In Re: Adoption of: K.M.S., a Minor ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.M.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.E., MOTHER :
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: No. 630 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 21, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
2021-0011
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.E., MOTHER :
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: No. 656 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 21, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
2021-0011,
CP-67-DP-0000245-2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2022
Appellant A.E. (Mother) files these consolidated appeals from the decree
granting the petition to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her
minor, dependent daughter, K.M.S. a/k/a K.S. (Child), born in March of 2019,
pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b),
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and from the order changing Child’s placement goal to adoption under the
Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.1 The petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights and the motion for goal change were filed by Appellee,
York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (the Agency).
Additionally, Mother’s counsel, Lori A. Yost, Esq. (Counsel),2 filed a petition to
withdraw, as well as an Anders3 brief asserting that Mother’s appeals are
frivolous. After review, we affirm the trial court’s decree terminating Mother’s
parental rights, dismiss Mother’s appeal from the order changing Child’s
placement goal as moot, and grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw.
The trial court summarized on the record the relevant facts and
procedural history of these matters as follows:
This is the date and time scheduled for a hearing in the interest of
[Child] docket 2021-0011 in the orphans’ court and docket CP-67-
DP-245-2019 in the dependency court. The court has before it
petitions filed by the [Agency]. The first petition is a petition to
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1On June 11, 2021, we consolidated the appeals at 630 MDA 2021 and 656
MDA 2021 sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2138.
2 The record further reveals that Martin Miller, Esq., is counsel on behalf of the
Agency, David Worley, Esq., is Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), and Kara
Kucherich, Esq., is Child’s legal counsel. N.T., Hr’g, 4/20/21, at 2. See In
re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 174-75, 180 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (courts must
appoint counsel to represent the legal interests of a child involved in a
contested involuntary termination of parental rights proceeding; a child’s legal
interests are separate from a child’s best interest as a child’s legal interests
are synonymous with the child’s preferred outcome, and a child’s best interest
must be determined by the court).
3Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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involuntarily terminate the parental rights of [Mother and
Father.4] The second petition is to change the court-ordered goal
from reunification to that of placement for adoption . . . .
The [c]ourt has made part of today’s record, without objection,
the entire dependency file regarding [Child,] again filed at docket
CP-67-DP-245-2019. The [c]ourt has also taken judicial [notice]
of all applications, motions, and orders filed in the dependency
action as part of today’s orphans’ court proceeding without
objection. Also, without objection, the [c]ourt made part of
today’s record the [Agency’s] Exhibits 1 through 5.
The [c]ourt did note for the record that Attorney Miller, on behalf
of the [A]gency; Attorney Worley, as guardian ad litem; and
Attorney Kucherich, as legal counsel for [Child], had signed a
stipulation of counsel, which was filed with the [c]ourt on April
15th of 2021. The petition for involuntary termination of parental
rights and change of goal were filed on January 21st of 2021.
[Child] was first adjudicated dependent on October 10th of 2019,
approximately 18 months ago. [The Agency] filed for involuntary
termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a) (1), (2), (4), (5) and (8).
Based on the testimony the [c]ourt has heard, and the exhibits
and documents that have been made part of and are incorporated
into today’s proceeding, the [c]ourt finds that the [A]gency has
met its burden to have the parental rights of both Mother and
Father to [Child] involuntarily terminated. The [A]gency met its
burden by clear and convincing evidence. The [A]gency has also
met its burden as it relates to its petition to change the court-
ordered goal [from] reunification [to] adoption.
In determining that the [A]gency has met its burden regarding
both petitions, the [c]ourt makes the following findings. Since
[Child] was adjudicated dependent, there have been three
Permanency Review Hearings and three Permanency Review
orders issued by the [c]ourt. In its March 3rd of 2020 Permanency
Review order, the [c]ourt found that Mother had made minimal
compliance with the permanency plan for her and that Father had
made no compliance with the permanency plan. The [c]ourt
further found that Mother had made minimal progress and Father
had made no progress towards alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated [C]hild’s original placement and the
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4The trial court also involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to Child.
N.T., Op., 4/20/21, at 3. However, Father did not file an appeal.
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adjudication of [Child as dependent]. In its August 11th of 2020
Permanency Review order, the [c]ourt found that there had been
no compliance with the permanency plan by Mother or Father and
there had been no progress by Mother or Father towards
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement of [C]hild in foster care. Finally, in its Permanency
Review order dated January 7th of 2021, the [c]ourt again found
no compliance with the permanency plan by Mother and Father
and no progress by Mother or Father towards alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement of
[C]hild.
The [c]ourt finds that as of today’s date neither Mother nor Father
have documented that they have been able to acquire safe, stable,
and appropriate housing for reunification with [Child]. Neither
Mother nor Father have documented lawful income to the
[A]gency, other than Mother providing one pay stub to the
[A]gency in September of 2020. The record reflects that Mother
was incarcerated from late 2020 through early 2021 and Mother
has not provided any documentation of any lawful income since
her release from incarceration. Since the adjudication of [Child]
on October 10th of 2019, neither Mother nor Father have
performed any parental duties on behalf of [Child]. Neither
Mother nor Father have attended any doctor or other
appointments on behalf of [Child], and neither parent has
provided any gifts or cards to [Child].
Since the adjudication of dependency, Father has had no visits
with [Child]. Furthermore, Mother has had no visits with [Child]
in at least approximately 16 months. The [c]ourt notes that [it]
did not suspend Mother or Father’s rights to visit with [Child] in
an appropriate manner. The [c]ourt finds here today that neither
parent is ready to assume custody of [Child].
The [c]ourt heard testimony here today as it relates to Mother
that [she was referred to] Catholic Charities [for drug testing,
rehabilitation services, and assistance in accessing parenting
resources and supervision of visits with Child5] . . . the most recent
time on February 8th of 2021[,] and [that ended] unsuccessfully
due to noncompliance by Mother and lack of communication by
Mother with the Catholic charities in-home team. The [c]ourt
heard further testimony that Mother is currently on supervised bail
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5 See N.T., Hr’g, 4/20/21, at 22-26.
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regarding pending charges of prostitution and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Her probation officer testified that Mother is
currently not compliant with her supervised bail. Mother tested
positive for marijuana in February, and her current whereabouts
are unknown to her probation officer. Testimony further
established that Father has had no contact with the agency since
approximately February of 2021.
The [c]ourt finds that there is no parental bond between [Child]
and Mother or Father. The [c]ourt further finds that [Child] would
suffer no long-term negative impact from Mother and Father’s
parental rights being terminated. The [c]ourt finds that neither
Mother nor Father have made any progress to alleviate the
circumstances which necessitated the adjudication of [Child] as .
. . dependent . . . and the placement of [Child] in foster care.
Neither Mother nor Father have completed any of the goals which
were set forth for them in the family service plans, which were
provided to Mother and Father throughout the period of
adjudication of dependency. A pre-adoptive resource has been
identified for [Child].
The [c]ourt notes that for today’s hearing neither Mother [nor
Father] have appeared and participated in today’s proceeding.
The [c]ourt finds that both Mother and Father were provided
appropriate notice of today’s proceeding. The [c]ourt finds that
termination of both Mother and Father’s parental rights best
serves the needs and welfare of [Child]. Said termination of
Mother and Father’s . . . parental rights will allow [Child] to move
forward and achieve permanency.
The [c]ourt will be filing a final decree for involuntary termination
of parental rights on this day, and in doing so the [c]ourt is
satisfied as to the truth of the facts set forth in the [A]gency’s
petition and finds [Mother] and [Father] have forfeited their
parental rights with respect to [Child]. The [c]ourt further finds
that it is in the best interest of [Child] that the [A]gency’s petition
be granted.
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that all parental
rights of [Mother] and [Father] in respect to [Child] are terminated
forever. Custody of [Child] will continue with the [Agency], which
is authorized to consent to the adoption of [Child]. [Child] may
now be adopted without further consent or notice to the parents.
The [c]ourt will also be filing an order changing the court-ordered
goal. In doing so, the [c]ourt orders and directs that the current
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goal of return to parent or guardian is changed to placement for
adoption and a new concurrent goal of placement with a legal
custodian nonrelative is established. I apologize, the [c]ourt edits
its dictated order that the new concurrent goal of placement with
a legal custodian is established. The [c]ourt is not establishing
whether that is relative or nonrelative here today. Legal and
physical custody of the child is confirmed with [the Agency].
N.T., Op., 4/20/21, at 1-8.
On April 21, 2021, the trial court filed the decree granting the Agency’s
petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b), and it filed a separate order changing Child’s placement goal
to adoption. Mother timely appealed and complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).6
As noted, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw and an Anders brief. In
the Anders brief, Counsel identifies the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating the parental rights
of Mother pursuant to Sections 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)
of the Adoption Act.
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child
pursuant to Section 2511 (b) of the Adoption Act.
3. Whether the trial court erred in changing the goal from
reunification to adoption.
4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to consider placement
of Child with biological family rather than in foster care
placement.
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6 As mentioned previously, Mother filed a separate notice of appeal at each
trial court docket. Attached to each notice of appeal was a statement of errors
complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), (b).
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Anders Brief at 5-6 (some formatting altered).7
When faced with an Anders/Santiago brief, this Court may not review
the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s
request to withdraw. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014). As
this Court has stated:
To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel
has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2)
furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and
3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to
retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
[appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention.
With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel
inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s
withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their
petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client
advising him or her of their rights.”
In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).8
Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following requirements
established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal;
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7 For purposes of our discussion, we have reordered the issues presented in
the Anders brief.
8 Mother has not filed a response to Counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
omitted).
“After an appellate court receives an Anders brief and is satisfied that
counsel has complied with the aforementioned requirements, the Court then
must undertake an independent examination of the record to determine
whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237
(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Our independent review is not limited
to the issues discussed by counsel, but extends to “additional, non-frivolous
issues” that may have been overlooked by counsel. J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 908
(citation omitted). An appeal is frivolous when it lacks any basis in law or
fact. See M.C.F., 230 A.3d at 1220; accord Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355.
The record reveals that on August 18, 2021, Counsel filed a petition to
withdraw and Anders brief asserting that Mother’s appeals are frivolous. On
August 23, 2021, this Court struck the Anders brief and denied Counsel’s
petition to withdraw without prejudice to Counsel’s ability to file an amended
petition to withdraw that complied with Anders and Santiago. Order,
8/23/21. Counsel was instructed to file an amended petition to withdraw and
Anders brief referring to anything in the record that arguably supports an
appeal and providing Counsel’s reasons for concluding Mother’s challenge are
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frivolous with citations to the record that are arguably relevant to the analysis.
Id. On August 25, 2021, Counsel filed an amended petition to withdraw and
Anders brief.
We conclude that Counsel has complied with the Anders/Santiago
procedures by filing a petition to withdraw and supplying Mother with a copy
of the Anders brief and a letter explaining Mother’s appellate rights.
Moreover, the Anders brief includes a summary of the relevant facts and
procedural history, and Counsel explains her reasons for concluding that the
issues are frivolous. Because Counsel has complied with the threshold
requirements to withdraw, we proceed to an independent review of whether
the issues are frivolous. See S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237-38.
Decree Terminating Parental Rights
As noted above, in Mother’s first two issues, she claims that the trial
court erred or abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights to Child
pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). We begin by stating our standard of
review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). Termination
of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.
§§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note
that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section
2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental
rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
We first address the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(8), because it is dispositive in this matter.
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Section 2511(a)(8) sets a twelve-month time frame
for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the child’s removal by the
court. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the twelve-
month time frame has been established, the trial court must determine
whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite
the reasonable efforts of the child welfare agency. Id. The “relevant inquiry
in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been
remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at
the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the trial court to
evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of the agency’s
services. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super.
2003). “A child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent
will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id.(citation omitted).
The record reflects that the Agency has been involved with Mother and
Child since September of 2019, and Child was adjudicated dependent on
October 10, 2019. N.T., Hr’g, 4/20/21, at 31-32. Child has remained involved
with and in the care of the Agency since that time.
When the termination hearing was held on April 20, 2021, Child had
remained in placement for more than eighteen months. During this time,
Mother has been unwilling or unable to care for herself or Child. As the trial
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court noted, Mother has made minimal progress towards alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated Child’s original placement with the Agency
and with the initial finding of dependency. N.T., Op., 4/20/21, at 1-8; see
also N.T., Hr’g, 4/20/21, at 27, 45. Additionally, Mother has not established
that she has or can acquire safe, stable, and appropriate housing for
reunification with Child, and there is no indication that Mother is employed.
N.T., Hr’g, 4/20/21, at 40. Mother has not performed any parental duties
since Child was adjudicated dependent on October 10, 2019. Id. at 47.
Mother has not attended any medical or other appointments on behalf
of or with Child, and Mother has not visited with Child in more than sixteen
months. Id. at 42, 46. Mother has been non-compliant with services, and
she has pending criminal charges for prostitution and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Id. at 15. Additionally, Mother is not compliant with her
supervised bail and has tested positive for illegal substances. Id. As of the
date of the termination hearing, Mother’s whereabouts were unknown to her
probation officer. Id.
As stated above, Child’s life cannot be put on hold in the hopes that
Mother will summon the ability to manage the responsibilities of parenting.
See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276. After review, we discern no error of law or
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s involuntarily termination of Mother’s
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), which is supported by the record
based on clear and convincing evidence. We agree with Counsel’s assessment
that this issue is meritless.
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We next review the trial court’s conclusion that involuntarily terminating
Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental, emotional, and
physical needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b).
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). We have explained:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent. Additionally, . . . the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether any
existing parent-child bond can be severed without
detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)). “Common sense dictates
that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. In weighing the bond considerations
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pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood
ever in mind.” Id. at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years,
and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When
courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted
children.” Id.
Here, the trial court found that there was no parental bond between
Child and Mother. N.T., Op., 4/20/21, at 6. Child was adjudicated dependent
when she was only six months old. Since that time, Child has been placed
with the Agency for more than eighteen months, which is most of her life, and
Mother does not visit Child. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion
that Child would suffer no long-term negative impact from the termination of
Mother’s parental rights. N.T., Hr’g, 4/20/21, at 47. Mother has made no
progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated adjudicating
Child dependent and placing Child in foster care, and Child views her foster
mother as her parent. Id. On this record we conclude that there was no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that terminating Mother’s
parental rights best serves the needs and welfare of Child. See C.D.R., 111
A.3d at 1219. Moreover, we agree with Counsel’s assessment that this issue
is frivolous.
Order Changing Child’s Placement Goal
In Mother’s third issue, she contends that the trial court erred or abused
its discretion in changing Child’s placement goal to adoption. However,
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because we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion or error of law in
the trial court’s decree that terminated Mother’s parental rights, Mother’s
appeal from the order changing Child’s placement goal to adoption is moot.
See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(noting that “even if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be
moot in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees” (citing
In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002)).
However, even if this issue was not moot, we would conclude that there
is no error or non-frivolous issues relative to the order changing Child’s
placement goal.
We review decisions changing a placement goal for an abuse of
discretion. In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 345 (Pa. Super. 2010). We have
explained:
Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the
juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing
necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent
of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of
progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and
feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a
likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement
for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best
interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must
guide the trial court. As this Court has held, a child’s life simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon
the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.
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In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
The evidence described above supports the trial court’s decision to
change Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Mother has
not made any progress since Child’s placement with the Agency in 2019.
Therefore, were we to reach this issue, we would not find any non-frivolous
issues to support Mother’s appeal from the order changing Child’s placement
goal.
In her fourth issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s alleged refusal to
consider placement of Child with a biological family member rather than foster
care. As in our disposition of Mother’s third issue, we conclude that this claim
relating to placement of Child is moot. See D.R.-W., 227 A.3d at 917 (stating
that where this Court affirms the decree terminating parental rights, an appeal
from an order changing placement is moot).
We note that the trial court made no determination on this issue.
Indeed, in the Anders brief, Counsel contends that the order is not final on
this point and therefore not appealable. Anders Brief at 36. Were we to
reach this issue, we would agree with Counsel’s assessment. There was no
order for placement of Child with a relative or non-relative. Therefore, there
is no order, final or otherwise, from which to take an appeal on this issue.
Clearly, we cannot determine if the trial court’s decision concerning placement
with a relative or non-relative was in error where the trial court did not decide
this issue after changing Child’s placement goal but ordering only that “today”
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custody was to remain with the Agency. N.T., Op., 4/20/21, at 8. Accordingly,
we agree with Counsel that this issue is frivolous, and that it does not support
an appeal.
For the reasons set forth above, we discern no abuse of discretion or
error of law in the trial court’s involuntarily termination of Mother’s parental
rights to Child. Additionally, we have conducted an independent review of the
record and conclude that Mother’s appeal is frivolous and that Counsel has not
overlooked any additional, non-frivolous issues.
Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw, affirm the decree
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and
(b), and we dismiss as moot Mother’s appeal from the order changing Child’s
permanency goal to adoption.
Decree affirmed. Appeal from the order changing the placement goal is
dismissed as moot. Counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/06/2022
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