Adoption of A.L.G., Appeal of: R.A.G. ( 2018 )

J. S58042/18 & J. S58043/18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.L.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: R.A.G., FATHER :
: No. 796 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree, May 1, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans' Court Division at No. 42-17-0138
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.R.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: R.A.G., FATHER :
: No. 797 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree, May 1, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans' Court Division at No. 42-17-0139
IN RE: ADOPTION OF M.M.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: R.A.G., FATHER :
: No. 798 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree, May 1, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans' Court Division at No. 42-17-0140
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.L.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.G., MOTHER :
: No. 808 WDA 2018
J. S58042/18 & J. S58043/18
Appeal from the Decree, May 1, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans' Court Division at No. 42-17-0138
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.R.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.G., MOTHER :
: No. 809 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree, May 1, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans' Court Division at No. 43-17-0139
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.M.G., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.G., MOTHER : No. 810 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree, May 1, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Orphans' Court Division at No. 42-17-0140
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2018
R.A.G. (“Father”) and M.G. (“Mother”) appeal from the May 1, 2018
decrees entered in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County, Orphans’
Court Division, involuntarily terminating their parental rights to their
dependent children, A.L.G., male child, born in May 2010; A.R.G., female
child, born in January 2013; and M.M.G., female child, born in October 2005
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(collectively, “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have consolidated Father’s and
Mother’s appeals sua sponte. After careful review, we affirm.
The orphans’ court set forth the following:1
McKean County Children and Youth Services
(hereinafter [“CYS”]) filed [] Petition[s] to
Involuntarily Terminate the Parental Rights of
[Mother] and [Father] to [A.L.G., A.R.G., and M.M.G.]
After several days of hearings and at the
commencement of proceedings on April 6, 2018,
Mother, through counsel, indicated that she wished to
involuntarily relinquish her parental rights. Mother
filed a Petition to Voluntarily Relinquish Parental rights
and a full colloquy was conducted. However, since the
petition cannot be made final until at least 10 days
after it is acknowledged[,] further hearing was
scheduled for April 27, 2018. Mother appeared at the
April 27, 2018 hearing and indicated that she wished
to withdraw her voluntary relinquishment. The record
is now closed and this Memorandum addresses the
request to involuntarily terminate Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights.
....
The initial hearing to address the termination petition
was scheduled for January 5, 2018. Parents had
notice of that hearing. All parties were present and
ready to proceed except for Parents. Parent[s’]
counsel advised the court that Mother had an accident
the night prior to the hearing and had been
transported to the emergency room of the Kane
Community Hospital for treatment. It was indicated
1 On May 1, 2018, three separate opinions were filed, one for each child. The
majority of the following recitation of the procedural history and facts of the
case was taken from the orphans’ court opinion for A.L.G. Where the narrative
differs regarding facts specific to A.R.G. and M.M.G., pertinent information
was inserted from the orphans’ court opinions for each child. The instances
where these insertions occur are clearly noted.
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that she that she [sic] had fallen and struck her head.
It was also indicated that Father had gone to the
hospital to assist Mother and to provide her
transportation back to their residence in Mount
Jewett, PA; and, neither Parent had obtained much
sleep. Counsel requested a continuance of the
hearing. The court granted the request for a
continuance but indicated that Parents had 10 days to
provide medical documentation to the court that
verified that Mother did need/receive medical care and
that it would have been difficult for her to appear for
the January 5, 2018 hearing. No medical
documentation has been provided and the court,
therefore, finds that Parents had no valid reason for
failing to appear for the January 5, 2018 hearing.
However, it was established at the January 12, 2018
hearing that Parents had been consuming alcohol the
night prior to the January 5, 2018 hearing. It was in
the process of consuming alcohol that Mother fell and
hit her head and an ambulance was called.
The consumption of alcohol by the Parents on
January 4, 2018 is very troubling as they are both
prohibited from doing so. Father has an extensive
prior criminal record and he is currently on 5tate [sic]
Parole. It is a condition of his parole that he not
consume alcohol or have any alcohol at his residence.
He has had prior parole violations for consuming
alcohol while on supervision. In 2017[,] he was
personally transported by his parole officer to an
inpatient treatment facility in Erie to address his
frequent alcohol consumption. The reunification plan
in the dependency case also mandates that Father and
Mother consume no alcohol and they are to follow
their drug and alcohol treatment plans.
Christina Mitchell, a drug and alcohol treatment
specialist, testified that she was the treatment
specialist assigned for Mother and Father. She
testified that they each missed numerous
appointments. Father was unsuccessfully discharged
from treatment and Mother “chose to be discharged”
from treatment in April of 2017.
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Mother also has a prior criminal record. She was
required as part of her most recent period of
supervision (which has now expired) to refrain from
drinking alcohol and to complete drug and alcohol
treatment.
On February 22, 2018[,] Father appeared for a
termination hearing intoxicated. His parole agent
took him into custody after the hearing commenced
and he was required to attend an inpatient treatment
facility at “Maple Manor.” He completed that program
and was discharged on March 26, 2018. He asserts
that his previous inpatient treatment “was a joke” but
he benefitted from the Maple Manor Program.
Father’s alcoholism has put the [C]hildren’s safety
directly at risk. In 2014[,] he was driving while
intoxicated with the [C]hildren in the car. He was
convicted of DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol and
Endangering the Welfare of Children; and, sentenced
to 1 to 5 years [of] confinement as he had prior DUI
convictions. The fact that Father was on supervision
for a prior DUI offense that occurred when his
[C]hildren were in the car and then he showed up
intoxicated for a termination hearing involving those
same [C]hildren reflects the unbreakable grip that his
alcohol addiction has on him. Despite the high risk of
his parole being violated again for alcohol
consumption and the negative effect in the
termination proceedings[,] he drank a substantial
amount of alcohol and then came to court.
The court specifically finds that both Mother and
Father have a long history of drug and alcohol
addiction which they have little or no personal
motivation to address – and this pattern will likely
continue indefinitely into the future. The incidents on
January 4, 2018 and February 22, 2018 reflect that
the [P]arents’ alcohol addiction is becoming more, not
less, severe. Knowing that Father could be facing
revocation and confinement and knowing that they
had a hearing the following day regarding termination
of their parental rights, they none-the-less drank to
the point that emergency personal [sic] responding to
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the scene concluded “that they (Parents) seemed to
be intoxicated on something.”
There were other concerns in Parent[s’] home on
January 4, 2018. Parents were utilizing a fireplace for
heat and the first responders were extremely
concerned, based on the ashes and debris that had
spilled out of the fireplace and onto the floor[,] that
the structure could/would catch on fire. One first
responder indicated that, if there were children in the
home when they had responded, they would have felt
compelled to report the incident to appropriate child
welfare authorities.
Father testified that he and Mother have resided
together since shortly after Mother’s paramour,
[C.F.], went to jail in 2015 for physically abusing
[A.L.G.] and Father was released from his period of
state incarceration for, in part, driving intoxicated with
the [C]hildren in the car. However, Father also
testified that he and Mother have not been involved in
a relationship for years. He indicated that they reside
together “for the kids.” He did testify that, despite
not being in a relationship, he loves Mother and enjoys
“sitting on the couch with her and cuddling for hours.”
[The Children] have been in placement since
November 19, 2015. Therefore, for over two years
[CYS], the court and service providers have
attempted to work with Parents to improve conditions
to the point that the [C]hildren could safely be in
Parents’ care and custody. When the [C]hildren were
initially placed[,] Father was incarcerated in a State
Correctional Facility. He was facing charges for
Driving Under the Influence and Endangering the
Welfare of a Child(ren). He was subsequently
convicted at [] CR 2015 (McKean County) of both of
these and additional counts. He was sentenced to a
State period of confinement. Again, it is a condition
of his sentence that he consume no alcohol and be in
no place where alcohol is served and sold. He was
also ordered to follow his drug and alcohol treatment
plan.
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In November of 2015[,] Mother was also incarcerated.
She was also facing a charge of Endangering the
Welfare of a Child. The victim of that count was
[A.L.G.] She was eventually convicted of one count
of Endangering the Welfare of a Child (victim being
[A.L.G.]) and sentenced to not less than 4 months to
no more than 11½ months. The facts that support
this conviction are: In November of 2015[,] Mother
was residing with her then paramour, [C.F.,] and her
[C]hildren in Bradford, PA. At that time[,] [A.L.G.]
was attending elementary school in Bradford. School
staff observed bruising on [A.L.G.’s] body.
Lisa Dunkle, a CYS caseworker, responded to the
school. She observed sever[e] bruising on [A.L.G.,]
particularly in the buttock area. It was black and
purple. It was evident that he had been extremely
beaten likely with some item. [A.L.G.] was then
transported to the Bradford Regional Medical Center
where this extreme bruising was medically
documented. At the hospital[,] [C.F.] admitted to
caseworker Dunkle that he “had spanked him
([A.L.G]) because he was bad all the time and that is
all he responds to.” Mother admitted to a CYS
caseworker that she was aware that [C.F.] had, as in
recently and on other previous occasions, inflicted
corporal punishment on [A.L.G.] She explained that
she is present when [C.F.] “spanks” [A.L.G.] and she
was present for the November 2015 assault. She
explained the [sic] [C.F.] “starts out with his hand and
then proceeds to using a belt.” Mother justified these
assaults by asserting that she herself was spanked
and “this is all [A.L.G.] responds to.” Therefore,
Mother not only prevented [sic] her paramour from
physically beating and bruising [A.L.G.,] she
encouraged it. Mother also attempted to downplay
the harm/injury to [A.L.G.] She told Bradford City
Police Officer Linda [C]lose that she “only saw one
small bruise” and later indicated that she “saw nothing
(regarding injury).” Officer Close, who has decades
of experience as a police officer, indicated that “this is
not the first time that I have seen injuries. There have
been many incidents – but this is one of the cases that
stuck with me.” [M.M.G.] indicated that she had also
been struck with a belt by [C.F.] Mother initially
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indicated that she was not going to discontinue her
relationship with [C.F.,] and she planned on
cohabitating with him and the [C]hildren after they
were both were [sic] released from incarceration
([C.F.] was subsequently convicted of criminal
offenses that arose form [sic] beating [A.L.G.]). She
sent letters to him while he was incarcerated
indicating that she wanted to be back with him and
“have your baby.” However, her position
subsequently changed. She resumed her relationship
with Father when he was released from incarceration.
The two of them have resided together for most of the
time since the dependency case was initiated
in in [sic] November of 2015. However, their
relationship is unstable and they have separated at
times.
The use of excessive corporal punishment, specifically
beating [A.L.G.] with a belt, has caused emotional
injury to all of the [C]hildren. [M.W., M.M.G.’s foster
mother,] testified (testimony the court finds credible)
that when her husband walked into a room with a
belt[,] [M.M.G.] ran away in fear and hid from them.
She was shaking and they had to assure her that they
would never utilize a belt to discipline her.
Although Father was incarcerated when the [C]hildren
were abused by Mother’s paramour[,] Mother’s prior
actions and inaction still have bearing regarding the
request to terminate Father’s Parental Rights. As
indicated elsewhere in these facts[,] Father continues
to reside with Mother “for the kids.” Although Father
claims he has no active romantic relationship with
Mother[,] the two of them have a pattern of being
together when Father is not incarcerated. Father has
had periods of employment in the past[,] and the
children were in Mother’s sole care when Father was
working. Therefore, it is likely the [C]hildren would
be in Mother’s care in the future if they were ever
placed back into Father’s care.
There was some initial cooperation from Parents
following the November 2015 finding of dependency.
Parents were attending medical appointments and
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staying in contact with the [C]hildren. However, in a
June 2016 finding in the dependency case[,] it was
indicated that Parents were only minimally working
with the Parents as Teachers Program, which was a
major component of the reunification plan. A finding
was also made that Parents had once again been
evicted and had no definite plans regarding housing.
Mother and Father had also recently separated.
Mother was still having contact with [C.F.,] and there
was evidence that she intended on
continuing/renewing her relationship with him despite
the abuse that he had inflicted on [A.L.G.] Father had
missed many of his Drug and Alcohol treatment
appointments and was on the verge of being
discharged from treatment.
Findings following the August 16, 2016 review hearing
were more positive. Parents had reconciled again and
they were each following their drug and alcohol and
mental health treatment plans.
By the time of the October 25, 2017 review hearing[,]
Parents’ progress had again declined. They had
separated yet again. Their participation in the Parents
as Teachers program had fallen off. Father was
residing with another female and Mother was
homeless. Parents had previously obtained mental
health evaluations but were not attending their mental
health treatment appointments.
It was found at a January 25, 2017 review hearing
that Parents were still not following their mental
health treatment plan. They hadn’t re-engaged since
the January 25, 2017 hearing even though they had
been ordered, as part of the reunification plan, to do
so. Mother had new criminal charges and Father had
two positive drug screens (positive for illegal
substances) since the last hearing. Father had
re-engaged in Drug and Alcohol treatment. Parents
still did not have available housing and they had made
minimal efforts to obtain appropriate housing for the
[C]hildren.
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At a May 10, 2017 review hearing[,] it was found that
[P]arents had, in the past few days before the
hearing, obtained housing. However, Father was still
not engaged in mental health treatment and neither
Parent was working with the Parents as Teachers
Program. Father was missing his drug and alcohol
appointments again.
Parents have a horrible history regarding housing.
They have repeatedly requested housing assistance,
obtained housing, failed to pay rent and damaged the
property which resulted in many, many evictions.
They have had substantial judgments entered against
them by different landlords. CYS presented
documentation of 9 different judgments from
9 separate landlords totaling $12,488.36.
Parents have also submitted false information in the
past to obtain housing assistance. Linda Thompson
from the McKean County Redevelopment Authority,
the department that oversees many public housing
programs in McKean County, testified that due to their
negative history[,] there is [sic] no current housing
assistance options for the Parents. Parents have
made appointments with her organization and
“no showed” on numerous occasions. She explained
that, even if assistance was [sic] available, it is very
unlikely that any landlords in McKean County would
be willing to rent to Parents due to their well-known
and negative rental history. She has attempted to
work with Parents to develop a plan to re-pay past due
rent/judgments but Parents failed to show up for
appointments.
Rebecca Plummer, the Director of the Christian
Ministry in Bra[d]ford, testified that her organization
provided housing assistance to Parents as far back as
2011. Parents have requested assistance from the
Ministry to pay of[f] their past due rent, for gas cards
and for rental assistance. Parents knowingly provided
false information to the Ministry and are therefore no
longer eligible for assistance. In 2016[,] Parents had
obtained a voucher for a one week stay at a local hotel
from the Ministry. The Ministry generally only
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provides a voucher for a week. After the first week[,]
Mother came in and indicated that she and Father had
separated when they had not. Because they believed
Mother[,] they provided her with another voucher for
an additional week. Then Mother and Father had a
third party come in and claim to be homeless to obtain
a third voucher. Mother took this voucher and forged
it to make it look like it was a valid voucher for
Parents. Parents’ dishonesty and abuse of the
Christian Ministry program forced the Ministry to
make major changes to their operating procedures.
Parents have also attempted to conceal information
regarding their relocation and evictions form [sic]
their caseworker. Joshua Blotzer testified that he had
received information that Parents were about to be
evicted from their residence and he questioned
Parents about it, indicating that he and CYS
maybe [sic] able to assist them in finding a new
residence. Parents adamantly denied that they were
being evicted. They were then evicted. Caseworker
Blotzer also had difficulty obtaining required
signatures form [sic] the Parents for school and
treatment matters. Parents would indicate that they
would sign the necessary papers but then not show up
to do it. This resulted in unnecessary and harmful
the [sic] delay in needed treatment for [the Children].
Father has had a consistent pattern of criminal
convictions and confinement for supervision violations
including: 1) McKean County [] CR 2014. Conviction
for DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, Endangering the
Welfare of Children. Sentenced to 1 to 5 years [of]
confinement; 2) McKean County [] CR 2012.
Conviction for DUI Highest Rate of alcohol. Sentenced
to 90 days to 5 years; 3) McKean County [] CR 2007.
Convicted of DUI Highest Rate. Sentenced to
48 hours to 6 months; 4) McKean County [] CR 2006.
Convicted of Retail Theft, 3rd or Subsequent Offense.
Sentenced to 6 months of probation; 5) McKean
County [] CR 2005. Convicted of Theft by Unlawful
Taking. Sentenced to 5 days to 6 months; 6) McKean
County [] CR 2002. Convicted of Burglary (-2).
Sentenced to 30 days to 1 year. Father has had many
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violations of his supervision on these convictions
including being convicted of new offenses and utilizing
drugs and alcohol. His current parole officer testified
that Father “is found to be at a maximum level of
supervision. He is frequently unemployed and has
issues with drugs and alcohol.” Parole Agent
Shawn Hartman explained how he personally drove
Father to an inpatient facility in September 2017. He
received a call from McKean County Adult Probation
and advised that Mother and Father had appeared for
an appointment that Mother had with her county
probation officer. Father was intoxicated.
Agent Hartman then found alcohol containers in
Parents’ residence[,] and Father admitted to
consuming alcohol. Agent Hartman testified that
Father has repeated episodes of intoxication and
alcohol possession. Father completed the inpatient
treatment program in Erie (which Father has termed
“a joke”) but, again after that he: 1) had the incident
on January 4th and 5th, 2018 where he and Mother
were drinking; 2) missed many of his drug and alcohol
appointments; and, 3) showed up intoxicated on
February 22, 2018 for the termination hearings
involving these cases. Mother was also violated for
being intoxicated, etc. after she and Father showed up
for her probation appointment under the influence in
2017. This lengthy pattern of criminal activity and
supervision violations is likely to continue in the future
and result in Father being incarcerated again.
Shannon McAndrew, a mobile mental health therapist
at the Guidance Center in Bradford, is working with
[A.L.G.] to address and assist him in controlling his
negative behaviors [and has attempted to work with
the family regarding therapy for A.L.G.2] The court
found her testimony credible that Parents[’]
participation with her and her program has been poor.
For example, she made contact with Mother in
November of 2018 and scheduled 3 appointments to
meet with [A.L.G.] and Parents. She explained to
Mother that it is very important that she meet with
Parents to obtain [A.L.G.’s] history. She told Mother
2 Orphans’ court opinion as to M.M.G., 5/1/18 at 12.
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that “[A.L.G.] would not get better unless she
(Mother) was involved.” Parents no showed for all
3 appointments. She called Mother after each missed
appointment and encouraged her to attend the next.
She also offered Parents different times and dates for
the appointments. Parents then stopped returning
Ms. McAndrew’s calls.
[A.L.G.] currently resides in the foster home of [R.H.]
He had been placed there when he was initially
removed from his Parents’ care. He was subsequently
moved to his biological aunt and uncle[’s home]. He
was placed with his aunt and uncle due to behavior
problems he was having in [R.H.’s] foster home.
Further, [R.H.] and her husband were separating and
she had some personal matters to address. However,
[the aunt and uncle] later advised CYS that they are
not a permaencey [sic] option for [A.L.G.] Therefore,
[A.L.G.] was transitioned back into [R.H.’s] foster
home with his sister[, A.R.G.]
[R.H.] is now divorced and she informed CYS that she
had a strong bond with [A.L.G.] and would like for him
to remain in her care. [A.L.G.] is doing well in [R.H.’s]
foster home. [R.H.] monitors [A.L.G.’s] behavior in
school and works with school staff and service
providers to assist [A.L.G.] [A.L.G.] has a productive
bond with her and his sister[, A.R.G.]
Shannon McAndrew, [A.L.G.’s] mobile therapist,
testified that [R.H.] has made all of the appointments
that she scheduled for [A.L.G.] and she reaches out
to Ms. McAndrew for assistance in managing
[A.L.G.’s] behaviors.
Orphans’ court opinion as to A.L.G., 5/1/18 at 1-13.
[A.R.G.] currently resides in the foster home of [R.H.]
[A.L.G.] also resides there. [A.R.G.] has resided there
since she was removed from her Parents’ care in
2015. [A.R.G.] has a very strong bond with [R.H.]
[A.R.G.] is doing well in the [R.H.] foster home.
[R.H.] indicated that she would adopt [A.R.G.] if that
is an option. However, [A.L.G.] has had some
difficulties in her home and she has not yet committed
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to adopting him. He has started a new medication
regimen and is responding well. However, she wants
to see a pattern of improvement before committing to
adoption. She is unwilling to adopt one sibling without
adopting the other. Therefore, if she decides not to
adopt [A.L.G.,] she will not adopt [A.R.G.] either.
Orphans’ court opinion as to A.R.G., 5/1/18 at 12-13.
[M.M.G.] is currently in the [M.W. and J.W.] foster
home. She is doing well there. The [Ws] are
providing a loving home for her and have made
substantial efforts to assure that her needs are met.
They are very active with her care, service providers
and school. They intend on adopting M.M.G. if that is
an option.
Orphans’ court opinion as to M.M.G., 5/1/18 at 12.
Due to the delay that occurred from Parents’ failure to
timely address approval of care, medication, etc.,
McKean County CYS was granted legal authority to
make these decisions. Services and treatment are
now timely and [A.L.G.’s] behavior, although still of
concern, has dramatically improved. Nevertheless,
[R.H.] still has reservations about committing to the
adoption. [A.L.G.’s] recent treatment has resulted in
behavior improvements and there is optimism that
progress will continue but this progress has not yet
been for an extended period. She is hopeful that
progress will continue and she would be willing to
adopt [A.L.G.] and keep him in her home with
[A.R.G.] but she cannot provide any guarantee at this
time. This is an important factor that the court has to
consider regarding whether termination of Father’s
parental rights would best serve his developmental,
physical and emotional needs.
Orphans’ court opinion as to A.L.G., 5/1/18 at 13.
Due to the delay that occurred from Parents’ failure to
timely address approval of care, medication, etc.,
[CYS] was granted legal authority to make these
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decisions. Services and treatment are now timely for
[M.M.G.]
Orphans’ court opinion as to M.M.G., 5/1/18 at 13.
The [C]hildren enjoy visiting Parents when they are at
visits. They interact with Parents. However, when
Parents miss visits[,] it is upsetting to the [C]hildren.
Parents have attended many of the visits but have
also missed many of them. There is a pattern of the
[C]hildren’s behavior declining after the visits. There
have been concerns about Parents discussing
inappropriate topics/information with the [C]hildren
during the visits. This has greatly upset the
[C]hildren. For example, during the most recent visit,
Mother, while Father was present[,] “told the kids that
she might not see them for a while.” Mother also
talked to the [C]hildren further but the case aid [sic]
couldn’t hear what she was saying. Since the visit was
days before the termination hearing[,] it is likely that
Mother discussed the possibility that her rights might
be terminated with the children. This, again, greatly
upset the [C]hildren and was added stress that Mother
should have not [sic] exposed the [C]hildren to.
Orphans’ court opinion as to A.L.G., 5/1/18 at 13.o
The record reflects that the orphans’ court entered the decrees
terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to A.L.G., A.R.G., and
M.M.G. on May 1, 2018. The record further reflects that on May 24, 2018,
Father filed timely notices of appeal, together with concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter, on
May 31, 2018, Mother filed timely notices of appeal, together with
Rule 1925(b) statements. On June 1, 2018, the orphans’ court filed its
Rule 1925(a) opinions with respect to Father’s appeals wherein it referred this
court to its May 1, 2018 opinions concerning termination of Father’s parental
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rights with respect to each of the Children and also addressed issues that
Father has now abandoned. Also on June 1, 2018, the orphans’ court filed its
Rule 1925(a) opinions with respect to Mother’s appeals wherein it referred this
court to its May 1, 2018 opinions concerning termination of Mother’s parental
rights with respect to each of the Children.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding
that [CYS] had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that grounds for the involuntary
termination of [Father’s] parental rights existed
when [Father] was substantially in compliance
with [CYS’s] reunification plan; had made
efforts to correct the identified problems which
led to the placement of the minor [C]hildren;
when no evidence was submitted that [Father]
failed or refused to perform parental duties[;]
and[] when [CYS] did not otherwise prove
grounds existed to terminate [Father’s] parental
rights?
2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in not giving
primary consideration to the effect of this
termination on the development and emotional
needs and welfare of the [Children] pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511(b)?
Father’s brief at 9.
Mother raises the following issue for our review:
Whether the [orphans’] court abused its discretion in
finding that [CYS] produced clear and convincing
evidence to support an involuntary termination of
[Mother’s] parental rights[?]
Mother’s brief at 9.
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In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If
the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of
law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may
be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different
result. Id. at 827. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.,
855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent
evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record
could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d
387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
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Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511,
the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to
terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on
the conduct of the parent. The party seeking
termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in
Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her
parental rights does the court engage in the second
part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child
under the standard of best interests of the child. One
major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to
the effect on the child of permanently severing any
such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to A.L.G., A.R.G., and M.M.G. pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long held that, in order to affirm a
termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the orphans’ court as
to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze
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the court’s termination decree pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b),
which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition
filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not
be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect
to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first
initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of
the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2).
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015),
quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.”
In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights, the orphans’ court noted
that Father has struggled with alcoholism for most of his life and at least as
long as A.L.G. and A.R.G. have been alive. (Orphans’ court opinions, 5/1/18
as to A.L.G. at 17; as to A.R.G. at 16; as to M.M.G. at 16.) Moreover, Father’s
alcoholism and his lack of motivation and/or inability to address same have
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placed the Children at risk. Father has driven while intoxicated with the
Children in the car. Additionally, Father’s alcoholism has made him unable to
retain employment and housing. Father’s alcoholism has resulted in
numerous evictions and $12,000 of landlord judgments entered against him.
Although Father’s alcoholism placed him at high risk of violating his parole and
losing his Children, Father not only continued to consume alcohol, but his
alcohol consumption has increased. Father consumed alcohol with Mother the
night before the scheduled January 5, 2018 termination hearing to the point
where Mother fell and struck her head, and as a result, Father and Mother did
not attend the hearing. (Id. at 17-18; 16-17; and 16-17.) Father consumed
alcohol the night before the scheduled February 22, 2018 termination hearing
to the point where he appeared in court intoxicated and was taken into
custody. (Id. 17-18; 17; and 17.)
With respect to the termination of Mother’s parental rights, the orphans’
court noted that she, too, has struggled with alcoholism for years. (Id. at 18;
17; and 17.) As previously stated, she consumed so much alcohol the night
before the January 5, 2018 termination hearing that she fell and struck her
head. (Id. at 17; 16; and 16.) Mother’s drunken fall resulted in her need for
emergency medical care and her inability to attend the termination hearing.
(Id.)
In terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the Children, the
orphans’ court noted that Father and Mother have an enabling relationship.
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(Id. at 18; 17; and 17.) When Father and Mother are together – which is
often – they drink alcohol together. Additionally, Father and Mother have
failed to follow through with the Parents as Teachers Program; have failed to
consistently attend Child’s medical appointments; have failed to follow
through with and complete their drug and alcohol treatment, but have
continued to drink alcohol; have consistently failed to take reasonable steps
to address the Children’s medical and mental health needs; have neglected to
sign necessary medical forms for approval of the Children’s medical care; and
have failed to attend the Children’s medical and dental appointments. (Id.)
We conclude that the record supports the orphans’ court’s factual
findings and that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to A.L.G., A.R.G., and M.M.G. under
Section 2511(a)(2). The record demonstrates that the conditions that existed
upon removal establish repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal of Father and Mother that caused the Children to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental
well-being. The record also supports the conclusion that Father and Mother
continued to lack capacity to parent the Children.
We now turn to whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b).
As to that section, our supreme court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The
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emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 620
A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the
determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M.,
53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below,
evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy
task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the love,
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comfort, security, and stability the child
might have with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that
courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in
a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
T.S.M., 73 A.3d at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court observed,
“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation
to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result,
all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
In determining that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights
favored A.L.G.’s and A.R.G.’s needs and welfare, the orphans’ court noted its
immediate concern that R.H.’s plans regarding the adoption of A.L.G. and
A.R.G. are uncertain due to A.L.G.’s negative behaviors. (Orphans’ court
opinions, 5/1/18 as to A.L.G. at 19; as to A.R.G. at 18.) The orphans’ court
noted R.H.’s testimony that she has a very strong bond with A.L.G. and A.R.G.
and that she intends to take all steps to assure that A.L.G. obtains the
treatment and care that he needs even if she does not adopt A.L.G. R.H.
indicated she would not abandon A.L.G. and A.R.G. and that she would assist
CYS in finding an adoptive home for A.L.G. and A.R.G. (Id.)
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The orphans’ court balanced the uncertainty of R.H.’s adoption of A.L.G.
and A.R.G. against the alternative of not granting the involuntary termination
petition. (Id. as to A.L.G. at 19; as to A.R.G. at 18.) Although the orphans’
court noted that A.L.G. and A.R.G. recognize Mother and Father and enjoy
spending time with them, the orphans’ court concluded that it is unlikely that
Mother and Father will address their alcoholism. (Id. as to A.R.G. at 19; as
to A.R.G. at 18.) The orphans’ court found that if it did not grant the
termination petitions, it would be less likely that A.L.G. and A.R.G. would be
adopted in the future, either by R.H. or another family, because they would
be caught in an “in-between world where [A.L.G. and A.R.G. know their]
Parents and enjoy[] their visits but cannot be in their care” which will likely
be troubling for A.L.G. and A.R.G. (Id. as to A.L.G. at 19; as to A.R.G. at 19.)
The orphans’ court concluded that because there exists a much greater
potential for A.L.G. and A.R.G. to obtain permanency if parental rights are
terminated, termination would “best fulfill [Child’s] ‘developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare.’” (Id. as to A.L.G. at 20; as to A.R.G. at
19.) Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination,
and the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to A.L.G. and A.R.G.
In determining that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights
favored M.M.G.’s needs and welfare, the orphans’ court noted that although
M.M.G. has a bond with Father and Mother, that bond has been more
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destructive than beneficial to M.M.G. (Orphans’ court opinion, 5/1/18 as to
M.M.G. at 18.) The orphans’ court further noted that M.M.G. has “received
extensive mental health treatment and is in great need of stability.” The
orphans’ court determined that M.M.G.’s foster parents provide her with the
stability that she needs, which has improved M.M.G.’s anxiety and mental
health concerns. Accordingly, the orphans’ court concluded that severing
M.M.G.’s bond with Father and Mother would “still best fulfill [M.M.G.’s]
‘developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.’” (Id.) Our
review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination, and the
orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to M.M.G.
Based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and
conclude that the orphans’ court appropriately terminated Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to A.L.G., A.R.G., and M.M.G. under
Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/24/2018
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