Com. v. Hill, B. ( 2014 )

J-S52033-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRYAN M. HILL
Appellant No. 671 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006321-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2014
Appellant, Bryan M. Hill, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench
trial conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”)—highest
rate of alcohol.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows:
[O]n June 1, 2013, at approximately 12:05 a.m. [Officer
Alonso] heard a police dispatch call about a hit-and-run
accident in the vicinity of S. Newtown Street Rd. (Rt 252)
and Media Line Road in Newtown Township, Delaware
County, Pennsylvania. The hit-and-run accident allegedly
involved a motor vehicle that struck a utility pole. There
was no description of the vehicle broadcast over the police
____________________________________________
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c).
_____________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S52033-14
radio only that it was last seen heading north on S.
Newtown Street Road towards Newtown Township.
Just after hearing the radio call, Officer [Alonso] was on
West Chester Pike near the intersection with S. Newtown
Street Rd. (Rt 252) when he observed a vehicle traveling
on Route 252 with heavy front-end damage. The front-
end damage to the vehicle was so significant that it would
not have passed inspection. At the intersection, Officer
[Alonso] observed that the vehicle was a Dodge Caravan
with heavy front-end damage indented in a “V” pattern.
The intersection where [Officer Alonso] made the
observation about the front-end damage was well lit.
[Officer Alonso] turned onto Route 252 and made a U-turn
into a position behind the damaged Caravan. Officer
[Alonso] had arrived on Route 252 behind the vehicle
within one minute of receiving the radio call.
Officer [Alonso] activated his lights and siren as the Dodge
Caravan entered the intersection. The vehicle did not
stop. Another [p]atrolman, Officer [Vandergrift], also
responded to the area. Officer [Vandergrift] pulled up next
to the vehicle with his siren and lights activated. At this
point, both police vehicles had their lights and sirens
activated but the driver still did not pull over. The Caravan
did not stop until Officer [Vandergrift] put his police vehicle
in such a position as to block the Caravan’s path. The
driver was not compliant until Officer [Vandergrift]
impeded his travel. Ultimately, the vehicle was pulled
over.
Officer [Vandergrift] approached the vehicle from the front
and Officer [Alonso] approached the rear of the vehicle.
Both [o]fficers told the driver, later identified as
[Appellant], to shut off his vehicle and get out of the
vehicle. The [o]fficers had to tell [Appellant] more than
once to turn his vehicle off. [Appellant] would not follow
the [o]fficers’ orders. [Appellant] was not compliant prior
to being removed from his vehicle [and placed] in
handcuffs.
[After the officers removed Appellant from his vehicle], the
[o]fficers turned him around to face his car. [Appellant]
-2-
J-S52033-14
said “what’s going on?” The [o]fficers told him “you have
just been in an accident” and they placed him in
[handcuffs]. Officer [Alonso] smelled the odor of an
alcoholic beverage. He asked [Appellant] if he had been
drinking and [Appellant] answered “yes.” Officer [Alonso]
asked [Appellant] to recite the alphabet and he was unable
to do so. The [o]fficer[s] observed that [Appellant] was
not steady on his feet and[,] therefore, did not ask him to
perform any other field sobriety tests. [Appellant] was
placed under arrest for [driving under the influence of
alcohol]. He was read the implied consent form at the
scene of the vehicle stop. The [o]fficers asked [Appellant]
if he would submit to blood testing and he said yes. [The
officers] transported [Appellant] to Riddle Memorial
Hospital where his blood was drawn and placed into an
evidence locker.
(Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed February 14,
2014, at 1-2) (numbering omitted). Appellant was arrested and charged
with DUI—highest rate, because his blood alcohol content registered greater
than 0.16. This offense was Appellant’s third DUI offense. On January 27,
2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress physical
evidence and statements. The court held a suppression hearing on January
30, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the court denied Appellant’s motion.
Appellant’s bench trial commenced on February 28, 2014, and the
court found Appellant guilty of DUI—highest rate of alcohol. On March 4,
2014, the court sentenced Appellant to one (1) to three (3) years’
imprisonment, followed by a consecutive term of two (2) years’ probation.
The court also deemed Appellant RRRI eligible at nine (9) months’
imprisonment and ordered Appellant to complete a safe driving course and
pay a fine. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 5, 2014. On
-3-
J-S52033-14
March 7, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant
timely complied on March 14, 2014.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
AND STATEMENTS AS THERE WAS NO REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP APPELLANT’S VEHICLE?
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
AND STATEMENTS AS THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ARREST APPELLANT?
DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AS
APPELLANT WAS UNDER ARREST AND NOT GIVEN
MIRANDA[2] WARNINGS?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
We examine Appellant’s issues subject to the following principles:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct.
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the
prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the findings of the suppression court, we
are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
____________________________________________
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
-4-
J-S52033-14
court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based
upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[i]t is
within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
In his first issue, Appellant argues the police officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop of Appellant’s motor vehicle.
Appellant asserts Officer Alonso unlawfully stopped Appellant’s vehicle based
solely on an anonymous 911 call, which indicated only the location of the
accident and the direction the suspect vehicle was traveling. Appellant
alleges the anonymous call did not provide the officer with reasonable
suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle, especially when the call did not provide
a description of the suspect vehicle. Appellant concludes this Court must
grant the motion to suppress and remand in accordance with that decision.
We disagree.
Section 6308 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:
§ 6308. Investigation by police officers
* * *
(b) Authority of police officer.―Whenever a police
officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking
vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
-5-
J-S52033-14
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may
stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial
responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added).
Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion[,] either of
criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code
under the authority of Section 6308(b)[,] must serve a
stated investigatory purpose. In effect, the language of
Section 6308(b)—“to secure such other information as the
officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
the provisions of this title”—is conceptually equivalent with
the underlying purpose of a Terry[3] stop. … Mere
reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when
the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory
purpose relevant to the suspected violation.
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 611 Pa. 650, 25 A.3d 327 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
[T]o determine whether the police officer had reasonable
suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be
considered. In making this determination, we must give
due weight…to the specific reasonable inferences [the
police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test
does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those
facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a
combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may
warrant further investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Fulton, 921 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 594 Pa. 686, 934 A.2d 72 (2007) (quoting Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________
3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
-6-
J-S52033-14
Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa.Super. 2006)) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). If an objective view of the facts indicates an
officer had specific, articulable facts that a traffic violation occurred, the law
deems the stop reasonable. Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 92,
960 A.2d 108, 114 (2008).
Instantly, the Commonwealth presented the following evidence at
Appellant’s suppression hearing: Officer Alonso received a police radio call
reporting an accident in the area he was patrolling; the report indicated that
a vehicle struck a utility pole and left the scene; approximately one (1)
minute after Officer Alonso received the radio call, he observed Appellant’s
motor vehicle at an intersection only one and one-half (1½) miles away from
the reported accident scene; Appellant’s vehicle had heavy front-end
damage in a “V” pattern, and Officer Alonso believed the pattern matched
the damage that would occur if the vehicle had struck a utility pole; Officer
Alonso did not believe the vehicle was safe to operate and did not believe
the vehicle would pass inspection due to the significant front-end damage.
Officer Alonso testified that the condition of Appellant’s vehicle violated
Pennsylvania motor vehicle inspection standards. (N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 1/30/14, at 36). Officer Alonso, therefore, stopped Appellant’s
vehicle for investigatory purposes after learning of the recent motor vehicle
accident and observing damage on Appellant’s vehicle consistent with the
accident. Based on the totality of the above circumstances, Officer Alonso
-7-
J-S52033-14
had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
6308(b); Fulton, supra. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s denial
of Appellant’s motion to suppress on this basis. See Williams, supra.
In his second and third issues combined, Appellant argues that the
officers did not have probable cause to arrest him and failed to give
Appellant proper Miranda warnings prior to his arrest. Appellant maintains
he was not free to leave the scene when the officers stopped his vehicle,
pulled him out, threw him against the vehicle, and immediately placed him
in handcuffs. Appellant contends the officers noticed signs of intoxication
and ordered Appellant to perform a field sobriety test only after they had
placed Appellant in handcuffs. Appellant asserts the officers did not have
any confirmation that Appellant had been involved in the accident, and they
placed Appellant under arrest based solely on the unreliable information
from the anonymous 911 call and the damage to Appellant’s vehicle.
Appellant claims the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Appellant, given
the totality of these circumstances.
Appellant also argues the officers failed to advise him of his Miranda
rights before they conducted a custodial interrogation. Appellant contends
Officer Alonso read no Miranda warnings before he asked Appellant whether
he had been drinking. Appellant claims Officer Alonso obtained Appellant’s
answer during an unlawful interrogation. Appellant concludes this Court
must grant the motion to suppress and remand in accordance with that
-8-
J-S52033-14
decision. We disagree.
Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general
classifications:
The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or
request for information) which need not be supported by
any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to
stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative
detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it
subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but
does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute
the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally an arrest or
“custodial detention” must be supported by probable
cause.
Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305 (Pa.Super 2011),
appeal denied, 616 Pa. 651, 49 A.3d 442 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 583 Pa.
668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005)).
“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances
within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the
person to be arrested.” Williams, supra at 27 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 591 Pa.
722, 920 A.2d 831 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause
justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the totality of the
circumstances.” Williams, supra at 27 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was
-9-
J-S52033-14
correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.”
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 604 Pa. 198, 203, 985 A.2d 928, 931
(2009) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“The key difference between an investigative and a custodial detention
is that the latter ‘involves such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of an arrest.’” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979
A.2d 879, 887 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 587
Pa. 511, 519, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (2006)).
The court considers the totality of the circumstances to
determine if an [interaction] is investigatory or custodial,
but the following factors are specifically considered: the
basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether
the suspect was transported against his will, how far, and
why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat or
use of force; and the methods of investigation used to
confirm or dispel suspicions.
Commonwealth v. Teeter, 961 A.2d 890, 899 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court “has declined to hold that every
time an individual is placed in handcuffs that such individual has been
arrested.” Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d 654, 660 (Pa.Super.
2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 247 n. 2, 643 A.2d
61, 67 n. 2 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S. Ct. 1217, 131
L. Ed. 2d 198 (1995)). “[F]or their safety, police officers may handcuff
individuals during an investigative detention.” Commonwealth v. Rosas,
875 A.2d 341, 348 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 691, 897 A.2d
- 10 -
J-S52033-14
455 (2006) (finding suspect was not under arrest when trooper ordered
suspect from vehicle and placed him in handcuffs). Moreover, “when an
officer detains a vehicle for violation of a traffic law, it is inherently
reasonable that [the officer] be concerned with safety and, as a result, may
order the occupants of the vehicle to alight from the car.” Id.
Additionally, in evaluating whether an officer should have provided
Miranda warnings during an interaction, “a court must consider the totality
of the circumstances…[and] keep in mind that not every statement made by
an individual during a police encounter amounts to an interrogation.
Volunteered or spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible even
without Miranda warnings.” Williams, supra at 30 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gaul, 590 Pa. 175, 180, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (2006),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 939, 128 S. Ct. 43, 169 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2007)).
Motorists have statutory obligations to stop and provide officers with
information about an accident when the accident results in damage to any
motor vehicles or other property. Williams, supra at 31 (citing 75
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3743, 3744). Thus, a motorist is not in custody for Miranda
purposes during the time he is obligated to remain and provide the required
information about an accident. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez,
519 Pa. 116, 546 A.2d 26 (1988)).
Instantly, a police dispatch informed Officer Alonso that a vehicle
recently had hit a utility pole and left the scene of the accident. Officer
- 11 -
J-S52033-14
Alonso independently observed Appellant’s vehicle in the general area of the
accident only one (1) minute after he received the radio call. Officer Alonso
testified that Appellant’s vehicle caught his attention because the damage on
the front end of the vehicle consisted of a significant intrusion in a “V”
pattern. (N.T. Suppression Hearing, 1/30/14, at 13). Appellant refused to
stop when police activated their lights and sirens and continued to drive at a
low rate of speed. The officers forced Appellant to stop his vehicle by
blocking the roadway with Officer Vandergrift’s patrol car. Additionally,
Appellant refused to obey the officers’ orders to exit Appellant’s vehicle.
Officer Alonso testified that, based on Appellant’s failure to comply, Officer
Alonso was unsure of Appellant’s mental state or potential reasons for
“running.” (Id. at 39-40). Based on Appellant’s failure to comply with
multiple police orders and the officers’ reasonable concern for safety, the
officers removed Appellant from his vehicle and placed him in handcuffs to
conduct an investigatory detention. See Rosas, supra; Guillespie, supra
(placing individual in handcuffs does not always constitute arrest).
After the officers removed Appellant from his vehicle, Officer Alonso
smelled an odor of alcohol coming from Appellant. Officer Alonso asked
Appellant if he had been drinking, and Appellant responded “yes.” Appellant
failed a field sobriety test, and the officers decided not to ask Appellant to
perform any other tests when they observed Appellant was unsteady on his
feet. See Williams, supra (finding police may utilize experience and
- 12 -
J-S52033-14
personal observations to render opinions as to whether suspects are
intoxicated). Based on the damage to Appellant’s vehicle, the officers’
observations of Appellant, and their knowledge of the recent hit-and-run
accident, the officers had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving
under the influence of alcohol. See id.; Thompson, supra.
Furthermore, prior to this arrest, Appellant was not in custody for
purposes of Miranda. The officers initially attempted to detain Appellant to
gain more information about the damage to his car, which was consistent
with the police dispatch’s description of the accident. See Williams, supra.
Additionally, Appellant had a statutory obligation to stop and provide the
officers with information about the damage to his vehicle and if it was
related to the reported accident. See id. Thus, Appellant was subject to
only an investigatory detention under these circumstances, when he
answered Officer Alonso’s question about whether Appellant had been
drinking. See id. Therefore, Appellant’s statement did not require Miranda
warnings. Id. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s denial of
Appellant’s motion to suppress. See id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
- 13 -
J-S52033-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/31/2014
- 14 -