Com. v. Peay, J. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S17013-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JALIK PEAY,
    Appellant                   No. 2030 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 12, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011915-2010
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED MAY 15, 2018
    Appellant, Jalik Peay, appeals pro se from the post-conviction court’s
    June 12, 2017 order denying his first petition under the Post Conviction Relief
    Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we vacate that
    order and remand for further proceedings.
    The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not necessary to our
    disposition of the present appeal. We only note that Appellant was convicted
    of attempted murder and related offenses in June of 2012. This Court affirmed
    Appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 22, 2015, and in March of 2016,
    our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.            See
    Commonwealth v. Peay, 
    134 A.3d 104
     (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished
    memorandum), appeal denied, 
    135 A.3d 585
     (Pa. 2016).
    J-S17013-18
    On July 14, 2016, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. Gina
    A. Capuano, Esq., was appointed to represent Appellant.        However, rather
    than filing an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf, Attorney Capuano filed
    a Turner/Finley1 ‘no merit letter’ and a petition to withdraw. On April 10,
    2017, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss
    Appellant’s petition.       Therein, the court referenced Attorney Capuano’s
    petition to withdraw, but it did not dispose of that petition. Additionally, when
    the PCRA court issued the June 12, 2017 order dismissing Appellant’s petition,
    it again failed to rule on Attorney Capuano’s request to withdraw.
    On June 16, 2017, Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal. On
    June 28, 2017, the PCRA court issued an order directing him to file a Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) statement. According to the PCRA court, it received a pro se Rule
    1925(b) statement from Appellant on July 18, 2017, but Appellant never
    actually filed that document.          See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/22/17, at 4.
    Nevertheless, on September 22, 2017, the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion
    addressing the three, pro se issues raised in Appellant’s concise statement.
    Now, in Appellant’s pro se brief, he raises three claims for our review.
    However, we cannot address those issues, as Appellant has effectively been
    denied his rule-based right to counsel on appeal from the denial of his first
    ____________________________________________
    1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-S17013-18
    PCRA    petition.2      See    Pa.R.Crim.P.      904(C)   (stating   that,   “when   an
    unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to
    afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to
    represent the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction
    relief”); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    121 A.3d 1049
    , 1053 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (“The rule-based right to counsel and to effective assistance of
    counsel extends throughout the post-conviction proceedings, including any
    appeal from the disposition of the PCRA petition.”) (citations omitted).
    Moreover, it is well-settled that “once counsel has entered an appearance on
    a defendant’s behalf he is obligated to continue representation until the case
    is concluded or he is granted leave by the court to withdraw his appearance.”
    Commonwealth v. Willis, 
    29 A.3d 393
    , 397 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. White, 
    871 A.2d 1291
    , 1294 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations
    omitted)).
    Here, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Capuano to represent
    Appellant, but it never ruled on her petition to withdraw. Thus, while Attorney
    Capuano remained counsel-of-record for Appellant during the proceedings
    ____________________________________________
    2 While Appellant does not raise any issue regarding his lack of representation
    on appeal, that omission “does not prevent us from sua sponte addressing
    this issue and remanding his case.” Commonwealth v. Stossel, 
    17 A.3d 1286
    , 1290 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding “that where an indigent, first-time
    PCRA petitioner was denied his right to counsel - or failed to properly waive
    that right - this Court is required to raise the error sua sponte and remand for
    the PCRA court to correct that mistake”).
    -3-
    J-S17013-18
    below, she never filed anything on his behalf, including the notice of appeal
    or court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. Additionally, Attorney Capuano has
    not entered her appearance before this Court, or filed an advocate’s brief or
    petition to withdraw.
    Consequently, we are compelled to vacate the PCRA court’s June 12,
    2017 order denying Appellant’s petition, and remand for the court to rule on
    Attorney Capuano’s pending petition to withdraw.
    Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.      Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/15/18
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2030 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 5/15/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/15/2018