In the Int. of: I.S., Appeal of: M.K. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: M. K., MOTHER :
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: No. 204 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 19, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001641-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.M.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: M. K., MOTHER :
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: No. 205 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 19, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000099-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 8, 2022
In these consolidated cases, M.K. (“Mother”) appeals nunc pro tunc from
the decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
I.M.S., born in September 2019, and the order changing the child’s
permanency goal from reunification to adoption. In addition, Mother’s counsel
has filed in this Court a petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief
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pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm and grant
the petition to withdraw.
We begin with an overview of the relevant facts and procedural history.
Mother had participated in a methadone program for seven years prior to and
throughout her pregnancy with I.M.S. N.T., 4/19/21, at 80-81. Nonetheless,
she relapsed three times during the pregnancy, and I.M.S.’s meconium
contained methadone and opiates after her birth. Id. at 72, 80-81. As a
result of her prenatal exposure to drugs, I.M.S. suffered from neonatal
abstinence syndrome, i.e., withdrawal, and she was transferred to the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”). Id. at 28, 66-68, 71-72. I.M.S.
experienced vomiting, diarrhea, sleep difficulties, tremors, and prolonged
crying. Id. at 66. She needed a feeding tube to eat because she was not
receiving enough calories from bottle feeding. Id.
I.M.S. spent six weeks in the NICU. On October 21, 2019, when I.M.S.
was ready for discharge, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) obtained a protective custody order from the Family Court of
Philadelphia County and removed her from Mother’s custody. DHS then filed
a dependency petition, citing concerns regarding Mother’s ongoing substance
abuse, suspected intimate partner violence between Mother and C.S.
(“Father”), and Mother’s housing instability. On October 30, 2019, the trial
court adjudicated I.M.S. dependent pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) of the
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Juvenile Act. The trial court ordered Mother to participate in random drug
screening and services for dual diagnosis (i.e., substance abuse and mental
health), parenting, housing, and employment. The court permitted Mother to
have visitation with I.M.S. under supervision.
On February 22, 2021, sixteen months after I.M.S. entered foster care,
DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 It also filed a petition seeking
to change I.M.S.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.
The trial court conducted a joint hearing on DHS’s petitions on April 19,
2021. At the time of the hearing, I.M.S. was nineteen months old and
represented by Joshua Weil, Esquire.2 DHS presented the testimony of
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1DHS also filed a petition to terminate involuntarily Father’s parental rights.
The court conducted a joint hearing on the petitions and ultimately terminated
Father’s parental rights as well as Mother’s. Father did not file an appeal or
participate in Mother’s appeal.
2 Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua sponte that the
trial court appointed counsel to represent a child’s legal interest in a contested
termination of parental rights hearing pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), and
if counsel served in a dual role as guardian ad litem, that the trial court
determined before appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s
best and legal interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa.
2020). If a child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the
outcome of the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and
best interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018).
During the joint evidentiary hearing, after Attorney Weil entered his
appearance on I.M.S.’s behalf as “GAL and Child Advocate,” Mother requested
that the court appoint legal counsel for I.M.S. N.T., 4/19/21, at 10-11. Citing
T.S., supra, the court ultimately denied Mother’s request. Id. at 11. It
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Spencer Vaye, who was a case manager from the Community Umbrella
Agency (“CUA”) that DHS assigned to work with the family. It also presented
the testimony of J.E. (“Foster Mother”), who, along with her husband, has
been providing foster care to I.M.S. since her discharge from the NICU.
Finally, Mother testified on her own behalf. After placing findings of fact on
the record, the court announced its decision to grant DHS’s petition under all
subsections pleaded. It entered a formal decree the same day. It also entered
a court order in the dependency matter changing I.M.S.’s permanency goal
from reunification to adoption.
One day after the appeal period expired, Mother’s counsel filed petitions
at the adoption docket and the dependency docket requesting to file an appeal
nunc pro tunc. The trial court denied the petitions, and Mother appealed to
this Court. Holding that Mother’s counsel was per se ineffective in failing to
file timely notices of appeals, this Court reversed the trial court’s orders
denying the petitions for nunc pro tunc relief and remanded for reinstatement
of Mother’s appellate rights and appointment of new counsel. Interest of
I.M.S., 267 A.3d 1262, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2021).
On remand, the trial court reinstated Mother’s appellate rights and
appointed Claire Leotta, Esquire, to represent Mother. Attorney Leotta filed
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determined that one-year-old I.M.S. was unable to communicate her
preference and understand the termination proceedings. Id. at 11-14.
Attorney Weil concurred in the court’s assessment. Id. at 12. Given I.M.S.’s
age, the trial court complied with T.S., supra, and K.M.G., supra.
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the instant notices of appeal nunc pro tunc together with a concise statement
of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On
January 25, 2022, the trial court issued an order referring this Court to its
statements in the record at the conclusion of the hearing in lieu of a written
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Attorney Leotta then filed a petition
to withdraw and an accompanying Anders brief in this Court. Mother has not
filed a response.
We begin by addressing the petition to withdraw and Anders brief filed
by Mother’s counsel. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639
(Pa.Super. 2005) (“‘When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court
may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on
the request to withdraw.’”) (citation omitted); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d
1267 (Pa.Super. 1992) (extending the Anders procedure to appeals from
involuntary termination decrees).
To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted).
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With respect to the third Anders requirement, this Court has held
counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to
their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock,
873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa.Super. 2005).
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directed that Anders
briefs must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, supra, at 361.
Here, Attorney Leotta avers in her petition to withdraw that she has
determined Mother’s appeal is frivolous after conducting a thorough and
conscientious examination of the record. Attorney Leotta avers she mailed
Mother a letter explaining her rights and has attached a copy of the letter to
the petition to withdraw and Anders brief. Attorney Leotta’s letter complies
with our law, as it informs Mother that she may retain new counsel or proceed
pro se and raise any additional arguments she deems worthy of our attention.
Attorney Leotta’s Anders brief includes a summary of the facts, procedural
history of this case, two issues that could arguably support Mother’s appeal,
and an assessment of why those issues are frivolous, with citations to the
record and relevant legal authority. As Attorney Leotta has complied
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substantially with Anders, we review the issues presented in her brief. We
also “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there are any
additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v.
Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Commonwealth
v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (describing our
duty as a “simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face
to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or
misstated”).
Attorney Leotta identifies two issues for our consideration.
1. Whether the Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to
prove by clearing [sic] and convincing evidence that [M]other’s
parental rights should have been terminated pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) since she had
substantially completed her objectives as required?
2. Whether there was a strong emotional and parental bond
between [Mother and I.M.S.] which would have had a negative
effect on [I.M.S.] if the parental bond was permanently
severed?
Anders brief at 5.
We review these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
“In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate
review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination
court is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255
A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When applying this standard, the appellate court
must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if
they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123
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(Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the
evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of
L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).
“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support
an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to
trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
Interest of S.K.L.R., supra, at 1123-24.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must
balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs
for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., supra, at 358.
Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences
for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., supra, at 591. As such, the law of
this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory
grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,
supra, at 359 (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds describing
particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary termination.”
C.M., supra, at 359; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In evaluating
whether the petitioner proved grounds under subsection 2511(a), the trial
court must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best
interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa.Super.
2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for
termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the
court then must assess the petition under subsection 2511(b), which focuses
on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
We analyze the court’s decision pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b) of the
Adoption Act:3
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
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3 This Court need only agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition
to § 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).
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continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
....
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
To satisfy § 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must show three components:
(1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent for at least
12 months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177
A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Unlike other subsections, § 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to
evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to
the placement of the children. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa.Super.
2017). “[T]he relevant inquiry” regarding the second prong of § 2511(a)(8)
“is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus
whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the
hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Further, the Adoption
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Act prohibits the court from considering, as part of the § 2511(a)(8) analysis,
“any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described [in the petition]
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
Although § 2511(a) generally focuses on the behavior of the parent, the
third prong of § 2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the needs of the child.”
In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court
has recognized “that the application of [§ 2511(a)(8)] may seem harsh when
the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that
had led to the removal of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led
to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates
only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to
complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child
who has been placed in foster care.
Id.Instantly, the trial court determined that DHS removed I.M.S. from
Mother’s custody due to Mother’s substance abuse more than a year before
DHS filed the petition to terminate parental rights, the conditions leading to
removal continued to exist because Mother had only recently begun
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addressing some of the circumstances that brought I.M.S. into care, and
termination of Mother’s parental rights met I.M.S.’s needs and welfare
because Mother has not established stability to care for I.M.S., particularly
with I.M.S.’s medical needs. N.T., 4/19/21, at 103-111. The trial court
recognized that Mother had made some progress, but concluded DHS proved
that Mother’s recent sobriety and erratic lifestyle were still too unstable. Id.In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied upon the following facts,
all of which are supported by the certified record. As described supra, DHS
removed I.M.S. upon her discharge from the NICU, where she spent six weeks
suffering from opiate withdrawal. Mother visited I.M.S. twice under
supervision early in her dependency. Id. at 52. On January 22, 2020, Mother
was informed I.M.S. required surgery to correct a tongue tie that was causing
significant difficulty with her feeding. The trial court provided Mother with
seven days to contact I.M.S.’s doctor, but she did not do so. Id. at 36, 95.
I.M.S.’s surgery was delayed in part because DHS had to obtain an order from
the trial court permitting DHS to consent to the surgery in Mother’s absence.
Id. at 37, 46-47.
After the January 2020 review hearing, Mother’s whereabouts were
unknown to DHS for nine months. During this time, Mother did not visit with
I.M.S. Similarly, although Mother admitted that she had the case manager’s
contact information, she did not contact the agency. Id. at 96. According to
Mother’s testimony, she had been evicted from her house and was homeless
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without a phone during this time. Id. at 90. Mother did not resurface until
October 2020, when she enrolled in an inpatient substance abuse program at
the Kirkbride Center in Philadelphia. She did not inform DHS of this
development. DHS only learned Mother had enrolled at Kirkbride through
I.M.S.’s maternal uncle. See id. at 51-52. This program was Mother’s first
attempt at drug treatment since I.M.S. was born addicted to opiates thirteen
months earlier.4 Id. at 51, 81. She then transitioned to a recovery facility at
Joy of Living on December 15, 2020. Id. at 34, 81, 96. Mother was six
months clean at the time of the evidentiary hearing, but she was still at Joy
of Living and was not yet living independently in the community. Id. at 85,
88, 93.
Mother did not engage mental health counseling, despite the court-
ordered requirement that she receive both mental health and substance abuse
counseling. Id. at 36, 64-65. Moreover, she made little progress on her
court-ordered goal to enroll in parenting, she only attended one class one
week before the hearing, which obviously was after DHS filed the petition. Id.
at 92-93. At the time of the hearing, Mother was unemployed and had no
income. Id. at 36. Although she was approved to obtain housing through the
Joy of Living program, she had not acquired it yet. Id. at 89. Finally, in
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4 Mother had been enrolled in a methadone program for seven years prior to
I.M.S.’s birth. It is unclear from the record whether she continued to attend,
but even if she did, this program did not prevent her from relapsing during
her pregnancy.
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addition to the two visitations that Mother attended early in the case, she
visited I.M.S. only two other times: a virtual visit on February 25, 2021, and
an in-person supervised visit on March 12, 2021. Id. at 44, 52, 86.
Based upon these facts, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of
law in the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions leading to I.M.S.’s
removal continued to exist more than twelve months after her removal. While
Mother finally confronted her persistent substance abuse, the remaining
conditions were largely unaddressed. Her visitations with I.M.S. and her
contact with service providers continued to be sporadic, and Mother did not
progress toward her court-ordered parenting goal, find employment, or
address her mental health problems. Ultimately, Mother has not
demonstrated a measure of stability that would support a finding that she is
capable of overcoming the impediments to caring for I.M.S. or addressing the
child’s medical needs. As the court was within its discretion to decline to
subordinate I.M.S.’s need for permanency in order to provide Mother more
time to remedy the remaining conditions, we do not disturb its determination.
See R.J.S., supra, at 513.
We turn now to subsection (b), which requires the court to “give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra, at 628 (citation and
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quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has made clear that § 2511(b)
requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of bond between a
parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 1993). It is
reasonable to infer that no bond exists when there is no evidence suggesting
the existence of one. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762–63 (Pa.Super.
2008). To the extent there is a bond, the trial court must examine whether
termination of parental rights will destroy a “necessary and beneficial
relationship,” thereby causing a child to suffer “extreme emotional
consequences.” E.M., supra, at 484-85.
“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect
of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one
of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the
best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014).
“In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as
the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent.” Id. In determining needs and welfare, the court may properly
consider the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the child and consider
“whether a parent is capable of providing for a child’s safety and security or
whether such needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s parental
rights.” L.W., supra, at 524.
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Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates
that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” T.S.M., supra, at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the
bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed,
“[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation
to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result,
all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
The trial court determined that DHS proved its burden under subsection
2511(b). N.T., 4/19/21, at 109-11. Over the 18 months that I.M.S. spent in
foster care, she had only four visits with Mother, including three in-person
visits. As such, the court determined there was no parent-child bond formed
during this minimal contact, and therefore, no detrimental effect on I.M.S. if
the court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 109. By contrast, the
court found there was a bond between Foster Mother and I.M.S. Id. The
court observed Foster Mother has cared for I.M.S. since her birth, first as her
nurse in the NICU, and then as her foster parent since I.M.S. was six weeks
old. Id. The court credited the testimony of Mr. Vaye, who assessed the bond
between Foster Mother and I.M.S. as “perfect.” Id. at 110.
The certified record supports the court’s determination. Based on these
circumstances, the court was within its discretion to conclude that no
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meaningful bond existed between Mother and I.M.S. I.M.S.’s foster parents
are willing to adopt her, and she has only experienced their parental care. In
addition to their emotional support, foster parents ensured I.M.S. received
early intervention services and helped her work with a speech pathologist and
physical therapist. Id. at 67-68. Additionally, they ensured that I.M.S. did
not aspirate while eating prior to her tongue surgery, cared for her after the
surgery, and continue to consult with her dentist about the need for a second
surgery. Id. at 68-70.
Given I.M.S.’s young age, her lack of contact with Mother, her bond with
her foster parents, and the foster parents’ ability to attend to her medical
needs, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to protect I.M.S.’s
relationship and stability with foster parents. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[W]e agree with the court that the bond between
K.Z.S. and [his foster parent] is the primary bond to protect, given [the
child’s] young age and his very limited contact with [his mother].”). Thus,
based upon the foregoing, we agree with counsel that a challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence to support the trial court’s decision to terminate
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to subsections 2511(a) and (b) is frivolous.
Finally, in light of our duty to review the record for any arguably
meritorious issues, we observe that although Attorney Leotta filed an appeal
from the permanency review order changing I.M.S.’s permanency goal to
adoption, Attorney Leotta did not discuss whether there is an arguably
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meritorious issue relating to the goal change. Nevertheless, this issue also is
patently frivolous.
We review decisions changing a placement goal for an abuse of
discretion. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). When considering a
petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the trial court must determine
the matters set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, i.e. the
appropriateness, feasibility, and likelihood of attaining the current goal,
Mother’s progress, child’s safety, etc. In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978
(Pa.Super. 2008). In making these determinations, the best interests of the
child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. In re
A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa.Super. 2011).
Stated plainly, we find no non-frivolous issues to support Mother’s
appeal from the order changing I.M.S.’s placement goal from reunification to
adoption. Mother has been absent from I.M.S.’s life. She was not there for
I.M.S. when the child required medical treatment. In the parental void created
by Mother’s absence and her later efforts to stabilize her life, I.M.S. has
bonded to her foster parents, and is safe, stable, and secure in their care.
Accordingly, we would discern no abuse of discretion.
As our independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues,
we affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights and the order
changing I.M.S.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption, and grant
counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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Decree affirmed. Goal change order affirmed. Petition to withdraw
granted.
Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/08/2022
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