McNamara, K. v. McNamara, D. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KEVIN MCNAMARA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DENISE MCNAMARA : No. 1319 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order August 14, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): FD09-4216-008
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2018
Kevin McNamara (Husband) appeals from the order granting the petition
for special relief filed by his former spouse, Denise McNamara (Wife), during
post-decree proceedings. Husband challenges the trial court’s order directing
him to provide Wife with records of his years of military service. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
The parties married in 1996, separated in 2009 and were divorced
August 15, 2016. During the marriage, Husband was an active
military service member, engaged either in full or part time
service as an Army Reservist. In 2013, the parties engaged in
settlement negotiations and a Consent Order was drafted,
memorializing their Agreement. That Consent Order was never
signed by the parties nor was it entered as an Order. After judicial
conciliation, [the lower court] entered a December 2, 2013 Order
stating, inter alia, that the parties had essentially settled the case
pursuant to the terms of the unsigned Consent Order and would
memorialize that agreement. That Order had no mention of
medical benefits. A subsequent Order was entered scheduling a
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Master’s hearing to address three distinct issues, none of which
involved the provision of health insurance or medical benefits.[FN]1
The parties appeared before Special Master Tricia Sorg who issued
a recommendation dated June 23, 2016. Again, medical benefits
were not raised nor are they addressed in the Master’s
Recommendation. No exceptions were filed and the Master’s
Recommendation became a final Order o[n] August 1, 2016.
The issues pertained to payments Husband was to make over
[FN] 1
time, Husband’s entitled [sic] to an APL credit, and Wife’s claim
for attorney fees. None of these issues pertain to the instant
appeal.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/17, at 1-2 (footnote in original).
On July 11, 2017, Wife presented a petition for special relief, requesting
that Husband provide her with documentation of his military service so she
could apply for medical benefits through the military as a divorced spouse.1
The trial court granted Wife’s request, and ordered Husband to provide Wife
with “points records of his military service.” Order, 7/13/17. On August 2,
2017, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration, in which he argued that
Wife was attempting to “reopen the previously settled equitable claims of this
divorce, and is seeking additional equitable benefits and/or claims which she
waived when the parties entered into a settlement of the equitable
distribution.” Motion for Reconsideration, 8/2/17, ¶ 19. Essentially, Husband
interpreted the trial court’s Order as requiring him to provide Wife with lifetime
____________________________________________
1 The United States military offers a medical benefits plan referred to as
“TRICARE,” which provides lifetime medical benefits to former spouses of
service members depending on the service member’s years of service and the
length of the marriage.
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medical benefits. Husband argued that it was an impermissible modification
of the settlement agreement between the parties. Wife argued that she was
not seeking “property or compensation” from Husband; rather, she was
seeking a benefit from the United States military, to which she believed she
was entitled by virtue of her marriage to Husband. The trial court agreed with
Wife, and on August 14, 2017, issued an order upholding the July 13, 2017
order granting Wife’s petition for special relief. Husband took the instant
timely appeal on September 11, 2017. On October 3, 2017, Husband filed a
court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Husband presents three issues for our review:
1) Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining that it
had subject matter jurisdiction over matters related to
healthcare coverage when such matters were not raised in the
pleadings nor agreed to by the parties?
2) Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in granting a petition
for special relief for a matter not previously raised by the
parties after a final divorce decree had been entered in which
the Trial Court included a relinquishment of jurisdiction over
matters not raised by the parties?
3) Did the Trial Court commit plain error in ordering [Husband] to
produce documents not specifically designed to provide [Wife]
with her requested relief?
Husband’s Brief at 4.2
____________________________________________
2Husband’s Rule 1925(b) Statement raises additional issues, which Husband
does not argue in his appellate brief. Accordingly, those issues are waived.
Chapman-Rolle v. Rolle, 893 A.2d 770, 774 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“It is well
settled that a failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting any
argument constitutes a waiver of issues on appeal”).
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Husband’s first two issues are related, and thus we address them
together. First, Husband alleges that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Wife’s petition for special relief. Husband asserts that the trial
court’s jurisdiction is limited to claims raised by the parties in pleadings.
Husband’s Brief at 12. Husband argues that because neither party raised a
claim for medical benefits in their filings, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider Wife’s petition for special relief. Further, while Husband
acknowledges that Section 3323(f) of the Divorce Code extends a trial court’s
jurisdiction beyond the pleadings filed by the parties, he contends that a trial
court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3323(f) is “limited to interpreting and
enforcing unmerged property settlement agreements negotiated by the
parties in contemplation of divorce.” Husband’s Brief at 19-20 (citing
Annechino v. Joire, 946 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. 2008); Foley v. Foley, 572
A.2d 6 (Pa. Super. 1990); Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, 502 A.2d 185
(Pa. Super. 1985)); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f).
Second, Husband argues that even if the trial court had jurisdiction, it
erred in granting Wife’s petition, which was presented to the trial court more
than 30 days following the entry of the final divorce decree. Husband’s Brief
at 21. Husband complains that after the entry of a final divorce decree, the
decree may only be re-opened in extraordinary circumstances or upon a
finding of fraud. Id. at 23-24. Husband argues that because Wife’s petition
“fails to assert extrinsic fraud or extraordinary cause,” the trial court erred in
granting Wife’s petition. Id. at 24.
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Ordinarily, this Court reviews an order granting special relief for an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 864 A.2d 1224, 1229
(Pa. Super. 2004); Geraghty v. Geraghty, 600 A.2d 1261, 1263 (Pa. Super.
1991). However, where, as here, an appeal presents the question of whether
a tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a matter, it presents an appellate court
with a pure question of law. As such, our standard of review is de novo, and
our scope of review is plenary. A.S. v. I.S., 130 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. 2015).
Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify a final order 30 days
after entry of the order or after an appeal has been filed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5505; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701. Nevertheless, courts
with jurisdiction over domestic relations matters have broad jurisdiction to
resolve matters uniquely pertaining to matrimonial issues, including
disposition of property between the parties, issues related to children, and to
resolve “[a]ny other matters . . . which fairly and expeditiously may be
determined and disposed of in such action.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a)(5).
The family court division, therefore, may exercise broad equitable
power.
In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power
and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which
are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to
effectuate the purposes of this part and may grant such other
relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party
or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction
and who is involved or concerned with the disposition of the cause.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f).
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Further, we note that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.43
provides for the filing of a petition for special relief, as follows:
(a) At any time after the filing of the complaint, on petition setting
forth facts entitling the party to relief, the court may, upon such
terms and conditions as it deems just, including the filing of
security,
...
(3) grant other appropriate relief.
Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43. The granting of such relief is an exercise of the trial court’s
equitable powers. Jawork v. Jawork, 548 A.2d 290, 293 (Pa. Super. 1988).
This Court has held that “petitions for special relief are not limited to the period
when an action is pending[,]” since “[i]t is easily conceivable that, after the
final disposition of all matters in the divorce action, a party may need the
assistance of the court in enforcing some portion of its order.” Id. at 292 n.
6.
Here, the trial court rejected Husband’s claim that it lacked jurisdiction
to entertain Wife’s petition for special relief, stating:
Husband . . . ignores the provisions of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
3104(a)(5)[,] which gives me continuing and broad jurisdiction in
matters concerning marriages, divorce, and annulment cases
which are before me. He also ignored my equity powers to “issue
injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the
interests of the parties . . .” and the power to “grant such other
relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party
. . .” Accordingly, my Order, which requires one party to provide
the other with information necessary to determine their eligibility
to a medical benefit to which they may be entitled by way of their
marriage, is within my jurisdiction.
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Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/17, at 4.
In Wife’s petition for special relief, she asserted that Husband’s refusal
to provide a statement of his military service would deny her medical benefits,
causing her irreparable harm and prejudice. The trial court, as stated above,
concluded that its equity powers provided it with the authority to order
Husband to provide Wife with the necessary information and documentation.
We agree with the trial court that, under these circumstances, where
Husband’s refusal to cooperate jeopardizes Wife’s entitlement to lifetime
medical benefits, “equity and justice” compel entry of the order directing
Husband to provide Wife with the necessary documentation regarding his
years of military service.
Husband has disregarded the court’s continuing jurisdiction and broad
equity and enforcement powers, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f), as well as the
legislative intent in promulgating the amendments to the Divorce Code, which
include “effectuat[ing] economic justice between the parties who are divorced
. . . and insur[ing] a fair and just determination and settlement of their
property rights.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102(a)(6). We conclude, therefore, that
when Wife petitioned the court for special relief, the court, through its
continuing and broad jurisdiction, properly entertained the petition. Having
acted within the confines of the Divorce Code, we further conclude that the
trial court’s resolution of Wife’s claim was not an abuse of discretion.
Likewise, we reject Husband’s claim that even if the trial court had
jurisdiction to review Wife’s claim, it erred in granting Wife’s petition because
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it was presented to the trial court more than 30 days following the entry of
the final divorce decree. Husband’s Brief at 21-25; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5505. Although Section 5505 states that “a court upon notice to the parties
may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry,” Husband
fails to recognize that here, the trial court did not modify or rescind the final
divorce decree. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (emphasis added). Rather, the trial
court exercised its equitable powers to protect Wife’s interest in medical
benefits through the United States military. Accordingly, Husband’s second
argument fails.
Husband’s final claim alleges that the trial court’s order incorrectly
ordered him to produce a “points record,” rather than a “DD-Form 214” or
“Statement of Service,” as Wife requested. Husband’s Brief at 26. Husband
argues that the trial court cannot order him to produce “confidential
information relative to Husband’s military employment records simply because
it would take him five minutes to do so, when the production of said
information ordered bears no relevance on the issue.” Id. at 27.
Initially, we note that Husband has failed to cite any authority to support
his claim that the trial court lacks the authority to order the production of
confidential information relating to his years of service in the military.
Moreover, it is clear from the record and from Husband’s appellate brief that
he understands what information Wife requires, namely, a Statement of
Service issued by the United States military or DD-Form 214. See Husband’s
Brief at 25-27. However, rather than provide Wife with the time sensitive
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information she needs to claim her medical benefits, Husband has willfully
disregarded the courts order to provide Wife with the required documentation.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court, with the added admonition
to Husband to cooperate with Wife and obtain, transmit, execute or otherwise
act to provide Wife with whatever documentation is necessary to facilitate
Wife’s claim to medical benefits as outlined in the TRICARE health program.
Order affirmed.
P.J.E. Ford Elliott joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2018
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