Com. v. Calderon, R. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S41034-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RONALD CALDERON                         :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 906 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 15, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-38-CR-0000179-2015
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2022
    Appellant Ronald Calderon appeals from the November 15, 2021, order
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, which denied
    Appellant’s pro se petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
    42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. After a careful review, we vacate the PCRA court’s
    order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: The
    Commonwealth charged Appellant with various crimes in connection with a
    home invasion, which resulted in the shooting of one of the victims.
    Represented by court-appointed counsel from the Office of the Public
    Defender, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury convicted him of
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S41034-22
    three counts of robbery, five counts of criminal conspiracy, and two counts of
    aggravated assault.1
    On October 28, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
    aggregate of thirteen and one-half years to thirty-one years in prison. On
    November 22, 2016, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
    Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme
    Court.
    On July 26, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se document entitled “Motion to
    Correct Sentence”2 wherein he contended the trial court imposed an illegal
    sentence by failing to merge his conviction on one count of conspiracy (to
    commit robbery) with his conviction on one count of robbery. On July 29,
    2021, the lower court summarily denied the “Motion to Correct Sentence”
    without prejudice to Appellant’s right to file a PCRA petition.
    On or about September 3, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition
    wherein he again asserted the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1), 903(c), and 2702(a), respectively.
    2 Although the pro se document was time-stamped on July 29, 2021, we deem
    it to have been filed on July 26, 2021, when Appellant handed it to prison
    authorities as evidenced by Appellant’s certification. See Commonwealth v.
    Jones, 
    549 Pa. 58
    , 
    700 A.2d 423
     (1997) (holding an affidavit attesting to the
    date of deposit with prison officials may be considered as evidence of the date
    of mailing); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 
    931 A.2d 710
     (Pa.Super. 2007)
    (explaining the prisoner mailbox rule).
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    J-S41034-22
    to merge his convictions. By order entered on November 15, 2021, the PCRA
    court summarily denied Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition.3
    On November 23, 2021, Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.4
    On June 29, 2022, this Court directed the PCRA court to determine whether
    Appellant was entitled to the appointment of counsel, and the PCRA court
    responded by appointing counsel to assist Appellant on appeal.
    In his counseled brief, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his
    “Statement of the Questions Involved” (verbatim):
    1. Did the Trial Court commit err (sic) when it did not merge
    Count I and Count II for sentencing?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2 (suggested answer omitted).
    Initially, we note “[o]ur standard of review for issues arising from the
    denial of PCRA relief is well-settled. We must determine whether the PCRA
    court’s ruling is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
    Commonwealth v. Hand, 
    252 A.3d 1159
    , 1165 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation
    omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    3 We note that, although the PCRA court treated this petition under the
    auspices of the PCRA, the court did not provide Appellant with notice of its
    intent to dismiss as provided for in Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) or hold an evidentiary
    hearing.
    4 Although the pro se notice of appeal was time-stamped on December 16,
    2021, which would have been thirty-one days after the PCRA court filed its
    order, we deem the notice of appeal to have been filed on November 23, 2021,
    when Appellant handed it to prison authorities as evidenced by Appellant’s
    certification. See Jones, supra; Patterson, 
    supra.
    -3-
    J-S41034-22
    In the case sub judice, we discern several breakdowns in the PCRA
    court, which require us to vacate the PCRA court’s November 15, 2021, order
    and remand for further proceedings.
    Preliminarily, as it pertains to Appellant’s pro se “Motion to Correct
    Sentence,” which he filed on July 26, 2021, we conclude the PCRA court erred
    in failing to treat this document under the auspices of the PCRA.5 It is well-
    settled the PCRA is “the sole means of obtaining collateral relief,” and “if the
    underlying substantive claim is one that could potentially be remedied under
    the PCRA, that claim is exclusive to the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Pagan,
    
    864 A.2d 1231
    , 1233 (Pa.Super. 2004) (emphasis omitted). We are
    particularly mindful that the PCRA provides the exclusive means of obtaining
    collateral relief in Pennsylvania for criminal defendants alleging that they are,
    inter alia, serving an illegal sentence.         See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (“This
    subchapter provides for an action by which…persons serving illegal sentences
    may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall
    ____________________________________________
    5 We note that we may raise this matter sua sponte. See Commonwealth
    v. Beatty, 
    207 A.3d 957
    , 961 (Pa.Super. 2019). Further, while we
    acknowledge the PCRA court denied the “Motion to Correct Sentence” without
    prejudice to Appellant’s right to file a PCRA petition, it is well-settled the PCRA
    has jurisdictional time limits, subject to three statutory exceptions, which
    provide that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall
    be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final.
    See Commonwealth v. Monaco, 
    996 A.2d 1076
    , 1079 (Pa.Super. 2010);
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Thus, it is incumbent upon a court to
    determine when a PCRA petition has been filed in order to determine whether
    it has jurisdiction.
    -4-
    J-S41034-22
    become the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
    common law and statutory remedies….”).
    In his pro se “Motion to Correct Sentence,” Appellant contends his
    sentence is illegal under the merger doctrine.       This raises a legality of
    sentencing claim, which is subject to the PCRA.      See Commonwealth v.
    Moore, ___ Pa. ___, 
    247 A.3d 990
     (2021) (noting merger claims are legality
    of sentencing claims that are cognizable under the PCRA). Thus, we conclude
    the PCRA court should have considered Appellant’s July 26, 2021, pro se
    document as a first PCRA petition.
    Furthermore, we note the PCRA court failed to appoint counsel to assist
    Appellant after he filed his July 26, 2021, pro se document.6 See
    Commonwealth v. Stossel, 
    17 A.3d 1286
     (Pa.Super. 2011) (holding where
    a first-time PCRA petitioner was not appointed counsel, and there is no
    indication he waived his right to counsel, we may raise the issue of error sua
    sponte).
    “[I]t is undisputed that first time PCRA petitioners have a rule-based
    right to counsel.” Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 
    29 A.3d 1177
    , 1180 n.6
    (Pa.Super. 2011). Specifically, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 904
    relevantly provides:
    ____________________________________________
    6 We further note that, after Appellant filed his pro se document entitled “PCRA
    petition” on or about September 3, 2021, the PCRA court summarily dismissed
    this petition without appointing counsel to represent Appellant.
    -5-
    J-S41034-22
    (C) Except as provided in paragraph (H),[7] when an
    unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is
    unable to afford[8] or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall
    appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant's
    first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (bold in original) (footnotes added).
    Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he denial of PCRA relief
    cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”
    Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
    554 Pa. 31
    , 
    720 A.2d 693
    , 699 (1998). Thus,
    when an indigent petitioner files his first PCRA petition without the assistance
    of counsel, the PCRA court must appoint counsel to assist the petitioner in
    filing an amended PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Tedford, 
    566 Pa. 457
    , 
    781 A.2d 1167
     (2001). The indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must
    be honored regardless of the merits of his underlying claims or the facial
    untimeliness of his first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 
    206 A.3d 1135
     (Pa.Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Perez, 
    799 A.2d 848
    (Pa.Super. 2002). This right to counsel “exists throughout the post-conviction
    proceedings, including any appeal from [the] disposition of the petition for
    post-conviction relief.” Commonwealth v. Quail, 
    729 A.2d 571
    , 573
    (Pa.Super. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    7Paragraph (H) applies to death penalty cases and is inapplicable to the case
    sub judice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(H).
    8 Here, there is no dispute Appellant is indigent, and the PCRA court
    determined as much in response to our June 29, 2022, order.
    -6-
    J-S41034-22
    In the case sub judice, as indicated supra, Appellant’s pro se “Motion to
    Correct Sentence,” which he filed on July 26, 2021, constituted Appellant’s
    first PCRA petition. Accordingly, the PCRA court committed an error of law
    when it failed to appoint counsel to represent Appellant throughout the PCRA
    proceedings.
    Consequently, for all of the aforementioned reasons, we vacate the
    PCRA court’s November 15, 2021, order and remand for proceedings
    consistent with this decision, including the appointment of counsel to assist
    Appellant as it relates to his first PCRA petition, which we deem to have been
    filed on July 26, 2021.9
    Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/29/2022
    ____________________________________________
    9 We recognize that, in response to this Court’s June 29, 2022, order, the
    PCRA court appointed Michael J. Light, II, Esquire to assist Appellant on
    appeal. Upon remand, the PCRA court shall either appoint new counsel or, if
    appropriate, direct Attorney Light to represent Appellant during the PCRA
    proceedings below. In any event, PCRA counsel may seek to withdraw, if
    appropriate, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    518 Pa. 491
    ,
    
    544 A.2d 927
     (1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc), as well as its progeny.
    -7-