Halsey, W. v. Swingle, R. ( 2022 )

J-A07018-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
WARREN HALSEY, SCOTT A. WILLIAMS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND DANIELE C. WILLIAMS : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
ROGER SWINGLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND :
AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF : No. 1214 EDA 2021
REBECCA DEFREHN, LITTS & SONS :
STONE CO., INC. GRASSIE & SONS, :
INC., CHARLES SIMS, DOROTHY SIMS, :
CHARLES SIMS, JR., AND NANCY M. :
MEDALIS :
________________________________ :
ROBERT SWINGLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND :
AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF :
REBECCA DEFREHN :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MORRIS WILLIAMS, DECEASED, OF :
STERLING TOWNSHIP, AND HIS HEIRS :
AT LAW, AND SUCH OTHER PERSONS :
CLAIMING BY, UNDER OR THROUGH :
HIM, SCOTT WILLIAMS AND DANIELLE :
C. WILLIAMS :
:
:
APPEAL OF: WARREN HALSEY, SCOTT :
A. WILLIAMS AND DANIELLE C. :
WILLIAMS
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 7, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
362--CV-2015 & 136-CV-2016
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JULY 1, 2022
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Warren Halsey, Scott Williams, and Daniele Williams (“Appellants”)
appeal from the order granting a prescriptive easement in favor of Robert
Swingle, individually and as the Executor of the Estate of Rebecca DeFrehn,
as well as in favor of Litts & Sons Stone Co., Inc., Grassie & Sons, Inc., Charles
Sr. and Dorothy Sims, Charles W. Sims, Jr. and Nancy M. Medalis
(“Appellees”). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This case concerns a complicated property dispute involving neighboring
properties. The subject of the dispute is what has been described as a dirt
road that runs behind the parties’ properties (“Access Road”). It appears that
there is no way to access the properties from the parallel public road except
by the disputed Access Road.
Over the years, the Swingle property was used as a dairy farm, although
the property contained a sparsely utilized quarry. That changed in 2011, when
Swingle leased the farm to Litts & Sons and Grassie & Sons (“Lessees”), who
began using the property as a commercial quarry. Traffic increased
exponentially on the Access Road and Appellants complained of noise and
garbage build-up on their properties.
Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory relief, claiming ownership of
the Access Road. Swingle countered with an action to quiet title, asserting
ownership of the Access Road due to adverse possession. These two actions
were tried together in a bench trial in April and November of 2018. Counsel
for Lessees did not appear. On January 29, 2019, the trial court issued a
memorandum opinion and order, finding Appellees had established a
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prescriptive easement over the Access Road, but found Lessees had
committed trespass.
The trial court made the following findings of fact:
1. [Appellant] Warren Halsey (hereinafter, “Halsey”) is an adult
individual residing at 752 Maple Grove Road, Moscow, Wayne
County, Pennsylvania 18444.
2. [Appellant] Scott A. Williams (hereinafter, “S. Williams”) is an
adult individual residing at 8670 Rue Court, Owings, Maryland
20736.
3. [Appellant] Danielle C. Williams (hereinafter, “D. Williams”) is
an adult individual residing at 292 Bortree Road, Moscow, Wayne
County, Pennsylvania 18444.
4. [Appellee] Roger Swingle (hereinafter, “Swingle”), individually
and as Executor of the Estate of Rebecca DeFrehn, is an adult
individual residing at 179 Callapoose Road, Moscow, Wayne
County, Pennsylvania 18444.
5. [Appellee] Lifts & Sons Stone Co., Inc. (hereinafter, “Lifts &
Sons”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
this Commonwealth with a physical address of 19 Primrose Drive,
Spring Brook Township, Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania
18444.
6. [Appellee] Grassie & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter, “ Grassie & Sons”)
is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of this
Commonwealth with a registered office address of 10 Mount Cobb
Highway, Lake Ariel, Wayne County, Pennsylvania 18436.
7. [Appellees] Charles Sr. and Dorothy Sims (hereinafter, “The
Sims”) are adult individuals residing at 768 Maple Grove Road,
Building D, Moscow, Wayne County, Pennsylvania 18444.
8. Defendant Charles W. Sims, Jr. (hereinafter, “ Sims Jr.”) is an
adult individual residing at 768 Maple Grove Road, Building D,
Moscow, Wayne County, Pennsylvania 18444.
9. [Appellee] Nancy M. Medalis (hereinafter, “Medalis”) is an adult
individual residing at 325 Steele Road, Feasterville-Trevose,
Pennsylvania 19053.
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10. Halsey is the owner of a 14.82- acre parcel of real property
located in Sterling Township, Wayne County, Pennsylvania more
particularly identified at Wayne County Tax Map No. 26-0-0340-
0029-0010. Halsey acquired this parcel by virtue of a deed dated
May 28, 1999 and recorded in Wayne County Record Book 1515
at page 21.
11. S. Williams is the owner of a . 2-acre parcel of real property
located at 768 Maple Grove Road, Sterling Township, Wayne
County, Pennsylvania, more particularly identified at Wayne
County Tax Map No. 26-0-0340-0031. S. Williams originally
acquired an interest in this parcel by virtue of a deed dated June
12, 2001 and subsequently acquired full ownership interest of this
parcel by virtue of a deed dated May 31, 2014 and recorded in
Wayne County Record Book 4813 at page 228.
12. S. Williams is also the owner of a . 997- acre parcel of real
property located at 768 Maple Grove Road, Sterling Township,
Wayne County, Pennsylvania, more particularly identified as
Wayne County Tax Map No, 26-0-0340-0032. S. Williams
originally acquired an interest in this parcel by virtue of a deed
dated July 28, 2001 and subsequently acquired full ownership
interest of this parcel by virtue of a deed May 31, 2005 and
recorded in Wayne County Record Book 4813 at page 230.
13. D. Williams is the owner of a 33.74- acre parcel of real
property located in Sterling Township, Wayne County
Pennsylvania, more particularly identified at Wayne County Tax
Map No. 26-0-0340-0036.0004. D. Williams acquired this parcel
by virtue of a deed dated February 3, 1997 and recorded in Wayne
County Record Book 1227 at page 295.
14. Rebecca DeFrehn was the owner of a 135.22- acre parcel of
real property located in Sterling Township, Wayne County,
Pennsylvania, more particularly identified at Wayne County Tax
Map No. 26-0-0340-0028. Rebecca DeFrehn (then known as
Rebecca Swingle) originally acquired an interest in said parcel with
her then-husband, Wayne Swingle, by virtue of a deed dated
February 26, 1959, and subsequently acquired sole ownership of
said parcel by virtue of a deed dated October 3, 2000 and recorded
in Wayne County Record Book 1697 at page 198.
15. Rebecca DeFrehn passed away in 2006.
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16. Swingle is the son of Rebecca DeFrehn and was appointed to
serve as the Executor of the Estate of Rebecca DeFrehn
(hereinafter, “DeFrehn Estate”).
17. Swingle is also the owner of a 2- acre parcel of real property
located in Sterling Township, Wayne County, Pennsylvania, more
particularly identified at Wayne Co. Tax Map No. 26-0340-
0028.0004, which Swingle owns with Medalis. Swingle and Medalis
acquired said parcel by virtue of a deed dated March 14, 2007 and
recorded in the Wayne County Record Book 3273 at page 120.
18. The Sims are owners of a 10-acre parcel of real property
located in Sterling Township, Wayne County, Pennsylvania, more
particularly identified at Wayne County Tax Map No. 26-0-0340-
0028-0001. The Sims initially acquired said parcel by virtue of a
deed dated October 1, 1977 and recorded in Wayne County
Record Book 341 at page 298.
19. Sims Jr. is the owner of a 4.25-acre parcel of real property
located in Sterling Township, Wayne County, Pennsylvania, more
particularly identified at Wayne County Tax Map No. 26-0-0340-
0028-0002. Sims Jr. initially acquired said parcel by virtue of a
deed dated October 20, 1979.
20. Medalis is the owner of two (2) parcels of real property located
in Sterling Township, Wayne County, Pennsylvania: ( 1) a 2.72-
acre of real property more particularly identified at Wayne County
Tax Map No. 26-0-0340-0028-003, which Medalis acquired by
virtue of a deed dated January 13, 2005 and recorded in Wayne
County Record Book 2700 at page 319, and (2) a 2- acre parcel
of real property more particularly identified at Wayne County Tax
Map No. 26-0-0340-0028.0004 and which parcel was acquired by
Medalis by virtue of a deed dated March 14, 2007 and recorded in
Wayne County Record Book 3273 at page 120.
21. S. Williams’, D. Williams’, and Halsey’s respective properties
are located along Maple Grove Road and Bortree Road in Sterling
Township, Wayne County, Pennsylvania.
22. In or about 1964, Zelda and Harold Williams (hereinafter,
“Zelda W.”), one of S. Williams’ predecessors in title, agreed to
allow access from Maple Grove Road to the properties owned
and/or used by the predecessors in title of Swingle.
23. The written reference to this agreement appears in a deed
from Zelda W. to William E. and Mary R. Ehrenstrasser
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(hereinafter, “The Ehrenstrasser’s” [sic]), which deed is dated
January 25, 1964 and recorded in Wayne County Deed Book 220
at page 234.
24. In the deed described in the above paragraph, the access
route is described as being twenty feet (20’) wide.
25. One-half the width of this access -ten feet ( 10’)- would have
been located on Zelda W’s property, while the remaining ten feet
( 10’) of the width of the access route would have been located on
property owned at the time by Frank and Betty Morris, which
property today is owned by Halsey.
26. Zelda W. was unable to convey the additional ten feet ( 10’)
over the Halsey property that she did not own, and therefore the
legal import of Deed Book 220 at Page 2345 was to create a ten
foot ( 10’) wide right of way for the benefit of the Ehrenstrasser’s
[sic].
27. Over the years, the Swingles made use of the existing private
driveway to get out to Maple Grove Road and all of their use was
for ingress and egress to their property.
28. In 2011, the Swingle parent tract began being used actively
as a quarry, causing heavy equipment, machinery, and trucks to
access the Swingle site. Thus, the use of the driveway changed
substantially over the years from 2011 to the present time.
29. The increased use of the access route has resulted in dust and
noise coming onto S. Williams’, D. Williams’, and Halsey’s
properties.
30. Lifts & Sons and Grassie & Sons have also caused the access
route to be raised by at least six inches (6”), which has led to
water, mud, and silt running onto S. Williams’, D. Williams’, and
Halsey’s respective properties.
31. Furthermore, the quarry usage is causing trash to be dumped
onto S. Williams’, D. Williams’, and Halsey’s respective properties.
32. Ultimately, the expansion of the quarry activity resulted in S.
Williams, D. Williams, and Halsey to file a Complaint (Wayne Co.
Docket No. 362- CV-2015).
33. S. Williams, D. Williams, and Halsey amended their Complaint
to include Medalis, The Sims, and Sims Jr. for the sole purpose of
being an indispensable party in Plaintiffs’ Action for Declaratory
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Relief. They have not caused any damage to S. Williams’, D.
Williams’, and Halsey’s properties, and accordingly S. Williams, D.
Williams, and Halsey are not seeking compensation from The
Sims, Sims Jr., and Medalis. The Amended Complaint was filed
November 2, 2015.
34. Swingle countered by filing an action to quiet title, filed to
Wayne Co. Docket No. 136- CV-2016, claiming that he owned the
access route in question via adverse possession.
35. 136-CV-2016 and 362-CV-2015 were consequently
consolidated.
36. A Non-Jury trial started on April 3, 2018. On May 11, 2018,
an Order from this Court stated that all parties shall be prepared
to present on both cases and have all witnesses available and
present for the trial that was to be continued on July 27, 2018.
37. On September 24, 2018, this Court issued an Order stating
that Counsel should again be prepared to present on both cases
and have all witnesses available for the last day of trial continued
to November 2, 2018.
38. On November 2, 2018, Counsel for Litts & Sons and Grassie &
Sons did not appear for trial.
39. On November 16, 2018 it was the Order of this Court that the
matter was taken under advisement and if the parties wish, they
may submit an outline of issues and conclusion of law within
fourteen (14) days
Tr. Ct. Op., 1/29/19 at 2-7.
After the court issued its January 29, 2019 order, it scheduled an
additional hearing to determine damages for trespass, but Appellants
withdrew their damages claim. Thereafter, the court issued a May 24, 2021
order rendering the remaining aspects of the January 29, 2019 order final and
judgment was entered on the docket reflecting the same on October 7, 2021.
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This timely appeal followed.1 Appellants filed a Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement
and the court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) response incorporating the reasoning
set forth in its earlier opinion.
Appellants present the following issues:
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellees met their
burden of proving a prescriptive easement of twenty feet in width
over the properties of Scott Williams and Daniele Williams when
the trial court did not find that each of the Appellees continuously
used a right-of-way twenty feet in width on the Williams properties
for at least twenty-one years, and the testimony and evidence
show that none of the Appellees used a right-of-way more than
ten feet in width on the Williams properties prior to 2011?
2. Did the trial court err in failing to limit any prescriptive
easement grant to Appellees to residential use when the use of
the subject access route was limited to residential use during each
Appellee’s prescriptive period and allowing commercial use of the
subject access route creates an unreasonable burden on the
subject access route and the Williams properties by substantially
increasing the traffic, noise, dust, garbage, and water run-off?
____________________________________________
1 Although Appellants’ initial case and Swingle’s counterclaim were never
formally consolidated, the trial court treated them as such for purposes of
trial. The court issued a single order, listing both docket numbers, and
Appellants filed a single notice of appeal. Appellants report that they were
directed to file only a single notice by the prothonotary. On August 13, 2021,
this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018) (“the
proper practice under Rule 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an order
that resolves issues arising on more than one docket. The failure to do so
requires the appellate court to quash the appeal”). After Appellants filed a
response, this Court discharged the rule and referred the matter to this panel.
We decline to quash the instant matter because the prothonotary’s direction
misled Appellants. See Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 354
(Pa.Super 2020) (en banc) (where a party is misinformed about appellate
rights a breakdown in court operations has occurred and this Court will decline
to quash).
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Appellants’ Br. at 8.
Due to the interrelated nature of Appellants’ issues, we will discuss them
in tandem. In their first issue, Appellants claims that the trial court erred by
concluding that Appellees established that each Appellee utilized the access
road in an adverse, open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted manner
for a period of at least 21 years sufficient to establish a prescriptive easement.
According to Appellants, the court never made sufficient factual findings to
support this determination.
Further, Appellants contend that even if Appellees established an
easement by prescription, they did not establish that it was 20 feet wide.
Appellants emphasize that the limited testimony presented at trial pointed to
an access road with a narrower width. Appellants assert that only one witness,
who hadn’t lived at the property since he was a child, testified that two trucks
could pass on the road and therefore opined that the Access Road was about
20 feet wide. In support of their argument, Appellants’ point to Hash v.
Sofinowski, 487 A.2d 32 (Pa.Super. 1985) (limiting size of a prescriptive
easement to the actual use of the land during the prescriptive period and
holding anticipated future use was insufficient to expand easement). Further,
Appellants maintain that the court erroneously ordered four inches of
“ditching” surrounding the Access Road when there had not been any ditching
along the road at any point and no party requested ditching.
In their second issue, Appellants claim that the trial court erred by
declining to limit the use of the Access Road to residential purposes only. The
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Swingle farm only began to be used as an active quarry in 2011, well after
the required 21 years needed for an easement. Thus, Appellants maintain that
any prescriptive easement should be restricted to residential access.
Appellants emphasize that the Lessees’ commercial use of the Access Road
has placed an unreasonable burden on the surrounding properties including
increased traffic, noise, dust, garbage, and water run-off.
Conversely, Appellees claim that the trial court’s decision was supported
by the record. The evidence established that the Appellees, their families, and
guests used the Access Road to access their homes for over 50 years. Roger
Swingle testified that his family farm used the access road continuously and
that two vehicles could pass each other on the road at the same time.
Therefore, Appellees contend that Swingle aptly concluded that the Access
Road must be at least 20 feet. Swingle also testified that his family had
maintained the Access Road over the years by putting in drainage and cutting
back brush. Without the Access Road, Swingle testified that his family would
not be able to access their property. Charles Sims likewise testified regarding
his similar use of the Access Road. Appellees point out that Appellants’ own
surveyor testified that the Access Road was at least 12 to 16 feet wide, and
the entrance was even wider.
In equity matters, the trial judge “is the ultimate fact-finder.” Gurecka
v. Carroll, 155 A.3d 1071, 1075 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation
omitted). We will not disturb the findings of fact unless they are “unsupported
by competent evidence or are demonstrably capricious.” Id. (citation
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omitted). We similarly leave the final decree undisturbed unless the trial judge
committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Id. If there is a prayer for
general relief, an equity court may “grant broader relief than that specifically
requested” so long as that relief is “consistent with and agreeable to the case
pleaded and proven.” Karpieniak v. Lowe, 747 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa.Super.
2000).
“A prescriptive easement is a right to use another’s property which is
not inconsistent with the owner’s rights and which is acquired by a use that is
open, notorious, and uninterrupted for a period of 21 years.” McNaughton
Properties, LP v. Barr, 981 A.2d 222, 225 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2009). To
establish a prescriptive easement, the user must prove “(1) adverse, (2) open,
(3) notorious, (4) continuous and uninterrupted use [of land] for a period of
twenty-one (21) years.” Village of Four Seasons Ass’n, Inc. v. Elk
Mountain Ski Resort, Inc., 103 A.3d 814, 822 (Pa.Super. 2014). The burden
of proving these elements falls on “the party asserting the easement” by “clear
and positive proof.” Id. (citation omitted).
Further, “the degree of use of a prescriptive easement may increase in
certain circumstances to accommodate the normal evolution of the dominant
tenement where reasonable[.]” Hash, 487 A.2d at 36. However, a prescriptive
easement is as a rule limited to the use that created it. McGavitt v. Guttman
Realty Co., 909 A.2d 1, 4-5 (Pa.Super. 2006). When determining whether an
increased use is permissible “a comparison must be made between such use
and the use by which the easement was created with respect to (a) their
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physical character, (b) their purpose, (c) the relative burden caused by them
upon the servient tenement.” Id. (citation omitted). Significantly, “our courts
have uniformly declined to accept conversions from private residential use to
commercial use as ‘normal evolution‘ of the dominant tenement.” Id. (citation
omitted).
In this case, the trial court determined that the evidence established a
prescriptive easement in favor of Appellees:
The testimony throughout the non-jury trial evidences that
the original land owned by Rebecca DeFrehn and the properties
subdivided therefrom, have only one access roadway, and that
this roadway is located in the location of a twenty foot (20’) right
of way set forth in two (2) lots subdivided from a larger tract of
land owned by S. Williams’ predecessor in title. These two (2) lots
were to be accessed by a right of way twenty feet (20’) in width
which was subsequently relied upon and referenced by the
surveyor, James Hinton, in preparing and submitting subdivision
maps to Sterling Township and the Wayne County Planning
Commission. Specifically, the twenty foot (20’) right-of-way to
these original (2) lots became the access width of the roadway to
property owners, The Sims, Sims Jr., and Medalis. Swingle’s use
of the land is therefore not exclusive due to various other
individuals also using the land as their access way to their
respective properties, thus ruling out any adverse possession
claims.
Additionally, testimony given during trial further
strengthens Swingle’s argument for prescriptive easement.
Swingle has maintained the access road for approximately fifty-
nine ( 59) years. He has plowed snow, drained water, and cleared
obstacles for well past the statutory requirement of twenty-one
(21) years. Swingle was never told not to use the access road and
S. Williams never acted as owner of the roadway since its
inception. Also, the roadway is the only way to access Swingle’s
land as well as the Sims, Sims Jr., and Medalis property. Swingle’s
use of the roadway has been open, hostile, and notorious well
within the statutory time period. Therefore, Swingle, individually,
his successors, heirs and assigns have a prescriptive easement
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commencing at Township Road 317-Maple Grove Road being
twenty feet (20’) in width, continuing along the warrantee line of
the Jacob Downing Warrant (now the property of Halsey) and to
the lands now owned by the DeFrehn Estate.
Tr. Ct. Op., at 9.
Ample evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Appellees
established a prescriptive easement on the Access Road. As noted, the trial
court credited Swingle’s trial testimony as establishing the open, hostile and
notorious use of the Access Road, for a period exceeding 21 years, to access
Appellees’ land-locked properties from the public road.
Appellants invite this Court to reweigh the evidence by arguing that the
trial testimony did not credibly establish a prescriptive easement 20 feet wide.
We must decline. See Makozy v. Makozy, 874 A.2d 1160, 1168 (Pa.Super.
2005). The court aptly considered the testimony of Roger Swingle who
described the access road as being wide enough to allow two cars to pass
simultaneously and thus 20 feet in width. Appellants have cited nothing that
would empower us to override the trial court’s credibility determinations.
Appellants’ argument that this Court’s decision in Hash supports their
claim is also unavailing. In Hash, this Court reversed the trial court’s
determination that the width of a prescriptive easement could increase over
the prescriptive time. See Hash, 487 A.2d at 34. Conversely, here, the court
did not rely on evidence of the width of the Access Road at the end of the
prescriptive period alone. It instead credited the testimony of Swingle, who
testified his memory of the width of the Access Road as it existed toward the
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beginning of the prescriptive period. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants established a prescriptive
easement of 20 feet. Gurecka, 155 A.3d at 1075.
However, we do take issue with the court’s decision to order four feet of
unrequested “ditching” on the side of the Access Road. As noted by Appellants,
no party requested the “ditching” and no party had ever created any such
“ditching” during the prescriptive period. Hence, we hold that the court erred
by ordering relief that was not agreeable to the case pleaded and proved by
the parties. See Karpieniak, 747 A.2d at 930. Accordingly, we reverse that
potion of the trial court’s order requiring “ditching.”
We also find error in the court’s order to the extent that it permits
expanded commercial use of the Access Road. As the court acknowledges in
its findings of fact, increased commercial use of the Access Road did not occur
until 2011, with the leasing of the Swingle’s property to Lessees for purposes
of commercial use of the Quarry. Thus, the commercial use commenced well
after the 21-year prescriptive period. Moreover, the court also recognized that
such commercial use caused an exponential shift in the nature and volume of
traffic on the Access Road to such an extent that the court found the Lessees
had committed trespass. The court recognized that the commercial use of the
Access Road had caused a substantial burden on Appellants’ properties due to
increased noise, trash, and water runoff. While the increased use of a
prescriptive easement may be permissible in certain circumstances as a
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“natural evolution,” a shift from residential use to commercial use is generally
not a permissible increase. See McGavitt, 909 A.2d at 5.
In McGavitt, the use of an access road had changed from primarily
residential, for purposes of ingress and egress, to heavy commercial use
involving heavy trucks making dozens of daily deliveries. See id. Our Court
there concluded “that heavy commercial and industrial use [cannot] be
considered a reasonably foreseeable extension of access to a single-family
residence during the prescriptive period.” Id. This Court thus held that “the
trial court committed reversable error in granting a prescriptive easement.”
Id. Likewise, in the instant case we conclude that the Lessees’ increased
commercial use of the Access Road cannot be considered the “normal
evolution” of the use. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order to the
extent that it grants a prescriptive easement for purposes of commercial use.
Order affirmed in part, reversed in part, and case remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/1/2022
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