Com. v. Curran, W. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S75041-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    WONCIEL CURRAN,
    Appellant                 No. 1552 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order entered March 28, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0208821-2001
    BEFORE: ALLEN, LAZARUS, and MUNDY, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 01, 2014
    Wonciel Curran (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order denying
    his untimely petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
    The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history
    as follows:
    Thirteen years ago, in 2001, Appellant pled guilty to
    sexual assault and corruption of a minor and was
    sentenced to 11½ to 23 months [of incarceration,]
    followed by three years of probation.           Appellant
    subsequently violated the terms of his probation and was
    resentenced to 5 to 10 years on each charge on May 20,
    2003. No direct appeal was filed.
    Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on June 19, 2012,
    alleging that he was unlawfully induced into entering a
    plea of guilt, that his counsel was ineffective, and that his
    constitutional rights were violated. PCRA counsel was
    appointed, but he did not file an amended petition.
    Instead, counsel filed a no-merit Finley letter, alleging he
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    had reviewed the quarter session file, all available notes of
    testimony, and had corresponded with Appellant. Based
    upon his review, counsel stated that Appellant’s petition
    was untimely and that no applicable exception to the filing
    requirement applied. Accordingly, counsel sought leave to
    withdraw from the case.
    On February 24, 2014, this court gave Appellant the
    requisite notice of its intent to dismiss his petition without
    a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. [] 907(a). Appellant
    filed a timely response, but did [not] address the
    timeliness of his petition. On March 28, 2014, this court
    dismissed the petition and granted counsel’s request to
    withdraw. Appellant filed the instant appeal on April 11,
    2014.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 5/20/14, at 1-2.
    This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a
    petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
    supported   by   the   evidence   of   record   and   is   free   of   legal   error.
    Commonwealth v. Halley, 
    870 A.2d 795
    , 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA
    court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
    findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 
    768 A.2d 1164
    ,
    1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).     Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a
    hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that the petitioner’s
    claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the
    record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 
    772 A.2d 1011
    (Pa. Super. 2001).
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    J-S75041-14
    Before addressing the issues Appellant presents on appeal,1 we must
    first consider whether the PCRA court properly determined that his petition
    was untimely. The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
    Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citation
    omitted). Thus, if a petition is untimely, neither an appellate court nor the
    PCRA court has jurisdiction over the petition. 
    Id.
     “Without jurisdiction, we
    simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims”
    raised in an untimely petition. 
    Id.
    Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
    subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, an
    exception to the time for filing the petition. Commonwealth v. Gamboa-
    Taylor, 
    753 A.2d 780
    , 783 (Pa. 2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Under
    these exceptions, the petitioner must plead and prove that: “(1) there has
    been interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; or
    (2)   there   exists   after-discovered        facts   or   evidence;   or   (3)   a   new
    constitutional right has been recognized.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Appellant’s pro se brief does not include a statement of questions involved
    on appeal, and otherwise fails to comply with the briefing requirements of
    the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. We do not dispose of
    Appellant’s appeal based upon a defective brief, however, because the
    untimeliness of his PCRA petition is evident.               See generally,
    Commonwealth v. Snyder, 
    870 A.2d 336
     (Pa. Super. 2005).
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    J-S75041-
    14 A.2d 586
    , 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).          A PCRA petition
    invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within sixty days of
    the date the claim first could have been presented.” Gamboa-Taylor, 753
    A.2d at 783. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Moreover, exceptions to
    the time restrictions of the PCRA must be pled in the petition, and may not
    be raised for the first time on appeal.     Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    936 A.2d 521
    , 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not
    raised before the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first
    time on appeal.”).
    Because Appellant did not file a direct appeal to this Court following
    the imposition of his revocation sentence, his judgment of sentence became
    final on June 19, 2003, thirty days after the time for filing a direct appeal to
    this Court had expired.    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).     Therefore, Appellant
    had to file his petition by June 19, 2004, in order for it to be timely.     As
    Appellant filed the instant motion on June 19, 2012, it is untimely unless he
    has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated
    exceptions applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 
    741 A.2d 1258
    , 1261
    (Pa. 1999).
    Appellant has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s
    time bar. Appellant’s pro se brief presents a rambling, unintelligible
    discourse involving many federal and state statutes, as well as the perceived
    constitutional infirmities to his convictions.   To the extent we understand
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    them, none of Appellant’s assertions reference the pertinent provisions of
    the PCRA, or establish any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar. Thus,
    the PCRA court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
    Appellant’s PCRA petition.    We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order
    denying Appellant post-conviction relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/1/2014
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