Adoption of: D.H., Appeal of: S.Z.T. ( 2022 )

J-S18033-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF D.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: S.Z.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1424 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 6, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 054-ADOPT-2021,
055-ADOPT-2021, CP-21-DP-000052-2020,
CP-21-DP-000053-2020
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.Z.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1425 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 6, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 055-ADOPT-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.Z.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1550 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered November 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-21-DP-000053-2020
J-S18033-22
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.Z.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1551 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered November 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-21-DP-000052-2020
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2022
In these consolidated cases, S.Z.T. (“Mother”) appeals from the October
6, 2021, decrees in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
involuntarily terminating her rights to D.H., born in April 2016, and D.T., born
in October 2017 (collectively, “Children”).1, 2 Mother also appeals from the
November 23, 2021, orders changing Children’s permanency goals from
reunification to adoption. In addition, Mother’s counsel (“Counsel”) has filed
a petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
____________________________________________
1On October 6, 2021, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of
D.H. (“Father”), the natural father of Children. Father did not file a notice of
appeal and did not participate in the instant appeals.
2 By decree entered on January 6, 2022, the orphans’ court involuntarily
terminated Mother’s parental rights to her daughter, N.P. Mother filed a notice
of appeal which is docketed at 142 MDA 2022, which we dispose of by separate
memorandum.
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A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After review, we grant the petition to withdraw, affirm
the termination decrees, and dismiss the appeals from the goal change orders
as moot.
We begin with an overview of the relevant facts and procedural history.
Cumberland County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) became involved
with the family in March 2020, after receiving a report that Children were
residing with M.G., a cousin of Mother, and her paramour, B.G. N.T., 10/6/21,
at 12. The report alleged that Children had been in the care of M.G. “on and
off for most of [their] lives.” Id. at 13. Further, the report alleged that M.G.
was paying for Children’s medical needs “out of pocket” which she could not
sustain. Id. at 12-13.
M.G. testified that in October 2018, prior to CYS placing Children with
her, Mother moved away. N.T., 10/6/21, at 55. At this time, Children were
in the care of Father who was receiving monetary assistance from M.G. Id.
At the end of October 2018, M.G. offered to care for Children until Father could
obtain a job. Id. From October 2018, to the date of the termination hearing,
other than a four-month period from December 2019, to March 2020, Children
were in the care of M.G.3 Id. at 56.
On June 11, 2020, the juvenile court adjudicated Children dependent.
N.T., 10/6/21, at 12. CYS placed Children in the home of M.G. as a formal
____________________________________________
3 In December 2019, Mother took Children for Christmas, and said she would
bring them back after the holiday. N.T., 10/6/21, at 56. However, Mother
did not bring Children back until March 2020. Id. at 56.
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kinship foster placement. CYS provided Mother with permanency goals: to
obtain and maintain stable housing; to address parenting concerns; to
maintain consistent contact with Children; to meet the needs of Children’s
medical, dental, vision, and education; and to address mental health concerns.
Id. at 13-22.
On May 5, 2021, CYS filed petitions for goal changes to adoption. On
September 24, 2021, CYS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
(b). The orphans’ court conducted an evidentiary hearing on all petitions on
October 6, 2021, when Children were five years old and three years old,
respectively. Legal counsel for Children was Damian DeStefano, Esquire, and
Children’s guardian ad litem was Tammi Blackburn, Esquire. CYS presented
the testimony of Emily Normand, a parent educator at Alternative Behavior
Consultants (“ABC”); Shannon Underwood, CYS caseworker; Christina
Witmer, a caseworker at KidsPeace, who participated in ten sessions with D.H.
regarding his ability to maturely communicate what he wants; and M.G.
Mother, who was represented by Robert H. Hawn, Jr., Esquire, testified on her
own behalf, and presented the testimony of her father.
By decrees dated October 6, 2021, and entered on October 8, 2021, the
orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). By orders dated
October 6, 2021, and entered November 23, 2021, the court changed
Children’s permanency goals to adoption. On November 2, 2021, Mother filed
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timely notices of appeal from the termination decrees along with concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On December 3, 2021, Mother filed timely notices of
appeal from the goal change orders along with concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On
December 10, 2021, this Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte. The
court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 22, 2022.
On April 16, 2022, Counsel filed a petition with this Court requesting to
withdraw from representation and submitted a brief pursuant to Anders and
Santiago. We begin by reviewing Counsel’s request. See Commonwealth
v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘When faced with a
purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the
underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.’”) (citation
omitted); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(extending the Anders procedure to appeals from involuntary termination
decrees).
To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
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Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted).
With respect to the third Anders requirement, this Court has held
counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to
their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock,
873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directed that Anders
briefs must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Instantly, Counsel filed petitions to withdraw certifying his review and
determination that Mother’s appeal is frivolous. Counsel also filed a brief
which includes a summary of the procedural history and facts of the case with
citations to the record, the issues raised by Mother that arguably support the
appeal, and Counsel’s assessment regarding why the appeal is frivolous with
citations to relevant legal authority. Finally, Counsel attached to his petition
a letter he sent to Mother pursuant to Millisock, 873 A.2d at 752.
Accordingly, Counsel complied with the requirements of Anders and
Santiago.
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We next “conduct a review of the record to ascertain if on its face, there
are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or
misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc).
Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issues:
1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or commit an error
of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and convincing
evidence, that the child’s permanent placement goal of
reunification was neither appropriate, nor feasible and ordered
a goal change to adoption, thus contravening section 6351(f)
of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)?
2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion or commit an error
of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and convincing
evidence, that sufficient grounds existed for a termination of
appellant’s parental rights in her child, and when it failed to
primarily consider the child’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare, thus contravening sections
2511(a) and 2511(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)
& 2511(b)?
Anders Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).4
We will begin by analyzing the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights. We review involuntary termination decrees for an abuse of
discretion, which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a
determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by
competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa.
____________________________________________
4 Legal counsel for Children submitted a letter in this Court in support of
affirming the decrees and orders and agreed with Counsel that the appeals
are wholly frivolous. See Letter from Children’s Counsel, April 21, 2022.
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2021). When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by
the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where
the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate
court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error
of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591
(Pa. 2021).
“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support
an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to
trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must
balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs
for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.
Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences
for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of
this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory
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grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,
255 A.3d at 358 (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds
describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary
termination.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).
In evaluating whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 2511(a),
the court must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or
best interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa. Super.
2021). If the court determines the petitioner established grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court
then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
The orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).5 Here, we analyze the court’s
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5 Although the orphans’ court entered the decrees under 23 Pa.C.S.
2511(a)(5) and (8) as well, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court reconsidered
its ruling sua sponte. It determined Children were not removed from the care
of a parent or under voluntary agreement with an agency and subsections
(a)(5) and (a)(8) were inapplicable. We need not address this issue, as we
need only agree with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a),
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
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as well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc).
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met[:] (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform
parental duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citations omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” In re
Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011)). As such, “[a] parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, the orphans’ court determined that “Mother . . .
essentially abandoned her [C]hildren.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/22/22, at
6. The court continued: “Except for a four-month period ending in March
2020, Mother has consistently neglected her parental duties since October of
2018. That neglect caused [C]hildren to rely solely upon [M.G.] and her
partner for their physical and emotional support.” Id. The court also found
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that “Mother had made virtually no progress toward remedying the causes of
her parental neglect.” Id.
In making this conclusion, the orphans’ court relied on various facts, all
of which are supported by the record. Primarily, Mother’s contact with
Children was sparse. During the dependency period, Mother was referred for
visitation on June 26, 2020, November 5, 2020, May 7, 2021, and September
2, 2021. N.T., 10/6/21, at 15. According to the CYS caseworker, Underwood,
Mother did not respond at all to the first two referrals. Id. On May 7, 2021,
Mother was offered seven visits. Id. Underwood stated that “[Mother]
attended one, she no-showed for four, and she cancelled two.” Id. Finally,
on September 2, 2021, Mother was offered three visits. Id. Mother attended
one, no-showed for one, and cancelled one. Id. Over the course of the
dependency, Mother only visited Children on two occasions, and went
approximately one year from their placement before finally visiting. Id.
M.G. testified that, with her approval, Mother contacted Children
intermittently via phone. See N.T., 10/6/21, at 61. The record does not
reveal when this contact began, but it indicates that this contact ceased in the
Spring of 2021. Id. at 17-18, 61-62. M.G. testified that she blocked Mother’s
number at that time because Mother threatened her. Id. at 62. M.G. stated
that she told Mother if she wanted to speak to Children, she could reach out
to M.G.’s mother. Id.
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Additionally, the orphans’ court appropriately found that Mother “did
little to avail herself of” the services offered by CYS. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
3/22/22, at 6-7. According to Underwood, CYS referred Mother for a parental
assessment on three occasions. See N.T., 10/6/21, at 14. CYS first referred
Mother for this assessment on July 16, 2020, but Mother did not respond. Id.
On November 5, 2020, CYS referred Mother for the assessment again, but
Mother did not respond. Id. Finally, CYS referred Mother for a third time on
May 7, 2021, and ultimately, Mother began the assessment on May 20, 2021.
Id. at 15. On July 9, 2021, Mother was referred for ten parenting sessions.
Id. at 9-10. These sessions began on September 4, 2021, but at the time of
the termination hearing, Mother had only completed three sessions. Id. at 9.
CYS also requested that Mother receive a mental health evaluation due
to concerns regarding “extreme emotions and difficulty keeping her on track
and other mental health things that [CYS] observed.” N.T. 10/6/21, at 20.
Underwood testified that Mother told her that she obtained an evaluation on
September 23, 2021, in New York. Id. The CYS caseworker emailed a release
to Mother so CYS could view the evaluation results, but Mother did not sign
and return the release. Id. at 20-21. Accordingly, at the time of the hearing,
CYS could not confirm that Mother obtained an evaluation. Id. at 21.
Regarding Mother’s goal of housing stability, CYS referred Mother for
emergency housing in the winter of 2020, but Mother lost this opportunity
when she did not follow through with signing paperwork at the Housing
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Authority. N.T., 10/6/21, at 18. Underwood testified that Mother wanted to
transfer the case to New York, and a family group conference occurred on
January 26, 2021, to discuss this possibility. Id. at 31-33. At the conference,
though, Mother indicated that it would be easier for her to move to Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, which is closer to Children. Id. at 31. Ultimately, Mother
obtained appropriate housing near Children on August 4, 2021; however,
Underwood indicated that Mother did not intend to stay in that home, but
instead “relocat[ed] to New York.” Id. at 19. Furthermore, regarding
stability, Mother is not employed. Id.
Finally, CYS provided Mother with a goal to ensure Children’s medical,
dental, vision, and education needs were met. N.T., 10/6/21, at 21. However,
Underwood stated that Mother had “not attended any appointments
throughout the life of the case. She also h[ad not] talked to anybody about
[C]hildren. When [Mother] talk[ed] to [her], she d[id] not ask about their
well-being. She d[id] not ask about their education. She d[id] not ask about
their medical needs.” Id.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
orphans’ court in concluding that Mother’s conduct warrants termination
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record demonstrates that Mother’s
repeated and continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal to obtain stability,
participate in a parenting program, visit Children regularly, involve herself in
Children’s medical, dental, vision, and education needs, and obtain a verified
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mental health assessment, has caused Children to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental
well-being. Further, Mother has not established that the conditions and
causes of her incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
See In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted) (reiterating that the court
may properly reject as untimely or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow
through on necessary services when the parent failed to co-operate with the
agency or take advantage of available services during the dependency
proceedings).
We turn now to Section 2511(b), which requires the court to “give
primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and
welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has made clear that
Section 2511(b) requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of
bond between a parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa.
1993). It is reasonable to infer that no bond exists when there is no evidence
suggesting the existence of one. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762–63
(Pa. Super. 2008). To the extent there is a bond, the trial court must examine
whether termination of parental rights will destroy a “necessary and
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beneficial” relationship, thereby causing a child to suffer “extreme emotional
consequences.” E.M., 620 A.2d at 484-85 (citation omitted).
“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect
of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one
of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the
best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). “[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the
intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent.” Id. In determining needs and welfare, the court
may properly consider the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the child and
consider “whether a parent is capable of providing for a child’s safety and
security or whether such needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s
parental rights.” L.W., 267 A.3d at 524.
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates
that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Supreme Court directed that, in
weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must
keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M.
Court observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we
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have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts
fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
Here, the orphans’ court “found no evidence that severing the ties
between Mother and [C]hildren would have any detrimental effect on [them].
Mother had essentially abandoned her responsibilities to care for them. None
of the [C]hildren had any significant bond with her. [M.G.] had stepped up to
become their de facto Mother.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/22/22, at 7. The
court also stated: “[M.G.] has provided the only stable environment [Children]
have ever known. While we did not believe any of [Children] would suffer any
adverse effect by the termination of Mother’s parental rights, we were also
satisfied that if there would be, it could be easily overcome by the love and
support of [M.G.].” Id. at 8.
The record clearly supports this conclusion. According to the CYS
caseworker, Underwood, M.G. has had Children “on and off for most of [their]
lives.” N.T., 10/6/21, at 13. Underwood testified that she did not believe
Children would suffer any detrimental effect if Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. Id. at 25-26. Underwood also averred: “When you try to talk to
[Children] about [Mother], they don’t really comprehend that. When I talked
to them recently about how their visits went, [Children] said, [they] played
with a nice lady, with the mommy lady, and it didn’t seem to fully comprehend
for them.” Id. at 36. Relatedly, Witmer, the caseworker at KidsPeace, who
observed the family at their home, opined that Children see M.G. and B.G. as
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their parents and that Children’s relationship with M.G. is loving. Id. at 48-
49. Finally, M.G. testified that she loved Children and that she believed
Children love her. Id. at 58. She also indicated that Children love the home
and always want to do things with her and B.G. Id. at 58, 69. On this record,
the orphans’ court did not err in concluding that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was consistent with Children’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Our independent review of the certified record reveals no preserved
non-frivolous issue that would arguably support this appeal from the decrees.
Therefore, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation, and
affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Regarding Mother’s appeals of the goal change orders, we need not
dwell on this issue; given our disposition concerning the termination decrees,
Mother’s appeals from the orders changing Children’s placement goals to
adoption are moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the
court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”) (citation
omitted).
Counsel’s petitions to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed. Appeals
from goal change orders dismissed.
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President Judge Emeritus Bender joins the Memorandum.
Judge McLaughlin Concurs in the Result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/22/2022
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