Com. v. A.A. ( 2015 )

J-A14029-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
A.A.
Appellant No. 1176 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 19, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005893-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2015
Appellant A.A. appeals pro se from the order entered in the Lancaster
County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition seeking relief
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of
this appeal as follows:
On January 9, 2012, the District Attorney of Lancaster
County filed a Criminal Information (No. 5893-2011)
charging [Appellant] with 14 counts of sexual offenses
involving three different child-victims, all of whom were
related to [Appellant].1 These offenses occurred between
the dates of January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2010, at
which time [Appellant] engaged in sexual intercourse with
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-A14029-15
three separate complainants who were less than 13 years
of age.
1
[Appellant] was initially charged as a juvenile
through the filing of a Juvenile Petition, as he was a
minor at the time the offenses were committed
(D.O.B. 08/01/1992). On September 31, 2011, the
Commonwealth filed a Petition to Transfer Juvenile to
the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, and a hearing was ordered to be
held on December 6, 2011. Furthermore, a guardian
ad litem was appointed for [Appellant]. On
December 30, 2011, when he was 19 years of age,
[Appellant] knowingly, voluntarily, and with the
benefit of counsel and his guardian ad litem entered
into five stipulations that effectively transferred his
case from Juvenile Court to the Court of Common
Pleas, and the court entered an order transferring
[Appellant] to criminal court on that same day.
More specifically, in addition to vaginal and anal
intercourse, [Appellant] placed his penis in the mouth of
his half-sister, F.T. (D.O.B. 2/20/1997), placed his mouth
on the child’s vagina, and committed one act of forcible
sexual intercourse against this child by holding her against
her will. At various times [Appellant] also fondled the
child’s breasts and ejaculated on the victim’s face and
chest. Additionally, [Appellant] raped his other half-sister,
K.T. (D.O.B. 5/13/1999), by at various times engaging in
vaginal intercourse while touching the child’s buttocks
without her consent. Finally, [Appellant] engaged in
sexual intercourse with his cousin, S.J. (D.O.B. 1/24/2000)
and placed his penis in this victim’s mouth.
Counts 1, 2, 10, and 13 of the Criminal Information
charged [Appellant] with four separate instances of rape of
a child,2 a felony of the first degree. Count 6 charged
[Appellant] with rape by forcible compulsion,3 a felony of
the first degree. Counts 3, 4, and 14 charged [Appellant]
with three instances of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse with a child,4 a felony of the first degree.
Count 5 charged [Appellant] with aggravated indecent
assault of a child,5 a felony of the first degree. Counts 7
-2-
J-A14029-15
and 12 charged [Appellant] with three instances of
indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.7
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c)[.]
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1)[.]
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b)[.]
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b)[.]
6
18 Pa.C.S. § 4302(a)[.]
7
18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7)[.]
On January 10, 2012, [Appellant] appeared before the
Honorable Judge Louis J. Farina and entered into a guilty
plea pursuant to a negotiated agreement. At the
conclusion of the guilty plea hearing, Judge Farina
accepted [Appellant’s] guilty plea after finding it was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court then entered
an order directing that [Appellant] undergo an assessment
by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board [(“SOAB”)],
and sentencing was deferred until completion of the
assessment.
A sexually violent predator [(“SVP”)] hearing was held
before Judge Farina on May 29, 2012, in order to
determine whether [Appellant] was [an SVP]. After the
hearing, in which Dr. Veronique N. Valliere testified on
behalf of the Commonwealth and Dr. Timothy P. Foley
appeared and testified on behalf of [Appellant], the court
found the Commonwealth had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that [Appellant] was [an SVP].
Thereafter, sentence was imposed pursuant to the
negotiated plea agreement, at which time [Appellant]
received an aggregate prison sentence of not less than 10
years nor more than 30 years in the state correctional
institution.9
9
[Appellant] was sentenced as follows: (1) 10 to 30
years[’] imprisonment on each of the four counts of
rape of a child; (2) 10 to 30 years[’] imprisonment
on the charge of rape by forcible compulsion; (3) 10
-3-
J-A14029-15
to 30 years[’] imprisonment on each of the three
counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with
a child; (4) 10 to 30 years[’] imprisonment on the
charge of aggravated indecent assault of a child; (5)
1 to 2 years[’] imprisonment for each of the two
counts of incest; (6) 1 to 5 years[’] imprisonment for
each of the two counts of felony indecent assault of a
minor; and (7) 1 to 2 years[’] imprisonment on the
charge of misdemeanor indecent assault of a minor.
All sentences were to be served concurrent with one
another.
On June 27, 2012, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal. On
July 23, 2012, [Appellant] filed a statement of errors
complained of on appeal, alleging the trial court committed
error by denying his request to submit a written expert
report in lieu of live testimony at the SVP hearing and by
denying his request for the court to fund that expert
testimony. However[, Appellant’s] counsel subsequently
filed an Anders brief in the appeal and sought leave to
withdraw.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania filed a memorandum
decision on April 3, 2013, granting counsel’s request to
withdraw and affirming the judgment of the trial court. On
March 4, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se document titled
“Notice of Appeal” with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which was later returned to [Appellant]
because his appeal was not timely.
[Appellant] then submitted a pro se motion for [PCRA]
relief, post-marked April 2, 2014 and filed on April 7,
2014. In his motion, [Appellant] requested release from
custody and a new trial by alleging his guilty plea was
unlawfully induced and his appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a petition
for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Thereafter, on April 23, 2014, Christopher
P. Lyden, Esquire, was appointed as counsel to represent
[Appellant] on his PCRA motion.
On May 15, 2014, after investigating [Appellant’s] claims,
counsel submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213-4-
J-A14029-15
(Pa.Super.1988) and Commonwealth v. Turner, 544
A.2d 927 (Pa.1988), expressing the opinion that the issues
raised in [Appellant’s] pro se PCRA motion had no merit.
Counsel also conducted an independent review of the
record, finding “no other claims of merit to present” on
[Appellant’s] behalf. Counsel simultaneously filed a motion
to withdraw as counsel, complying with the requirements
of Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607[2]
(Pa.Super.2006) (overruled on other grounds).
In accordance with Pennsylvania rules of criminal
procedure, [the PCRA] court then conducted an
independent review of the record. On May 29, 2014, the
court issued a Rule 907 notice concluding that
[Appellant’s] PCRA motion was patently frivolous, the
allegations were not supported by the record, and there
were no genuine issues concerning any material fact.
Pursuant to Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure, [Appellant] was allowed twenty (20) days from
the date of the notice to file a response to the proposed
dismissal. Thereafter, on June 19, 2014, the court filed an
order dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition.13
13
On June 19, 2014, at 9:27 a.m., the court filed an
order dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA motion, noting
that [Appellant] had failed to submit a timely
response within twenty days of the Rule 907 notice
as required. On June 19, 2014, at 9:40 a.m.,
[Appellant’s] reply to rule 907 notice was filed with
the Lancaster County Office of the Prothonotary.
Consequently, [Appellant’s] reply was not before the
court for consideration prior to dismissal of the PCRA
motion.[3]
____________________________________________
2
See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa.2009) (“To the
extent Friend stands for the proposition that an appellate court may sua
sponte review the sufficiency of a no-merit letter when the defendant has
not raised such issue, we disavow such holding.”).
3
The PCRA court’s failure to consider Appellant’s response to the Rule 907
notice before dismissing his PCRA petition is irrelevant; Appellant suffered no
prejudice because the PCRA court addressed the claims asserted in
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5-
J-A14029-15
On July 7, 2014, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. A concise statement of
matters complained of on appeal was submitted on July
23, 2014, asserting three errors. First, [Appellant] alleges
the trial court erred in permitting PCRA counsel to
withdraw his appearance without investigating
[Appellant’s] mental health claims. Second, [Appellant]
alleges PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate the aforementioned mental health claims.
Finally, [Appellant] alleges his guilty plea was unlawfully
induced due to his “mental infirmity,” and as such he was
not aware of the nature of the charges against him or of
the permissible range of sentences which could be
imposed.
PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 5, 2014, (“PCRA” Opinion) at 1-6
(unnecessary capitalization, citations to the record, and some footnotes
omitted).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE PCRA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO RAISE THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF APPELLATE
AND TRIAL COUNSEL CONCERNING APPELLANT’S MENTAL
HEALTH?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PCRA
COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW HIS APPEARANCE WITHOUT
INVESTIGATING ANY OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIMS?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Appellant’s response in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Commonwealth
v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa.Super.2013) (“It is apparent from the
court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that it received and evaluated those
documents, albeit after it issued its order denying Appellant’s petition. The
court concluded that all of the claims asserted in Appellant’s responses were
meritless.… Appellant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the
court’s failure to consider his responses to the Rule 907 notice prior to
denying his petition.”).
-6-
J-A14029-15
WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS UNLAWFULLY
INDUCED DUE TO HIS LACK OF MATURITY, AND MENTAL
HEALTH ISSUES?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his first two issues, Appellant argues his PCRA counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate claims about his mental health.
Appellant claims he presented issues of arguable merit and that the PCRA
court erred by allowing counsel to withdraw without pursuing these issues.
We disagree.
Our standard of review is well-settled. “In reviewing the denial of
PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears,
86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa.2014)
(citation omitted). “It is well-settled that a PCRA court’s credibility
determinations are binding upon an appellate court so long as they are
supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d 998,
1013 (Pa.2013) (citation omitted). However, this Court reviews the PCRA
court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080,
1084 (Pa.Super.2014) (citation omitted).
-7-
J-A14029-15
Our Supreme Court has explained the procedure required for court-
appointed counsel to withdraw from PCRA representation:
[Turner and Finley] establish the procedure for
withdrawal of court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks
on criminal convictions. Independent review of the record
by competent counsel is required before withdrawal is
permitted. Such independent review requires proof of:
1) A ‘no-merit’ letter by PCRA counsel detailing the
nature and extent of his [or her] review;
2) A ‘no-merit’ letter by PCRA counsel listing each
issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed;
3) The PCRA counsel’s ‘explanation’, in the ‘no-merit’
letter, of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;
4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent
review of the record; and
5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the
petition was meritless.
Pitts, 981 A.2d at 876 n.1 (citations omitted). In addition, this Court has
required that PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must:
contemporaneously serve a copy on the petitioner of
counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel, and must
supply the petitioner both a copy of the ‘no-merit’ letter
and a statement advising the petitioner that, in the event
the court grants the application of counsel to withdraw, he
or she has the right to proceed pro se or with the
assistance of privately retained counsel.
Friend, 896 A.2d at 614 (emphasis deleted). Further,
[i]f counsel fails to satisfy the foregoing technical
prerequisites of Turner/Finley, the court will not reach
the merits of the underlying claims but, rather, will merely
deny counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v.
Mosteller, 633 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa.Super.1993). Upon
-8-
J-A14029-15
doing so, the court will then take appropriate steps, such
as directing counsel to file a proper Turner/Finley request
or an advocate’s brief. Commonwealth v. Karanicolas,
836 A.2d 940, 948 (Pa.Super.2003).
However, where counsel submits a petition and no-merit
letter that do satisfy the technical demands of
Turner/Finley, the court—trial court or this Court—must
then conduct its own review of the merits of the case. If
the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without
merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny
relief. Mosteller, 633 A.2d at 617. By contrast, if the
claims appear to have merit, the court will deny counsel’s
request and grant relief, or at least instruct counsel to file
an advocate’s brief.
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Pa.Super.2007).
Instantly, Appellant filed a timely pro se motion for PCRA relief. On
April 23, 2014, the court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed a motion to
withdraw on May 15, 2014. Along with his motion to withdraw, counsel filed
a no-merit letter, which detailed the nature and extent of his review by
stating that he reviewed Appellant’s PCRA petition, the court file, the notes
of testimony from the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing and did
additional legal research. See Turner/Finley Letter, dated May 15, 2014.
Counsel listed the issue Appellant wished to have reviewed and explained
that appellate counsel had no obligation to continue with Appellant’s appeal
after the Superior Court had granted him permission to withdraw. Counsel
stated that Appellant’s issue was, therefore, meritless and that, after
conducting an independent review of the record, Appellant had no other
claims of merit to present. Id. The PCRA court then conducted its own
-9-
J-A14029-15
“thorough review of the record” and concluded Appellant’s PCRA motion was
“patently frivolous, the allegations are not supported by the record, and
there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact.” Rule 907 Notice,
filed May 29, 2014, at 15. Thus, the court properly granted counsel’s motion
to withdraw.
Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate Appellant’s mental health. Although ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are cognizable under the PCRA, Appellant’s issue merits no
relief.
This Court follows the Pierce4 test adopted by our Supreme Court to
review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:
When a petitioner alleges trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in
a PCRA petition, he must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from
ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place. We have
interpreted this provision in the PCRA to mean that the
petitioner must show: (1) that his claim of counsel’s
ineffectiveness has merit; (2) that counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and
(3) that the error of counsel prejudiced the petitioner-i.e.,
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error
of counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. We presume that counsel is effective, and it
is the burden of Appellant to show otherwise.
____________________________________________
4
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa.1987).
- 10 -
J-A14029-15
Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 531 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of
proving all three prongs of this test. Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787
A.2d 312, 319-320 (Pa.2001). “If an appellant fails to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence any of the Pierce prongs, the Court need not
address the remaining prongs of the test.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald,
979 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa.2010) (citation omitted).
Appellant complains his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate why Appellant was raping his young family members. He claims
a psychiatric evaluation would have revealed poor mental health, specifically
a pedophilic sexual disorder. However, Appellant fails to elaborate on why
counsel would have investigated this claim, how it would have helped his
case, or how he has been prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to pursue it.
The PCRA court reasoned:
Addressing his alleged “mental defect,” [Appellant] was
found by clear and convincing evidence to be affected by
Paraphilia (N.O.S.) during the SVP Hearing, which satisfied
the statutory criteria for classification as [an SVP].
* * *
However, a SVP Hearing and a diagnosis of Paraphilia
(N.O.S.) do not affect [Appellant’s] competence to stand
trial, and [Appellant] may not use that finding as a means
to attack his underlying conviction. To that end, none of
the psychological experts involved in this case, including
[Appellant’s] expert, ever used this diagnosis as a basis for
questioning [Appellant’s] competence in any way.
- 11 -
J-A14029-15
Moreover, any argument PCRA counsel could have made
as to [Appellant’s] alleged mental defect or competency to
stand trial would have been fatally undercut by the record.
As part of [Appellant’s] transfer from Juvenile Court to the
Court of Common Pleas, [Appellant] stipulated he was “not
committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or
mentally ill.” Furthermore, prior to the on-the-record
colloquy conducted by the court during his guilty plea
hearing, [Appellant] signed a seven-page Guilty Plea
Colloquy and Post-Sentence Rights form stating he had
never been treated for mental illness. When asked
whether a mental illness or its treatment would affect his
ability to understand his rights or why he was in court at
that time, [Appellant] replied “N/A.” Additionally,
[Appellant’s] counsel noted there were two psychological
evaluations done on [Appellant] prior to his waiver of the
certification hearing which do not support [Appellant’s]
assertions that he suffered from a mental defect.
PCRA Opinion, at 16-17.
As Appellant cannot establish that his claim of ineffectiveness has any
merit, we need not address the remaining prongs of the Pierce test. See
Fitzgerald, supra.
In his third and final issue, Appellant argues his guilty plea was
unlawfully induced due to his lack of maturity and mental health issues.
This issue lacks merit.
“The entry of a guilty plea is a protracted and comprehensive
proceeding wherein the court is obliged to make a specific determination
after extensive colloquy on the record that a plea is voluntarily and
understandingly tendered.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044,
1046 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d
312, 314 (Pa.Super.1993) (citation omitted). At a minimum, the trial court
- 12 -
J-A14029-15
must determine that: (1) the defendant understands the nature of the
charges to which he is pleading guilty, (2) there is a factual basis for the
plea, (3) the defendant understands that he has a right to trial by jury, (4)
the defendant understands that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty,
(5) the defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or
fines for the charged offenses, and (6) the defendant is aware that the judge
is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement tendered unless the judge
accepts the agreement. Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1047 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P.
590, Comment).
“[T]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the
outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that
[his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1001 (Pa.Super.2013)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Pa.Super.
2010) (alterations in original)). A guilty plea colloquy must “affirmatively
demonstrate the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its
consequences.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d
497, 501 (Pa.Super.1998)). After a defendant enters a guilty plea, “it is
presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of
proving involuntariness is upon him.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.
Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa.Super.2008)).
- 13 -
J-A14029-15
Whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty “requires a finding
that the defendant comprehends the crime for which he stands accused, is
able to cooperate with his counsel in forming a rational defense, and has a
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Willis,
68 A.3d at 1002 (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876(Pa.Super.2007)).
Here, the trial court conducted a thorough colloquy before Appellant,
who was 19 years old, entered his guilty plea. See N.T., 1/10/12, at 3-22.
The court explained the charges and the maximum penalties and fines each
charge warranted. Id. at 3-5. The court advised Appellant of his right to a
jury trial and the Commonwealth’s burden to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 8. Appellant then admitted to the factual bases for
all of his charges. Id. at 9-11. Additionally, Appellant signed a guilty plea
colloquy and post-sentence rights form in which he indicated he was not
being treated for any mental illness. After the court apprised Appellant of
his rights, Appellant acknowledged that he was competent and understood
everything in the guilty plea colloquy he reviewed with his attorney, that he
was not being coerced into entering the plea, that he did not have any
questions, and that it was his own decision to plead guilty. Id. at 17-22.
Thus, Appellant’s guilty plea was not unlawfully induced, and his claim lacks
merit. See Yeomans, supra.- 14 -
J-A14029-15
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties and the
applicable law, we conclude the PCRA court properly denied Appellant PCRA
relief and properly granted counsel’s petition to withdraw from
representation of Appellant. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/29/2015
- 15 -