Com. v. Kimble, D. ( 2022 )

J-S10037-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DEVIN BARRY KIMBLE :
:
Appellant : No. 1178 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 3, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No: CP-06-CR-0000352-2019
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2022
Appellant, Devin Kimble, appeals from the aggregate judgment of
sentence of two years’ probation, which was imposed after his jury trial
conviction for resisting arrest and recklessly endangering another person
(REAP).1,2 We affirm.
The facts underlying this appeal are as follows. On January 4, 2019,
Police Officer Pablo Dominguez (Officer Dominguez) and Police Officer Shawn
Heck (Officer Heck) were driving in the 1200 block of Perkiomen Avenue at
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5104 and 2705, respectively.
2 Additionally, the trial court found Appellant guilty of two traffic offenses,
refusal to surrender registration plates and cards upon suspension and driving
with a suspended license. 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1376(a) and 1543(a), respectively.
The trial court sentenced Appellant to pay fines for both charges.
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3:00 a.m. N.T., 8/2/21, at 78-80. Officer Dominguez observed Appellant’s
vehicle, checked the status of the license plate and determined that it was
suspended or revoked. Id. at 80. Appellant had pulled his vehicle into a
parking spot on the road when Officer Dominguez initiated a traffic stop of
Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 81-86.
Officer Dominguez approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and
informed Appellant that he was being pulled over because the plate was
suspended. Id. at 86. Officer Dominguez testified that Appellant immediately
became upset and angry and stated he believed the officers initiated the stop
because of his race. Id. at 87-88. Appellant provided Officer Dominguez with
the car information but did not produce a driver’s license. Id. Officer
Dominguez determined that Appellant had a scofflaw warrant for driving with
a suspended license. Id. at 91.
Before taking Appellant into custody based on the scofflaw warrant,
Officer Dominguez decided to call for backup and Officer Bryan Baxter arrived
on the scene. Id. at 92-93. The three officers approached the vehicle and
ordered Appellant to exit. Id. at 92-93. Appellant began to exit and the
officers ordered him to turn around and face the vehicle, but Appellant did not
comply. Id. at 94. Officer Dominguez testified that when he secured a
handcuff on Appellant’s one wrist, Appellant pulled his hands toward his chest,
tensed his arms, and stepped on the side of the car to push himself up and
away from the officers. Id. at 95. Officer Baxter testified that Appellant used
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moderate force to actively tuck, tense, and pull his arms away from the
officers. Id. at 62-65.
Appellant and the officers went to the ground in the middle of the
southbound lane and Appellant continued to struggle against the officers by
pulling his hands toward his chest. Id. at 65. Officer Dominguez testified
that he was pulling hard and using substantial force because Appellant was
trying to pull his arms under his body as much as he could. Id. at 98. Officer
Baxter testified that he was using a good amount of force trying to get
Appellant’s arm free. Id. at 67. Officer Dominguez testified that Appellant
was pulling hard, and screaming and yelling. Id., at 98. The officers testified
that the struggle to handcuff Appellant lasted about a minute to a minute and
a half. Id. at 70, 99.
The struggle occurred in the southbound lane of traffic, and Officer
Baxter testified that the officers’ feet were close to the double yellow line in
the road and that he observed traffic going in both directions, with cars
passing within two to three feet of the officers. Id. at 68. Officer Dominguez
testified he was eventually able to secure Appellant’s other arm into the
handcuffs and stated that Appellant was resisting during the entire episode.
Id. at 100-101. Officer Baxter testified that he had minor scrapes on his knee
as a result of the episode. Id. at 71. It took two officers to walk Appellant to
the police wagon because Appellant continued to push forward and backwards
and officers had to pull Appellant’s arms back so he could be searched. Id.
at 101-102.
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Appellant was arrested and charged with the offenses stated above. He
proceeded to a jury trial on August 2, 2021 and was found guilty of resisting
arrest and REAP. The trial court then found Appellant guilty of the summary
traffic violations after a bench trial. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate sentence of two years’ probation plus fines. Appellant filed a timely
post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on August 16, 2021. On
September 8, 2021, Appellant filed this timely direct appeal.3
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the guilty verdict for resisting arrest was in error as
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt an essential element of the offense;
specifically, the Officers were not in danger of bodily injury and
did not need to employ substantial force in order to arrest
Appellant.
2. Whether the guilty verdict for recklessly endangering another
person was in error as the evidence at trial was insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the
offense, specifically, officers were not placed in danger of
serious bodily injury or death.
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is
as follows:
Whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
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3 The trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of
errors complained of on appeal on September 13, 2021. Appellant filed his
timely Rule 1925(b) statement on September 23, 2021. The trial court
entered its opinion on November 10, 2021.
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enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. . . . Finally, the trier of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Fortson, 165 A.3d 10, 14–15 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
and internal brackets omitted) (some formatting), appeal denied, 174 A.3d
558 (Pa. 2017). “Moreover, if a fact finder reasonably determines from the
evidence ‘that all of the necessary elements of the crime were established,
then the evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict.’”
Commonwealth v. Heidler, 741 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. 1999). A claim
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law; as such, the
standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Weimer, 977 A.2d 1103, 1104-05 (Pa. 2009) (citation
omitted).
Appellant argues, first, that a mere assertion that substantial force was
used by a police officer is not sufficient evidence to convict him of resisting
arrest. Appellant’s Brief at 15. He asserts that the incident was merely a
scuffle. Id. at 16. Appellant compares the facts of his case to
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 426 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. 1981) and
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Commonwealth v. Eberhardt, 450 A.2d 651 (Pa. Super. 1982). Appellant’s
Brief at 14-15.
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with
the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful
arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a
substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone
else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to
overcome the resistance.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. In addition to proving that the person had the intent to
prevent a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other
duty, this statute contains two additional disjunctive provisions. The
Commonwealth must prove that the person (1) created a substantial risk of
bodily injury to the public servant or to anyone else or (2) employed means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance. See
Eberhardt, 450 A.2d at 652 (appellant only charged with the first of the two
disjunctive provisions found in § 5104.).
A conviction for resisting arrest cannot be sustained with evidence of a
minor scuffle. See, e.g., Rainey, 426 A.2d at 1150 (holding that simply
trying to escape from officer’s grip did not meet requirements for resisting
arrest). “[I]t is equally well-established that a suspect’s mere flight to escape
arrest does not violate § 5104[.]” In Int. of Woodford, 616 A.2d 641, 644
(Pa. Super. 1992).
[The resisting arrest statute] does not require evidence of serious
bodily injury, nor does it require actual injury. Merely exposing
another to the risk of such injury is sufficient to sustain a
conviction[.]
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Id. at 643–44.
Appellant argues that the facts of his case are similar to Rainey, 426
A.2d 1148 and Eberhardt, 450 A.2d 651. However, a closer examination of
those cases shows that they are readily distinguishable. In Rainey, the
appellant squirmed, wiggled, and shook himself to get away from the officer
who had grabbed him by the sleeve of his coat when he attempted to run
away. Rainey, 426 A.2d at 1149. This Court stated the “[a]ppellant's actions
in attempting to escape were no more than efforts ‘to shake off the
policeman’s detaining arm.’” Id. at 1150. We concluded that “[a]t most this
was a ‘minor scuffle’ incident to an arrest.” Id.In Eberhardt the appellant was charged in the Information with
resisting arrest by creating a substantial risk of bodily harm to the officers.
The officers were executing a valid arrest warrant for appellant in his home
and upon finding appellant hiding under the bed, the appellant began to
“scuffle” with them. Id. at 652. “The scuffle proceeded into the living room
and then downstairs into the dining room. During the scuffle, much furniture
was overturned and one of the officers sustained a bruise on his forearm.”
Id. The appellant ultimately escaped through the third-floor window. Id.
This Court determined that the “appellant’s actions were only attempts to
escape and not an aggressive assertion of physical force by appellant against
the officers.” Id. at 653. We found that there was no substantial risk of bodily
harm to the officers. Notably, this Court stated it did not analyze whether the
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appellant “employed means justifying or requiring substantial force to
overcome the resistance” because it was not charged in the Information. Id.
“Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner,” see Fortson, 165 A.3d at 14, the
evidence is sufficient to establish resisting arrest because Appellant created a
substantial risk of bodily injury to the officers by continuing to struggle with
them as they were sprawled out in the middle of an active lane of traffic and
within two to three feet of vehicles passing in either direction. Additionally,
the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction because Appellant used
means requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance, which is evident
from his actions upon exiting the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Jackson,
907 A.2d 540, 546 (Pa. Super. 2006) (sufficient evidence for resisting arrest
when appellant created a substantial risk of bodily injury and employed means
requiring substantial force to overcome his resistance by continuing to resist
the officer attempting to take him into custody, kicking backward and striking
the officer in his knee, requiring the officer to struggle to overcome the
resistance and once taken into custody appellant continued to resist attempts
to subdue him when he spat blood and saliva at the officer); Commonwealth
v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2011) (sufficient evidence for
resisting arrest when officer testified that when he attempted to remove
appellant’s hand from his pocket appellant struggled with him, striking him
with his left and right shoulders, while cursing and telling the officer to get off
of him).
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Appellant used a moderate amount of force to pull up his arms and tense
them up when Officer Dominguez placed a handcuff around his right wrist. He
stepped onto the step at the bottom of the car, pressed himself up and away
from the officers and continued to pull up, and tuck up his arms. Additionally,
once on the ground, Appellant persisted in his resistance by continuing to pull
hard on his arms to get them under his full body weight, forcing the officers
to pull hard to attempt to dislodge them from under Appellant’s body. Officer
Baxter used a good amount of force and Officer Dominguez had to use a
substantial amount of force to overcome Appellant’s continuous resistance.
Even after securing Appellant with handcuffs, Appellant continued to struggle
with officers on the way to the police wagon and before being searched.
Appellant’s issue is without merit as he both created a substantial risk of bodily
injury to the officers and employed means justifying or requiring substantial
force to overcome the resistance.
Next, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the
conviction for REAP. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the officers were in danger of
serious bodily injury or death. Appellant’s Brief, at 16. Appellant argues that
merely arresting Appellant in the road does not establish a risk of death or
serious bodily injury. Id. He asserts that his resistance itself did not establish
risk of serious bodily injury to the officers and argues that the danger posed
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to the officers is no more than the danger posed to any officer while making
a traffic stop on a travelled road. Id. at 16-18.4
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (emphasis added).
“Serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
Reckless endangerment of another person (“REAP”) requires the
creation of danger, so the Commonwealth must prove the
existence of an actual present ability to inflict harm to another.
Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal
citation omitted).
“[T]he Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had an actual
present ability to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to do so.”
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 915–16 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(internal citation omitted). “Danger, not merely the apprehension of danger,
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4 To the extent that Appellant challenges the mens rea requirement for REAP,
see Appellant’s Brief at 18, we find this is waived as he did not specify this
element in his Rule 1925(b) statement. “[W]hen challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence on appeal, the [a]ppellant’s [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925 statement must
specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient in
order to preserve the issue for appeal.” Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 198
A.3d 1112, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal citation omitted, brackets in
original).
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must be created.” Id. at 916 (internal citation omitted). “[T]he mere fact
that the victim only sustained minor injuries and did not sustain “serious bodily
injury” does not ipso facto establish that appellant’s actions did not place
others in danger of such injury.” Commonwealth v. Lawton, 414 A.2d 658,
662 (Pa. Super. 1979).
“Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner,” see Fortson, 165 A.3d at 14, the
evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant’s conduct placed the officers
in danger of death or serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Headley,
242 A.3d 940, 944 (Pa. Super. 2020) appeal denied, 253 A.3d 675 (Pa. 2021)
(REAP established where, during an argument with his paramour, appellant
discharged his gun into the floor of his apartment, the bullet entered the
apartment of his downstairs neighbor and within three or four feet from where
she was sitting, placing her in danger of death or injury and could have
seriously wounded or killed her and finding appellant’s actions created actual
danger and not merely apprehension of danger.)
Appellant’s actions, by continuing to struggle with officers in the middle
of the southbound lane of an active road while cars were driving by two to
three feet away and the struggle caused the officers’ legs to be within two feet
of the double yellow lines in the road, placed the officers in danger of being
struck by a car driving in either direction. Being struck by a car going 25 to
35 miles per hour could certainly result in death or serious bodily injury,
particularly when it was still dark outside and the street lights were obstructed
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by trees. The episode occurred in the middle of the active southbound lane
of travel. The northbound lane was in no way obstructed so that cars could
drive northbound and cars driving southbound would have to enter into the
northbound lane, pass the officers’ cars, and come back into the southbound
lane, where the struggle was occurring. For the reasons above, we conclude
that Appellant’s claim of error is meritless: the evidence was sufficient to
establish that Appellant’s actions created actual danger and placed or may
have placed the officers in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/8/2022
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