Com. v. Samuels, D. ( 2019 )


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    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    DOUGLAS SAMUELS
    Appellant             :   No. 1422 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 16, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-22-CR-0005730-2016
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                FILED JULY 17, 2019
    Douglas Samuels appeals from the judgment of sentence of life without
    the possibility of parole following his conviction for first -degree murder. We
    affirm his conviction, but remand for resentencing after a determination of
    Appellant's ability to pay a fine.
    Appellant and Freddie Stewart ("victim") grew up together and had a
    volatile history.   In the past, Appellant had called the police approximately
    twelve times on the victim because the victim was either harassing or
    physically assaulting him. On the morning of August 27, 2016, Appellant and
    the victim got into an argument about money. The victim threatened to beat
    Appellant if he did not return the money by 5:00 p.m. that evening.
    Appellant went to his car to get his firearm to kill the victim, but found
    that he was out of ammunition.           As a result, Appellant took public
    transportation to a nearby Wal-Mart to purchase ammunition.            Upon his
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    return, Appellant fired several test shots, before going to locate the victim.
    He found the victim sitting outside of his residence. In response to Appellant's
    appearance with a gun, the victim fled. Appellant fired a shot over the back
    of the victim's head "to keep him running." N.T. Jury Trial, 6/27/18, at 299.
    Appellant did not pursue the victim. Instead, he walked eleven blocks
    to his sister's house for lunch and hid his weapon in the bushes to prevent
    anyone from locating it.      After lunch, Appellant retrieved his weapon and
    walked back to the victim's house. He found the victim asleep in his vehicle.
    Appellant woke the victim up, so that the victim would know it was him, before
    firing one shot into the victim's face and killing him. Multiple witnesses heard
    a gunshot and saw Appellant with a gun pointed at the victim.              Appellant
    remained on scene, where he made several unprompted statements to
    bystanders and officers responding to the scene, admitting responsibility for
    the killing. Appellant also gave a taped confession to the arresting officers.
    Appellant was charged with criminal homicide. Appellant proceeded to
    a jury trial and was found guilty of first -degree murder. On July 16, 2018,
    Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
    and a $10,000 fine was imposed.          Appellant filed a post -sentence motion
    challenging his sentence and the weight of the evidence. The motion was
    denied and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the
    trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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    I.    Did not the lower court abuse its discretion by failing to
    grant [Appellant] a new trial on the basis that the guilty
    verdict was against the weight of the evidence when the
    totality of the evidence as to the issues of killing in the heat
    of passion and imperfect self-defense was unreliable,
    contradictory, and incredible?
    II.    Did not the court impose an illegal sentence when it imposed
    a fine of $10,000 on a person serving a life -without -parole
    sentence without any consideration of [Appellant's] ability
    to pay such a fine?
    Appellant's brief at 5.
    First, Appellant seeks a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
    against the weight of the evidence, i.e., that the greater weight of the
    evidence supported a verdict for the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter,
    not first -degree murder. Appellant's brief at 21. Appellant argued that, since
    he proved that he was either operating under the heat of passion or an
    unreasonable belief that the killing was justified, his conviction should have
    been mitigated accordingly. Id.
    An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight
    of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the
    trial court. Therefore, "we may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is
    so   contrary to the evidence as to           shock one's sense of justice."
    Commonwealth v. Champney, 
    832 A.2d 403
    , 408 (Pa. 2003). As our
    Supreme Court has explained:
    Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
    discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
    is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
    had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
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    appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
    and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
    court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
    evidence.   One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
    denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict
    was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
    trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
    This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting
    or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
    evidence is unfettered. We have explained that:
    The term "discretion" imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
    and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the
    framework of the law, and is not excised for the purpose of giving
    effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on
    the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal
    motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused
    where the course pursued represents not merely an error of
    judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
    where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the
    action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill -will.
    
    Id.
    Appellant argues that the jury failed to properly weigh his trial testimony
    that he had sustained "numerous beatings at the hands of the [victim] for a
    [two and one-half] year period," that the victim had threatened to kill him the
    morning of the crime, that Appellant was aware of the victim's violent prior
    record, that he believed the victim had a gun in his vehicle, and that he did
    not approach the victim intending to shoot him whether or not the victim had
    a gun. Appellant's brief at 19-21. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred
    in denying his post -trial motions in that respect. We disagree.
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    Appellant's testimony did not persuade the trial court that his conviction
    was against the weight of the evidence. In its opinion, the trial court engaged
    in a thorough analysis of the allegation that the weight of the evidence
    supported Appellant's imperfect self-defense and heat of passion justification
    defenses. Specifically, it found that the evidence established that Appellant,
    by his own admission, undertook actions over the course of many hours that
    belied his argument that there was insufficient time for him to "cool off" before
    he shot and killed the victim. Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/18, at 16-21. It also
    found     that the    evidence    negated    Appellant's   imperfect   self-defense
    justification, since Appellant's own testimony also proved that he was in no
    immediate danger. Id. at 17-21. The trial court found most compelling the
    fact that Appellant admitted that "a sleeping man would present no immediate
    danger of death or serious bodily injury." N.T., 6/27/18, at 306. Ultimately,
    in denying Appellant's claim, the trial court concluded that
    the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings. As cited
    above, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Appellant,
    acted with the specific intent to kill [the victim], without legal
    justification. In this case, there is direct and circumstantial
    evidence of Appellant's specific intent to kill [the victim]. The jury
    heard direct evidence of Appellant's specific intent to kill [the
    victim] in his own words on the audio recording of his voluntary
    statement with the police one hour after the murder wherein he
    stated that it was his intent to kill [the victim] at the time he did.
    The jury was also presented with circumstantial evidence of
    Appellant's specific intent to kill by evidence of his use of a deadly
    weapon on a vital part of [the victim's] body. Appellant shot [the
    victim] in the face with a shotgun at relative close range.
    Accordingly, this [c]ourt did not err in denying Appellant's post -
    sentence motion for a new trial or arrest of judgment based on a
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    challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting a first -degree
    murder verdict.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/18, at 20.
    Our review of the record reveals no indication of bias or ill -will on the
    part of the trial court in its analysis. As the trial court aptly stated, Appellant's
    own actions and statements undercut his assertion that the heat of passion or
    imperfect self-defense justifications apply. Id. at 16-21. Thus, we find that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief on Appellant's
    challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his conviction for first -
    degree murder. Appellant is entitled to no relief on this claim.
    Next, Appellant alleges that the trial court imposed a $10,000 fine
    without first determining his ability to pay. Appellant's brief at 22-23. The
    trial court and Commonwealth concede that no such finding was made, and
    request that we remand so that the fine can be downwardly modified.
    Commonwealth's brief at 6, Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/18, at 20.
    The trial court may impose a fine in addition to a defendant's other
    sentence when "the court is of the opinion that a fine is specially adapted to
    deterrence of the crime involved or to the correction of the defendant." 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9726(b)(2). However, "[t]he court shall not sentence a defendant
    to pay a fine unless it appears of record that     .   .   .   the defendant is or will be
    able to pay the fine." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(c)(1); Commonwealth v. Thomas,
    
    879 A.2d 246
    , 264 (Pa.Super. 2005). Imposition of a fine is not precluded
    merely because the defendant cannot pay the fine immediately or because he
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    cannot do so without difficulty. Commonwealth v. Church, 
    522 A.2d 30
    , 33
    (Pa. 1987).
    Here, all of the parties agree that the trial court did not make specific
    findings of Appellant's ability to pay the fine imposed.              Our review of the
    sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the only mention of Appellant's
    ability to pay a fine was made by the Assistant District Attorney, when he
    noted that Appellant was "[o]bviously   .   .   .   going to have [a] very limited ability
    to pay any type of fine." N.T. Sentencing, 7/16/18, at 4. Thus, consistent
    with § 9726(c)(1) and Thomas, 
    supra,
     we remand the case to the trial court
    for resentencing after a determination of Appellant's ability to pay a fine.
    We affirm the murder conviction, vacate the judgment of sentence in
    part, and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    J seph D. Seletyn,
    Prothonotary
    Date: 07/17/2019
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1422 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 7/17/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024