T.K. v. A.Z. ( 2017 )

J-S11038-17
2017 Pa. Super. 67
T.K. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
A.Z. :
:
Appellant : No. 1261 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Civil Division at No(s): 2016-2624
BEFORE: OLSON, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 14, 2017
A.Z. (“Appellant”) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Cambria County granting the petition for Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) filed
by his former wife, T.K. (“Appellee”). After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant and Appellee were married for eleven years before they
separated in March 2009. The couple share custody of their minor children.
As the parties had a strained relationship following their separation, they
exchanged custody of the children at a local police station and were required
by a court order to communicate through a court-monitored application. On
July 20, 2016, Appellee filed for the PFA against Appellant. On August 3,
2016, the lower court held a PFA hearing at which both parties testified.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S11038-17
Appellee alleged that Appellant had harassed and stalked her
throughout the seven years following their separation; Appellee identified
exact dates of recent incidents as recorded in her diary. Appellee accused
Appellant of putting a nail in the tire of her car on July 9, 2016, while she
took their children to their therapy appointment. Although Appellant was
not allowed to contact Appellee by a previous court order, Appellant would
have the children and other individuals “scream stuff into the phone” to
Appellee on repeated occasions. N.T. Hearing, 8/3/16, at 5-6.
In addition, Appellee testified to numerous instances in which she felt
that Appellant was stalking her. Appellee contended that Appellant would
follow her in her vehicle almost every day, drive past her, and honk his car
horn. Appellee noticed numerous times that Appellant was following her
around the local grocery store. Appellee claimed that, at the local football
game, Appellant would follow her when she would go to the bathroom as
well as sit near her in the stands and make comments about her within
earshot. On another occasion, Appellee and the children detected Appellant
watching them and hiding while they were sled riding. Appellee asserted
that Appellant would constantly call their children, tell them he was near
Appellee’s home, and honk his car horn as he passed by. As a result of
Appellant’s behavior, Appellee expressed fear and concern for her safety.
Appellant testified and denied all of Appellee’s allegations, but offered
no explanation or any specific response to Appellee’s assertions. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the lower court entered an order granting Appellee
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the PFA against Appellant. In doing so, the lower court found Appellee did
not present sufficient evidence to show that Appellant was responsible for
the nail found in her car tire. Nevertheless, the lower court found Appellee
testified credibly to Appellant’s behavior, which it characterized as stalking
and harassment. The lower court indicated that its order would be in effect
for the statutory period of three years. Appellant filed this timely appeal and
complied with the lower court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant raises two issues for our review on appeal:
(1) Whether the entry of a Protection from Abuse Order and
finding of abuse following hearing [sic] is contrary to the
evidence presented and as such an error of law?
(2) Whether the entry of a Protection from Abuse Order
following hearing for a period of three (3) years is contrary
to the evidence presented and as such an abuse of
discretion?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
Our standard of review is well-established: “[i]n the context of a PFA
order, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law or
abuse of discretion.” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa.Super.
2014). This Court has emphasized that “[t]he purpose of the PFA Act is to
protect victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate such abuse,
with the primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse.”
Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2008). The
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PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122, defines “abuse,” in relevant part, as
follows:
“Abuse.” The occurrence of one or more of the following acts
between family or household members, sexual or intimate
partners or persons who share biological parenthood:
***
(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or
repeatedly committing acts toward another person,
including following the person, without proper authority,
under circumstances which place the person in reasonable
fear of bodily injury. The definition of this paragraph
applies only to proceedings commenced under this title
and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions
commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and
offenses).
23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a).
On appeal, Appellant concedes that he acted in the manner described
by Appellee at the PFA hearing, but argues that his behavior, while it may be
considered “rude,” “fall[s] far short of the definition of abuse as set forth in
the statute.” Appellant’s Brief, at 11. Moreover, Appellant asserts that
Appellee “never testified to being afraid of or even having a fear of
Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13. We disagree.
Appellant’s behavior falls squarely within the definition of abuse in
Section 6102(a) which includes “[k]nowingly engaging in a course of conduct
or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including following the
person, without proper authority, under circumstances which place the
person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). Appellant
does not contest Appellee’s assertions that he repeatedly followed her in his
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vehicle, in the local grocery store, at sporting events, and in other locations.
Appellant does not deny that he kept track of Appellee’s whereabouts, and
constantly drove past her home and honked the car horn. Appellant
concedes that he tried to yell to Appellee while talking to their children on
the telephone despite a court order requiring him to communicate through a
court-monitored application. This course of conduct constitutes abuse within
the definition set forth under the PFA Act.
We also reject Appellant’s assertion that Appellee never testified to
being afraid of or even having a fear of Appellant. At the hearing, Appellee
testified as follows:
You don’t know what it’s like to walk in a store and wonder
is this the time he does something, is this going to be the
time I get shot. I can’t sleep. My family is not safe. People
walk with me to and from my car at work. Why can’t I go in the
store and shop without him being behind me making noises or
letting me know he’s there[?]
When [Appellant] gets angry, I feel threatened.
When [Appellant] doesn’t like something that happens in court,
harassment happens. There’s a pattern before and after
hearings. When he doesn’t like something the Court does, you
know, he gets other people to engage in these behaviors with
him.
***
What am I to [Appellant]? If he doesn’t follow the Court
Orders and he doesn’t care when people tell him to stop, what
am I to him? Why wouldn’t he hurt me? This [PFA petition]
is the only thing, Your Honor, that has given me peace for the
last three weeks. My kids are doing better. They’re sleeping.
They’re not upset. It’s stressful when someone is screaming into
the phone. We don’t act like that at my house. It’s stressful,
and this is the only thing that has given me peace. This is the
most peace I have had in seven years. And it needs to stop.
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N.T. Hearing, 8/3/16, at 15 (emphasis added). Although Appellee did not
use the specific word “fear,” she clearly testified to her deep concern for her
safety, opining that Appellant’s behavior would eventually escalate from
repetitive stalking to seeking to cause her bodily harm. Accordingly, we
conclude there is sufficient evidence to support to justify the entry of the
PFA order as Appellant engaged in a repeated course of conduct which
placed Appellee in reasonable fear of bodily injury. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102.
Appellant also asserts that the lower court abused its discretion as the
length of the PFA order is “excessive.” Appellant’s Brief, at 15. However,
other than this bald, one-sentence assertion, Appellant offers no authority or
analysis to support this claim. “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide
any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to
develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that
claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 604 Pa. 176, 191, 985 A.2d
915, 924 (2009) (citations omitted). As a result, we find this argument is
waived for lack of development.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/14/2017
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