion or that the
court’s findings lack evidentiary support or that the court
capriciously disbelieved the evidence. Conclusions of law,
however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is
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to determine whether there was a proper application of law to
fact by the lower court. With regard to such matters, our scope
of review is plenary as it is with any review of questions of law.
Shaffer v. O'Toole, 964 A.2d 420, 422-23 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 981 A.2d 220 (Pa.
2009).
In essence, Appellant argues that she never formed an oral contract
with Appellee. “In order to form a contract, there must be an offer,
acceptance, and consideration or mutual meeting of the minds.” Yarnall v.
Almy, 703 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. 1997). The parties must manifest an
intent to be bound to an agreement whose terms are sufficiently definite.
Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 516
(Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc). “When oral contracts are disputed, the issues
of what was said, done, and agreed upon by the parties are ones of fact to
be determined by the fact finder. Also, the question of the intent of the
parties is a factual one reserved to the province of the fact finder.” Krebs v.
United Ref. Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. 2006).
The trial court found as fact that Loughner conveyed the payment
schedule to Appellant before Appellee delivered the check to Loughner. Trial
Court Opinion, 2/3/15, at 2. The trial court found Appellee credible and did
not credit Appellant’s testimony:
While [Appellant] denied being told the $10,000 was a
loan, her denial was not credible. [Appellee’s] testimony that
[Loughner] had conveyed the repayment terms to [Appellant]
before [Appellant] received the check, [Appellant] admitting
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[Loughner] told her in advance to expect the money and
[Appellant] reciting the repayment terms to [Appellee] shortly
after receiving it is credible evidence that [Appellant] accepted
the repayment terms at or before the time she received the
$10,000.
Id. at 3. We have conducted a thorough review of the trial transcript, and
we conclude the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact.
Appellant’s argument—that no contract exists because of the absence
of consideration or mutual meeting of the minds—is simply a challenge to
the trial court’s credibility determinations. Appellee testified that he
provided a $10,000.00 loan to Appellant in exchange for Appellant’s promise
to repay the loan according to an agreed-upon schedule. Appellant notes
that the only evidence of her assent is hearsay within hearsay, as it came
from Appellant’s testimony that the parties negotiated the agreement
through Loughner. Appellant believes it was “a stretch” for the trial court to
credit hearsay within hearsay. Appellant’s Brief at 8. We initially note
Appellant lodged no objection to Appellee’s testimony, and the applicable
standard of review requires this court to defer to the trial court’s credibility
findings. Shaffer, 964 A.2d at 422-23.
Appellant also relies on Johnston the Florist. There, TEDCO was the
general contractor for the construction of a personal care facility. The owner
hired Johnston the Florist to do landscape work for the project. TEDCO was
not a party to the negotiations between the owner and Johnston. Johnston
nonetheless filed a complaint against TEDCO seeking payment for its
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landscaping work, alleging that it had an oral contract with TEDCO. As
evidence of the oral contract, Johnston produced several invoices it sent to
TEDCO during the course of Johnston’s landscaping work. This Court
affirmed the trial court’s finding that no contract existed, as the offer and
acceptance occurred between Johnston and the owner with no involvement
from TEDCO. Johnston the Florist, 657 A.2d at 512-16.
Johnston the Florist does not support Appellant’s argument. Here,
the trial court found credible evidence that the parties arrived at an
agreement using Loughner as an intermediary and that Appellant confirmed
those terms to Appellee. According to Appellee’s testimony, he offered to
loan Appellee $10,000.00 if Appellant would repay the loan according to a
prescribed schedule. Appellee testified that Appellant accepted that offer.
In Johnston the Florist, in contrast, the record contained no evidence that
TEDCO entered an agreement with Johnston, even through an intermediary.
Appellant cites no law forbidding the use of an intermediary to negotiate a
binding contract.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s assertions of
error lack merit. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/17/2015
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