Com. v. Coker, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES LEE COKER, JR.,
Appellant No. 665 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 13, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-CR-0004079-2016
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 22, 2018
Appellant, James Lee Corker, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on January 13, 2017, following his non-jury trial conviction of simple
assault.1 Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred when it admitted
hearsay testimony from the investigating officer. We affirm.
We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our
review of the certified record and the trial court’s April 3, 2017 opinion. On
April 25, 2016, Patrol Officer Roland Norman responded to a call at 120
Chester Avenue in Yeadon, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. (See Trial Court
Opinion, 4/03/17, at 3). Officer Norman spoke to Lavanna Murray, the victim,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
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who claimed that Appellant assaulted her after an argument. Officer Norman
observed that she was distraught and bleeding from cuts on her forehead, and
that there was blood on the floor. (See id.).
On January 13, 2017, the court conducted a non-jury trial. Officer
Norman testified that upon arriving at the residence, he saw the victim had
cuts on her head, and was bleeding from them. (See N.T. Trial, 1/13/17, at
8). He further stated that he noticed blood on the floor of the apartment, and
that the victim was distraught when he got there. (See id. at 8-9). The trial
court overruled Appellant’s objection, and permitted Officer Norman to testify
as to what the victim told him about how she injured her head, under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. (See id. at 10). Officer
Norman explained that the victim told him that, after Appellant knocked on
the window, she let him into her apartment. Shortly thereafter, she received
a text message from a male, which made Appellant upset. The victim and
Appellant started arguing, and she tried to run upstairs. Appellant caught her
on the stairs and started assaulting her. (See id. at 10-11).
Appellant testified in his own defense. He stated that he went to the
victim’s apartment to get his toothbrush and she attacked him. He claimed
that the cut on the victim’s forehead happened earlier when she was getting
her hair done. (See id. at 34, 36-38). Appellant denied hitting the victim.
(See id. at 38). At the conclusion of trial, the court found Appellant guilty of
simple assault, and entered a sentence of no further punishment. The court
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found Appellant not guilty of recklessly endangering another person.2 (See
id. at 55). This timely appeal followed.3
Appellant presents one question on appeal.
I) [Whether] the court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony
of the investigating officer to be admitted over objection
where the statements were offered as substantive proof as
to what transpired on the night in question between
[Appellant] and the alleged victim, and where the alleged
victim never appeared for the trial and the officer was not
present to observe what actually took place[?]
(Appellant’s Brief, at 7) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In his issue, Appellant claims that the court abused its discretion and
admitted hearsay evidence when it permitted Officer Norman to testify about
what the victim told him. (See id. at 11-18). Specifically, he argues that,
“the out-of-court statements did not amount to an excited utterance and,
more importantly, they were of such broad scope that Appellant was entirely
stripped of all confrontation rights afforded him by the United States
Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (Id. at 12). We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the admissibility of evidence,
we note that [t]he admissibility of evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and such a decision will be reversed
only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. An
abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise
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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
3Pursuant to the court’s order, Appellant filed his concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal on March 13, 2017. The trial court entered its opinion
on April 3, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Hearsay testimony is per
se inadmissible in this Commonwealth, except as provided in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence[,] by other rules prescribed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 569-70 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal
denied, 879 A.2d 781 (Pa. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court admitted Officer Norman’s testimony about the
victim’s statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
In determining whether an out-of-court statement
constitutes an excited utterance, we are mindful of the following
principles:
Rule 803(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence permits the admission of an excited
utterance as an exception to the general rule that
hearsay evidence is inadmissible. The Rule defines an
excited utterance as: [a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event. [Pa.R.E. 803(2).] . . . [F]or a statement to be
considered an excited utterance, it must be made
spontaneously and without opportunity for reflection:
[A] spontaneous declaration by a
person whose mind has been suddenly
made subject to an overpowering emotion
caused by some unexpected and shocking
occurrence, which that person has just
participated in or closely witnessed, and
made in reference to some phase of that
occurrence which he perceived, and this
declaration must be made so near the
occurrence both in time and place as to
exclude the likelihood of its having
emanated in whole or in part from his
reflective faculties. . . . Thus, it must be
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shown first, that [the declarant] had
witnessed an event sufficiently startling
and so close in point of time as to render
her reflective though[t] processes
inoperable and, second, that her
declarations were a spontaneous reaction
to that startling event.
. . . [T]his Court further held that there is no
clear-cut rule as to the time sequence required for a
statement to qualify as an excited utterance, but
rather that fact-specific determination is to be made
on a case-by-case basis.
Additionally, [i]n assessing a statement offered as an
excited utterance, the court must consider, among other things
whether the statement was in narrative form, the elapsed time
between the startling event and the declaration, whether the
declarant had an opportunity to speak with others and whether,
in fact, she did so. Our [c]ourts have not established a bright line
rule regarding the amount of time that may elapse between the
declarant’s experience and her statement. Rather, [t]he crucial
question, regardless of time lapse, is whether, at the time the
statement is made, the nervous excitement continues to dominate
while the reflective processes remain in abeyance. It is the
spontaneity of . . . an excited utterance [that] is the source of
reliability and the touchstone of admissibility.
Id. at 570-71 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court explained that Appellant testified that
he woke up at 2:00 a.m. and decided to go to 120 Chester Avenue. The victim
called the police at 2:53 a.m., thus the trial court surmised that a “reasonable
inference may be drawn that the incident did not occur earlier than 2:30 a.m.”
(Trial Ct. Op., at 6-7). When Officer Norman arrived on scene, the victim was
“distraught, upset about what happened, and dabbing at her wounds.” (Id.
at 7). The court reasoned that although there was testimony that another
woman arrived on scene after the incident and before Officer Norman,
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nothing suggests that during the minutes between the incident
and [the victim’s] statements there was an opportunity to
fabricate a false version of events. [The victim] said that during
the heat of the argument with [Appellant] she became upset and
ran up the steps. [Appellant] caught her at the top of the steps
where the assault occurred. It is submitted that sufficient indicia
of reliability existed based on the totality of these circumstances
and that the “excited utterances” of the victim were admissible.
(Id.).
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it permitted Officer Norman to testify about the victim’s statements
under the excited utterance hearsay exception. The record supports that the
victim “witnessed an event sufficiently startling and so close in point of time
as to render her reflective though processes inoperable and, second, that her
declarations were a spontaneous reaction to that startling event.” See Gray,
supra at 570 (citations omitted). Furthermore, based on our review of the
record, we agree that, regardless of time lapse between the attack and the
victim’s statement, her “nervous excitement continue[d] to dominate while
[her] reflective processes remain[ed] in abeyance[,]” and her statements to
Officer Norman were spontaneous. Id. at 571 (citation omitted). Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Appellant’s issue
does not merit relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins the Memorandum.
Judge Ransom concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/22/18
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