Com. v. Wedderburne, S. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S10018-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant                :
    :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    STAFFORD ALPHANSO                           :    No. 1102 MDA 2021
    WEDDERBURNE                                 :
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-22-CR-0004833-2020
    BEFORE:       MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                                FILED: JULY 15, 2022
    The   Commonwealth         appeals     the   grant   of   Stafford   Alphanso
    Wedderburne’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a vehicle stop. The
    Commonwealth maintains that the trial court erred in granting the motion
    because police had probable cause and there were exigent circumstances. It
    further maintains that the search is supported by the doctrines of plain view,
    inventory search, and inevitable discovery. We affirm.
    Following a traffic stop, an officer searched Wedderburne’s vehicle and
    recovered loose marijuana, marijuana cigarettes, loose bullets, and a firearm.
    The Commonwealth charged Wedderburne with multiple offenses including
    persons not to possess a firearm and possession of a small amount of
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S10018-22
    marijuana.1 He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the police officer
    lacked probable cause and that there were no exigent circumstances sufficient
    to excuse the failure to get a warrant. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed
    3/24/21, at ¶¶ 17-18. The trial court held a hearing on the motion.
    Officer Brian Aponte testified that on September 17, 2020, around 1
    a.m., he observed a Hyundai sedan with a nonfunctioning left brake light.
    N.T., Suppression Hearing, 5/3/21, at 5. Officer Aponte stopped the vehicle
    because of the brake light. Id. at 6. He approached the vehicle and observed
    Wedderburne in the driver’s seat. Id. at 8. He also testified that there were
    two other individuals in the car, one in the back passenger-side seat and one
    in the front passenger seat. Id. at 7. After approaching the vehicle on the
    front passenger side, he asked Wedderburne to roll down the window. Id.
    Officer Aponte noticed an odor of marijuana coming from the car and
    marijuana “blunts” or “roaches” in the center console, underneath the radio.
    Id. at 8. Officer Aponte requested backup “due to the time of the night and
    the amount of people in the vehicle.” Id.
    Officer Aponte explained to Wedderburne the reason for the traffic stop
    and asked for the insurance and registration for the vehicle. Id. at 9.
    Wedderburne told the officer that his sister was the owner of the vehicle and
    that he would try to find the paperwork. Id. at 9, 10. Officer Aponte suggested
    that he look in the glove compartment, and without “even try[ing] to go in
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), respectively.
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    there,” Wedderburne replied that it was not located in the glove compartment.
    Id. at 10. Officers Prisbe and D’Arcy arrived as backup for Officer Aponte. Id.
    at 12.2 Officer Aponte asked Wedderburne for his license, who replied that he
    did not have one and retrieved his Pennsylvania identification card (“ID”) from
    a bookbag. Id. at 9, 13. Officer Aponte saw that Wedderburne’s license was
    suspended and told him that based on the smell of marijuana and the
    marijuana blunts in the vehicle, he was going to search the vehicle. Id. at 13,
    14. Wedderburne started to reach for the marijuana blunts, and Officer Aponte
    “advised him to just leave them alone, that we would get to it[.]” Id. at 14.
    Officer Aponte asked for consent to search the vehicle, but Wedderburne said
    that he could not give consent because it was not his vehicle. Id. at 14.
    Officer Aponte testified that it was his understanding that the vehicle
    search was allowed based on the smell of marijuana. Id. at 12. He removed
    Wedderburne from the vehicle and asked him to stand by the backup officers
    who were on the sidewalk. Id. at 14-15. Officer Aponte then had the
    passengers exit the vehicle. Id. at 15.
    After all the occupants were out of the car, Officer Aponte searched it.
    During the search, all the occupants were standing on the sidewalk next to
    the backup officers. Id. at 15. He found a plastic baggie of leafy vegetable
    substance that appeared to be marijuana and marijuana roaches in the center
    console. Id. He also found duct tape, latex gloves, a bandana, and several
    ____________________________________________
    2   The first name of these officers is not provided in the transcript.
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    loose 9-millimeter bullets in the bookbag from which Wedderburne had
    retrieved his ID. Id. at 16. Officer Aponte also discovered a firearm in the
    glove compartment. He later learned the gun was stolen and that
    Wedderburne had a prior felony that prevented him from lawfully possessing
    a firearm. Id. at 18, 29. Police placed all occupants under arrest and
    conducted a search incident to arrest. Officer Aponte recovered from
    Wedderburne’s person marijuana, latex gloves, and a bandana. The latex
    gloves and bandana appeared to match those found in the bookbag. Id. at
    20. The court had the parties submit briefs and, with court permission, the
    Commonwealth also submitted a copy of a police mobile video audio recording
    (“MVR”) of the incident. See id. at 28.
    The trial court granted the suppression motion. See Order of Court, filed
    8/2/21. It concluded that exigent circumstances did not exist for the officer’s
    safety or to preserve potential evidence in the vehicle. See Memorandum
    Opinion and Order of Court, filed 8/2/21, at 5-6. It concluded that the plain
    view doctrine did not cure the illegality of the search of the vehicle because
    “exigent circumstances did not exist, and the officer did not have some prior
    justification to give him lawful access to the items” that were seized. Id. at 7.
    The court noted that the Commonwealth argued that the evidence could have
    been inevitably discovered because officers could have conducted an
    inventory search of the vehicle. However, the court was unpersuaded by this
    argument, concluding that the MVR showed that officers merely moved the
    car to a parking lot for Wedderburne’s sister to pick up and did not impound
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    it. See id. at 8. It also concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies
    to what “would have been discovered,” not what could have been lawfully
    discovered. See id.
    The Commonwealth timely appealed. It raises one issue: “Whether the
    trial court erred in granting [Wedderburne’s] suppression motion where law
    enforcement possessed probable cause and exigency to conduct the search in
    question, which was also supported by the doctrines of plain view, inventory
    searches, and inevitable discovery[.]” Commonwealth’s Br. at 4.
    When reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress, we “consider only
    the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the
    prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains
    uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Korn, 
    139 A.3d 249
    , 252 (Pa.Super.
    2016). We are bound by factual findings of the suppression court that are
    supported by the record. 
    Id.
     We review the legal conclusions de novo. See
    
    id. at 252-53
    .
    The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting
    suppression. It maintains that Wedderburne did not properly preserve a
    challenge under Commonwealth v. Alexander, 
    243 A.3d 177
     (Pa. 2020)
    (requiring probable cause and exigent circumstances for warrantless search
    of vehicle) because he only argued that exigent circumstances did not exist.
    It further argues that exigent circumstances did exist, and that the doctrines
    of inevitable discovery and plain view render suppression improper.
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    Exigent Circumstances
    The United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions protect against
    unreasonable searches and seizures. See Commonwealth v. Newsome,
    
    170 A.3d 1151
    , 1154 (Pa.Super. 2017). “[A] warrant stating probable cause
    is required before a police officer may search for or seize evidence” unless an
    exception to the warrant requirement applies. Commonwealth v. Anderson,
    
    40 A.3d 1245
    , 1248 (Pa.Super. 2012). As applied to vehicle searches,
    Pennsylvania law requires police to have a warrant unless probable cause and
    exigent circumstances exist. Alexander, 243 A.3d at 181.
    Exigent circumstances will excuse a warrantless search or seizure where
    the Commonwealth establishes that there is a “compelling need [by officers]
    for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Commonwealth v.
    Trahey, 
    228 A.3d 520
    , 530 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). The compelling
    need usually exists “either because evidence is likely to be destroyed, or
    because there exists a threat of physical harm to police officers or other
    innocent individuals.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 
    740 A.2d 712
    , 717
    (Pa.Super.    1999)   (citation   omitted).   Determining   whether    exigent
    circumstances exist requires a consideration of the totality of circumstances
    and entails a case-by-case assessment. Trahey, 228 A.3d at 530, 531.
    The Commonwealth claims exigent circumstances existed here because
    Wedderburne “made a motion consistent with attempting to dispose” of the
    marijuana blunts. Id. at 15, 16. It also cites concerns about officer’s safety.
    The Commonwealth notes that because of the number of occupants in the
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    vehicle at the time of the traffic stop, and the time of day, Officer Aponte felt
    that it was necessary to call backup. It also maintains that Wedderburne
    waived any challenge to the search pursuant to Alexander because he only
    challenged the exigent circumstances and not the probable cause to search
    the vehicle. Id. at 14. In support, the Commonwealth cites Wedderburne’s
    brief following the suppression hearing. Id.
    Wedderburne properly preserved his challenge under Alexander by
    raising it in his motion to suppress. See Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion at ¶¶ 17-
    18. He further developed and briefed the applicability of Alexander in his
    post-suppression hearing brief. See Defendant's Brief in Support of Omnibus
    Pretrial Motion, filed 5/21/21, at 6-9 (unnumbered). Although he limited his
    argument in that brief to contending that the Commonwealth had failed to
    establish exigent circumstances, and did not discuss probable cause, that does
    not mean he waived all arguments under Alexander.
    As to the Commonwealth’s argument on exigency, it is meritless. First,
    there was no testimony that Wedderburne was trying to “dispose of” the burnt
    marijuana blunts. Rather, Officer Aponte testified that after he told
    Wedderburne that he saw the blunts, Wedderburne reached toward them, at
    which point Officer Aponte told him to leave them and that he would get them.
    Officer Aponte did not say that Wedderburne thereafter continued to reach
    toward the blunts, or that he believed Wedderburne was attempting to discard
    or destroy them.
    -7-
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    Second, the claim that the officers’ safety was at risk when Officer
    Aponte searched the vehicle lacks substantiation in the record. Officer Aponte
    did not search the car until all the occupants had gotten out of it and were
    standing next to the backup officers. Moreover, no testimony suggests the
    occupants did anything at the time of the search that could reasonably pose
    a risk to officer safety. The record does not support a conclusion that “the
    exigencies of the situation ma[d]e the needs of law enforcement so compelling
    that the warrantless search [was] objectively reasonable[.]” Alexander, 243
    A.3d at 208. The trial court did not err in rejecting the claim of exigent
    circumstances.
    Inevitable Discovery
    The inevitable discovery doctrine provides that suppression of evidence
    seized without a warrant can be avoided where the Commonwealth shows by
    a “preponderance of the evidence that the illegally obtained evidence
    ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means[.]”
    Commonwealth v. King, 
    259 A.3d 511
    , 522 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation
    omitted) (emphasis added). The Commonwealth “must demonstrate that the
    evidence would have been discovered absent the police misconduct, not
    simply       that   they   somehow   could   have   lawfully   discovered   it.”
    Commonwealth v. Perel, 
    107 A.3d 185
    , 196 (Pa.Super. 2014) (emphasis in
    original).
    The Commonwealth argues that the evidence would have been
    discovered because officers “could have impounded the vehicle and conducted
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    an inventory search.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 18 (emphasis added). As the
    trial court stated, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the officers
    would have discovered the evidence. Nothing in the record shows that Officer
    Aponte conducted an inventory search of the vehicle or even that police
    attempted to impound the vehicle. Rather, the MVR showed that police left
    the car in a parking lot for Wedderburne’s sister to retrieve. The
    Commonwealth at most has shown that the police “somehow could have
    lawfully discovered” the evidence. Perel, 107 A.3d at 196. The trial court did
    not err in finding that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable here.
    Plain View
    The plain view doctrine allows police to seize evidence without a warrant
    where: “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is
    immediately apparent to [the officer] that the object is incriminating; and (3)
    the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.” Commonwealth v.
    Heidelberg, 
    267 A.3d 492
    , 504 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
    The Commonwealth maintains that “the search of the vehicle was
    justified by plain view[.]” Commonwealth’s Br. at 16. It states that Officer
    Aponte conducted a lawful traffic stop based on probable cause because
    Wedderburne’s brake light was not working. It states that Officer Aponte was
    in a lawful vantage point while conducting the traffic stop when he smelled
    the odor of marijuana and saw the marijuana blunts in the center console.
    Officer Aponte also testified that he observed what he described as marijuana
    blunts or roaches in the center console, evidence which the Commonwealth
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    contends he believed to be incriminating considering that he then conducted
    a search of the vehicle after this observation. The Commonwealth argues that
    because the first two prongs of the plain view doctrine are satisfied, “the
    limited automobile exception afforded Officer Aponte lawful access to the
    evidence since the probable cause arose suddenly without advance warning
    that [Wedderburne] or his vehicle would be the target of a police
    investigation.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 17-18.
    The Commonwealth’s argument fails for several reasons. First, the plain
    view doctrine applies to the seizure of evidence. It cannot serve to justify the
    search of the car, as the Commonwealth suggests. See Commonwealth v.
    Lutz, 
    270 A.3d 571
    , 577 (Pa.Super. 2022) (“the plain view doctrine provides
    that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant”)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Luczki, 
    212 A.3d 530
    , 546 (Pa.Super. 2019)
    (emphasis added). Second, there is no evidence that Officer Aponte could view
    the duct tape, latex gloves, bandana, bullets, or gun from a lawful vantage
    point. According to the testimony, he did not see any of them until he
    conducted the illegal search of the car.
    Regarding the marijuana blunts, even assuming the first two prongs of
    the doctrine are met – view from a lawful vantage point and immediately
    apparent incrimination – Officer Aponte did not have a lawful right of access.
    As explained above, pursuant to Alexander, the Commonwealth’s claim to
    Pennsylvania’s “limited automobile exception” fails. The trial court did not err
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    by concluding that the plain view doctrine was not applicable. We affirm the
    order granting Wedderburne’s motion to suppress.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/15/2022
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1102 MDA 2021

Judges: McLaughlin, J.

Filed Date: 7/15/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024