Wilson, D. v. Smyers, K. ( 2022 )

J-A15020-22
2022 PA Super 177DENISE L. WILSON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KYRA S. SMYERS :
:
Appellant : No. 128 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 10, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County,
Civil Division at No(s): 797 for the year 2017.
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: October 14, 2022
Kyra S. Smyers (Mother) appeals the order issued by the Bedford
County Court of Common Pleas, which expanded the custody rights of Denise
L. Wilson (Grandmother1) regarding Mother’s five-year-old son, L.H.S. (the
Child). Under a previous consent order, Grandmother exercised supervised
physical custody for an hour and a half, every other week, in Mother’s home.
This matter involves the parties’ cross-modification petitions. Grandmother
sought unsupervised partial custody under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1); in
response, Mother sought to “suspend” Grandmother’s custody, stopping the
visits altogether. The trial court granted Grandmother’s relief, awarding her
partial custody on the first Saturday of each month. On appeal, Mother argues
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1 Denise Wilson is the paternal grandmother.
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that the court misapplied 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1) (considerations when
awarding grandparent custody). After careful review, we affirm.
In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court provided
the relevant factual and procedural history:
Mother and George Bango, Jr. (Father) began a relationship
when Mother was 19 years old, and Father was 32 years old,
while they both worked at [a local hospital]. Mother was
employed in the housekeeping department while Father was
an emergency room nurse. Father was an Army veteran
and suffered from mental health issues. Mother’s parents
did not approve of the relationship. Mother hid the
relationship, and ultimately six months of her pregnancy,
from her parents. As the relationship progressed, Father
became more controlling and obsessive with Mother.
Father’s mental health problems spiraled and ultimately he
ended his own life [in December 2016, when the Child was
approximately 5 months old].
[…] Grandmother initially filed a Complaint for
Grandparent’s Custody on August 18, 2017. In her initial
Petition, Grandmother requested periods of partial custody
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1).[2] [A] hearing on the
matter was ultimately scheduled for May 24, 2018, at which
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2 Section 5325(1) (Standing for partial physical custody and supervised
physical custody) provides:
In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating
to standing for any form of physical custody or legal
custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file an
action under this chapter for partial physical custody or
supervised physical custody in the following situations:
(1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent
or grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action
under this section;
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1).
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point the parties agreed to an order granting Grandmother
periods of supervised partial custody every other Friday
from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., to be supervised by Mother
and to occur in Mother’s home, as well as several collateral
provisions. These supervised periods of partial custody
were faithfully exercised by Grandmother for approximately
two years until the COVID-19 pandemic. The parties agreed
to suspend the in-person periods of partial custody in
March/April 2020 and instead Grandmother would telephone
the Child. Grandmother made repeated requests to resume
some form of in-person contact with the Child, which [were]
denied by Mother.
Ultimately, Grandmother filed a Petition to Modify the
Custody Order on July 29, 2021, which gave rise to the
instant litigation and appeal. In her Petition to Modify,
Grandmother requested that the visits resume and not be
supervised, arguing that supervision was no longer
necessary since a relationship and bond had developed
between Grandmother and the Child such that those
provisions were no longer necessary. Thereafter, on
September 22, 2021, Mother filed a Petition for Modification
of Custody, requesting that Grandmother’s periods of partial
custody be suspended, alleging that the Child and
Grandmother failed to develop a bond and that the Child
identifies Mother’s fiancé as his father and [the fiancé’s]
parents as [the Child’s paternal] grandparents.
Following hearings held on November 12, 2021, and January
3, 2022, [the trial court] granted Grandmother’s Petition for
Modification of Custody and by Order dated January 2,
2022, granted Grandmother unsupervised partial custody
on the first Saturday of each month from 10:00 a.m. until
5:00 p.m., as well as several collateral provisions.
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 2/11/22, at 1-3 (capitalization and format
adjusted) (footnote added).
Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents three issues for our
review, which we reorder for ease of disposition:
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1. Did the trial court commit an error of law or an abuse
of discretion when it precluded [Mother] from offering
more detailed testimony of the circumstances
surrounding the [Father’s] conduct towards [Mother]
and her family, culminating in the [Father] taking his
own life (suicide), and those circumstances’ effects
upon Mother and her extended family?
2. Did the trial court commit an error of law or an abuse
of discretion when, under the circumstances of the
present matter, it ordered an expansion of
[Grandmother’s] physical custody rights to partial
custody, notwithstanding the lack of any appreciable
relationship between her and the [Child]?
3. Did the trial court commit an error of law or an abuse
of discretion when, under the circumstances of the
present matter, it overrode [Mother’s] decision (or
denied her request) to terminate continuing contact
between the [Child] and [Grandmother],
unnecessarily and/or improperly overriding a fit
parent’s decision and giving insufficient weight to the
parent-child relationship, by ordering an expansion of
custodial contact afforded [to] the [Grandmother] to
partial custody?
Mother’s Brief at 7-8.
Mother’s first appellate issue concerns the admission of evidence. Citing
her unhealthy relationship with Father and the circumstances of his death,
Mother argued at trial that any involvement with the paternal family would
adversely affect her mental health and, by proxy, her ability to parent. To
support this argument, Mother sought to introduce her own testimony, as well
as that of her family members. According to Mother, “[s]uch testimony would
have provided significant context as to why [Mother] decided it was better to
end an unproductive, unsubstantial relationship between [Grandmother] and
the Child.” Id. at 32. The trial court permitted some of Mother’s testimony
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but found Mother’s additional, proffered evidence to be irrelevant or
superfluous. Mother alleges the court erred.
To resolve this issue, we are guided by the following principles. The
admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the
trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d
736, 749 (Pa. Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the
exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.(citation omitted).
The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the
evidence is relevant. Id. at 750 (citation omitted).
Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a
material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more
or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or
presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. In
addition, evidence is only admissible where the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.
Id.; see also Pa.R.E. 401; 402; 403.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court summarized Mother’s
testimony:
The court heard a substantial amount of testimony about
the relationship between the parents prior to Father’s
suicide. It was obvious to this court that the parents’
relationship was not a very good one due in large part to
[Father’s] serious mental health struggles. Mother testified
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that she and Father never lived together. As the
relationship progressed, he became more possessive and
was obsessed with her. Mother testified that in
approximately May 2016, Father was acting erratically,
which culminated in a stand-off with the Pennsylvania State
Police. Father had a firearm and attempted to kill himself
but was taken into custody and incarcerated. Mother
testified credibly that this was a terrifying time for her and
her family. Father was released from jail in approximately
September 2016. After being released, Father sent Mother
a few emails. Father filed a custody petition, and a custody
conference was held in October 2016. A custody hearing
was scheduled for March 2017. Mother acknowledged
sending Father messages expressing love, but Mother
testified that she only did so because she didn’t want him to
hurt himself. Ultimately, Mother filed for a Protection From
Abuse Order on December 28, 2016. Father committed
suicide on December 29, 2016, after being served with the
temporary order. While acknowledging the certain and
unfortunate effect the above events had on Mother, this
court noted that the deceased Father is not a party to this
action and there is no evidence whatsoever that
Grandmother engaged in any abusive acts. Rather, the
evidence has shown that Grandmother has acted with good
faith throughout this custody case.[3]
T.C.O. at 10-11 (capitalization adjusted) (footnote added).
The trial court explained that it initially allowed significant testimony
about Father’s actions and their impact on Mother, but that the court
prohibited collateral testimony after doubting its relevance, “especially since
Grandmother had no role in those events or the parents’ relationship.” See
id. at 20. Mother concedes the trial court allowed her to provide information
about the traumatic impact Father’s death had on her. However, she
____________________________________________
3 The trial court also noted: “Grandmother credibly testified that she did not
blame Father’s suicide on Mother, testifying that it happened because [Father]
had mental health problems.” T.C.O. at 9.
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maintains that the court erred when it prevented her from elaborating why
she should be allowed to end the relationship between Grandmother and the
Child. See Mother’s Brief at 32.
After review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The trial court allowed
Mother to make her case, affording her ample opportunity to present
supporting testimony. The court even found Mother to be credible, expressly
noting that Mother became physically emotional during her testimony. See
N.T., 1/3/22 (Day 2), at 81. But after a certain point, the court decided that
additional testimony regarding Mother’s history with Father, and how it
currently affects her, was superfluous and not particularly relevant to either
Mother’s relationship with the Child, nor the Child’s relationship with
Grandmother. We conclude that the court’s evidentiary ruling was not
manifestly unreasonable, and we decline to remand for further testimony.4
Mother’s first issue is without merit.
The crux of Mother’s appeal concerns the trial court’s substantive
custody award. We begin our analysis of her remaining issues by observing
this Court’s scope and standard of review for custody matters:
In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
record, as our role does not include making independent factual
____________________________________________
4 The procedural disposition of this case is also pertinent to our decision. Here,
Grandmother sought a modest adjustment of her custody time. Moreover,
Mother only sought to end Grandmother’s contact with the Child in response
to Grandmother’s modification petition. Notably, the trial court recognized
that traumatic event occurred nearly six years ago, and the Grandparent-Child
relationship has existed for years without any real issue.
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determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
However, we are not bound by the trial court's deductions or
inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in
light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d 1155, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
The Child Custody Act provides grandparents with the ability to seek
partial custody in certain situations, including when a parent of the child is
deceased. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). Underpinning the statute is the state’s
interest in protecting the health and emotional welfare of children, which
includes ensuring that children are not deprived of beneficial relationships with
their grandparents. See Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006);
see also D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 211 (Pa. 2016).
“The stated goal [of fostering the grandparent-child relationship] is not
insignificant. In the event of a major disruption to the family environment,
such as where there is parental abuse, neglect, substance abuse, mental
illness, or abandonment, the interest may be especially pronounced.” D.P.,
146 A.3d at 214 (citation omitted). Our courts have recognized that the
state’s interest extends to situations where a parent has died:
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a
grandparent’s desire for partial physical custody would not
prevail over a fit parent’s decision to limit contact in all
cases, it refused “to close our minds to the possibility that
in some instances a court may overturn even the decision
of a fit parent to exclude a grandparent from a grandchild’s
life, especially where the grandparent’s child is
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deceased and the grandparent relationship is
longstanding and significant to the grandchild.”
J. & S.O. v. C.H., 206 A.3d 1171, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2019) appeal denied, 654
Pa. 517 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Hiller, 904 A.2d at 887) (emphasis original). The
High Court has also emphasized “the many potential benefits of strong inter-
generational ties” as another reason to foster the grandparent-child
relationship. See Hiller, 904 at 886 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
64 (2000)).
Of course, the state’s interest in protecting the grandparent-child
relationships comes with a cost – namely, the infringement of a parent’s
rights. See Hiller, 904 A.2d at 886. “There is no dispute that Section 5325
burdens the rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children; that such right is a fundamental one; and that,
as such, it is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and
equal-protection guarantees.” D.P., 146 A.3d at 210 (citations omitted); see
also Troxel; and see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Instantly, Mother acknowledges Grandmother has standing to pursue
partial custody under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). She does not allege any
procedural violation, nor does she challenge the validity of that subsection,
which was reaffirmed as recently as 2019. See J. & S.O., supra. Instead,
Mother claims the trial court impermissibly infringed on her fundamental
custody right, by misapplying one of the relevant factor analyses prescribed
by the Child Custody Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (c).
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The Child Custody Act mandates two separate analyses when a
grandparent seeks partial custody. First, “[i]n ordering any form of custody,
the court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect
the safety of the child, including [factors 1 through 16.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
5328(a)(1)-(16).5 Second, for grandparents, the Child Custody Act further
mandates the consideration of supplemental criteria under Section
5328(c)(1)(i)-(iii), in addition to the factors itemized under Section 5328(a).
D.R.L. v. K.L.C., 216 A.3d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Mother’s second and third appellate issues concern the trial court’s
findings under Section 5328(c)(1)(i) and (ii), respectively.
Section 5328(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:
(1) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised
physical custody to a party who has standing under section
5325(1) or (2) (relating to standing for partial physical
custody and supervised physical custody), the court shall
consider the following:
(i) the amount of personal contact between the child
and the party prior to the filing of the action;
(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child
relationship;
[…]
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5 We have held that a Section 5328(a) analysis is also necessary when – as
was the case here – a party seeks to modify the type of custody award. See
A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 824 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5323(a) (“Award of custody”). Grandmother sought to modify the type of
custody award, from supervised physical custody to partial physical custody.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
In her second appellate issue, Mother argues the trial court ignored “the
utter lack of substance to the relationship” between Grandmother and the
Child when considering Section 5328(c)(1)(i). See Mother’s Brief at 23. She
concludes that the custody award was erroneous, because it “was imposed in
the absence of a substantive, caring and nurturing relationship upon which
[the Child] relies and derives emotional value.” Id.
For support, she cites Hiller, supra. In that case, a maternal
grandmother sought partial custody after the mother’s death from cancer.
Prior to the mother’s death, the child had frequent contact with the
grandmother, especially during the last two years of the mother’s illness, when
they saw each other almost daily. The grandmother was an active part in the
daily routine and took on the task of preparing the child for the mother’s
death. And given their close relationship, the trial court determined that the
grandmother should be entitled to partial physical custody. Hiller, 904 A.2d
at 877.
Hiller concerned the constitutionality of the prior version of Section
5325, which authorized grandparents to seek partial custody in the event of a
parent’s death. Ultimately, our Supreme Court acknowledged the state’s
interest in fostering the grandparent-child relationship and upheld the statute
authorizing grandparent custody upon a parent’s death. Id. But Mother does
not rely on Hiller for its holding, per se; instead, she relies on facts of Hiller
to illustrate what, in her view, constitutes the requisite amount of personal
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contact before a court may award a grandparent custody under Section
5328(c)(1)(i). Mother distinguishes the instant case from the facts of Hiller
to argue that the subject Child and Grandmother had a much more attenuated
relationship. Mother concludes that, unlike the relationship in Hiller, the
amount of personal contact between Grandmother and the Child does not
warrant a partial custody award.
First, we do not construe Hiller – as Mother does – to be the yardstick
by which a court measures the amount of grandparent-child contact before
determining whether a partial custody award is deserved. That consideration
is codified by Section 5328(c)(1)(i), which the trial court must weigh in
conjunction with the other relevant factors. Second, although we recognize
the factual distinctions from Hiller, the record in this matter does not support
Mother’s allegation that the partial custody award was unfounded due to the
lack of personal contact between Grandmother and the Child.
In its consideration of the amount of personal contact between
Grandmother and the Child, the trial court made the following findings:
• [T]he testimony was clear that Grandmother did not
have a relationship with the Child prior to Father’s
suicide on December 29, 2016. However, it appeared
that Grandmother desired to develop a relationship
with the baby, as evidenced by a letter sent to Mother
on or about August 1, 2016.
• Of relevance to this court was the fact that at the
hearing [in May 2018], Mother agreed to entry of a
consent order granting Grandmother supervised
partial custody every other Friday evening. By her
agreement, Mother allowed a relationship to begin
between Grandmother and the Child, beginning in
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June 2018 when the Child was approximately two
years old. Mother testified that she agreed to the
above arrangement because she felt compassion for
Grandmother and wanted to make things work.
Approximately 40 of these supervised visits occurred
as scheduled for almost two years until approximately
March/April 2020.
• Grandmother testified that while the supervised visits
were enjoyable, that having them occur where Mother
lived with the Maternal Grandparents and [Mother’s
minor siblings], was awkward and tense.
Grandmother felt like she was intruding into their
home. Grandmother testified that she referred to
herself as “Nana” and the Child also called her “Nana,”
and that when told “I love you,” the Child would
respond “I love you too.” Mother acknowledged that
she had heard the Child refer to [Grandmother] as
“Nana” but further testified that the Child typically did
not refer to [Grandmother] at all during visits or if he
did, he called her “Denise.”
• Grandmother entered as evidence several
photographs of the Child taken during the early visits.
This court noted that the pictures depict a happy,
smiling Child that appeared to be enjoying his
interactions with Grandmother.
• In March/April 2020, due to the uncertainty
surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties
agreed to stop the in-person visits and instead have
telephone calls. […] However, the court was satisfied
to resume visits and allow unsupervised contact while
in a public location to occur near Mother’s home as a
way to slowly transition to Grandmother resuming
regular contact with the Child. […] By all accounts,
the several “unsupervised” [] visits went well.
See generally T.C.O. at 6-8 (emphasis original).
The trial court was primarily persuaded by the fact that Mother allowed
Grandmother to begin a relationship three years ago, when the Child was a
toddler. Whether Mother was motivated by guilt, or sympathy, or out of a
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genuine concern for the Child’s best interests, she allowed Grandmother to
become a part of the Child’s life. Indeed, Grandmother has consistently
maintained this relationship since. Although Mother’s opposition to
Grandmother’s custody appears to be made in good faith, we find her
appellate argument on this point to be somewhat disingenuous. Mother
cannot expect the trial court to ignore the relationship that Mother herself
permitted to blossom. Nor can Mother expect this Court to ignore the trial
court’s subsequent findings.
When considering the trial court’s findings in light of the record, we
discern no abuse of discretion. The court thoroughly considered the amount
of personal contact between the Child and Grandmother prior to the
commencement of the modification action. Importantly, we observe that the
trial court awarded Grandmother partial custody for only seven hours each
month, on the first Saturday. To be sure, the partial physical custody award
is an expansion of Grandmother’s custody (and thus necessarily an
infringement upon Mother’s custody). But the award is not out of proportion
with the amount of personal contact between Grandmother and the Child,
prior to Grandmother’s modification petition. Put another way, the court’s
conclusions under Section 5328(c)(1)(i) are not manifestly unreasonable in
light of the sustainable findings. See S.T., 192 A.3d at 1160. For these
reasons, Mother’s second appellate issue is without merit.
In her final appellate issue, Mother argues the custody award “interferes
with the parent-child relationship,” in contravention of Section 5328(c)(1)(ii).
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See generally Mother’s Brief at 26-30. “We have emphasized that the
burden is on the grandparents to demonstrate that partial custody or
[supervised physical custody] in their favor is in the child’s best interest and
will not interfere with the parent-child relationship.” D.R.L., 216 A.3d at 279
(citation omitted); see also Hiller, 904 A.2d at 879.
Mother reasons that Grandmother’s involvement would interfere with
Mother’s desire to begin a new life with Kevin Smith (Fiancé) and his family.6
To explain, Fiancé has been involved in the Child’s life since infancy. The Child
believes Fiancé is his father and that Fiancé’s parents are his extended
paternal family. Mother has decided not to inform the Child about “all of the
circumstances pertaining to the Child’s Father.” See Mother’s Brief at 28.
Evidently, it was Mother’s intention never to tell the Child about Father or the
paternal family – or at least not in the immediate future. According to Mother,
the partial custody award interferes with her parental right to decide what to
tell the Child and when.
The trial court opined that Mother “wishes to erase the fact that the
Child had a biological father and therefore deny [the Child] the opportunity to
continue the relationship [with Grandmother.]” See T.C.O. at 10. The court
said it was “gravely concerned about the effect this will have on the Child’s
emotional health and well-being.” Id.
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6 The wedding was planned for February 2022.
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However, the learned trial court determined that it was still Mother’s
decision how much to divulge to the Child and when to do so. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court spoke directly to Mother:
[Mother’s] been forthright with the court today which I
appreciate as to her feelings on the matter. And it would
seem to me with everything she’s been th[r]ough, she’s
earned that right to be able to tell [the Child] what she
thinks is appropriate. I would just, while it is your decision,
ma’am, I would just very, very strongly encourage you to
give it serious consideration moving forward when you’re
deciding what to tell him, if anything, because in my
experiences these things, these secrets, they don’t remain
secrets. And it would seem to me the most important
person in [the Child’s] life, or people I should say, are his
Mother and [Fiancé.] And I would just ask you to consider
how [the Child] will feel at some point, and it’s not if, it’s
probably a matter of when he finds out that [Fiancé] is not
his biological father. How will it impact [the Child] when he
finds out that the two most important people in his life
essentially lied to him? My experience in handling these
cases is the older a child gets when he’s told, if secrets are
kept, it has a devastating impact.
But, ma’am, I can’t make that decision for you. You’re his
mother. You need to make that decision. But I would just
encourage you to just give it some real thought. Certainly
[the Child] is not at an age to where it would be appropriate
to tell him, I guess what we’ll call the full story. Certainly
that would not be in his best interest. But it would seem to
me an age appropriate factual, age-appropriate
conversation at least rooted in facts telling him that his
biological father was ill and he died, but that he has [Fiancé]
and [Fiancé’s] been in his life, that he loves him and he
wants to be his dad. But, again, that’s not my job here
today, ma’am. I would just ask you to consider it.
N.T. (Day 2) at 92-94.
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The court also acknowledged that Grandmother has respected Mother’s
wishes thus far and cautioned Grandmother to continue to do so:
The other thing, [Grandmother], it seems to me as though
you’ve been overall pretty respectful of the wishes of
[Mother] as far as what’s told to the Child. I’m not going to
specifically put it in the court order what you’re allowed to
talk to him about, but I really don’t see where it would be in
his best interests to have some of these things told to him
by anybody other than his Mother. So, my point, ma’am, is
I would expect you to continue to support her and be
respectful of however she presents this situation to the
Child. And I know you may not agree with that, but we’ve
got to look at what’s in the Child’s best interest.
Id. at 95-96.
Even though the trial court ruled that Mother retained the exclusive right
of whether, and how much, to share with the Child about his Father, Mother
maintains that the partial custody award still interferes with the parent-child
relationship.
For support, Mother relies on D.R.L., supra. There, the trial court found
that the grandparents’ request for more partial custody would interfere with
the mother’s and the adoptive father’s relationship with the child. D.R.L., 216
A.3d at 285-86. Under our deferential abuse of discretion standard, we had
to affirm:
In sum, we interpret the crux of [the] paternal
grandparents’ claims as disputes with the trial court’s
findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and
weight of the evidence. [The] paternal grandparents
essentially ask this court to re-find facts, re-weigh evidence,
and re-assess credibility. That is not our role. As evidence
by the trial court’s opinion, the trial court performed a
detailed and thorough analysis of the child’s best interest.
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The trial court’s findings and determinations are supported
by competence evidence in the record and we will not
disturb them. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by declining to expand the
paternal grandparents’ custodial periods with the child.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (capitalization adjusted).
Mother’s reliance upon D.R.L. is misplaced, because she fails to
appreciate how her case differs from the procedural disposition of D.R.L.
Here, the trial court found that an expansion of Grandmother’s custody would
not interfere with the parent-child relationship. We must follow the same
deferential standard of review, which means that we do not “re-find facts, re-
weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.” Id.
Applying our deferential standard, we conclude the trial court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence. The court heard testimony that
Grandmother has deferred to Mother’s wishes regarding the involvement of
the paternal family. Moreover, Grandmother has promoted the parent-child
relationship and has been supportive of Fiancé. The court opined:
The court heard testimony that Grandmother complied with
Mother’s wishes to keep the Child’s biological Father a
secret. Mother apparently has told the Child that
Grandmother is just a “family friend.” While Grandmother
disagrees with this, she has followed Mother’s wishes.
Furthermore, Grandmother testified that she would be in
favor of [Fiancé] adopting the Child, so that the Child would
have all the benefits afforded by an intact family unit.
However, Grandmother felt that the Child should also be
able to have a relationship with the paternal side of his
family, including his teenage half-sister[.] Despite
disagreeing with Mother on this issue, Grandmother has
followed Mother’s wishes. There was no evidence that
Grandmother has not supported the parental relationship
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between the Mother and the Child. In her testimony,
Grandmother was complementary of Mother and Fiancé.
Grandmother credibly testified that she was never critical of
Mother, Fiancé, or the maternal grandparents and never
said or did anything during visits to undermine Mother’s
position of importance in the Child’s life. Grandmother
credibly testified that she did not blame Father’s suicide on
Mother, testifying that it happened because he had mental
health problems.
T.C.O. at 8-9 (capitalization adjusted).
Perhaps we would have concern if the trial court gave Grandmother
carte blanche to tell the Child the unvarnished truth, without regard to
Mother’s careful consideration about how best to inform the Child. Had the
court done so, then we could envision how its award might run the risk of
parental interference under Section 5328(c)(1)(ii). But that is not what
occurred here. The trial court utilized a deft touch, reserving for Mother the
right to inform the Child about his parentage, while imploring the parties to
appreciate the “minefield” created by withholding the truth. See N.T. (Day 2)
at 97. Given the court’s decision, Mother’s argument – that a partial custody
award interferes with her ability to create a new family unit with Fiancé – fails
on its own terms: Grandmother is supportive of Mother; Grandmother has
abided by Mother’s wishes about what is told to the Child; and Grandmother
is in favor of Fiancé adopting the Child.
Briefly, we dispose of Mother’s ancillary arguments regarding the trial
court’s application of Section 5328(c)(1)(ii). Mother wished that Grandmother
refer to herself as “a close family friend” and not “Nana.” After some
deliberation, the court allowed Grandmother to refer to herself as “Nana.” Id.
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at 97-99. We discern no error or abuse of discretion. First, as we discussed
in detail above, the state has an interest in fostering the grandparent-child
relationship. The Legislature has codified that interest in the Child Custody
Act, which explicitly refers to grandparents. It might lead to an absurd7 result
if a grandparent, who obtained an award under a grandparent custody statute,
could not self-identify as the grandparent. Second, the testimony reveals that
the Child already refers to Grandmother as “Nana,” at least some of the time.
Insofar as Mother alleged that the partial custody award causes parental
interference because the award adversely affects her mental health, we
conclude this argument merits no relief. We note that the trial court found
credible Mother’s testimony that the circumstances of her relationship with
Father cause her stress and anxiety. But the court did not conclude that this
emotional toll meant that Grandmother’s partial custody award interfered with
the parent-child relationship. The court was not persuaded that a relatively
modest expansion of Grandmother’s custody would now produce such distress
that it would cause parental interference.8 Such a determination was within
the court’s purview.
In sum: the trial court did not error or abuse its discretion when it
determined that Mother’s additional testimony about her history with Father
____________________________________________
7 Courts must not interpret a statute in a manner that leads to an absurd
result. See, e.g., C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 953 (Pa. Super. 2013).
8 The trial court also encouraged Mother to consider Grandmother’s proposal
that the parties seek some type of counseling. Evidently aware that these
professional services can be costly, the court stopped short of including it in
the custody order.
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was irrelevant; the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
Grandmother and the Child had a prior, beneficial relationship under Section
5328(c)(1)(i); and the court’s award would not result in parental interference
under Section 5328(c)(1)(ii), as Mother retained the right to determine how
best to reveal to the Child the truth about his parentage. Apart from these
holdings, we echo the thoughtful remarks delivered by the trial court. We
sympathize with the trauma the parties have endured, applaud their endeavor
to be respectful toward each other, and encourage them to continue being
mindful of the Child’s best interests.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2022
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