Com. v. German Santos, J. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S47034-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JOSE M. GERMAN SANTOS,                     :
    :
    Appellant               :       No. 473 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 12, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000197-2017
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                    FILED: OCTOBER 15, 2019
    Jose M. German Santos (“Santos”) appeals from the Order denying his
    Petition for Relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1
    Counsel for Santos has filed a Petition to Withdraw from representation, and
    a No-Merit/Turner Finley Brief.2 We grant counsel’s Petition to Withdraw,
    and affirm the Order of the PCRA court.
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    2  See Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). See
    also Commonwealth v. Widgins, 
    29 A.3d 816
    , 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    (recognizing that filing a no-merit brief may fulfill counsel’s obligation to file a
    no-merit letter, provided that the brief contains all the information that must
    be included in a no-merit letter).
    J-S47034-19
    In its Opinion, the PCRA court summarized the relevant history
    underlying this appeal as follows:
    On October 16, 2017[, Santos] pled guilty to Count 1 – Possession
    with Intent to Deliver (PWID) Marijuana; Count 6 – Driving Under
    the Influence, Controlled Substance, and Count 7 – Driving Under
    the Influence [], Controlled Substance Impaired Ability.[3] On
    November 20, 2017, [Santos] was sentenced to undergo a period
    of incarceration of seventy-two hours to six months in the Luzerne
    County Correctional Facility, Alcohol Highway Safety School, a
    twelve[-]month license suspension, and a $1,000.00 fine.
    [Santos] was also sentenced to two years [of] probation for Count
    1[,] to run consecutive to Count 6.[FN] [Santos] did not file any
    post-sentence motions or appeals. On October 12, 2018, [Santos]
    filed a PCRA Petition. On January 24, 2019[, Santos,] through
    appointed counsel, filed a supplemental PCRA Petition…. [T]he
    issue [Santos] pursued at the PCRA hearing[,] held on February
    28, 2019[,] was trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing
    to advise him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.
    [FN]   Counts 6 and 7 merged for sentencing purposes.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 3/12/19, at 1-2 (one footnote added, one footnote in
    original).
    Following a hearing, the          PCRA court denied Santos’s Petition.
    Thereafter, Santos flied the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
    Prior to addressing the merits of the issue raised in counsel’s No-Merit
    Brief, we must determine whether counsel met the procedural requirements
    to withdraw. Counsel seeking to withdraw in PCRA proceedings
    ____________________________________________
    3   See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1), (2).
    -2-
    J-S47034-19
    must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must
    then submit a “no-merit” letter to the PCRA court, or brief on
    appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s
    diligent review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner
    wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack
    merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.
    Counsel must also send to the petitioner[] (1) a copy of the “no-
    merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw;
    and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro
    se or by new counsel.
    Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that satisfy
    the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court … must then
    conduct its own review of the merits of the case. If the court
    agrees with counsel that the claims are without merit, the court
    will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.
    Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 
    141 A.3d 509
    , 510-11 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (corrections and some quotations and citations omitted).
    Here, counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for
    withdrawing as PCRA counsel. Counsel has provided Santos with a copy of
    the Petition and the No-Merit Brief, and advised Santos of his right to proceed
    pro se or with private counsel. See Petition to Withdraw at 1. Santos has
    neither retained private counsel nor submitted any pro se filings to this Court.
    Accordingly, we next address Santos’s substantive claims to determine
    whether they lack merit.
    In the No-Merit Brief, Santos claims that his guilty plea counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by permitting him to plead guilty, “without informing
    him of the potential for deportation.” No-Merit Brief at 5. Santos argues that
    -3-
    J-S47034-19
    his plea counsel was aware that Santos was not a United States citizen, and
    that he could be deported for pleading guilty. 
    Id.
    As this Court has explained,
    [w]hen reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must
    determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the
    record and free of legal error. Generally, we are bound by a PCRA
    court’s credibility determinations. However, with regard to a
    court’s legal conclusions, we apply a de novo standard.
    Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    206 A.3d 1
    , 6 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted).
    To be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
    basis existed for counsel’s action or omission; and (3) there is a reasonable
    probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent
    such error. Commonwealth v. Steele, 
    961 A.2d 786
    , 796 (Pa. 2008). With
    regard to the second, i.e., the “reasonable basis” prong, this Court will
    conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if the
    appellant proves that “an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success
    substantially greater than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    899 A.2d 1060
    , 1064 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). To establish
    the third prong, i.e., prejudice, the appellant must show that there is a
    reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
    different but for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Dennis,
    
    950 A.2d 945
    , 954 (Pa. 2008).
    -4-
    J-S47034-19
    In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law regarding an
    ineffectiveness claim relating to advice to a non-citizen about the risks of
    deportation, addressed Santos’s claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See
    PCRA Court Opinion, 3/12/19, at 3-5. The PCRA court’s findings are supported
    in the record, and its legal conclusions are sound. See 
    id.
     We therefore affirm
    on the basis of the PCRA court’s Opinion, with regard to Santos’s claim of
    ineffective assistance of plea counsel. See 
    id.
    We further agree with counsel’s assessment that the appeal lacks merit
    and is frivolous. Consequently, we grant counsel’s Petition to Withdraw from
    representation.
    Petition to Withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/15/2019
    -5-
    Circulated 09/10/2019 03:31 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COlVlMON PLEAS
    OF LUZERNE COUNTY
    CO:MMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :
    v.                                               CRilvfINAL DIVISION
    JOSE M. GERMAN SANTOS                                        NO: 197 OF 2017·
    INMATE NO:
    MEMORANDUM
    I.         INTRODUCTION
    This memorandum is filed to address the issues raised in the Petition for Post
    Conviction Collaieral Relief (hereinafter "PCRA") by Defendant, Jose German Santos, on
    October 12, 2018: At the PCRA hearing on February 27, 2019, Defendant pursued the allegation
    of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him _of the deportation consequences of
    his guilty plea agreement.
    II.        PROCEDURAL IDSTORY
    On October 16, 2017 Defendant pled guilty to Count I -Possession with Intent to
    Deliver (PWID) Marijuana; Count 6 - Driving Under the Influence, Controlled Substance; and
    Count 7 - Driving Under the Influence (DUI), Controlled Substance Impaired Ability. On
    November 20, 2017, Defendant was sentenced to undergo a periodof incarceration of seventy-
    two hours to six months in the Luzerne County Correctional Facility, Alcohol Highway Safety
    School, a twelve month licensesuspension, _and a $1,000.0d fine. Defendant was also sentenced
    to two years probation for Count 1 to run consecutive to Count 6.1 Defendant did not file any. .
    post-sentence motions or appeals. On October 12, 2018, Defendant filed a PCRA Petition. On
    .    .     I
    1
    Counts 6 and 7 merged for sentencing purposes.
    Court Attachment A
    January 24, 2019 Defendant;· through appointed· counsel, filed a supplemental PCRA Petition.
    As previously indicated, the issue Defendant pursued at the PCRA hearing held on February 27,
    2019 was trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to advise him of the deportation
    consequences of his guilty plea.
    
    ID.
        LEGAL ANALYSIS
    To be eligible for relief under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) of the Post Conviction Relief
    Act, .a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "ineffective
    assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
    determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innoc.ence could have taken place."
    '
    Commonwealth v. Hickman, 
    799 A.2d 136
    , 140 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting 42 Pa.G.-�.A. §
    9543(a)(2)(ii)). :
    There is a-presumption that counsel is effective. Commonwealth v. Cross, 
    634 A.2d 173
    ,.
    175 (Pa� 1993) (citing Commonwealth�: Pierce, 
    527 A.2d 973
    , 975 (Pa. 1987)). Defendant
    bears the burden of proving counsel's ineffectiveness and that burden does not shift. Cross, 634
    A.2(j at 175 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones., 
    471 A.2d 879
     (Pa. 1984)).
    For a Defendant to prevail on   an ineffectiveness claim, he must satisfy a jhree-prong test
    and demonstrate �t: "(l � his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of
    · conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
    interests; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the
    outcome of the proceedings would have been different." Commonwealth v.          AIL 
    10 A.3d 282
    ,
    291 (Pa. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 
    786 A.2d 203
    , 213 (Pa 2001));
    Comm.on�ealth v. Kiroballzl 
    724 A.2d 326
    , 333 (Pa. 1999). "A failure to satisfy any prong of the
    .                         .
    ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v.
    baniels, 
    963 A.2d 409
    , 419 (Pa 2009) (ci�g Commonwealth v. Sneed, 
    899 A.2d 1067
    , 1076
    (Pa. 2006)). With regard to counsel not having a reasonable basis for his action, his approach
    '
    must be "so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen it." Commonwealth v.
    . � 
    766 A.2d 859
    , 862-63 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller� 431 A.2d .
    .                                                       -
    233, 234 (Pa. 1981)). Finally, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue-a
    meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Loner, 
    836 A.2d 125
    , 132 (Pa. Super. 2003). ·
    ·   Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with a guilty plea will not justify relief
    unless the ineffectiveness of counsel caused defendant to enter. an involuntary or unknowing
    plea, Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
    995 A.2d 1184
    , 1192 (Pa. Super. 2010). If the defendant
    enters a plea onthe advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the ple� depends on whether
    counsel's advice was within the range of competence which would be expected of attorneys in
    criminal cases. 
    Id.
     A valid guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered.
    It is clear that counsel must inform a noncitizen defendant .as to the risk of deportation
    that may.result from aguilty plea. Padilla v. Kentucky, 
    559 U.S. 356
    , 369 (2010). However, our
    Supreme Court has interpreted Padilla as requiring counsel to inform a defendant as to the risk of
    deportation, not as to its certainty. Commonwealth v. McDermitt, 
    66 A.3d 810
    , 814 (Pa. Super.
    .                     .
    2013). When the risk of deportation is clear, "theduty to give correct advice is equally clear."
    Padilla, 
    559 U.S. at 368
    . However, giving correct advice does not necessarily mean that counsel ·
    . :,•
    must tell a defendant he would definitely be deported. C4:1rtnnonwealth v. Escobar. 
    70 A.3d 838
    ,
    841 (Pa. Super. 2013). As the court noted in Escobar, there is po guarantee that.the United States
    Attorney General would take all the steps necessary to carry out defendant's deportation. 
    Id.
    Here, Defendant alleged that he entered a guilty plea to .PWID Marijuana; DUI,
    Controlled Substance; and DUI, Controlled Substance Impaired Ability, without being advised
    .                                        .
    as to the deportation co�equences of his plea by counsel. Defendant testified that he would not
    have pled guilty had he know he would be deported .. (Notes of Testimony, In re: PCRA Hearing,
    February 27, 2019, (Vough, J.) (hereinafter "N.T._'') at 5).
    Defendant. retained Joseph Sklarosky, Sr., Esq. (hereinafter "Attorney Sklarosky"),
    . .
    a
    criminal defense attorney with forty..five years of experience, to represent him in connection with
    the criminal case. :CN-T. 8-9). Defendant retained Attorney Sklarosky prior to -�e preliminary
    hearing and he was aware that Defendant was not a United States citizen. (N.T. 9, 12). · Attorney
    Sklarosky knew that a guilty plea to the charges filed against Defendant could subjecthim to
    •                 I
    deportation. (N.T.: 13, 15).
    Defendant eventually pled guilty to PWID Marijuana; DUI, Controlled Substance; and
    DUI, Controlled Substance Impaired Ability. The negotiated plea agreement was favorable to
    ..                    I                  .
    Defendant. Prior to pleading guilty, Attorney Sklarosky advised Defendant that he could be
    .   ·,
    subject to deportation as Defendant
    ..
    completed
    .
    Attorney Sklarosky's intake form, which
    indicated that Defendant was not a U.S. citizen and had a green card. (N.T. 9-10; 12, C-1; 12-
    13). Attorney Sklarosky testified that it is bis normal practice to refer all criminal clients who
    are not U.S. citizens charged with misdemeanors or felonies and facing possible deportation to a
    local immigration attorney. (N.T. 9-10, 13, 15-16). Attorney Sklarosky followed bis normal
    ·.. practice. in this case and gave the Defendant a business card for a local immigration attorney
    priorto the plea hearing on October 16, 2017. (N.T. 6, 12-13). Defendant was made aware of the
    •
    possible deportation consequences of his .plea by Attorney Sklarosky as Defendant testified that
    he received the immigration attorney's business card, but did not contact the immigration:
    attorney. (N.T. 6).
    Additionally, this Court found the testimony presented by Attorney Sklarosky at the
    PCRA Hearing to be credible. He followed his normal practice by advising the Defendant that
    his guilty plea may res,ult in deportation and gave the Defendant an immigration attorney's
    business card. The Defendant admitted to receiving the immigration attorney's phone number,
    but failed to contact the attorney, Accordingly, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim lacks merit as
    Attorney Sklarosky provided the requisit� advice reg�,g his plea and deportation
    consequences; Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered-into his guilty plea
    agreement. Therefore, Defendant's. Petition for Post Conviction Relief raises no issues of merit
    I                                                                          •
    and must be denied.
    BY TIIE COURT:
    �7[/J
    :MICHAEL T. VOUGH,            J.