In Re: A.P., a Minor Appeal of: J.P., Father ( 2016 )

J-S39001-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF: A.P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.P., FATHER No. 2250 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order entered November 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Orphans’
Court, at No: A-44 of 2015
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF: J.P., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.P., FATHER No. 2251 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order entered November 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Orphans’
Court, at No: 2015-00045
BEFORE: STABILE, PLATT, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016
Appellant, J.P. (Father), appeals from the November 18, 2015 orders
involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his twin sons, A.P. and J.P.,
born in January of 2004. Upon careful review, we affirm.
A.P. and J.P. were adjudicated dependent on December 7, 2012, at
which time Father was incarcerated. Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/16, at 1;
N.T., 10/21/15, at 79. Initially, A.P. and J.P. were placed with Father’s wife,
M.P.-P. On May 30, 2013, while Father remained incarcerated, they were
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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removed and placed together in the same foster home. Trial Court Opinion,
2/16/16, at 1-2; N.T., 10/21/15, at 79-80. The Lackawanna County Office
of Youth and Family Services (the Agency) established Family Service Plan
(FSP) goals for Father including that he comply with prison programs,
participate in parenting classes and drug and alcohol classes in prison, and
that he be successfully released from prison.1 N.T., 10/21/15, at 16.
On May 5, 2014, the trial court ordered that Father have no contact
with A.P. and J.P., due to their disclosure that Father had sexually assaulted
them. Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/16 at 2; N.T., 10/21/15, at 24. The trial
court aptly summarized the testimonial evidence as follows.
After placement, A.P.[’s] and J.P.’s foster parents began to
notice inappropriate sexualized contact between the boys. A.P.
and J.P. would touch each other’s penises and make
inappropriate sexual comments towards each other. A.P.
touched a dog’s penis and both minor children would act out
sexually on each other. . . . Subsequently, both boys were
interviewed at the Children’s Advocacy Center [(CAC)] on July
25, 2014, regarding possible sexual abuse. Based on the CAC
interview and a follow-up Child Protective Services investigation,
Father was indicated as a perpetrator of sexual abuse against
both minor children.[2] Father never appealed his indicated
status.
As a result of the alleged sexual abuse by Father, and their
acting out sexually, A.P. and J.P. have been placed in separate
1
Father was released from prison on November 11, 2014. He was re-
incarcerated in September of 2015, for reasons unspecified in the record.
N.T., 10/21/15, at 82. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record
regarding the length of Father’s maximum and minimum sentences.
2
In addition, Father was indicated as a perpetrator of sexual abuse against
N.L., who is the biological son of T.L. (Mother), and the half-brother of A.P.
and J.P.
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therapeutic foster homes and therapy. Both receive regular
therapy and Sexual Issues Treatment Education therapy, (SITE),
which is for children of sexual abuse. Casey Murray, the minor
children’s SITE counselor[,] testified that . . . the sexual abuse
by Father has affected every aspect of the minor children’s lives.
A.P. and J.P. both report being afraid of the dark because
Father’s abuse would take place at night. A.P. and J.P. have to
take a separate bus to school because of sexual comments they
were making to a kindergarten student.[3] Further, she testified
A.P. and J.P. have trouble becoming close to males, both having
much closer relationships with their foster mothers, than with
their foster fathers.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/16, at 2-3 (citations to record omitted).
In February of 2015, when Father was no longer in prison, the Agency
discussed new FSP goals with him, including participating in a sexual
offender program. N.T., 10/21/15, at 19-20. The trial court explained as
follows.
Father [ ] refused because the program requires participants to
admit responsibility for their actions. . . . As part of the new
plan, the [A]gency also wanted Father to participate in [a]
Father’s Group and have a sex offender evaluation performed.
Father refused to sign the plan and refused to participate in the
services offered to him by the [A]gency at that time. The order
of no contact between the minor children and Father remains in
effect to the present day.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/16, at 3-4 (citations to record omitted).
On June 9, 2015, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary
termination of parental rights of Father and Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
3
Specifically, Ms. Murray testified, “There was a time when they were in
Bushkill Elementary, [J.P.] and [A.P.] had to be transported on a separate
bus, . . ., because of sexual comments they made to a female student in
kindergarten.” N.T., 10/21/15, at 175.
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§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). A hearing occurred on October 25 and
29, 2015, during which the Agency presented the testimony of the following
witnesses: Agency caseworkers, Cristin Wormuth, Jay D. Miller, Marissa
Lynady, and Marcy McNamara; Megan Ryman, specialist at Drug and Alcohol
Treatment Services; Casey Murray, therapist at SITE, mentioned above;
Megan Carey, clinical coordinator at Pennsylvania Mentor, who provides
therapy to A.P.; and George Hockenbury, an employee at Northern Tier
Research and an expert in toxicology and pathology. Mother testified on her
own behalf. Father did not testify or present any witnesses.
By orders dated November 6, 2015, and entered on November 18,
2015, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights.4 Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte.5 The
orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 16, 2016.
On appeal, Father presents the following issues:
A. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law and/or
manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency
sustained its burden of proving the termination of Father’s
parental rights is warranted under Sections 2511(a)(1),
2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
4
With respect to Mother, the trial court involuntarily terminated her parental
rights to A.P., J.P., and N.L. Because N.L. is not Father’s child, he is not a
subject of this appeal.
5
Mother did not file notices of appeal.
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B. Even if this Court concludes the Agency established statutory
grounds for the termination of Father’s parental rights, whether
the [orphans’] court nevertheless erred as a matter of law
and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the
Agency sustained its additional burden of proving the
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of
[A.P. and J.P.]?
Father’s Brief at 5.
We consider Father’s issues, mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
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the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
This Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section
2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights.6 In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). We conclude that the trial court in this case properly terminated
Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
. ..
6
Instantly, we conclude that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5)
and (8) was not proper because Father was incarcerated at the time of A.P.’s
and J.P.’s placement. See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en
banc) (stating that Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) did not provide a basis for
terminating the father’s parental rights when he was incarcerated at the
time of the child’s removal from the mother’s care); see also In re Z.P.,
994 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2010) (same).
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following
elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825
A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
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grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), our Supreme
Court addressed the relevance of incarceration in termination decisions
under Section 2511(a)(2). The S.P. Court held that
incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative
factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist
under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity
of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that
the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
Id. at 828.
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite
analysis as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a
bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Father acknowledges in his brief that his “re-incarceration is a
compelling factor” under Section 2511(a)(2) pursuant to S.P., supra, and
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In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014) (holding that the father’s
incarceration prior to the child’s birth and until the child is at least age seven
renders family reunification an unrealistic goal. As such, the court was
within its discretion to terminate parental rights “notwithstanding the
agency’s failure” to follow the court’s initial directive that reunification efforts
be made.). Father’s Brief at 14. In addition, Father acknowledges that the
no-contact order issued on May 5, 2014 “provides an additional barrier to
reunification.” Id. Nevertheless, Father baldly asserts that the orphans’
court erred in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2). For the following reasons, we conclude that Father’s assertion
is without merit.
The trial court found as follows:
Father’s incarceration at the time of placement, his re-
incarceration, the no[-]contact with the minor children since May
5, 2014, and his refusal to participate in services clearly has
incapacitated “his ability to care for the children[,] leaving them
without “essential parental care, control, or sustenance” . . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/16, at 7. The testimonial evidence supports the
court’s findings.
Mr. Wormuth, the Agency caseworker for this family from October of
2013, to March of 2015, testified that Father was indicated a perpetrator of
sexual abuse on August 12, 2014. N.T., 10/21/15, at 85. Mr. Wormuth
testified he informed Father in February of 2015, after his release from
prison, that his FSP was updated to include participation in a sexual offender
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program, in a father’s group, and for him to obtain “an evaluation,” but
Father “did not want to work with any of the services that I talked with him
about that day.” Id. at 20.
Ms. Lynady, the Agency caseworker after Mr. Wormuth and up through
the time of the subject proceedings, testified that she had only one contact
with Father, which was at a hearing involving this family on April 27, 2015.
N.T., 10/29/15, at 41. She testified an FSP was adopted at that hearing that
included the goal of Father obtaining a sexual offender evaluation, but
Father refused to sign the FSP. Id. at 42.
Therefore, from November of 2014, to September of 2015, the months
that Father was not in prison, he refused to comply with his updated FSP
goals. We discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in concluding
that Father’s repeated and continued refusal in this regard caused A.P. and
J.P. to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence, and the
causes of the refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In addition, with respect to the no-contact order, we conclude that the
rationale of our Supreme Court in S.P., supra, is applicable. We discern no
abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court to the extent it found that the no-
contact order results in the repeated and continued incapacity of Father,
which has caused A.P. and J.P. to be without essential parental care, control,
or subsistence, and the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be
remedied.
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Likewise, pursuant to S.P., supra, we discern no abuse of discretion
to the extent the court found that Father’s re-incarceration in September of
2015, results in the repeated and continued incapacity of Father, which has
caused A.P. and J.P. to be without essential parental care, control, or
subsistence, and the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
Thus, Father’s first issue fails.
In his second issue, Father argues the orphans’ court abused its
discretion in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Specifically, Father asserts, (1) “there are no present resources to provide
permanency” for A.P. and J.P.; (2) there is no record evidence regarding the
effect that termination will have on A.P. and J.P.; and (3) the court failed to
consider the effect that termination will have on the needs and welfare of
A.P. and J.P. Father’s Brief at 16. We disagree.
With respect to Father’s first assertion, this Court has recognized that,
“the Juvenile Act does not require pre-adoptive placement as a precondition
to termination of parental rights.” In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 922-923 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (finding that the child’s “age, loyalty to his natural parents,
and apparent lack of an identifiable pre-adoptive placement will not
automatically preclude him from attaining permanency after parental rights
have been terminated”). Similarly, in T.S.M., supra, our Supreme Court
recognized that, “the Adoption Act specifically provides that a pending
adoption is not a prerequisite to termination of parental rights involving
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agencies. . . .” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b), “If
the petitioner is an agency it shall not be required to aver that an adoption is
presently contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt
exists”).
The T.S.M. Court observed that, “contradictory considerations exist as
to whether termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has
a strong but unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially considering
the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive family.” Id.
However, the Court emphasized, “the law regarding termination of parental
rights should not to be applied mechanically but instead always with an eye
to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children
involved.” Id. at 268-269 (citation omitted). In this case, we discern no
abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in concluding that the termination
of Father’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of A.P. and J.P.
It follows that we reject Father’s second assertion, that there is no
record evidence regarding the effect that termination will have on A.P. and
J.P., and his third assertion, that the orphans’ court did not consider the
effect of termination on them. We have stated that, when evaluating a
parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social
workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section
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2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994
A.2d 1108, 1115-1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the court made the following findings on which it based its
decision to terminate Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b), which
the testimony of the Agency caseworkers and the therapists supports.
[T]here is no evidence that a bond exists between Father and
the minor children. It was established through testimony
presented by the [A]gency[] the minor children fear Father and
do not want to be reunified with him. It was further established
that the minor children are emotionally and mentally fragile and
are currently in treatment. Furthermore, the children have not
had any contact with their father since before the May [5], 2014
[no-contact] order. In the [c]ourt’s view, reunification between
the minor children and Father would be detrimental to the minor
children’s physical, emotional, and mental well-being.
Finally, it would be in the best interest of the minor children to
remain in their current setting. Both A.P. and J.P. are currently
in therapeutic foster homes. . . .[7] The minor children are also
receiving therapy in both the individual and group capacity.
Based on the testimony presented by the [A]gency, both
children have made strides in recovering from their emotional
and mental issues.
Further, [A.P. and J.P.] have been in placement for thirty-three
(33) consecutive months and have had no contact with Father in
twenty-one (21) months. This [c]ourt finds that it would be in
the best interest of the minor children to remain in their current
setting and for the parental rights of [Father] be terminated.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/16, at 8-9 (citations to record omitted).
The record reveals that A.P. and J.P., who were twelve years old at the
time of the termination hearing, are in separate foster homes, due to having
7
The testimony reveals that only A.P. is in a therapeutic foster home. N.T.,
10/21/15, at 87.
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sexually acted out on each other in their first foster placement. N.T.,
10/21/15 at 13, 17. There is no evidence that either foster home is a pre-
adoptive placement. Ms. Murray, the therapist at SITE who is treating A.P.
and J.P., testified that, due to the sexual abuse they suffered from Father,
the children are closer to their foster mothers than their foster fathers. Id.
at 176.
Jay D. Miller, who supervised Mother’s visitations with A.P. and J.P. for
the Agency, testified that A.P. and J.P. “seem[ed] very concerned [when
they learned] that [Father] was out of prison.” N.T., 10/21/15, at 109. He
testified that A.P. and J.P. wanted to know if “anything was going to change
because [Father] was out [of prison].” Id. at 108. Ms. Lynady, the current
Agency caseworker, testified on cross-examination by the Guardian ad litem:
Q. [D]o they fear dad?
A. Whenever dad is mentioned, [A.P. and J.P.] do get anxiety
and they asked a lot of questions. And once you tell them, you
know, they won’t see him, they seem to relax, so it does seem
like [] fear and anxiety.
N.T., 10/29/15, at 47. She explained that, on the first day of the
termination hearing, A.P. and J.P. were present and waiting in the victims’
room. Ms. Lynady testified, “[t]hey came out towards the TV and their first
question was, ‘we’re not going to see Dad.’ And I informed them, ‘no, they
won’t be seeing dad,’ and they said, ‘okay. Because we don’t want to see
dad.’” Id. at 46-47.
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The testimony reveals that A.P. has suffered most severely.
Mr. Wormuth, the first Agency caseworker for the family, testified that when
he had the case, A.P. “was hearing voices in his head. He was still
continuing to act out in school. He would hit his head off things when he got
upset. He would get very agitated. [ ] I had seen him when he was in First
Hospital, and he was talking about how he didn’t want to live anymore.”
N.T., 10/21/15, at 87.
Megan Carey, the clinical coordinator at Pennsylvania Mentor, testified
that she provides therapy for A.P. for anger management. N.T., 10/29/15,
at 209. She testified that he
is part of our intensive [Community Residential Rehabilitation]
Program, meaning that he receives two therapy sessions per
week instead of one. So he receives about two hours of therapy
per week. . . . He is also part of . . . a group therapy that we do
for some boys in our program that are between the ages of ten
and thirteen years [] old that meets every other Monday. . . .
Id. at 208-209. She testified that A.P. is diagnosed with Disruptive Mood
Dysregulation Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, Physical and Sexual Abuse of a Child and
Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Id. at 209.
Ms. Carey testified that A.P. has described feelings of fear toward
Father. Id. at 216. However, she testified he has “very mixed feelings
about his father.” Id. at 215. Ms. Carey explained,
There’s a part of [A.P.] that, I think, until very recently, . . .
continued to feel a loyalty I guess you would call it, toward his
father. In addition to that, he has also felt extremely angry
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towards his father, and has said that he feels that way because
of the things that his father has done to hurt him. He does know
that his father was recently arrested again. That seems to be a
turning point for [A.P.], where I don’t hear . . . I don’t want to
talk about my dad, because I have to protect him. . . .
...
[I]n the past two weeks, I’m not hearing anymore about
protecting his father or the loyalty towards his father so much,
it’s more feeling angry towards his dad, and, ‘My dad just can’t
seem to knock it off.’ And, ‘I’m glad he’s in jail. That’s where he
belongs.’ Feeling more safe that his dad is in jail, because he
knows where dad is.
Id. at 215-216. Importantly, Ms. Carey testified, A.P. “does have a very
close relationship with his foster mom.” Id. at 241.
With respect to J.P., Mr. Wormuth testified that he was in the same
foster home as N.L., his half-brother, but he was recently moved to a
separate home because he and N.L. “displayed sexually acting out behaviors
with each other[.]” N.T., 10/21/15, at 88. Ms. Carey testified that, as part
of her treatment of A.P., she supervised an unspecified number of visits with
J.P. Id. at 212. She testified with respect to her observations as follows:
During the visits that they have had in the past thirteen months,
that I’ve been a part of . . ., [J.P.] has had very poor boundaries
with [A.P.], stroking his face and his arms; kissing and hugging
him repeatedly. I’ve seen him put his crotch in [A.P.]’s hand,
purposely. Saying sexualized things. . . . So [A.P.] and I have
talked a lot about how [A.P.] feels about that. [A.P.] has done a
pretty good job of being assertive and telling his brother, ‘Stop
it. Get away. I don’t like that.’
Id. The current Agency caseworker, Ms. Lynady, testified that J.P. is
currently “doing well” in his new foster home. N.T., 10/29/15, at 21.
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Finally, the SITE therapist, Ms. Murray, testified with respect to the
children’s mutual feelings toward Father as follows:8
Q. Have they ever expressed, throughout the course of the
therapy that they did with you, their feelings towards spending
time with or seeing their father? . . .
A. It’s gone back and forth while I worked with them . . . Which
I see with every client [where this abuse has] been done by the
parent, because, they still have some kind of bond with the
parent. [ ] I can tell you today, when we told them that he was
. . . going to be here today, . . . , they were hoping that they
would not have to be here and see him. [ ] [T]hey had said, ‘He
couldn’t be at court because’ . . . one of them said, [ ] ‘he’s in
jail,’ and another one said, ‘No, he’s not.’ Two other ones said,
‘He’s always in jail. We don’t have to worry.’
Q. So they expressed fear?
A. They expressed fear and that they did not want . . . to see
him today. [ ] [T]here [have] been times where different ones
at different times have said they miss their dad, but it’s more
like we miss playing video games with dad. . . .
Id. at 176-177.9
Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the court in concluding that A.P. and J.P. do not have a parent-
child bond, or a beneficial bond of any nature, with Father. In addition, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the court in concluding that reunifying
8
Ms. Murray’s testimony includes A.P., J.P., and N.L., since she treated all
three children when they were in the same foster home. She implies in her
testimony that, for the last two years, she has been treating only J.P. and
N.L. N.T., 10/21/15, at 167.
9
Although Father was represented by counsel during the termination
hearing, there is no record evidence that Father was personally present.
Likewise, there is no record evidence that A.P. and J.P. participated in the
hearing.
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J-S39001-16
them with Father would be detrimental to their developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare, and that A.P.’s and J.P.’s best interest is
served by remaining in their separate foster placements. As such, Father’s
second issue with respect to Section 2511(b) fails. Accordingly, we affirm
the orders.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2016
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