Com. v. Rosenberger, D. ( 2017 )

J-S49019-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
DANA ROSENBERGER
Appellant No. 1640 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated October 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0001432-2009
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2017
Appellant, Dana Rosenberger, appeals pro se from the order
dismissing Appellant’s petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review of the PCRA court’s docket
noting that Stephen C. Paul, Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant
on May 23, 2016, and as there is no indication that counsel was granted
permission to withdraw, we remand for a hearing to clarify the status of
Attorney Paul’s representation of Appellant.
Appellant initially was charged with Indecent Assault under 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3216(a)(1), a misdemeanor of the second degree, and Corruption of
Minors under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1), a misdemeanor of the first degree.
On December 22, 2009, the trial court permitted amendment of the first
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S49019-17
count of the information to charge Indecent Assault of a Person Less than 13
Years of Age, a felony of the third degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7)-(8).
PCRA Ct. Op., 12/1/16, at 1.1 Appellant then pled guilty to the charges and,
pursuant to a negotiated plea, was sentenced by Judge Paul Pozonsky to an
aggregate term of two and one-half to ten years’ incarceration.
Commonwealth v. Rosenberger, No. 845 WDA 2014, at 1 (Pa. Super.
Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter Rosenberger II].
Throughout the plea and sentencing process, Appellant was
represented by Thomas Cooke, Esquire. Prior to his guilty plea hearing,
Appellant completed a written guilty plea colloquy, which included an
“explanation of defendant’s rights.” Guilty Plea Colloquy, 2/5/10, at 1. 2 For
those questions inquiring whether Appellant had discussed relevant
information with his attorney, Appellant initially answered “No” and then
crossed out that answer and initialed his change. See Guilty Plea Colloquy,
2/5/10, at 2, 7-8 ¶¶ 6-8, 47-48, 53. Appellant also answered “No” to
several questions asking whether he understood certain rights, but again
crossed out those answers and replaced them with “Yes” and his initials.
____________________________________________
1 The charges were based on Appellant’s inappropriate touching of a girl
under the age of 13 who was spending the night at a “sleep-over” with
Appellant’s daughter.
2 The handwritten date in the signatures section of the written guilty plea
colloquy is February 5, 2010, the same date as Appellant’s guilty plea and
sentencing hearing. The written plea colloquy was not date-stamped by the
Clerk of Courts of Washington County until February 22, 2010.
-2-
J-S49019-17
See id. at 3, 6-7 ¶¶ 12-14, 35. For some of his answers, Appellant included
additional comments that he later crossed out; again, he initialed the
changes. See id. at 4, 6, 8 ¶¶ 25, 31, 55.3
Ultimately, after changing these answers, Appellant acknowledged that
he fully understood his right to a trial by jury and that he had the right to
remain silent and not present evidence, that he could testify or have
witnesses testify on his behalf, that he could present relevant evidence, and
____________________________________________
3 The crossed-out comments were in answers to the following questions:
25. By pleading guilty or nolo contendere, you give up the
right not only to file pre-trial motions, but also you abandon or
give up any pre-trial motions already filed and not yet decided
and any pre-trial motion in which decisions were already made.
Do you fully understand this?
[APPELLANT’S ANSWER:] Yes I think.
* * *
31. If your petition to withdraw you[r] plea would be denied by
this Court, you would have thirty (30) days from the date your
sentence was imposed to appeal the denial o[f] your plea to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, but if you fail to file the appeal
within this thirty-day allotted time period, you will have given up
this right forever. Do you fully understand this?
[APPELLANT’S ANSWER:] Yes, but I don’t like it.
* * *
55. Do you understand that you will have a right to request
that your plea be withdrawn at any time prior to sentence[ing]
and you[r] will have ten (10) days after you[r] sentence to
challenge the validity of your plea; however, if you would fail to
do so within these time periods, you would forever [g]ive up
these rights?
[APPELLANT’S ANSWER:] Yes but again I don’t like it but
don’t feel I have much choice.
Guilty Plea Colloquy, 2/5/10, at 4, 6, 8 ¶¶ 25, 31, 55.
-3-
J-S49019-17
that he had the right to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s witnesses.
Additionally, he said he understood his appellate rights and the procedure
and timeframe for moving to withdraw his plea, as well as the consequences
of withdrawing his plea. Guilty Plea Colloquy, 2/5/10, at 1-8 ¶¶ 9-14, 20-
21, 26-27, 29-31, 35, 45, 55-56. Appellant initialed at the bottom of pages
2 to 8 of the written guilty plea colloquy and dated and signed page 8.
Attorney Cooke signed and dated the certification of defense counsel on
page 9.
During Appellant’s plea hearing on February 5, 2010, the following oral
colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Have you had a chance to review your legal
rights in this matter with your counsel, Mr. Cooke?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
THE COURT: You understand that in order for the Court to
accept your guilty plea in this matter that you must waive your
constitutional right to trial by jury?
[APPELLANT:] Yes. . . .
THE COURT: Have you had the opportunity to review with
Mr. Cooke this written Guilty Plea Colloquy, Explanation of
Defendant’s Rights?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
...
THE COURT: Did you understand the document?
[APPELLANT:] After he explained it to me, yes. I had to
make some changes, but, yes, I understand it. Yes, I initialed it.
-4-
J-S49019-17
THE COURT: You initialed all of the changes that are on the
document?
[APPELLANT:] I believe I did.
THE COURT: I believe that all of the changes have, in fact,
been initialed by you. Is anybody forcing you to enter this plea
today?
[APPELLANT:] No.
THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
THE COURT: Has your attorney gone over the meaning of
this document with you?
[APPELLANT:] A little bit, yes, but I understand it that I’m
pleading guilty.
...
THE COURT: . . . You understand that by entering this plea of
guilty you are, in fact, admitting that you committed the crime
with which you are charged and to which you are pleading
guilty?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
* * *
THE COURT: You understand the nature of the charges to
which you are pleading guilty?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
THE COURT: Is there, in fact, a factual basis to support your
plea of guilty, did the incident occur –
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
THE COURT: -- as set forth in the information?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
-5-
J-S49019-17
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to a
trial by jury?
[APPELLANT:] Yes, I do.
THE COURT: You understand that you’re presumed innocent
until found guilty by a jury of your peers?
[APPELLANT:] Yes.
N.T., 2/5/10, at 4-6, 8-9.
On February 19, 2010, Appellant petitioned to withdraw his guilty plea.
On February 22, 2010, Judge Pozonsky denied the motion as untimely.
Appellant’s defense counsel failed to file a requested appeal. On August 29,
2012, Appellant filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his appeal
rights. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on October 5, 2012, but on
February 7, 2014, we vacated that dismissal and remanded the case to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing “on his preserved claim that he is
entitled to reinstatement of his direct appeal rights since he asked counsel to
file an appeal and counsel failed to do so.” Commonwealth v.
Rosenberger, No. 1721 WDA 2012, at 1 (Pa. Super. Feb. 7, 2014)
(unpublished memorandum). Specifically, this Court stated: “[R]egardless
of whether Appellant could pursue his claims under the PCRA, he is entitled
to a hearing to determine if he asked plea counsel to appeal.” Id. at 8-9.
In light of this disposition, the Court did not address any other challenges
raised by Appellant in that appeal. Id. at 5.
-6-
J-S49019-17
Molly Maguire Gaussa, Esquire, represented Appellant at the hearing
on his reinstated direct appeal. Following that hearing, the trial court
determined that “counsel [had] failed to file a requested directed appeal.”
Rosenberger II, No. 845 WDA 2014, at 2. On May 21, 2014, Appellant
appealed his sentence to this Court. In that appeal, Appellant raised five
issues, only the first of which this Court found to be cognizable – Appellant’s
claim that “the trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.” Id. at 3. This Court held that “the trial court did not err in
denying his motion as untimely.” Id. at 4. This Court “also note[d] that
even if the motion was not untimely, Rosenberger would not have been
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id. On August 4, 2015, this Court thus
affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Id. at 2, 5.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2015, former judge Paul Pozonsky pleaded
guilty to stealing drugs that had been admitted into evidence in nine
separate cases. On May 9, 2016, Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition at
issue in this appeal. In his petition, Appellant contended that his PCRA
petition —
was late[4] due to governmental interference by showing:
(Judge, Ret.) Mr. Pozonsky, who retired in 2012, in the middle of
____________________________________________
4 Appellant’s PCRA petition was not late, as it was filed less than one year
after the date of final judgment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As noted above,
this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on August 4, 2015.
Rosenberger II, No. 845 WDA 2014, at 2, 5. His judgment thus became
final on September 3, 2015. Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Appellant’s pro se PCRA
petition of May 9, 2016, hence was filed less than one year thereafter.
-7-
J-S49019-17
the State grand jury investigation, was arraigned by District
Judge Robert Redlinger on a raft of misdemeanor drug and theft
charges for poaching drugs from that and nine (9) other criminal
cases.
PCRA Pet., 5/9/16, at 3. Appellant attached as Exhibit 8 the undated
findings of the grand jury convened to review evidence of Pozonsky’s
misconduct during his time as a judge.
Appellant also insisted in his pro se PCRA petition that Attorney Cooke
“sent [him] a plea colloquy to fill out even though [Attorney Cooke] knew
that [Appellant] wanted to go to trial. [Appellant] filled out the plea colloquy
against [his] better judgment on Feb. 3rd, 2010.” PCRA Pet., 5/9/16, at 4A-
4B.5
On May 23, 2016, the PCRA court appointed Stephen C. Paul, Esquire,
to represent Appellant and ordered Attorney Paul to file an amended PCRA
petition within sixty days. The certified record includes a Turner/Finley6
letter from Attorney Paul, addressed to the PCRA court and dated August 24,
2016, explaining his intent to withdraw from the case. Although there is no
indication in the certified record that Attorney Paul sent the Turner/Finley
letter to Appellant, the pro se brief filed by Appellant to this Court states
____________________________________________
5 When filing his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant used a boilerplate form.
Between pages 4 and 5 of the form, Appellant included three additional
pages of text, all labelled as page 4. We will refer to these three pages as
“4A,” “4B,” and “4C.”
6 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
-8-
J-S49019-17
that Appellant received the Turner/Finley letter on August 26, 2016.
Attorney Paul’s letter included explanations of why he believed that each of
the claims raised in Appellant’s PCRA petition were meritless, including:
The [PCRA] Petition’s claim of interference by former Judge
Pozonsky is without merit. Though Mr. Pozonsky was convicted
of crimes related to tampering with drug evidence, the [PCRA]
Petition and record demonstrate no tampering in this matter. As
such, [Appellant] is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Turner/Finley Letter, 8/24/16, at 4 ¶ vii. On September 6, 2016, Attorney
Paul filed his motion for leave to withdraw his appearance.
On September 7, 2016, the PCRA court entered a notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
907. The Rule 907 Notice stated that the PCRA petition would be dismissed
on October 4, 2016, unless Appellant, “either representing himself or
through counsel, responds to this order and notice demonstrating why the
[PCRA c]ourt should not dismiss” the PCRA petition.
On September 8, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Object to
Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and to Declare Counsel Ineffective and
Appointment of New Counsel.” On September 15, 2016, the PCRA court
entered a one-sentence order that Appellant’s “Motion to Object to Counsel’s
Motion to Withdraw and Declare Counsel Ineffective and Appoint New
Counsel is denied.” However, the PCRA court never specifically ruled on
Attorney Paul’s motion for leave to withdraw his appearance.
-9-
J-S49019-17
On September 28, 2016, Appellant filed pro se objections to the Rule
907 Notice, in which he argued that he had valid ineffective assistance of
counsel claims against Attorney Maguire Gaussa and Attorney Cooke. On
October 4, 2016, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing the PCRA
petition, as follows:
AND NOW, this 4th day of October, 2016, after reviewing
[Appellant]’s response to appointed counsel’s Turner/Finely
Letter, which was received by the Court on September 28, 2016,
it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
[Appellant]’s PCRA is DISMISSED. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 910
and Pa.R.A.P. 903(a), [Appellant] has the right to file an appeal
to the Superior Court within thirty (30) days of the date this
order is filed with the Clerk of Courts, if he desired.
[APPELLANT] SHALL BE SERVED WITH NOTICE OF THIS ORDER
BY CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED.
Order, 10/4/16 (emphasis in original). The above order did not resolve
counsel’s petition to withdraw. On October 25, 2016, Appellant filed a pro
se notice of appeal to this Court.
Since the PCRA court never explicitly granted or denied Attorney Paul’s
motion for leave to withdraw his appearance, the record is remanded to the
PCRA court for a period of time not to exceed thirty days, during which time
the PCRA court shall determine whether Appellant is still represented by
counsel and shall notify this Court of its determination.
Case remanded for a period of time not to exceed thirty days for
further proceedings to determine the status of Appellant’s counsel.
Jurisdiction retained.
- 10 -