Com. v. Wildoner, G., Jr. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GLYNN A. WILDONER, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 779 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 14, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-40-CR-0003314-2016
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: DECEMBER 30, 2022
Appellant Glynn A. Wildoner appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Luzerne County denying his petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw his
representation as well as an accompanying brief pursuant to Commonwealth
v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550
A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). We affirm the PCRA court’s order and
grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
On November 1, 2017, a jury convicted Appellant of three counts of
rape, three counts of statutory sexual assault, one count of involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse with a person less than 16 years of age, four counts
of unlawful contact with a minor, one count of aggravated indecent assault,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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four counts of corruption of minors, two counts of endangering the welfare of
children, and four counts of indecent assault.
On January 26, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of 300 to 600 months’ (25 to 50 years’) of incarceration.
Appellant filed post-sentence motions which were denied on May 22, 2018.
On June 11, 2019, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and on
December 23, 2019, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for
allowance of appeal.
On February 21, 2020, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition.2 After the
PCRA court appointed Appellant counsel, an evidentiary hearing was held on
March 3, 2022. In an order dated March 31, 2022, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition.
However, the trial court’s order was not served on the parties until April
14, 2022. On May 16, 2022, Appellant’s prior counsel, Jeffrey A. Yelen, Esq.
filed a motion to reinstate Appellant’s collateral appeal rights nunc pro tunc.
On May 23, 2022, the PCRA court granted this motion and reinstated
Appellant’s PCRA appeal rights.
On May 24, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, purporting to appeal
from the “order entered in this matter on the 23rd day of May 2022, reinstating
his appellate rights as to the denial of his PCRA petition on March 31, 2022.”
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2Any PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1).
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Pursuant to our appellate rules, “no order of a court shall be appealable
until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in the lower court.”
Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 114 provides
that an order is properly entered when the docket entries indicate “(a) the
date of receipt in the clerk's office of the order or court notice; (b) the date
appearing on the order or court notice; and (c) the date of service of the order
or court notice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2). The thirty-day time-period for
appealing from a criminal order other than a judgment of sentence begins to
run on the day that the order is served on the parties by the clerk of courts.
See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d).
In this case, the trial court’s March 31, 2022 order denying Appellant’s
petition was not appealable until the order was properly served on the parties
on April 14, 2022.3 As a result, Appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed
on Monday, May 16, 2022. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (whenever the last day of
any … period shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal
holiday…, such day shall be omitted from the computation).
On collateral appeal, Appellant’s current counsel was appointed to
prepare an appellate brief on Appellant’s behalf. Thereafter, counsel filed a
petition to withdraw and a no-merit Turner-Finley brief.
Our standard of review is as follows:
When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine
whether the PCRA court's order is supported by the record and
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3 We have amended the caption of this case accordingly.
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free of legal error. Generally, we are bound by a PCRA court's
credibility determinations. However, with regard to a court's legal
conclusions, we apply a de novo standard.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (quotation
marks and quotations omitted).
As an initial matter, we must first review counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
proceed ... under Turner, supra and Finley, supra and ... must
review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then
submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to
this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's diligent
review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to
have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit,
and requesting permission to withdraw.
Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no
merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to withdraw;
and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro
se or by new counsel.
Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that ...
satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court — trial
court or this Court — must then conduct its own review of the
merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims
are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and
deny relief.
Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007) (brackets
omitted)).
After reviewing the record and counsel’s petition to withdraw, we find
that PCRA counsel has complied with the technical requirements of Turner
and Finley, supra. In his appellate brief, PCRA counsel detailed the nature
and extent of his review, listed two issues which Appellant wished to appeal,
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and explained why he believed each claim was frivolous. Counsel indicated
that after conscientious review of the record, he could not identify any
meritorious issues that he could raise on Appellant’s behalf. Moreover, counsel
attached his letter to Appellant specifically indicating that he believed that the
appeal was wholly frivolous for the reasons set forth in his brief and notifying
him of his right to raise additional points for consideration by proceeding pro
se or with the assistance of privately retained counsel. See Commonwealth
v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa.Super. 2016).
We now consider the issues PCRA counsel presents in his brief to
ascertain whether any of the claims entitles Appellant to relief. PCRA counsel
raises two claims of the ineffectiveness of counsel. In reviewing claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel, we are guided by the following principles:
It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have
provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner
pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying
legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or
inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to
effectuate his client's interest; and (3) prejudice, to the
effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if not for counsel's error. See Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (1987);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The PCRA court may deny an
ineffectiveness claim if “the petitioner's evidence fails to
meet a single one of these prongs.” Commonwealth v.
Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (2000)....
Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, it
is the petitioner's burden to prove otherwise. See Pierce,
supra; Commonwealth v. Holloway, 559 Pa. 258, 739
A.2d 1039, 1044 (1999).
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[Commonwealth v. Natividad, 595 Pa. 188, 207–208, 938 A.2d
310, 321 (2007);] see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 582 Pa.
526, 537, 872 A.2d 1177, 1184 (2005) (stating an appellant's
failure to satisfy any prong of the Pierce ineffectiveness test
results in a failure to establish the arguable merit prong of the
claim of ineffectiveness).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2018).
First, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present
DNA evidence in his defense. However, Appellant fails to establish how DNA
evidence would have been beneficial to his case as the defense theory at trial
was that Appellant was falsely accused of sexually assaulting the victims.
At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel indicated that he had argued at trial
that there was no physical evidence to prove the prosecution’s allegations that
Appellant had abused the minor victims. N.T. PCRA hearing, 3/3/22, at 20. In
addition, trial counsel argued that there should have been no DNA results or
physical evidence to present at trial in light of Appellant’s assertion that the
abuse never occurred. Id. at 20-21.
As a result, we agree that there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to present DNA evidence at trial.
Second, Appellant asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to properly preserve for appeal a specific challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting one of his corruption of minors convictions.
In his appellate brief on direct appeal, Appellant argued that there was
insufficient evidence to support his corruption of minors conviction against one
of the victims (“A.H.”) as the Commonwealth failed to show Appellant engaged
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in “any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual
offenses)” pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
This Court noted Appellant had not raised this specific argument in his
court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, but instead challenged his corruption
of minors convictions based on his allegation that the prosecution failed to
show that Appellant engaged in conduct which corrupted or tended to corrupt
the morals of either victim.
As such, this Court found Appellant’s specific challenge to his corruption
of minors conviction was waived by his failure to include it in his 1925(b)
statement. Commonwealth v. Wildoner, 981 MDA 2018, 2019 WL
2447057, at *6 (Pa.Super. June 11, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (citing
Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013) (clarifying
that “[i]n order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the
element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was
insufficient”).
However, this Court noted that, even assuming that it had granted
Appellant relief on this issue, the trial court’s sentencing scheme would not
have been disrupted as Appellant’s sentence for corruption of minors relating
to victim A.H. ran concurrently with the rest of his sentence. Wildoner, 981
MDA 2018, at *6 n.3.
Thus, Appellant has not shown that appellate counsel’s failure to
properly preserve this issue for review resulted in prejudice, such that there
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was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel's error.
Johnson, supra.Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing
Appellant’s petition, which does not contain any non-frivolous issues of
arguable merit. We, therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing
Appellant’s petition and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Order affirmed. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date:12/30/2022
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