Com. v. Forman, N. ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • J-A24018-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    NICHOLAS ALEXANDER FORMAN                :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 2476 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002241-2020
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                        FILED JANUARY 4, 2023
    Nicholas Alexander Forman appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on August 19,
    2021, following his conviction for first-degree murder. After careful review, we
    affirm.
    Forman’s convictions stem from the beating and strangulation death of
    his girlfriend after a night out watching the Super Bowl on February 2, 2020.
    Forman was subsequently charged with first and third degree murder. Both
    charges were held for court after a preliminary hearing. In April 2021, Forman
    filed pretrial motions to suppress evidence which were denied.
    A four-day jury trial was held between August 16, 2021 and August 19,
    2021. The trial court summarized the extensive trial testimony as follows:
    On February 3, 2020, at approximately 11:10 a.m., [Forman]
    arrived at the emergency department of Pottstown Hospital in an
    J-A24018-22
    Uber with the victim, []. (N.T., Trial by Jury - Day 1, 8/ 16/21, pp
    61 - 62). Marques Harmon, a security officer at the hospital, went
    outside to assist, and there he saw that the victim in the backseat
    of the vehicle was unresponsive and had multiple injuries. Id. at
    62 - 64. Mr. Harmon went immediately to get additional
    assistance. Id. at 65. Several nurses came to help and began to
    administer CPR. Id. at 66. The victim was taken by gurney inside
    for further treatment. Id.
    [Forman] stayed at the hospital, and upon Mr. Harmon's
    suggestion, [Forman] followed him into a conference room, a
    room for families of a critically injured patient. Id. at 69 - 70.
    Once there, [Forman] offered an explanation for the victim's
    condition. Id. at 71. [Forman] told Mr. Harmon that the victim
    had been in a physical fight with several females that she had a
    verbal altercation with earlier that night, when they had been at
    P.J. Whelihan's celebrating the Super Bowl. Id. at 71 - 73.
    Breanna Coyle, an emergency room nurse at Pottstown Hospital,
    responded to Mr. Harmon's call for assistance. Id. at 84, 86. She
    described the victim as lifeless, without a pulse. Id. at 87. She
    observed [] the victim's condition as disheveled, with bruising on
    her face and around her neck, and her clothes were covered with
    debris. Id. at 87 - 88. When she started CPR, she noticed the
    victim's body was very cold. Id. at 88. Once back in the
    emergency room, Nurse Coyle saw bruising on the victim's
    extremities, scratches and bruising on her arms, dried blood and
    vomit on her face, swelling to her jaw, and bruising and swelling
    about the neck. Id. at 90 - 97. Nurse Coyle described the steps
    the emergency room personnel took in an attempt to resuscitate
    the victim. The nurse never saw any signs of life, no pulse, no
    respiration, and no consciousness. Id. at 98 - 99.
    Jolene Gaus, an emergency room nurse at Pottstown Hospital
    assisted Nurse Coyle with CPR. Id. at 102. She also observed that
    the victim's condition was lifeless and cold upon her arrival to the
    hospital. Id. at 103. There was no pulse or respiration, she was
    very cold, her lips were blue, and presented with multiple bruising
    and facial injury trauma. Id. at 104.
    Julie Rich, a nurse practitioner at Pottstown Hospital, also ran
    outside to assist both nurses Coyle and Gaus. Id. at 121. In the
    emergency room, advanced forms of life support were provided to
    the victim, but they were unable to get the victim's heart beating
    -2-
    J-A24018-22
    or the victim breathing on her own. Id. at 124. She testified that
    the victim presented as disheveled and with evidence of trauma
    about her neck and face. Id. at 123, 124 - 125. In particular,
    there were circumferential marks around her neck. Id. at 125.
    Nurse Rich notified the police that this might potentially be a
    crime. Id. at 126.
    Nurse Coyle, Nurse Gaus, and Diane Marie Craig, an emergency
    room technician, all of whom observed [Forman]’s demeanor,
    described him as calm during the initial resuscitation efforts. Id.
    at 99, 106 - 107, 114. Nurse Rich described [Forman]’s affect as
    flat, devoid of emotion. Id. at 128.
    Dr. Jeremy Zwillenberg, an emergency room doctor at Pottstown
    Hospital, treated the victim back in the trauma bay. Id. at 135.
    He described the life resuscitating efforts they employed but
    despite these efforts they were unable to rewarm the victim or
    restart her heart. Id. at 136 - 139.
    Detective Heather Long, a Pottstown Police Department detective,
    responded to the hospital for an unresponsive female. Id. at 150
    -151. She responded with a fellow officer, Sergeant Thomas
    Leahan. Id. at 151. After initially reviewing hospital surveillance
    video, she went into the conference room where [Forman] was
    waiting. Id. at 154. She asked [Forman] for his consent to search
    his cell phone and provided a consent to search form to him, which
    she explained. Id. [Forman] consented, he signed the form, and
    provided the detective with the passcode. Id.
    Detective Long, knowing that [Forman] arrived to the hospital in
    an Uber, went to the Uber application on his phone and found his
    previous trip history. Id. at 156. She also reviewed the videos and
    photographs on his cell phone, and she found a photograph of the
    victim lying face down on a floor, with her clothes disheveled. Id.
    at 156 - 157. There was also a video of [Forman], taken several
    hours later. Id. at 157. The following morning there was a
    photograph of the victim seat-belted in the back of the Uber. Id.
    The cell phone was later turned over to the Pennsylvania State
    Police to download it forensically. Id. at 161.
    Detective Sergeant Thomas Leahan learned that the victim's
    boyfriend was in the consultation room with another officer,
    Officer Nikolaus Stoltzfus. Id. Detective Leahan proceeded to the
    consultation room to speak with [Forman]. Id. [Forman] told him
    -3-
    J-A24018-22
    that he and the victim had gone to P.J. Whelihan's for the Super
    Bowl, where she got into an altercation with three females. Id. at
    165. He further told the sergeant that the victim gave the females
    his address so they could meet up at his house to fight, and that
    she did in fact fight with them. Id. at 165 - 166. [Forman] stated
    that after they fought, he carried the victim into his apartment
    and that he fell asleep at 6:00 a.m. Id. at 166. When he woke up
    at 9:45 a.m. he realized that she was having trouble breathing
    and called for an Uber to take them to the hospital. Id. at 166.
    [Forman] never asked about the victim's condition. Id. at 167. His
    demeanor was calm, cool, and collected. Id.
    Officer Nikolaus Stoltzfus, an officer with the Pottstown Police
    Department, also responded to Pottstown Hospital for a call of a
    suspicious person, that a person was brought to the hospital
    already deceased, and to investigate. (N.T, Trial by Jury- Day 2,
    8/17/21, p. 9 - 10). Officer Stoltzfus made contact with [Forman]
    in the conference room. Id. at 12. He asked [Forman] what had
    brought him to the hospital that day. Id. at 12 - 13. [Forman]
    stated that he had been at P.J. Whelihan's to watch the Super
    Bowl the night before. Id. at 13. While there, the victim got into
    an altercation with three females. Id. [Forman] also told the
    officer that the victim remained in contact with these women, and
    when they arrived at his house, the females arrived there and
    wanted to fight her. Id. [Forman] stated that when they fought,
    he went inside. Id. Sometime later, [Forman] went back outside
    and he found the victim laying on the ground. Id. at 13 - 14. He
    helped victim into his house and put her to bed. Id. at 14.
    [Forman] said that he woke up at 6:30 a.m., and that she was
    breathing. At around 9:45 he realized that there was something
    wrong with her and that is when he called an Uber to go to the
    hospital. Id. [Forman]’s demeanor was calm while speaking with
    the officer. Id. [Forman] never asked about the victim's condition.
    Id.
    Next the Commonwealth called several employees from P.J.
    Whelihan's who worked on the night of the Super Bowl, February
    2, 2020. In particular, Ashley LePerson, a server at P.J.
    Whelihan's, testified that [Forman] and the victim sat down for
    food and drinks at about 6:30 p.m. Id. at 18, 19, 20 - 21, 23, 25.
    She testified that their behavior seemed normal, and that she did
    not observe anyone talking to the victim. Id. at 27. This testimony
    was echoed by Anthony Dadario, a bartender at P.J. Whelihan's,
    that their behavior was normal and that no one came up to them.
    -4-
    J-A24018-22
    Id. at 37. Further, Ciara Kehoe, another bartender, noted that
    [Forman] and the victim closed out their tab at 10:03 p.m., and
    that she did not see anyone approach them that night. Id. at 46.
    Finally, Maxine Dobson, the general manager at P.J. Whelihan's
    testified. Id. at 49. She reviewed the surveillance footage from
    the cameras. Id. at 51. She found nothing of significance. Id. And
    when she spoke to her staff, nobody told her that there was any
    sort of altercation. Id. at 52.
    Daniel Persing, an Uber driver, drove [Forman] and the victim
    home from P.J. Whelihan's. Id. at 59 - 60, 61. Right before a pit
    stop to Quick Mart, Mr. Persing remembered that the victim
    received a text message, and [Forman] asked her about it. Id. at
    63. The victim tried to dismiss his question, but [Forman]
    continued to ask about the text message about three or four times
    prior to Quick Mart. Id. at 63 - 64. [Forman]’s demeanor was very
    calm, but persistent. Id. at 64. After the Quick Mart, [Forman]
    continued to ask the victim about the text message. Id. at 65. At
    some point [Forman] said, [“]I don't know if I want you to come
    F'ing home with me,[“] and the victim responded, [“]Cut it out,
    you're scaring me.[“] Id. at 66. Mr. Persing testified that he had
    a gut feeling that [Forman] wasn't going to let the conversation
    go, and after [Forman] and the victim exited the vehicle, he pulled
    over, put down the window and listened to see if things would
    calm down. Id. at 68 - 69, 71. For about five minutes he heard
    yelling and arms flailing, and then things calmed down. Id. at 72.
    Once it was quiet, Mr. Persing assumed they worked it out and left
    the area. Id. at 73 - 74.
    A neighbor of [Forman], Brady Reese, testified. On February 2,
    2020, he arrived home around 11:00 p.m. Id. at 84 - 85. He
    originally heard loud talking coming from across the street. Id. at
    85. He saw a woman on the lawn. She seemed to be walking
    around stumbling and mumbling to herself. Id. at 86, 91. Mr.
    Reese thought she heard the woman say, [“]Help.[“] Id. at 86.
    When he got halfway towards her, he asked the male that was
    with her if everything was alright, and he said, [“]She's fine[“] and
    [“]she's just drunk, everything's okay.[“] Id. It also appeared to
    him that the woman gave a thumbs up signal, so Mr. Reese walked
    back home. Id. He did see the couple walking side by side down
    the street. Id. at 88.
    At around 2:30 a.m., in the early morning hours of February 3,
    2020, Morgan Young, [Forman]’s on-and-off girlfriend, arrived at
    -5-
    J-A24018-22
    [Forman]’s house. Id. at 97, 98 - 99. When she got there she
    texted him, and he came out to her car. Id. at 99 - 100. They sat
    in the backseat for about an hour. Id. at 100, 101. Ms. Young
    testified that [Forman]’s demeanor was calm and that he seemed
    his normal self. Id. at 102. Ms. Young further testified that she
    knew [Forman] and the victim were in a relationship and that the
    victim was inside his house. Id. at 102 - 103. [Forman] had told
    her that the victim fell in the middle of the street, he tucked her
    in bed, that she was unconscious but still breathing. Id. at 103.
    Later in the day, [Forman] called an Uber and was driven to the
    district court in Limerick. Id. at 117 - 120. At the district Court
    was Corporal Scott Reynolds of the Upper Providence Township
    Police Department, who was working there that day. Id. at 122 -
    123, 125. Corporal Reynolds testified that he interacted with
    [Forman] for about 15 minutes, and that his demeanor was
    pleasant and courteous. Id. at 128. [Forman] went by Uber back
    to his residence. Id. at 133 - 135.
    At about 11:15 a.m. on February 3, 2020, another Uber driver []
    drove [Forman] and the victim to the hospital. Id. at 141 - 142,
    145, 151.
    On February 3, 2020, Trooper Matthew Taubenberger of the
    Pennsylvania State Police - Criminal Investigative Unit was called
    to assist with the investigation. Id. at 167. At about 2:00 p.m.,
    he went to [Forman]’s residence where he observed a clump of
    hair in the middle of the roadway immediately outside. Id. at 167
    - 168. He photographed it and collected the hair. Id. at 168. Later
    that day, the trooper also photographed [Forman]’s injury to his
    right hand. Id. at 174 - 175.
    Sergeant Thomas Falcon, the supervisor of the Criminal
    Investigative Unit of the Pennsylvania State Police, was also
    involved in the investigation. Id. at 179 - 180. On February 3,
    2020, Sergeant Falcon along with Trooper Sanzick, the lead
    investigator, responded to the Pottstown Hospital[] emergency
    department. Id. at 180. There he met with Detective Wittenberger
    and detectives Long and Leahan. Id. He was provided with two
    cell phones and the victim's clothing, which he secured and took
    back to the Skippack barracks. Id. at 181.
    The following day, on February 4, 2020, Sergeant Falcon was
    working with Sergeant Ryan Burza, and together they returned to
    -6-
    J-A24018-22
    the area of 937 Hamilton Road in Collegeville to do a neighborhood
    canvas. Id. at 184. In front of [Forman]’s residence, on the front
    lawn, the sergeant noticed that the lawn was torn up, and that
    there were mud and chunks of grass leading toward the driveway
    at 937 Hamilton, up and over the driveway. Id. at 188. He also
    found a bracelet, a beaded bracelet, spelling out the [victim’s first
    name]. Id. at 189.
    Trooper Todd Wright of the Pennsylvania State Police - Forensics
    Unit, testified. Id. at 191. As a part of the investigation on
    February 3, 2020, he went to 937 Hamilton Road and after a
    search warrant was secured, he executed a search of the
    premises. Id. at 194, 195. He found a clump of hair between the
    storm door and entrance door. Id. at 197.
    A full raw data extraction was performed by Nicholas Devine of
    the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office - Special
    Services Unit. Id. at 234 - 235. The raw data was converted into
    readable format. Id. at 239. Trooper Brad Furlong of the
    Pennsylvania State Police - Criminal Investigation Unit testified
    that he reviewed 500 videos and images from [Forman]’s phone.
    Id. at 256. In one of the videos, it depicts [the victim] taken
    outdoors, she's on the ground. Id. at 261. The date that video
    was created was February 2, 2020 at 11:58 p.m.
    Erica Williams, M.D, a forensic pathologist for the Montgomery
    County Coroner's Office, was accepted as an expert in forensic
    pathology. (N.T., Trial by Jury- Day 3, 8/ 18/21, pp. 130 -131,
    134). Dr. Williams performed an autopsy on the victim's body on
    February 4, 2020. Id. at 137. The doctor's external examination
    showed evidence that the victim had been strangled and beaten.
    Id. at 139 - 142. There was a constellation of injuries indicating
    strangulation. Id. at 142. There was also evidence of other blunt
    force trauma to the face and head, which the doctor detailed at
    trial. Id. at 143, 144 - 145. Dr. Williams removed the brain and
    prepared it for review by the neuropathologist, Dr. Emery. Id. at
    145, 146.
    Lyndsey A. Emery, M.D., the current assistant medical examiner
    for the City of Philadelphia, does private consultation work for
    Montgomery County. (N.T., Trial by Jury- Day 4, 8/ 19/21, p. 7).
    She was accepted as an expert in neuropathology. Id. at 11. She
    was brought into this case to specifically examine the victim's
    brain. Id. at 12 - 13. Dr. Emery testified that the victim's brain
    -7-
    J-A24018-22
    weight was above average, which is an indicator of edema,
    swelling. Id. at 16. Her external examination of the brain revealed
    that it was swollen, the wrinkles in the brain look flatter. Id. at
    23. In addition, she testified that there was bleeding into the
    subarachnoid space, the space between the actual brain and the
    covering that lays right on top of the brain. Id. There was
    hemorrhaging into that space on both sides of the brain, the
    cerebral hemispheres. Id. Next, Dr. Emery did a dissection of the
    brain. Id. at 24. After that dissection, she noted there were
    contusions of the brain of both cerebral hemispheres. Id. The
    victim also had hemorrhaging into a part of her brain called the
    pons, part of the brain stem. Id. at 25. Dr. Emery explained that
    that particular hemorrhage is called a Duret hemorrhage, and is
    frequently seen in blunt trauma. Id. The bilateral contusions on
    her brain suggest that there was some sort of blunt impact trauma
    or blunt impact injury. Id. at 25 - 26. She determined that based
    upon the distribution of injuries, there were multiple bilateral
    impact sites. Id. at 26. As far as the pons hemorrhages, the doctor
    has seen them very frequently in brains that have been injured by
    blunt trauma. Id. at 26 - 27.
    The brain also showed evidence of a left uncal herniation, which
    is a space that a swollen brain can herniate through when the
    brain is sufficiently swollen. Id. at 28 - 29. Dr. Emery opined that
    once you are at that state of herniation, it's very difficult to
    survive, and that this injury is almost entirely lethal. Id. at 29.
    She explained that the herniation is a consequence of those blunt
    injuries. Id. at 29 - 30. The blunt injury happens, there's
    hemorrhage in the subarachnoid space, there are bruises of the
    brain which results in brain swelling, and that brain swelling is
    what causes the herniation. Id. at 30. In sum, the doctor found
    bilateral subarachnoid hemorrhages, bilateral contusions, direct-
    type hemorrhages of the pons, and ultimately impending left uncal
    herniation. Id. Finally, based on the hypoxic ischemic changes
    that the doctor saw microscopically, she was able to determine
    that the survival interval for the victim was less than 12 hours.
    Id. at 32 - 33.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/2022, at 2-12.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Forman guilty of first-degree
    murder. The trial court sentenced Forman the same day to a term of life
    -8-
    J-A24018-22
    imprisonment. Forman filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied.1
    This timely appeal followed.
    Forman raises the following three issues on appeal:
    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Forman]’s motion to
    suppress the contents of his cell phone where he was illegally
    detained when he gave consent to search it, which was not
    voluntary, and the scope of the search exceeded that to which he
    consented?
    …
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
    [Forman]’s motion for a mistrial after the victim’s family, in the
    presence of the jury, had a prejudicial emotional reaction to a key
    piece of evidence, which deprived [Forman] of a fair trial?
    …
    3. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at [] trial to
    sustain the guilty verdict for first degree murder where [Forman]
    acted with malice but without the specific intent to kill the victim?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8.2
    In his first issue, Forman challenges the denial of his motion to suppress
    evidence gained from the search of his cell phone.
    ____________________________________________
    1 The order denying the post-sentence motion was dated August 30, 2021,
    and indicates it was sent to all parties on that date. However, for reasons that
    are unclear from the record, the order was not docketed as filed until
    November 9, 2021.
    2 Forman had raised an additional issue in his amended 1925(b) concise
    statement relating to the failure to instruct the jury on a charge of voluntary
    manslaughter. See Petition to Amend Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    Statement, 12/22/2021, at 2. While this issue was addressed by the trial court
    in its opinion, Forman specifically abandoned this issue on appeal. See
    Appellant’s Brief, at 7, FN 1. Therefore, we will not address it.
    -9-
    J-A24018-22
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
    denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
    supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
    from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of the
    suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
    prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as
    remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
    a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
    suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
    only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
    Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 
    915 A.2d 1122
    , 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations
    omitted). “In appeals from suppression orders, our scope of review is limited
    to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
    Caple, 
    121 A.3d 511
    , 517 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
    “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass
    on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
    The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence
    presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 
    823 A.2d 180
    , 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
    Forman argues the contents of his cell phone should have been
    suppressed because (1) he was illegally detained when he gave consent to
    search his cell phone, (2) his consent to the search was not voluntary, and (3)
    the scope of the search exceeded that to which he consented. We find these
    claims are either waived or meritless.
    First, Forman argues suppression should have been granted because he
    was illegally detained when he gave consent to search his cell phone. Before
    addressing the merits of this claim, we must determine whether it is waived.
    - 10 -
    J-A24018-22
    Our Supreme Court has held that when a trial court directs an appellant to file
    a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, any issues not raised
    in such a statement will be waived. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 308 (Pa. 1998).
    In his 1925(b) concise statement, Forman argued that he did not make
    a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights regarding the search of his cell
    phone where he was not apprised of his Miranda3 rights. See Petition to
    Amend Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, at 2.
    In contrast, Forman argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
    denying the motion to suppress the contents of his cell phone where he was
    illegally detained. The question of whether a detention is legally justifiable is
    distinct and separate from the question whether a suspect is actually detained.
    Notably, while the lack of a Miranda warning is the main point of the claim
    framed in the concise statement, and accordingly the trial court analyzed the
    claim as such in its opinion, Miranda is not mentioned at all in the portion of
    Forman’s appellate brief devoted to this claim. See Appellant’s Brief, at 37-
    40.4 Further, Forman’s appellate argument focuses on the issue of whether he
    was subjected to a detention, but does not develop any argument to support
    his claim that the alleged detention was illegal. While Forman makes a passing
    ____________________________________________
    3   See Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    4Miranda is only discussed once in the entire appellate brief in relation to a
    separate argument. See id. at 42-43.
    - 11 -
    J-A24018-22
    mention of the requirement of probable cause to support “a seizure[,]” he
    does not provide any analysis of the distinction between a custodial detention
    and an investigative detention. Nor does he provide any attempt to apply the
    standard of probable cause to the circumstances of this case. See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 
    832 A.2d 1123
    , 1127 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    Similarly, the trial court’s opinion on appeal focuses solely on defending its
    finding that Forman “was not restrained in any way.” Trial Court Opinion,
    1/31/22, at 18. The trial court did not provide any analysis of whether the
    police were entitled to detain Forman.
    Because the distinct issue of whether Forman’s detention was legal was
    not raised in the concise statement, the issue on appeal is waived. Lord, 719
    A.2d at 308.
    Next, Forman argues his consent to the search of his phone was not
    voluntary. Specifically, Forman concedes that he gave consent to search his
    phone, but contends the consent was not voluntary as he claims he was “in
    custody at the time he gave consent to search his phone.” Appellant’s Brief,
    at 41.
    “A search warrant is not required where a person with the proper
    authority     unequivocally   and   specifically   consents   to   the   search.”
    Commonwealth v. Acosta, 
    815 A.2d 1078
    , 1083 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish a valid
    consensual search, the Commonwealth must first prove that the consent was
    - 12 -
    J-A24018-22
    given during a legal police interaction.” Commonwealth v. Bell, 
    871 A.2d 267
    , 273 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
    Here, Detective Leahan indicated that when he asked to look at
    Forman’s phone, he did not consider Forman a suspect. See N.T., Pre-Trial
    Motions Via Video Conference, 5/24/2021, at 32. Rather, he was proceeding
    according to Forman’s claim that the victim had been involved in a fight with
    three other women. See 
    id.
     Police never told Forman he could not leave nor
    made any other show of force towards Forman. See id. at 39-40. The
    suppression court found this testimony to be credible. See id. at 145. As we
    cannot re-weigh the evidence on appeal, this evidence was sufficient to
    establish that Forman was not in custody when he gave his consent to the
    search of his cell phone.
    But this does not end our analysis, as Forman also challenges the
    suppression court’s conclusion that his consent was voluntary pursuant to the
    totality of the circumstances. “To establish a voluntary consensual search, the
    Commonwealth must prove that a consent is the product of an essentially free
    and unconstrained choice - not the result of duress or coercion, express or
    implied, or a will overborne - under the totality of the circumstances.”
    Commonwealth v. Randolph, 
    151 A.3d 170
    , 179 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    At the suppression hearing, Detective Leahan testified that after arriving
    at the ER, he proceeded to the family consultation room where he came in
    - 13 -
    J-A24018-22
    contact with Forman. See N.T., Pre-Trial Motions Via Video Conference,
    5/24/2021, at 25. Forman had two cell phones with him at the time, and
    identified one as the victim’s and one as his own. See id. at 25-26. Detective
    Leahan took custody of the victim’s phone. See id. at 26. Detective Leahan
    asked Forman if he would provide consent to search his phone, to which
    Forman verbally agreed, without hesitation, and without any questions. See
    id. at 27.
    Detective Long testified that she was called into the family consultation
    room to obtain consent from Forman. See id. at 36. Detective Long provided
    Forman with a consent form, which she filled out in his presence, read over
    and explained the form, and asked if Forman had any questions. See id. at
    38. Forman did not have any questions and signed the consent form. See id.
    Without any prompting, Forman then volunteered his passcode and wrote the
    passcode on the bottom of the form. See id. at 38-39. No weapons were
    brandished, Forman was never told he could not leave, nor did he ask to end
    the interview, and his egress was never blocked. See id. at 39. At no point
    was Forman restrained in any manner. See id. at 40.
    The trial court found the detectives’ testimony credible and accordingly
    found the consent was voluntary. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion
    and find Forman’s somewhat scattered argument does not persuade us
    otherwise. Accordingly, Forman fails to demonstrate that his consent was not
    voluntarily given.
    - 14 -
    J-A24018-22
    Finally, Forman argues the scope of the search exceeded that to which
    he consented. Specifically, Forman contends that even if his consent was
    voluntary, he believed he was only giving consent for the sole purpose of the
    detectives trying to get in contact with the victim’s family.
    Again, before addressing the merits of this claim, we must determine
    whether it is waived. “[A]ppellate review of an order denying suppression is
    limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially
    was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Little, 
    903 A.2d 1269
    , 1272–73 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    Although the burden in suppression matters is on the Commonwealth to
    establish “that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the
    defendant's rights,” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D), that burden is triggered only when
    the defendant “state[s] specifically and with particularity the evidence sought
    to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in
    support thereof.” Commonwealth v. McDonald, 
    881 A.2d 858
    , 860 (Pa.
    Super. 2005). “Bald statements or boilerplate allegations of illegally obtained
    evidence are insufficient to trigger the Commonwealth's burden of going
    forward and proving that a search was legal.” McDonald, 
    881 A.2d at 860
    ;
    see also Commonwealth v. Quaid, 
    871 A.2d 246
    , 249 (Pa. Super. 2005)
    (“[W]hen a motion to suppress is not specific in asserting the evidence
    believed to have been unlawfully obtained and/or the basis for the
    - 15 -
    J-A24018-22
    unlawfulness, the defendant cannot complain if the Commonwealth fails to
    address the legality of the evidence the defendant wishes to contest.”).
    Here, Forman included a blanket statement in his suppression motion,
    merely stating “the scope of said search was overly broad”. Omnibus Pre-Trial
    Motion, 4/23/2021, at 2. Forman failed to include any other support for this
    bald allegation, nor cite to any facts in support of this claim. Further, when
    the Commonwealth and the trial court asked Forman to state, with specificity
    and particularity, his basis for requesting suppression on the record at the
    commencement of the suppression hearing, Forman did not raise such an
    argument. Nor did he develop this basis for suppression at any point during
    the remainder of the suppression hearing.
    We find the burden of proof never shifted to the Commonwealth on this
    issue. Similar to the defendant in McDonald, Forman simply made a bald
    allegation, which he then failed to pursue in any meaningful way. As we find
    Forman abandoned his request, we conclude Forman waived this claim for our
    review. See id. at 860.
    In his second issue on appeal, Forman contends the trial court abused
    its discretion by denying Forman’s motion for a mistrial. Specifically, he argues
    he was deprived of a fair trial after the victim’s family, in the presence of the
    jury, had a prejudicial emotional reaction to a key piece of evidence.
    Our Supreme Court has explained:
    A trial court is required to grant a mistrial only where the alleged
    prejudicial event may reasonably be said to have deprived the
    - 16 -
    J-A24018-22
    defendant of a fair and impartial trial. It is well-settled that the
    review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is limited
    to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
    An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if
    in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or
    the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result
    of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused. A
    trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident upon which
    the motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect
    is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury
    from weighing and rendering a true verdict. A mistrial is not
    necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to
    overcome prejudice.
    Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 
    69 A.3d 191
    , 193 (Pa. 2013) (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Here, on the second day of trial, the Commonwealth entered a video
    into evidence that was taken from Forman’s phone, just before midnight on
    February 2, 2020. The 14-second video depicts the victim laying outside on
    the grass, seemingly unconscious, with visible blood and injuries on her face.
    During the video, Forman can be heard saying “This is what a cheating liar
    gets,” and additionally using vulgar language to describe the victim’s
    character. Right after the video started playing before the jury, the victim’s
    family began to cry and “wail loudly” in the courtroom. N.T., Trial By Jury -
    Day 2, 8/17/2021, at 263. In response, the court had to clear both the family
    and the jurors out of the courtroom. Outside the presence of the jury,
    Forman’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Instead, the
    court, by agreement of defense counsel, gave a curative instruction to the
    jury. See id. at 265-268.
    - 17 -
    J-A24018-22
    The curative instruction issued by the trial court was direct, unequivocal,
    and strong, informing the jury that they were not to consider the emotional
    outburst, and was sufficient to expunge any taint and assure a fair trial. Under
    the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
    court's determination that a mistrial was not warranted.
    In his third and final issue, Forman argues the evidence was insufficient
    to support his conviction for first degree murder. We are constrained to
    conclude Forman’s sufficiency claim is waived, as his Rule 1925(b) statement
    did not adequately identify the errors that he intended to challenge on appeal.
    It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
    statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. See Lord, at 309.
    Further, an appellant’s concise statement must identify the errors with
    sufficient specificity for the trial court to identify and address the issues the
    appellant wishes to raise on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (requiring a
    Rule 1925(b) statement to “concisely identify each error that the appellant
    intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the
    judge”). A Rule 1925(b) concise statement that is too vague can result in
    waiver of issues on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Dowling, 
    778 A.2d 683
    ,
    686-687 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“a [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to
    allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional
    equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all”).
    If [an appellant] wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
    insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the
    - 18 -
    J-A24018-22
    element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.
    This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
    [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly
    unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on
    appeal].
    Commonwealth v. Tyack, 
    128 A.3d 254
    , 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
    omitted). Further, waiver applies even where the trial court addresses the
    issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and where the Commonwealth does not
    object to the defective Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    959 A.2d 1252
    , 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“The Commonwealth's
    failure and the presence of a trial court opinion are of no moment to our
    analysis because we apply Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in a predictable, uniform fashion,
    not in a selective manner dependent on an appellee's argument or a trial
    court's choice to address an unpreserved claim.”) (citations omitted); see
    also Commonwealth v. Roche, 
    153 A.3d 1063
    , 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    Here, Forman’s Rule 1925(b) statement simply includes a blanket
    statement, declaring the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first
    degree murder. See Petition to Amend Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    Statement, 12/22/2021, at 2. The statement fails to “specify the element or
    elements upon which the evidence was insufficient” to support Forman’s
    conviction. As a result, we must conclude Forman’s sufficiency of the evidence
    claim is waived on appeal. See Williams, 
    959 A.2d at 1257-1258
    .
    - 19 -
    J-A24018-22
    Even if Forman had properly preserved this issue in his 1925(b)
    Statement, it would merit no relief.5 Forman concedes that he acted with
    malice, but argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with
    the specific intent to kill, a necessary element of a first degree murder
    conviction. However, Forman’s argument fails to acknowledge that specific
    intent to kill can be proven if the defendant knowingly applies deadly force to
    the person of another. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 
    662 A.2d 621
    , 629
    (Pa. 1995) (citation omitted). “Death caused by strangulation is sufficient to
    infer the specific intent required for a conviction of first degree murder.” 
    Id.
    (citations omitted).
    Here, the record contains evidence that Forman had an argument with
    the victim and beat and strangled her until she became unresponsive. Forman
    ____________________________________________
    5 Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
    to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict
    winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are
    sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the crimes charged
    is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dale, 
    836 A.2d 150
    , 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden
    of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
    of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 
    916 A.2d 657
    ,
    661 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
    “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
    preclude every possibility of innocence.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “As an
    appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do we assign weight to any
    of the testimony of record.” Commonwealth v. Kinney, 
    863 A.2d 581
    , 584
    (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the verdict
    “unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
    probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Bruce,
    
    916 A.2d at 661
     (citation omitted).
    - 20 -
    J-A24018-22
    then left the victim unresponsive in his home for a full night and subsequent
    morning before finally taking the victim to the hospital. Viewed in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was
    sufficient for the jury to infer that Forman strangled the victim with the specific
    intent to kill her. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, Forman’s third and final issue fails, and
    we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/04/2023
    - 21 -