In the Int. of: W.A.C., Appeal of: S.C. ( 2023 )

J-A24041-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: W.A.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1348 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000103-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: W.A.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1349 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000184-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1350 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000164-2020
J-A24041-22
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1351 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000183-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1352 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000212-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.C., MOTHER :
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: No. 1353 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000182-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 6, 2023
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S.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions filed by
the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily
terminate her parental rights to her sons, W.A.C. (born June 2015), C.M.C.
(born May 2016), and A.C.C. (born January 2019) (collectively, “Children”).1
Mother also appeals from the orders in Children’s dependency cases changing
their permanency goals from reunification to adoption. After careful review,
we affirm the termination decrees and dismiss the appeals from the goal
change orders as moot.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On January
19, 2020, DHS received a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report alleging
that A.C.C., who was one year old at the time, presented at St. Christopher’s
Hospital (“the hospital”) because he was having difficulty breathing. See N.T.,
3/1/22, at 21-25; see also DHS Exhibit 16, 1/19/20, at 3-4.2 The report,
ultimately deemed founded, alleged that A.C.C. had been malnourished: he
was the size of an infant, and his bones were visible beneath his skin. See
DHS Exhibit 16, 1/19/20; N.T. 12/8/20, at 108-09. The report stated that
____________________________________________
1 On March 1, 2022, the trial court terminated the parental rights of A.B., the
putative father of W.A.C. and C.M.C. On the same date, the trial court
terminated the parental rights of any unknown father for C.M.C.
Subsequently, on April 20, 2022, the trial court terminated the parental rights
of T.G., the putative father of A.C.C., and any unknown father. No putative
father or unknown father filed an appeal or participated in the instant appeals.
2 At the goal change/termination hearing, the parties stipulated to the
admission of DHS Exhibits 3-16. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 14-18.
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A.C.C.’s condition was deemed a near fatality and alleged that Mother's and
Grandmother’s neglect and abuse had caused his condition. See DHS Exhibit
16, at 2.
DHS investigative worker Shaylyn Kreider (“Ms. Kreider”) saw A.C.C. in
the hospital and stated that he “appeared to . . . be malnourished. I could
observe his ribs. He also had bed sores on his body. And his legs were
contorted and stuck together.” N.T., 3/1/22, at 24-25. Ms. Kreider testified
that A.C.C. weighed nine pounds at birth, but only eight pounds when he
arrived at the hospital, where doctors determined he could not walk or crawl.
See id. at 28-30. A.C.C. was hospitalized for more than two months, until
March 31, 2020. See id. at 29. Because of A.C.C.’s suspected abuse, the
hospital requested that A.C.C.’s siblings, C.M.C. and W.A.C., be brought for
physical screenings. See N.T., 12/8/20, at 46-47.
On January 20, 2020, DHS received a CPS report, later determined to
be founded, that C.M.C., then three years old, had been admitted to the
hospital, and that Mother and Grandmother had abused and neglected him.
See N.T., 12/8/20, at 110; N.T., 3/1/22, at 22; see also DHS Exhibit 6,
1/20/20, at 3.
Ms. Kreider observed C.M.C. while he was at the hospital and testified,
“He appeared to be malnourished. He was very thin. He also appeared to
have cracked skin. And he had a hard time walking.” N.T., 3/1/22, at 24.
Ms. Kreider also testified that C.M.C. and W.A.C. were initially placed in the
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same room at the hospital, but that the nursing staff had moved C.M.C. and
fed him separately after staff saw Mother give W.A.C. food meant for C.M.C.
See id. at 32.
DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report dated
January 20, 2020, regarding W.A.C., who was four years old at the time. See
N.T., 3/1/22, at 21-22; see also DHS Exhibit 5, 1/20/20. Ms. Kreider testified
that W.A.C. weighed approximately 140 pounds and appeared to be morbidly
obese. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 24.
DHS visited the hospital on January 21, 2020, and found C.M.C. to be
nonverbal, and found that A.C.C. was suffering from bedsores, alopecia,
influenza, and Respiratory Syncytial Virus (“RSV”), and had legs that were so
contorted that he could not walk. It determined that C.M.C. had not received
routine medical care for two-and-one-half years. Mother stated that C.M.C.
was verbal, that A.C.C. and C.M.C. ate regularly, and that their low weight
could be the result of genetic conditions. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 32.
Ms. Kreider, who spoke with Mother during her investigation, stated that
Mother did not understand the severity of Children’s conditions. See N.T.,
3/1/22, at 25. Mother also stated that she did not notice anything wrong with
A.C.C.’s or C.M.C.’s weight or appearance. See N.T., 12/8/20, at 117, 121.
Ms. Kreider never found medical evidence to support Mother’s contention that
Children had a genetic disorder. See id. at 32-33.
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Ms. Kreider also observed Mother’s home, where Children lived with
Mother, Grandmother, and two maternal uncles. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 31. Ms.
Kreider testified that there was no infant formula in the home, despite A.C.C.
needing it at the time. See id. at 26. She also stated that A.C.C.’s crib was
very dirty and that C.M.C.’s Pack ‘n’ Play portable crib appeared to have an
indent “like a body had been there for a while. It was also unkept and dirty.”
See id. It appeared A.C.C. and C.M.C. spent all day and night in their crib
and Pack ‘n’ Play, respectively. See id. at 31.
On January 22, 2020, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody
(“OPC”) for W.A.C. and placed him in a foster home. At a shelter care hearing
on January 24, 2020, the trial court lifted the OPC, and transferred legal
custody of W.A.C. to DHS. The trial court also suspended Mother’s visitation
until the adjudicatory hearing. See Order 1/24/20.
DHS received a CPS report dated January 23, 2020 that alleged that
Mother and Grandmother customarily left A.C.C. and C.M.C. in a room alone
all day and did not allow them to come out of the room and play with W.A.C.
DHS Exhibit 7, 1/23/20, at 3. The report, later determined to be valid, further
alleged that Mother and Grandmother called A.C.C. and C.M.C. “[b]astards,”
“[b]itches,” and “[s]tupid,” and that Mother only fed A.C.C. and C.M.C. once
a day and gave the majority of the food in the house to W.A.C. See DHS
Exhibit 7, at 3.
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On January 31, 2020, DHS obtained an OPC for C.M.C., who was being
discharged from the hospital, and placed him in a medical foster care home.
After a February 3, 2020 shelter care hearing, the trial court ordered no
contact between C.M.C. and Mother, lifted the OPC, and ordered the
temporary commitment to stand. See Order, 2/3/20.
On March 31, 2020, upon A.C.C.’s discharge from the hospital, DHS
obtained an OPC for A.C.C. and placed him in a medical foster care home.
After a shelter care hearing on April 1, 2020, the trial court transferred legal
custody to DHS and ordered A.C.C.’s temporary commitment to stand. See
Order, 4/1/20.
In January 2020, February 2020, and April 2020, respectively, DHS filed
dependency petitions for Children. While those petitions were pending, DHS
established family service plan (“FSP”) objectives requiring Mother to (1)
maintain employment; (2) sign consents; and (3) obtain appropriate housing.
See N.T., 3/1/22, at 36.
On March 12, 2020, Mother was arrested and charged with crimes
relating to the neglect and abuse of Children. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 27; see
also DHS Exhibits 14-16. The criminal court issued a stay away order keeping
Mother and Grandmother from Children. See N.T. 3/1/22, at 27.3
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3 The criminal court’s stay-away order remained in effect through the course
of the dependency matter. See Mother’s Brief at 38.
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On December 8, 2020, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing for
Children and heard the testimony of Dr. Norrell Atkinson, a child abuse
pediatrician and director of the hospital’s Child Protection Unit. See N.T.,
12/8/20, at 28.4 Dr. Atkinson testified that
[A.C.C.] was incredibly thin and malnourished. When he
came in[,] he was 12 months of age and his weight was, at that
point, only about nine -- or eight pounds when he came in. So
obviously a[t one] year of age, this is much less than what a child
should be weighing. It’s more similar to the birth weight of an
infant . . . You could see the bones from his ribcage, from his
arms, his legs. His skin was essentially hanging loose. He had
very minimal fat stores to his body. And he was hooked up to
multiple medical devices because . . . he was so sick.
Id. at 31. Dr. Atkinson continued:
He was incredibly sick and ill when he came in. He required
aggressive resuscitation with fluids, pressure support, oxygen.
His blood sugars were incredibly low. He had seizures. He was
gravely ill which caused the hospital to certify this case as a near
fatality. . ..
Id. at 37.
Dr. Atkinson also examined C.M.C. and W.A.C. during their
hospitalizations. Dr. Atkinson testified that C.M.C. “was not as severely ill as
[A.C.C.],” but was chronically malnourished. Id. at 47. C.M.C. had very little
fat; he also had a bony structure, very significant eczema, and developmental
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4At the termination and goal change hearing on March 1, 2022, at the request
of Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”), the trial court incorporated into the
record the notes of testimony from the December 8, 2020 adjudicatory
hearing. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 8-9.
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delays. See id. Although about three and one-half years’ old, C.M.C. was the
size of a thirteen-month-old child. See id. at 48-49.
Dr. Atkinson testified that W.A.C.’s appearance was vastly different from
his brothers because he was “morbidly obese” and much larger than
appropriate for a four-year-old, which presented the possibility of multiple
medical complications. See id. at 60-63.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated Children
dependent. The trial court also found under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303, that Mother
and Grandmother had abused all three Children, and that aggravated
circumstances5 existed for each child pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1).
The trial court ordered that no efforts were to be made to preserve the family
and reunify Children with Mother, and it ordered visitation between Mother
and Children to remain suspended. See N.T., 12/8/20, 238-43. see also
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5 Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act provides, in relevant part:
“Aggravated circumstances.” Any of the following
circumstances:
****
(2) The child or another child of the parent has been the victim of
physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual violence
or aggravated physical neglect by the parent.
****
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(2) (emphasis added).
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Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 12/8/20; Aggravated Circumstances
Orders, 12/8/20; DHS Exhibits 8-13.6
The court held permanency review hearings at regular intervals. On
April 1, 2021, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b),
and separate petitions to change Children’s permanency goals from
reunification to adoption. On March 1, 2022, the trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the petitions, when Children were ages six, five, and
three, respectively. Children were represented by a GAL and separate legal
counsel. Mother was represented by counsel and testified. DHS presented
the testimony of Ms. Kreider and Rodney Hill, a DHS social worker.7
By decrees dated and entered on April 20, 2022, the trial court
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). That same day, the court changed
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6On January 7, 2021, Mother filed notices of appeal regarding these orders.
On August 12, 2021, this Court affirmed the trial court’s orders. See In
Interest. of W.A.C., 262 A.3d 481, 2021 WL 2560049 (Pa. Super. August
12, 2021) (unpublished memorandum).
7 Following the March 1, 2022 hearing, the trial court held its decision
regarding Mother’s parental rights in abeyance. The trial court permitted
Mother twenty days to sign voluntary relinquishments of her rights to Children.
Mother did not sign the forms.
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Children’s permanency goals to adoption.8 Mother filed timely notices of
appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua
sponte on June 21, 2022. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on
August 15, 2022.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
when it involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights,
where such determination was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence under the Adoption Act[,] 23
P[a].C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)?
2. Whether [the] trial court erred or abused its discretion by
not adequately considering Mother’s efforts to correct the
conditions which originally brought [Children] into care[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
when it involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights
without giving primary consideration to the effect that the
termination would have on the developmental, physical[,]
and emotional needs of [Children] under [s]ection 2511(b)
of the Adoption Act?
4. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by
failing to consider the effect on [Children’s] bond with
Mother of a criminal court’s pretrial order denying her
contact with [Children] pending the outcome of the criminal
case; where the criminal court’s pretrial order created a
condition beyond Mother’s control; where the criminal case
was still pending at the time of the termination decree; and
where there had been no finding by the dependency trial
court that visitation posed a grave threat to [Children]?
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8On July 15, 2022, Mother entered negotiated guilty pleas to endangering
welfare of children and simple assault as to each Child. See Mother’s Brief at
20-21.
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5. Whether the [trial court] denied Mother her due process
under both the Pennsylvania and United States
Constitutions by rushing to termination when her ability to
maintain and improve her relationship with [Children] was
taken out of her control by the criminal justice system
before she had had the opportunity for a fair and speedy
trial[?]
6. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
changing . . . [C]hildren’s permanency goals to adoption
when DHS had not met its burden of proof that such a
change would best serve the needs and welfare of each
child[?]
Mother’s Brief at 11-13 (citations and footnote omitted) (reordered).9
Mother asserts in her first and second issues that clear and convincing
evidence did not support the involuntary termination of her parental rights,
and that the trial court did not adequately consider Mother’s attempt to correct
the conditions which originally brought Children into care. As both issues
related to the grounds for termination under section 2511(a), we address
them together.
We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,
which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d
580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, appellate
courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. See Interest of
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9 Children’s GAL filed a memorandum in support of terminating Mother’s
parental rights and changing Children’s permanency goals to adoption.
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S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re Adoption of C.M.,
255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).
Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of parental rights
proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101-2938. Section 2511(a) provides
grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. If the trial court finds
clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence of one of the grounds
for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must then consider
whether termination would best serve the child under subsection (b). See In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the
trial court’s decision as to any one of the grounds under subsection 2511(a),
along with subsection (b), to affirm a decree terminating parental rights. See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.3d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly,
we review the evidence relating to sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide
as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
****
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
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continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
****
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
To satisfy section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must show three
components: (1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent
for at least 12 months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of
J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Unlike other subsections, section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court
to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led
to the placement of the children. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super.
2017). The relevant inquiry regarding the second prong of section 2511(a)(8)
“is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus
whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the
hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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We observe that sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) both require a court
considering a termination petition to assess the needs and welfare of the
relevant child or children. However, the needs and welfare analysis required
by section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the needs and welfare analysis required
by section 2511(b) and must be addressed separately. See In re C.L.G., 956
A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
This Court has recognized “that the application of [s]ection [2511](a)(8)
may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward
resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.” In re
Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Nevertheless, by
allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
exist after a year,
the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be
held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that
contemplates only a short period of time, to wit eighteen . . .
months, in which to complete the process of either reunification
or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care.
Id.Regarding section 2511(b), we consider whether termination of parental
rights will best serve the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In this context, the
court must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent,
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and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.” Id.The court is not required to use expert testimony when conducting a
bonding analysis. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In cases where there is no evidence
of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends
on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Further,
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and
stability the child might have with the foster parent.
In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). “‘Above all else . . . adequate
consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s
own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination
of parental rights.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citation omitted).
“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her
child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential
in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847,
856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
With respect to section 2511(a), Mother argues that DHS did not prove
the elements necessary by clear and convincing evidence. See Mother’s Brief
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at 26. Regarding subsection (a)(8) specifically, Mother contends that DHS did
not offer competent evidence that “the conditions and causes [of] any such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Mother
in that the trial court did not hear competent weighty evidence thereof, which
a professional forensic evaluator might have provided.” Id. at 28 (italics
omitted). Mother also argues that she consistently kept DHS apprised of the
services she utilized. See id. at 29.10
The trial court considered Mother’s assertions of error and explained that
it found the testimony of Ms. Kreider, the DHS investigative worker, and Mr.
Hill, the DHS social worker, to be credible, clear, and convincing. See Trial
Court Opinion, 8/15/22, at 33, 37, 41. Conversely, the trial court found
“Mother’s testimony . . . was [] incredible and self-serving.” Id. at 41. The
trial court thus determined that the record supports by clear and convincing
evidence its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Id.
____________________________________________
10 Mother further claims that DHS did not provide evidence that the services
or assistance reasonably available and sought by Mother were not likely to
remedy the conditions that led to the removal of Children within a reasonable
period of time. That assertion is not a part of a section 2511(a)(8) analysis,
nor is Mother’s contention that the trial court failed to determine that “the
conditions and causes or any such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by Mother”, which is relevant to a section 2511(a)(2)
analysis, but not a section 2511(a)(8) analysis. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2).
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Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence for termination under
section 2511(a)(8). Regarding the first element of section 2511(a)(8), there
is no dispute that Children had been in DHS’s care for well over twelve months
at the time of the hearing. Concerning the second element, i.e., that the
conditions which led to the removal of Children continued to exist, the trial
court heard testimony that Children had all suffered from neglect; A.C.C. had
suffered a near fatality; and Mother still lived with Grandmother, the other
abuser of Children. See N.T., 3/1/22, at 36-37, 44, 57, 64-65. Moreover,
Dr. Atkinson testified that Mother inaccurately reported what she fed A.C.C.
and C.M.C. because they would have been a normal weight if they ate what
Mother reported. See N.T., 12/8/20, at 38-39, 52. Mr. Hill testified during
the termination hearing that although Mother has remained in consistent
contact with him, he does not “know if [Mother] understands why [Children
are] in care.” N.T., 3/1/22, at 37-38.
Mother’s own testimony demonstrated that she did not appreciate the
gravity of the risk to her children. On direct examination, she was asked the
following questions and provided the follow answers:
Q: What is your understanding about what happened to the boys
that caused them to be brought into DHS’s care?
****
A: That I didn’t properly take care of [Children] to the best of [my]
abilities.
****
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Q: Has your understanding of how [Children] came to be in the
condition that they were in two years ago -- has your
understanding of that changed over time of how it happened?
A: Yes.
Q: As we sit here today, what exactly do you think is the reason
that that occurred?
A: I was just so busy and caught up with working and taking care
of the house. I just fully trusted my mother and all her decisions.
Id. at 64-65, 71. In addition to blaming her mother, Mother also manifested
a lack of understanding of the cause of Children’s condition by stating that she
participated in a nutrition and cooking course she declared was necessary
because “[t]he guys were picky eater[s] and children who overeat.” Id. at
68. This testimony showed that the conditions that led to a one-year-old child
weighing less than his birth weight and a four-year-old child who weighed
more than 140 pounds, namely Mother’s inability to appreciate the conditions
that led to Children’s severe neglect, continued to exist.
Regarding the third element of section 2511(a)(8), that termination of
Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Children,
Ms. Kreider testified that over the first three months Children were in care,
W.A.C., who had been morbidly obese, began to lose weight; C.M.C., who was
malnourished, gained an appropriate amount of weight and became healthier
through occupational therapy; and A.C.C. had gained some weight and was
receiving services to address the effects of malnourishment. See id. at 33-
34. Additionally, Mr. Hill testified that W.A.C. is in a pre-adoptive placement,
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looks to his foster parent for love, protection, and support, and does not ask
for Mother. Id. at 39-40. Similarly, Mr. Hill testified that C.M.C. is in a
different pre-adoptive placement, and he looks to his foster parent for all his
needs. See id. at 41. A.C.C. is also in a different pre-adoptive placement
and is bonded with his foster mother who provides for all his needs. See id.
at 42-43. Mr. Hill also testified that Children are not bonded to Mother, do
not ask about her, and would not suffer irreparable harm if her parental rights
were terminated. See id. at 39-44.
Based on the foregoing testimony, we conclude that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in finding grounds for termination of Mother’s
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8). See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d at
446; see also In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 11.
In her third issue, Mother argues that the trial court’s section 2511(b)
analysis failed to give primary consideration to Children’s needs and welfare.11
Following our review, we again discern no abuse by the trial court in
concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Children’s best
interest pursuant to section 2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/22, at
41. Mr. Hill, a DHS social worker whom the trial court found credible, testified
that Children, who were six, five, and three, respectively, at the time of the
____________________________________________
11 Mother also maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in its section
2511(a) analysis. See Mother’s Brief at 29. As discussed above, the best
interest analysis under section 2511(a)(8) is separate from that of section
2511(b).
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termination hearing, do not have a bond with Mother, do not ask about her,
and would not suffer irreparable harm if her parental rights were terminated.
See N.T., 3/1/22, at 39-44. The trial court also heard testimony regarding
Children’s bonds with their respective foster parents. See id. Mr. Hill testified
that each child is thriving in his placement having formed bonds with their
foster parents, and none has had had any issues with their weight since being
placed. See id. at 39-48. Legal counsel for the Children told the trial court
that all three Children want to live forever with their foster parents. See id.
at 62-63. That evidence established that Children have no bond with Mother
and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of
Children. See Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 836 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(citation omitted) (stating that this Court will credit the factual findings of the
trial court which is on the “front lines assessing the credibility of witnesses”);
see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-63 (stating that where there is no
evidence of a bond between parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that
none exists). Moreover, Mother’s alleged progress toward reunification does
not demonstrate the existence of a bond with Children, much less one that
would be in Children’s best interest. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 241, 268-69
(Pa. 2013) (recognizing that some bonds between parent and child are
unhealthy and may cause damage if allowed to remain intact). Thus, Mother’s
third issue merits no relief.
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In her fourth issue, Mother claims that the trial court lacked sufficient
information to assess section 2511(b) because she was unable to visit
Children. Specifically, Mother contends the trial court refused her request to
postpone the hearing until her criminal matter was resolved so that visitation
could be considered, and that the trial court refused Mother’s request for a
parenting capacity evaluation. See Mother’s Brief. at 29-30. Mother further
argues that the trial court failed to consider the effect of the criminal court’s
pretrial order, over which she had no control, improperly analyzed the “grave
threat” analysis by focusing on the Children’s potential future testimony rather
than the grave threat she posed to them, and failed to consider whether she
posed a grave threat in the context of how visits would affect Children
individually. See id. at 30-39.
Visitation is only properly denied where it poses a grave threat to the
Child, a standard met where the parent demonstrates a severe mental or
moral deficiency that constitutes a grave threat to the child. See In re C.J.,
729 A.2d 89, 95 (Pa. Super. 1999).
Mother presents no law requiring a trial court to hold in abeyance an
involuntary termination decision pending resolution of related criminal
matters, and this Court is not aware of any such holding. As in this case, the
resolution of criminal matters can consume multiple years, and Children’s
needs and welfare are paramount in a section 2511(b) analysis. See In re
Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. We perceive no error in the failure to grant relief on
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Mother’s claim that the pendency of the criminal proceedings required that
the termination proceeding be halted.
To the extent Mother claims that the trial court misapplied the grave
threat analysis in denying her visitation, Mother supports her claim by citing
portions of hearing transcripts on February 6, 2020, and February 25, 2020,
on the dependency docket. See Mother’s Brief at 30-33, 34-37. Those
transcripts were never entered into evidence on the adoption dockets, nor did
Mother move to supplement the record with them. Thus, we may not consider
them. See In re S.S., 252 A.3d 681, 688 (Pa. Super. 2021).
Were we free to consider Mother’s allegation – unsupported by record
evidence – that the trial court should have focused its February 2020 grave
threat analysis on the risk to Children rather than to their later ability to
testify, we might agree that the trial court’s initial focus on Children’s future
testimony was misplaced. Nevertheless, at a later hearing, the trial court
found that aggravated circumstances existed regarding Mother’s abuse and
neglect of Children. See N.T., 12/8/20, at 241. In its opinion, the trial court
cited the Children’s dangerous medical conditions at the time they came into
care, and “the deplorable condition of their beds, food, lack of heating, and
overall distressing, dangerous care given by [Mother].” See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/15/22, at 47.
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Based on these findings, we would not conclude the trial court abused
its discretion in finding that Mother, who had malnourished one 12 child and
grossly overfed another to the point of morbid obesity, posed a grave threat
to Children.13
In her fifth issue, Mother argues that she was deprived of her due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by the “extraordinary delays” in the administration of justice
throughout the dependency process. See Mother’s Brief at 45-48. Mother
failed to assert this alleged error in her concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal, and the trial court did not address it. The claim is,
thus, unreviewable. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super.
____________________________________________
12A.C.C. was not then under the court’s jurisdiction. See Mother’s Brief at
31.
13 Additionally, the criminal court issued its stay-away order on March 12,
2020, less than two months after the trial court’s stay away order. See N.T.,
12/8/20, at 242 (trial court stating that the criminal court has issued a stay-
away order against Mother and Grandmother, and that its stay-away order
“just piggyback[s] on top of that.”). There were thus less than two months in
which the trial court’s stay-away order was the only bar to Mother’s visitation,
and that period of time began immediately after two of the Children were
hospitalized with malnutrition attributable to Mother, which is probative of a
grave threat. Additionally, even during that less than two months period, the
trial court did not absolutely preclude visitation as to the two children who
were then before it: the court ordered supervised visits with C.M.C., and
allowed for the possibility of visits with W.A.C. See Mother’s Brief at 30-33.
We decline to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining
that Mother presented a grave threat to Children in the less than two months
when the trial court’s stay-away order was the only bar to visitation.
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2017) (“[I]t is well-settled that issues not included in an appellant’s statement
of questions involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
are waived.”).
In her sixth and final issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by changing Children’s permanency goals from reunification to
adoption where DHS failed to meet its burden of proof that goal changes would
best suit Children’s needs and welfare. See Mother’s Brief at 44-45. Given
our disposition affirming the termination decrees, Mother’s appeals from the
goal change orders are moot. Therefore, we dismiss her appeals from the
goal change orders. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917
(Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue
the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”) (citation
omitted).
Termination decrees affirmed. Appeals from the goal change orders
dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/6/2023
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