Com. v. Thompson, G. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S15030-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    GARY THOMPSON                            :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 1774 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 16, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0001679-2015
    BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED JUNE 22, 2022
    Gary Thompson (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his first
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    The PCRA court detailed the case history as follows:
    On January 29, 2015, [Appellant], in concert with three
    others, robbed Robert Gotwalt on the 3100 block of D Street in
    Philadelphia. One of the men had a gun and used it to hit Gotwalt
    several times over the head. [Appellant] and his co-defendants
    were pulled over in a vehicle shortly after the robbery and
    arrested. The gun and a [ski] mask used in the robbery were also
    found in the vehicle.
    A [consolidated, non-jury] trial was held on November 16
    and 17, 2016. At the end of the trial, [Appellant] was found guilty
    of aggravated assault, robbery, conspiracy, [several firearms
    offenses,] receiving stolen property, simple assault, recklessly
    endangering another person, and possessing an instrument of a
    crime. On February 10, 2017, [Appellant] was sentenced to an
    aggregate sentence of 3.5 to 7 years [of] incarceration, followed
    J-S15030-22
    by 2 years of probation. [Appellant] did not file a post-sentence
    motion or a notice of appeal.
    On August 10, 2017, [Appellant timely] filed a pro se PCRA
    petition, seeking reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. On
    August 30, 2017, James R. Lloyd, Esquire [(PCRA counsel)],
    entered his appearance as appointed PCRA counsel. On October
    10, 2017, [PCRA counsel] filed an amended PCRA petition. On
    February 14, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss.
    On April 9, 2018, [PCRA counsel] filed a second amended PCRA
    petition.
    On September 10, 2018, an evidentiary hearing [(PCRA
    hearing)] was held on one issue: whether [Appellant] requested
    trial counsel to file an appeal. [Appellant] testified that at both
    his trial and sentencing, he was represented by Judge Hall, Esquire
    [(Attorney Hall, trial counsel, or Hall)]. N.T., 9/10/18, p. 8-9.
    When asked about requesting Mr. Hall to file an appeal on his
    behalf, [Appellant] testified as follows:
    [APPELLANT]: At the sentencing hearing, Judge Gordon
    had made a statement where he said that he was thinking
    about the case every [sic] since trial and he said he didn’t
    know if he was sending the right people to jail.
    So as soon as I heard that, I asked [Attorney] Hall,
    when he asked me “Are you okay with the sentence,” I
    said, “Yes, but I want to file an appeal.” And he said he
    was going to talk to me and I never heard from him since.
    ***
    PCRA COUNSEL: Okay. Before that did you ever tell
    [Attorney] Hall that you wanted to file an appeal or was
    that the first time you told him?
    [APPELLANT]: That was the first time.
    PCRA COUNSEL: Did that take place -- where did this
    conversation happen?
    [APPELLANT]: As we were still sitting at the sentencing.
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    Id. at 9-10. [Appellant] further testified that after his sentencing,
    he did not attempt to contact Mr. Hall. Id. at 11. [Appellant] did
    ask his mother to reach out to Mr. Hall, but she told [Appellant]
    that she was unable to get ahold of [Hall]. Id. at 12. …
    The Commonwealth then called Attorney Hall to testify.
    Hall affirmed that he represented [Appellant] through the waiver
    trial and sentencing. Id. at 17-18. Hall also affirmed that
    [Appellant] was charged with robbery and aggravated assault and
    that the DNA found on the ski mask matched [Appellant’s DNA].
    Hall testified about [Appellant] requesting an appeal as follows:
    HALL: I spoke to [Appellant] briefly regarding an appeal,
    and I said something along the lines of — and, Judge, I’m
    paraphrasing here — I said “I can think of no meritorious
    claims.” And I indicated to [Appellant] that the DNA
    evidence that matched his DNA was not good.
    But I told him that I will take a second look at
    things, and if there were, as I recall, any meritorious
    appealable issues, then I will go on and file the appeal
    anyway and ask the Judge to appoint new counsel because
    I do not accept court appointed appeals, nor have I ever.
    COMMONWEALTH: And so this conversation that you had
    with [Appellant] regarding any potential appeal issues,
    when did that take place?
    HALL: I want to say during sentencing. I want to say it
    was either during sentencing or immediately after trial
    once the convictions were handed down. And if I recall
    correctly, [Appellant’s] response was “Okay.”
    COMMONWEALTH: And that was his response to your —
    could you explain what that was in response to?
    HALL: Sure. I told [Appellant] that if I don’t see anything
    — and that particular day I didn’t see anything — but I told
    him that I would take a look at things and see if I could
    see anything, however, if he wanted me to appeal anyway,
    I will ask the Judge to appoint new counsel or just go on
    and file the appeal.
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    And if [Appellant] came up with anything that he
    wanted me to appeal, then he could either let me know or
    have his mother give me a call. The reason I referred to
    his mother is because from my time of representing
    [Appellant], his mother and I have spoken either on the
    phone or in person approximately 15 times. She had my
    phone number. So, I recall [Appellant’s] response being
    as what I just said, “Okay.”
    COMMONWEALTH: So he didn’t ask you to file an appeal?
    HALL: Absolutely not.
    ***
    COMMONWEALTH: So what is your typical practice when
    a client asks you to file an appeal?
    HALL: If that request is made while we were still in court
    or before the Judge, I would have asked the Judge to
    formally withdraw my representation and appoint counsel.
    COMMONWEALTH: And you would have done so on the
    record?
    HALL: Absolutely.
    COMMONWEALTH: If [Appellant] had asked you to file an
    appeal?
    HALL: Absolutely.
    COMMONWEALTH: And if someone had contacted you by
    phone or letter regarding an appeal or a post sentence
    motion, what is your typical practice?
    HALL: I would have went on and filed the appeal and then
    went into Judge Gordon’s courtroom and asked him to
    appoint counsel, because I don’t accept those type of
    appointments.
    Id. at 18-22. Hall further testified that after sentencing, he did
    not receive calls, emails, or letters from [Appellant’s] mother
    requesting him to file an appeal. Id. at 22.
    -4-
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    On re-direct, Hall elaborated on the conversation he had
    with [Appellant at sentencing]:
    COMMONWEALTH: Did you tell [Appellant] that you would
    file an appeal?
    HALL: I did not.
    COMMONWEALTH: Did you explain to him that he needed
    to ask for an appeal to be filed?
    HALL: I did not say those exact words, no.
    COMMONWEALTH: So if it wasn’t in those exact words,
    what was said?
    HALL: I told [Appellant] that if he wanted me to file an
    appeal on his behalf, or have an appeal filed period, then
    he could let me know or he should let me know or either
    have his mother contact me and I will just go on and do it
    and ask the Judge to appoint counsel.
    So I told [Appellant] that if I didn’t hear from him,
    I would assume that he doesn’t want to appeal. And the
    reason I said it that [] is because [Appellant] and I had a
    fairly, somewhat lengthy conversation regarding his
    sentence. I … indicated to [Appellant] that I felt that was
    a very good sentence based on the charges he was found
    guilty of.
    Id. [at] 27-28. …
    On January 31, 2019, [the PCRA] court sent [Appellant a
    Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907 notice of intent to dismiss [Appellant’s PCRA
    petition]. On February 19, 2019, [PCRA counsel] filed a response
    to the 907 notice. On February 28, 2019, following a thorough
    review of the record, this court dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA
    petition for lack of merit.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/19, at 2-5.
    -5-
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    Appellant timely appealed, arguing Attorney Hall was ineffective for
    failing to file a requested direct appeal. On April 7, 2020, this Court vacated
    and remanded the case for the PCRA court “to make the necessary credibility
    determination regarding whether Appellant requested that Attorney Hall file a
    direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
    236 A.3d 1057
    , at *6 (Pa.
    Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum).
    On June 16, 2021, in compliance with this Court’s directive, the PCRA
    court stated on the record:
    I find credibility in favor of Attorney Hall. I do not believe
    [Appellant] requested that [Hall] take an appeal. And so, the
    petition is dismissed based upon lack of merit. I believe Attorney
    Hall when he says [Appellant] did not ask him to file an appeal.
    N.T., 6/16/21, at 5.      That same day, the PCRA court entered an order
    dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant timely appealed. Although
    the PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    of errors, it issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion in which it relied upon the rationale
    in the prior June 26, 2019, opinion. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/21/21, at
    1-2; see also id. at 2 (stating the PCRA court, “did not find [Appellant] to be
    credible and remained unconvinced that [Appellant] ever requested Hall to file
    an appeal.”).
    Appellant presents a single issue for our consideration:
    Did the PCRA Court err and/or abuse its discretion when it denied
    [Appellant’s] petition under the PCRA seeking leave to file a direct
    appeal nunc pro tunc where trial counsel failed to file an appeal?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    -6-
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    “Our standard of review for issues arising from the denial of PCRA relief
    is well-settled.   We must determine whether the PCRA court’s ruling is
    supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Spotz,
    
    171 A.3d 675
    , 678 (Pa. 2017). We review the PCRA court’s decision for an
    abuse of discretion.   Commonwealth v. Roney, 
    79 A.3d 595
    , 603 (Pa.
    2013). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred
    and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 
    219 A.3d 157
    , 161
    (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
    We view the evidence of record in a light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below. We are bound by
    the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, unless those
    determinations are not supported by the record; however, we
    review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.
    Commonwealth v. Flor, 
    259 A.3d 891
    , 902 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted);
    see also Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 
    90 A.3d 717
    , 719 (Pa. Super.
    2014) (“As an appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do we assign
    weight to any of the testimony of record.”).
    All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    of sentence becomes final.        42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also
    Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010) (courts lack
    jurisdiction to address untimely PCRA petitions). Here, Appellant timely filed
    his PCRA petition within one year of his judgment of sentence becoming final
    in March 2017.
    -7-
    J-S15030-22
    To obtain relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    PCRA petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1)
    the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) there was no reasonable basis
    for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) but for counsel’s error, there is a
    “reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been
    different.” Commonwealth v. Treiber, 
    121 A.3d 435
    , 444 (Pa. 2015); see
    also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Failure to satisfy any of the three prongs
    is fatal to an ineffectiveness claim. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    84 A.3d 294
    ,
    311 (Pa. 2014). Counsel is presumed to be effective, and it is the petitioner’s
    burden to prove otherwise. 
    Id.
    Where defense counsel inexplicably fails to file a requested direct
    appeal, we have explained that such inaction
    constitutes ineffective assistance per se, such that the petitioner
    is entitled to reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc
    without establishing prejudice. However, before a court will
    find ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to file a direct
    appeal, the petitioner must prove that he requested a
    direct appeal and counsel disregarded the request.
    Commonwealth         v.    Ousley,    
    21 A.3d 1238
    ,    1244    (Pa.   Super.
    2011) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
    Appellant argues Attorney Hall was per se ineffective for failing to file a
    requested direct appeal:
    [Appellant] indicated that he wanted to appeal. [Attorney Hall]
    stated that he would look into potential appellate issues and file
    an appeal if he found an issue that counsel considered to be
    meritorious. [Attorney Hall] did not advise that [Appellant] had a
    right to appeal regardless of trial counsel’s assessment of the
    -8-
    J-S15030-22
    merits of any potential appellate issues. Finally, the record clearly
    reflects that [Attorney Hall] instructed [Appellant] that he had to
    take any and all appellate action through counsel. [Attorney
    Hall’s] subsequent failure to file an appeal after [Appellant] told
    him that he wished to proceed with an appeal resulted in the loss
    of the opportunity to challenge the verdict and sentence on
    appeal.
    Appellant’s Brief at 24 (emphasis in original).       Appellant references his
    testimony that he expressly asked Attorney Hall to file a direct appeal. 
    Id.
     at
    29-30 (citing N.T., 9/10/18, at 10 (Appellant stating, in response to Attorney
    Hall asking Appellant at sentencing, “‘Are you okay with the sentence,’ I said,
    ‘Yes, but I want to file an appeal.’ And [Attorney Hall] said he was going to
    talk to me and I never heard from him since.”)).
    Appellant argues:
    In essence, [trial] counsel told [Appellant] that he might file an
    appeal, and then never bothered to tell [Appellant]: (1) that [trial
    counsel] had not filed an appeal; or, more importantly, (2) that
    [Appellant] had a right to file an appeal regardless of whether
    [trial counsel] wanted to file an appeal.
    Appellant’s Brief at 35.
    Critically, the PCRA court found Attorney Hall’s testimony credible and
    discredited Appellant’s testimony that he asked Attorney Hall to file an appeal.
    See N.T., 6/16/21, at 4-5; PCRA Court Opinion, 10/21/21, at 2; see also
    PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/19, at 8 (“at no point is there any statement on the
    record of [Appellant] requesting [Attorney] Hall to file a notice of appeal”;
    Appellant admitted at the PCRA hearing “he did not attempt to contact Hall at
    any time after sentencing to request that he file an appeal.”).
    -9-
    J-S15030-22
    As the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record, we may not
    disturb them. Flor, supra, at 902.
    Finally, to the extent Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to advise him that he could file a direct appeal pro se, Appellant waived
    this claim for failing to raise it in his PCRA petition or otherwise before the
    PCRA court.1 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (claims cannot be raised for the first time
    on appeal); Roney, 79 A.3d at 611 (appellant/petitioner waived issues not
    presented to the PCRA court); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (“Each ground
    relied upon in support of the relief requested shall be stated in the [PCRA]
    petition. Failure to state such a ground in the petition shall preclude the
    defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction
    collateral relief.” (emphasis added)).
    Furthermore, at sentencing, Attorney Hall informed Appellant, on the
    record, of Appellant’s right “to file an appeal asking that a higher court review
    what the judge here has done today.” N.T., 2/10/17, at 26; see also id.
    (counsel advising Appellant if he “cannot afford an attorney, one will be
    ____________________________________________
    1 A claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a requested
    direct appeal is distinct from a claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to
    consult with defendant. Compare Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 
    736 A.2d 564
    , 571-72 (Pa. 1999) (discussing claims that defense counsel abandoned
    defendant by failing to file requested direct appeal), with Commonwealth
    v. Touw, 
    781 A.2d 1250
    , 1254 (Pa. Super. 2001) (discussing claims that
    counsel failed to consult with defendant about an appeal).
    - 10 -
    J-S15030-22
    appointed to represent you.”). Appellant responded that he understood and
    did not have any questions. Id. at 26-27.
    Accordingly, since Appellant failed to plead and prove that he asked trial
    counsel to file a direct appeal, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in
    rejecting Appellant’s ineffectiveness challenge and dismissing his PCRA
    petition.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mojica, 
    242 A.3d 949
    , 956 (Pa.
    Super. 2020) (affirming denial of PCRA relief where appellant/defendant failed
    to prove he asked defense counsel to file direct appeal); see also
    Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 
    32 A.3d 706
    , 717 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“While
    counsel cannot refuse to file a direct appeal because he believes there are no
    issues to appeal, he is not required to file an appeal that is not requested.”);
    cf. Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 572-73 (holding appellant proved defense counsel’s
    ineffectiveness for failure to file a requested direct appeal, and remanding for
    reinstatement of appeal rights).
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/22/2022
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1774 EDA 2021

Judges: Murray, J.

Filed Date: 6/22/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024