Com. v. Reeves, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S40039-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                           :
    :
    SHANE MYCHAL REEVES,                      :
    :
    Appellant              :           No. 2584 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order August 4, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
    Criminal Division, No(s): CP-15-CR-0004400-2011
    BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                           FILED JULY 06, 2016
    Shane Mychal Reeves (“Reeves”) appeals, pro se, from the Order
    denying his “Motion to Modify and Correct Illegal Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc.”1
    We affirm.
    On May 4, 2012, Reeves entered a negotiated guilty plea to two
    counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and was
    sentenced to an aggregate prison term of five to ten years. Reeves did not
    file a direct appeal.
    1
    The trial court addressed Reeves’s filing as a post-sentence motion to
    modify a sentence under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(a)(v).          However, the
    Motion contained arguments seeking relief pursuant to the Post Conviction
    Relief Act (“PCRA”), Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, and should have been
    analyzed as his third PCRA Petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing
    that “[t]he action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of
    obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
    statutory remedies for the same purpose that exists when this subchapter
    takes effect”); see also 
    id. § 9543(a)(2)
    (stating that collateral relief from
    an illegal sentence may be obtained under the PCRA); Commonwealth v.
    Jackson, 
    30 A.3d 516
    , 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (analyzing an appellant’s
    “motion to correct illegal sentence” as a PCRA petition).
    J-S40039-16
    Reeves filed his first PCRA Petition on August 20, 2012.      The PCRA
    court dismissed that Petition, and this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth
    v. Reeves, 
    97 A.3d 807
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
    Reeves filed his second PCRA Petition on January 12, 2015, which the
    PCRA court dismissed.
    On July 20, 2015, Reeves filed the instant Petition. The PCRA court
    denied the Petition on August 4, 2015.2        Reeves filed a timely Notice of
    Appeal.
    Reeves raises the following question for review: “Did the Court below
    error [sic] in denying relief?” Brief for Appellant at 4.
    An appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact
    to determine whether they are supported by the record, and
    reviews its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free
    from legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of
    the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light
    most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.
    Commonwealth v. Freeland, 
    106 A.3d 768
    , 775 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (citation and brackets omitted).
    Under the PCRA, a defendant must file any PCRA petition within one
    year of the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    2
    Reeves’s Petition was denied without a hearing or notice. Pennsylvania
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 states that “the judge shall give notice to the
    parties of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the notice
    the reasons for the dismissal.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Because the Motion
    should have been analyzed as a PCRA Petition, the lower court erred in not
    complying with this mandatory requirement. However, such a defect is
    waived due to Reeves’s failure to raise the issue. See Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    909 A.2d 383
    , 384 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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    § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of
    direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
    United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or the expiration of
    time for seeking review.”        
    Id. § 9545(b)(3).
        The PCRA’s timeliness
    requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the
    merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.
    Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1093 (Pa. 2010).
    In the present case, Reeves’s judgment of sentence became final on
    June 4, 2012, as he did not file a direct appeal.3           See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9545(b)(3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Reeves had until June 4, 2013, to
    file a timely PCRA petition. Thus, the instant July 20, 2015 Petition is facially
    untimely under the PCRA.
    The PCRA provides three exceptions to the one-year time limitation:
    (1) the failure to raise the claim was the result of government interference;
    (2) the facts of the new claim were unknown to the petitioner and could not
    have been discovered with due diligence; (3) the right asserted is a
    constitutional right recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court after the time period provided in the section
    has expired, and it has been held to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Any PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions must
    3
    We note that 30 days after May 4, 2012, is Sunday, June 3, 2012.
    -3-
    J-S40039-16
    be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented.
    See 
    id. § 9545(b)(2).
    Reeves invokes the third exception, and claims that the United States
    Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (2013), renders his sentence illegal.4 Brief for Appellant at 12. In Alleyne,
    the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the sentence for a given
    crime must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.
    
    Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155
    .
    Reeves failed to file his Petition within sixty days of June 17, 2013, the
    date of the Alleyne decision.     See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 
    69 A.3d 759
    , 763 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that to fulfill the 60-day requirement,
    defendants need to file their petitions within 60 days from the date of the
    court’s decision). Moreover, Alleyne is not retroactive to cases where the
    judgment of sentence was final. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    102 A.3d 988
    , 995 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that neither the United States Supreme
    4
    Reeves     also cites to this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v.
    Cardwell,     
    105 A.3d 748
    (Pa. Super. 2014), and Commonwealth v.
    Newman,       
    99 A.3d 86
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), in support of his
    argument.     Brief for Appellant at 12. However, this Court’s decisions do not
    invoke the   third timeliness exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
    -4-
    J-S40039-16
    Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Alleyne applies
    retroactively where the judgment of sentence has become final).5
    Accordingly, the PCRA court properly denied Reeves’s Petition.6
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/6/2016
    5
    Reeves also discusses claims of legal error and ineffectiveness of counsel
    during the initial stages of his appeal. Brief for Appellant at 9-12. However,
    Reeves did not raise these claims in his third PCRA Petition. Therefore,
    these claims are waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (providing that “[f]ailure
    to state [a ground for relief] in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude the
    defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction
    collateral relief.”); see also Commonwealth v. Rainey, 
    928 A.2d 215
    , 226
    (Pa. 2007) (noting that issues not raised in a PCRA petition are waived and
    cannot be considered for the first time on appeal).
    6
    It is well-settled that this Court may affirm a trial court’s decision on any
    valid grounds. Commonwealth v. Taggert, 
    997 A.2d 1189
    , 1197 n.10
    (Pa. Super. 2010).
    -5-