Com. v. Perfetto, M. ( 2017 )

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2017 PA Super 281COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
v. :
:
MARC PERFETTO, :
:
Appellee : No. 2479 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 13, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0013338-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, PANELLA, LAZARUS, OTT, STABILE,
DUBOW, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.
DISSENTING OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2017
This case involves the issue of the applicability of the compulsory
joinder rule set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 ("Section 110") when the
Commonwealth has charged a defendant with both summary and
misdemeanor traffic offenses. I respectfully dissent and disagree with the
Majority’s analysis because the legislation setting forth the jurisdiction of
Municipal Court vests jurisdiction to hear both types of offenses in not only
in Municipal Court as a whole, but also the General Division of Municipal
Court. Therefore, since the Commonwealth could have prosecuted the
Appellee for both types of charges in the General Division of Municipal Court,
but instead attempted to prosecute him in the different divisions of Municipal
Court, Rule 110 bars the Commonwealth from now prosecuting the
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misdemeanor charges. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of the Motion to
Dismiss.
Section 110 protects a defendant’s double jeopardy rights where the
Commonwealth initially declines to prosecute the defendant for the present
offense, electing to proceed on different charges stemming from the same
criminal episode. Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 628 (Pa. 2010)
(citations omitted).
Section 110 serves two major policies of protecting defendants from
governmental harassment and promoting judicial economy:
[T]o protect accused persons from governmental harassment of
undergoing successive trials for offenses stemming from the
same episode, and to promote judicial economy and finality by
avoiding repetitious litigation. By requiring compulsory joinder
of all charges arising from the same criminal episode, a
defendant need only once run the gauntlet and confront the
awesome resources of the state.
Commonwealth v. George, 38 A.3d 893, 896 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
We must strictly construe the compulsory joinder statute, which is a
penal statute pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1). Commonwealth v.
Fithian, 599 Pa. 180, 961 A2d 68, 74. Although we need not give the words
of the compulsory joinder statute their narrowest meaning or entirely
disregard legislative intent, “if an ambiguity exists in the verbiage of a penal
statute, such language should be interpreted in the light most favorable to
the accused.” Id. (citations omitted). “[W]here doubt exists concerning the
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proper scope of a penal statute, it is the accused who should receive the
benefit of such doubt.” Id. (citations and quotation omitted).
Section 110 provides that if the Commonwealth prosecutes a
defendant on certain charges, the Commonwealth is barred from prosecuting
the defendant again on charges stemming from the same criminal episode if
the Commonwealth could have prosecuted the defendant on the other
charges in the first prosecution:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in section 109 of this title . . .
and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant
could have been convicted on the first
prosecution; [or]
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or
arising from the same criminal episode, if
such offense was known to the appropriate
prosecuting officer at the time of the
commencement of the first trial and
occurred within the same judicial district as
the former prosecution unless the court
ordered a separate trial of the charge of
such offense[.]
18 a.C.S. § 110 (emphasis added).
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The issue in this case, therefore, deals with whether the
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction and the
subsequent prosecution is for “any offense of which the
defendant could have been convicted on the first
prosecution.” Section 110(a)(i). In other words, was there a
jurisdictional bar that prevented the Commonwealth from
prosecuting the defendant for all offenses in one proceeding.
More specifically and as applied to this case, the
Commonwealth prosecuted the Appellee for a summary traffic
offense in Traffic Division of Municipal Court and deferred
prosecuting him for the misdemeanor charges. The issue in this
case, therefore, is whether the court that convicted the defendant
on the summary offenses had the jurisdictional authority to convict
him of the misdemeanor offenses. As discussed in greater detail
below, we conclude that because the Appellee was convicted in
Municipal Court and Municipal Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
both summary and misdemeanor charges, Rule 110 barred the
prosecution of the misdemeanor offenses.1
1
My analysis of the jurisdictional issue differs from the Majority in that the
Majority concludes that under Rule 110, “jurisdiction is no longer an element
of the compulsory joinder test,” but concludes is still “implicit to any
compulsory joinder analysis.” I disagree. Rule 110(i) clearly imposes the
jurisdictional requirement by providing that the compulsory joinder rule
applies if the defendant “could have been convicted” in the first prosecution.
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Before 2013, Philadelphia had two separate courts that dealt with
summary and misdemeanor traffic offenses. Summary traffic offenses could
only be heard in Traffic Court and misdemeanor traffic offenses could only
be heard in Municipal Court. In particular, the legislature vested in Traffic
Court “jurisdiction of all prosecutions for summary offenses arising
under . . . Title 75.” 42 Pa.C.S.A 1302 (a)(i). Similarly, the legislature
vested in Philadelphia Municipal Court jurisdiction to hear “criminal offenses
by any person . . . for which no prison term may be imposed or which are
punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years,
including indictable offenses under Title 75. 42 Pa. C.S.A. 1123(a)(2).
Because the legislature vested Traffic Court with jurisdiction “of all
prosecutions for summary offense arising under . . . Title 75,” the
Commonwealth could only prosecute summary offenses in Traffic Court and
misdemeanor traffic offenses in Municipal Court. Therefore, the
Commonwealth did not violate Rule 110 by prosecuting both types of traffic
offenses in different courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Masterson, 418
A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. Super. 1980).
In 2013, the legislature enacted legislation that abolished Traffic Court
and transferred the jurisdiction of summary traffic offenses to Municipal
In other words, if the court that adjudicated the defendant in the first
prosecution “could have” adjudicated the charges that Commonwealth tries
to prosecution in the second prosecution, Rule 110 bars the subsequent
prosecution.
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Court. More specifically, the new legislation granted to Municipal Court the
jurisdiction to hear “prosecutions for summary offenses arising under . . .
Title 75.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 1123(a)(9). As a result of this amendment, one single
court, Municipal Court, had jurisdiction over both summary and
misdemeanor traffic offenses.
The legislation also created a new division of Municipal Court: the
Traffic Division. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 1121. As a result, Municipal Court has two
divisions: the General Division and the Traffic Division. The Traffic Division
has jurisdiction over summary traffic offenses:
The Traffic Division shall, at the direction of the President Judge of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court, exercise jurisdiction under section
1123(a)(9).
42 Pa.C.S.A. 1121(c). The legislation, however, vests in the General
Division jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, both summary and misdemeanor
traffic offenses:
The General Division shall exercise full jurisdiction of the municipal
court under section 1123(a)(relating to jurisdiction and venue).
42 Pa.C.S.A. 1121(b). Since section 1123(a) includes jurisdiction over
misdemeanor and summary traffic offenses, the General Division has
jurisdiction over both types of cases. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 1123(a)(2) and 42
Pa.C.S.A. 1123(a)(9).
Thus, the legislature created a statutory scheme in which the General
Division would hear those cases in which the Commonwealth charged a
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defendant with both summary and misdemeanor traffic offenses and the
Traffic Division would hear those cases in which the Commonwealth only
charged a defendant with a summary offense.
In this case, the Commonwealth charged the Appellee with both
summary and misdemeanor traffic offenses and attempted to prosecute the
charges separately. As discussed above, once the legislature abolished Traffic
Court and transferred jurisdiction of summary traffic offenses to Municipal
Court, one single court had jurisdiction to adjudicate both summary and
misdemeanor traffic offenses. There is nothing in the legislation that limits
Municipal Court’s authority to hear both types of cases. Thus, Rule 110
mandates that the Commonwealth prosecute both types of offenses together
in Municipal Court.
The Majority Opinion, when addressing the jurisdictional bar, interprets
the legislation that abolished traffic court as vesting exclusive jurisdiction to
hear summary offenses in Traffic Division. I disagree. There is no provision in
the legislation that vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Traffic Division. In fact,
the clear and unambiguous language of the legislation does the opposite. It
vests in the General Division the jurisdictional authority to adjudicate both
types of charges. In other words, the legislation devises a statutory scheme
in which the Traffic Division adjudicates cases in which the Commonwealth is
only prosecuting summary traffic offenses and the General Division when the
Commonwealth is prosecuting summary and misdemeanor traffic offenses.
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The Majority Opinion in concluding that the Traffic Division has
exclusive jurisdiction over summary traffic offenses also relies upon the
authority of the Supreme Court “by general rule provide for the assignment
and reassignment of classes of matters among several courts of this
Commonwealth and the magisterial district judges as the needs of justice
shall require . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 503(a).2 The Majority Opinion argues that the
Supreme Court, through the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
assigned the summary traffic offenses to the Traffic Division of Municipal
Court. Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 1001(A). In particular, the Majority Opinion relies upon
the definition of a “Municipal Court Case” which includes “any offense under
the Vehicle Code other than a summary offense.” The comment to the rule
provides that summary traffic offenses “are under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court Traffic Division …” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1001(D), cmt.
As discussed above, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s
interpretation of these provisions as vesting in the Traffic Division exclusive
jurisdiction over summary traffic offenses. First, such an interpretation is
contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute that vests in
the General Division the authority to adjudicate both summary and
misdemeanor offenses. Since the legislature vested jurisdiction of summary
offenses in both the General Division and Traffic Division, there is no
2
We note that 503(b) also requires the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
to report such rules to the General Assembly for approval either by vote or
failure to vote.
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statutory basis to interpret this rule and comment as vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the Traffic Division.
Moreover, the better interpretation is that the comment addresses
those cases in which the Commonwealth has only charged the defendant with
a summary offense and the Traffic Division is the appropriate division to hear
the summary traffic offense.
I also respectfully disagree with the Concurring Opinion and its
reliance on Section 112(1). As an initial matter, the Concurring Opinion
interprets Section 112(1) expansively and in such a way as to limit an
accused rights set forth in the Section 110. It is well established that we
should interpret ambiguities in statutes in the light most favorable to the
accused. Commonwealth v. Fithian, supra at 74.
In particular, the Concurring Opinion argues that since the
Commonwealth prosecuted the defendant in the Traffic Division of Municipal
Court and the judges in the Traffic Division only have the authority to hear
summary offenses, the Traffic Division lacked the jurisdiction to hear the
misdemeanor and the exception to the compulsory joinder rule set forth in
Section 112(1) applies.
Section 112(1) applies when “the former prosecution was before a
court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.” (emphasis
added). In this case, the legislature clearly granted to Municipal Court
jurisdiction over both summary and misdemeanor traffic offenses. 42 Pa.C.S.
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1123(a). Thus, the prosecution of the summary offense in the Traffic Division
was a prosecution before Municipal Court, which had jurisdiction to hear
both types of offense, and Section 112(1) does not apply.
The Concurring Opinion further relies on the fact that the judges in the
Traffic Division lacked the authority to hear misdemeanor offenses and
concludes that this limited authority of the judges is a sufficient jurisdictional
bar to permit separate prosecutions. Although the judges in the Traffic
Division have limited authority, Section 112(1) applies only when the “court,”
and not “division of a court,” lacked jurisdiction to hear the prior prosecution.
As discussed throughout, Municipal Court always had jurisdiction to hear both
types of cases.
The reason the Commonwealth prosecuted the summary offenses
separately from the misdemeanor offense is not based on any jurisdictional
bar. Rather, it is based on the administration of Municipal Court erroneously
listing summary traffic offenses separately from misdemeanor traffic
offenses. As a result of this administration decision, the defendant is deprived
of his right in Section 110 to be prosecuted in one proceeding for multiple
offenses arising from the same criminal episode. For this reason, I
respectfully dissent.
In conclusion, I find that Section 110 applies to this case and would
affirm Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss.
PJE Bender and Judge Lazarus join this dissenting opinion.
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