Com. v. Lynn, J. ( 2022 )

J-S26040-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN DAVID LYNN :
:
Appellant : No. 1390 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0006961-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN DAVID LYNN :
:
Appellant : No. 1391 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007094-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN DAVID LYNN :
:
Appellant : No. 1392 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007425-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
J-S26040-22
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN DAVID LYNN :
:
Appellant : No. 1393 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007427-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN DAVID LYNN :
:
Appellant : No. 1394 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007428-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN DAVID LYNN :
:
Appellant : No. 1395 MDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated September 28, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007584-2017
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 19, 2022
Appellant John David Lynn filed six pro se appeals to challenge the
orders of the Court of Common Pleas of York County denying his petitions
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Appellant asserts that trial
counsel was ineffective in recommending that he enter a guilty plea and forgo
his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After careful review, we affirm the PCRA court’s orders.
Between March 2017 and May 2017, Appellant was charged in York
County with multiple offenses on seven individual dockets. On April 6, 2017,
the York County District Attorney’s Office was notified that Appellant had been
apprehended in Baltimore County, Maryland on separate charges. Notes of
Testimony (N.T.), Rule 600 hearing, at 7.
Daniel Smith, extradition coordinator for the York County District
Attorney’s Office, immediately lodged a detainer, sent Baltimore County
formal notice that York County desired to extradite Appellant, and provided
several of Appellant’s arrest warrants. Id. at 4-8, 12. Thereafter, Mr. Smith
sent updates to Baltimore County on April 10, 2017 and May 2, 2017 when
additional warrants were issued for Appellant’s arrest. Id. Mr. Smith followed
the progress of Appellant’s Maryland case through the docket entries on the
judiciary website and by contacting the records department in the prison
where Appellant had been placed. Id. at 8, 14-15.
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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On September 19, 2017, Baltimore County police notified the York
County District Attorney’s Office that the charges against Appellant in
Maryland had been disposed. Id. at 8-9. On September 20, 2017, Appellant
signed an extradition waiver and was brought to York County on September
22, 2017. Id.
Appellant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After a hearing was held on January 25, 2019, the trial
court denied Appellant’s motion.
On March 11, 2019, Appellant entered negotiated guilty pleas in all
seven cases. On CR-7094-2017, Appellant pled guilty to fleeing or attempting
to elude a police officer, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), and
drivers’ required to be licensed. On CR-7428-2017, Appellant pled guilty to
retail theft, REAP, and drivers’ required to be licensed. On CR-7427-2017,
Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking – moveable property.
On CR-6961-2017, Appellant pled guilty to fleeing or attempting to
elude a police officer, accidents involving damage to unattended vehicle or
property, and drivers’ required to be licensed. On CR-7425-2017, Appellant
pled guilty to burglary (not adapted for overnight accommodation, no person
present). On CR-7584-2017, Appellant pled guilty to simple assault,
accidents involving damage to unattended vehicle or property, drivers’
required to be licensed, and required financial responsibility. On CR-0210-
2018, Appellant pled guilty to burglary (not adapted for overnight
accommodation, no person present).
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In exchange for these guilty pleas, the Commonwealth agreed to nol
prosse multiple other charges, including charges of aggravated assault. At
the guilty plea hearing, Appellant submitted a written plea colloquy and the
trial court conducted an oral plea colloquy. The trial court sentenced Appellant
to an aggregate term of six to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
On March 20, 2019, Appellant filed a timely counseled motion to clarify
his sentence. On May 2, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on his motion
and denied Appellant relief.
On May 10, 2019, Appellant filed pro se motions seeking to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP), indicating his intent to file a PCRA petition, and
requesting the removal of his counsel, Thomas Gregory, Jr., Esq. On May 20,
2019, Atty. Gregory filed a motion to withdraw his representation in light of
Appellant’s allegations of ineffective assistance. On October 2, 2019, the trial
court allowed Atty. Gregory to withdraw.
On October 10, 2019, Appellant filed a PCRA petition. Appellant
subsequently filed an amended petition and a request for standby counsel.
After the trial court permitted several amendments to the petition, made an
appointment of counsel, and held a Grazier hearing2 when Appellant
requested to represent himself, the trial court permitted Appellant to proceed
on his petition pro se.
____________________________________________
2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998).
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A hearing was scheduled by the court but ultimately continued when
Appellant asked to be physically present before the Court. On April 30, 2021,
Appellant was transported from prison and a hearing was held. On September
10, 2021, Appellant filed a motion objecting to the accuracy of the PCRA
hearing transcripts. After a brief hearing on September 10, 2021, the PCRA
court ordered certain parts of the transcript to be corrected with minor
changes. On September 28, 2021, the PCRA court issued an order denying
the petition, but did not send the parties notice of its order until October 7,
2021.3
On October 27, 2021, Appellant filed seven pro se notices of appeal,
which were docketed at 1390-96 MDA 2021. On November 15, 2021,
Appellant filed an application to consolidate the appeals, which this Court
granted on November 17, 2021. Appellant filed an application to discontinue
the appeal at 1396 MDA 2021, which this Court granted on February 3, 2022.4
Appellant raises the following questions for our review on appeal:
1. Did the PCRA court error in denying relief that Appellant’s guilty
pleas were unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently
____________________________________________
3Rule of Appellate Procedure 108(b) designates the date of entry of an order
as “the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of
entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).” Pa.R.A.P.
108(b). See also Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa.
1999) (determining that “an order is not appealable until it is entered on the
docket with the required notation that appropriate notice has been given”).
4This appeal is centered on Appellant’s claim that the denial of his Rule 600
motion affected the validity of his guilty pleas. As there was no Rule 600
hearing held regarding the charge at 1396 MDA 2021, the appeal in that
matter was properly dismissed.
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made due to counsel erron[e]ously advising Appellant that the
Rule 600 claims were not worthy of appeal constituting
ineffective assistance?
2. Did the PCRA court error in concluding that claim two is waived,
that Appellant’s U.S. 14th Amendment and Pennsylvania
Constitution Article 1, § 9, due process rights to plead guilty
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently were violated due to the
Judge abusing her discretion in denying fully meritorious Rule
600 claims?
3. Does the Commonwealth v. R. Booze, 947 A.2d 1287 (2008)
opinion contain legal errors, contradictions, and
mis[s]tatements that run afoul of Rule 600(C)(1)(3) and
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 464 A.2d 1376 (1980), that
led/contributed to the Judge abusing her discretion in denying
the Rule 600 claims[, r]equiring this Honorable Court to correct
the errors?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
In reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review is
well-established:
[o]ur review of the grant or denial of PCRA relief is limited to
examining whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported
by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from
legal error. Commonwealth v. Cox, 636 Pa. 603, 146 A.3d 221,
226 n.9 (2016). The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when
supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal
conclusions. Commonwealth v. Burton, 638 Pa. 687, 158 A.3d
618, 627 n.13 (2017).
Commonwealth v. Small, 647 Pa. 423, 440–41, 189 A.3d 961, 971 (2018).
Appellant’s three claims are closely intertwined as they are based on his
contention that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel
advised Appellant that his Rule 600 claims were not worthy of appeal.
Appellant claims that, but for counsel’s advice which Appellant characterizes
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as erroneous, Appellant would have proceeded to trial on all six dockets to
preserve the Rule 600 claims for appeal. Thus, Appellant asserts his guilty
pleas were unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently made as he received
incorrect advice as to his Rule 600 claims.
Our review of an ineffectiveness claim is guided by the following
principles:
[a]s originally established by the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, [104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984), and adopted by
Pennsylvania appellate courts, counsel is presumed to have
provided effective representation unless a PCRA petitioner
pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying
legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or
inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to
effectuate his client's interest; and (3) prejudice, to the
effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome at trial if not for counsel's error.
Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 331 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the
ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of
ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963
A.2d 409, 419 (2009).
Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 15 (Pa.Super. 2020).
In addition, this Court has provided that:
“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the
issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which
forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable
merit....” Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d
189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing
to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v.
Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).
Once this threshold is met we apply the “reasonable basis”
test to determine whether counsel's chosen course was
designed to effectuate his client's interests. If we conclude
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that the particular course chosen by counsel had some
reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel's
assistance is deemed effective. If we determine that there
was no reasonable basis for counsel's chosen course then
the accused must demonstrate that counsel's
ineffectiveness worked to his prejudice.
Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194–95 (internal citations
omitted).
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012 (Pa.Super. 2016).
To the extent that Appellant claims that counsel’s advice constituted
ineffective assistance such that his guilty plea was rendered invalid, we note
the following:
“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.”
Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa.Super.2007)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141
(Pa.Super. 2002)). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the
advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on
whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Moser, supra.
The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements
for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea
counsel, ... under which the defendant must show that
counsel's deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing,
involuntary, or unintelligent plea. This standard is
equivalent to the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to
all post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea.
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 105
(Pa.Super.2005) (en banc), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 688, 887 A.2d
1241 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
A valid guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently entered. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517,
522 (Pa.Super. 2003). The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandate that pleas be taken in open court, and require
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the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain
whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences
of his plea. Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764 (Pa.Super.
2002) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 590). Specifically, the court must
affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understands: (1) the
nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual
basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption
of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of sentences and fines
possible; and (6) that the court is not bound by the terms of the
agreement unless the court accepts the agreement.
Commonwealth v. G. Watson, 835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2003).
This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the
voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 383–84
(Pa.Super. 2002).
Kelley, 136 A.3d at 1012–13.
We agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to show that counsel
was ineffective in his handling of the Rule 600 motion such that counsel’s
advice caused Appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
Rule 600 states that: “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date
on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In regards to the
computation of time, Rule 600 provides that “periods of delay at any stage of
the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has
failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the
time within which trial must commence, while “[a]ny other periods of delay
shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). The Commonwealth's failure to bring the defendant
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to trial before the expiration of the Rule 600 time period constitutes grounds
for dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).
Rule 600 permits certain circumstances to extend the Commonwealth's
deadline. Those circumstances also include delay caused by the defendant
and delay that occurred “as the result of circumstances beyond the
Commonwealth's control and despite its due diligence.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
600(C)(1)-(2); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. “In determining whether the
Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, the courts have explained that
due diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not
require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the
Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt.
(citations omitted). “The Commonwealth's stewardship [] must be judged by
what was done rather than by what was not done” in Rule 600 cases.
Commonwealth v. Selenski, 919 A.2d 229, 232 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Moreover, the Comment to Rule 600 further states:
In addition to any other circumstances precluding the availability
of the defendant or the defendant's attorney, the defendant
should be deemed unavailable for the period of time during
which the defendant contested extradition, or a responding
jurisdiction delayed or refused to grant extradition; or during
which the defendant was physically incapacitated or mentally
incompetent to proceed; or during which the defendant was
absent under compulsory process requiring his or her
appearance elsewhere in connection with other judicial
proceedings.
Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (emphasis added).
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In litigating the Rule 600 motion, Appellant conceded that the success
of his motion depended solely on whether the time he spent in jail in Maryland
was included in the Rule 600 calculation. See N.T., Rule 600 Hearing,
1/25/19, at 3 (expressly stating “if you do not count that time, then the motion
loses”). Therefore, we need only determine whether the period of delay when
Appellant was incarcerated outside of Pennsylvania was attributable to the
Commonwealth.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due
diligence to bring him back to Pennsylvania during the time period that he was
incarcerated in Maryland during the pendency of those charges. While the
parties agree that the Commonwealth filed a detainer immediately after it was
notified that Appellant had been arrested in Maryland, Appellant asserted that
the Commonwealth should have filed a formal request to extradite him before
his Maryland charges were resolved, or at a minimum, sought confirmation
from Maryland authorities that extradition would not occur until the Maryland
charges were resolved.
Our Supreme Court has explained the difference between a formal
extradition request and a detainer:
[u]nlike a request for extradition, which is a request that the state
in which the prisoner is incarcerated transfer custody to the
requesting state, a detainer is merely a means of informing the
custodial jurisdiction that there are outstanding charges pending
in another jurisdiction and a request to hold the prisoner for the
requesting state or notify the requesting state of the prisoner's
imminent release.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 567 Pa. 135, 139, 786 A.2d 173, 175 (2001).
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Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Booze, 947 A.2d 1287 (Pa.Super.
2008) and Commonwealth v. Alexander, 464 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa.Super.
1983) in which this Court held that “[m]ere incarceration in another state does
not make a defendant unavailable within the meaning of Rule 600.” Booze,
947 A.2d at 1291. This Court further held that a defendant “is only unavailable
if the delay in returning him to Pennsylvania is due to the other state causing
the delay; the prosecution, however, must exercise due diligence in
attempting to bring the defendant back for trial.” Id.However, we conclude that both Booze and Alexander can be
distinguished from the factual circumstances presented in the instant case. In
Booze, the Commonwealth was notified that Booze was being held in
Maryland as of February 1, 2006. The Commonwealth faxed Maryland
authorities a copy of the complaint detailing charges Booze faced in
Washington County, Pennsylvania, intending the fax to serve as a detainer.
Although Booze was sentenced for her Maryland offense on October 4, 2006,
the Commonwealth took no action to bring her into custody until she filed a
motion to dismiss on April 3, 2007. This Court found that under these
circumstances, the Commonwealth did not demonstrate it acted with due
diligence in attempting to bring Booze back for trial. Booze, 947 A.2d 1292.
In Alexander, the Commonwealth filed a complaint against Alexander
in Allegheny County in March 1979 and was notified in January 1980 that
Alexander was incarcerated in New Jersey. After Appellant was sentenced on
the New Jersey charges on March 20, 1980, the Commonwealth sought
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Appellant’s return on March 27, 1980, but then took no action until July 10,
1980 when it contacted the New Jersey correctional institution where
Alexander had been incarcerated and learned that he had been transferred to
a different prison. Alexander, 464 A.2d 1385. Thereafter, after the
Commonwealth requested custody of Alexander on July 10, 1980, it did not
follow up with that request until September 16, 1980. Id. As such, this Court
found that the Commonwealth had not acted with due diligence in seeking
Alexander’s extradition. Id. at 1386.
In comparison, in this case, after the York County District Attorney’s
Office was notified on April 6, 2017 that Appellant had been arrested in
Baltimore County on separate charges, the Commonwealth immediately
lodged a detainer, informed Baltimore County authorities that York County
desired to extradite Appellant, provided several of the warrants for Appellant’s
arrest, and sent updates to Maryland authorities regarding his additional
warrants for his arrest.
The Commonwealth closely followed Appellant’s progress on the
Maryland charges such that when they were notified of the disposition of the
Maryland charges on September 19, 2017, the Commonwealth requested
Appellant’s extradition and swiftly brought Appellant to York County just days
later on September 22, 2017 after Appellant signed an extradition waiver.
While Appellant claims that the Commonwealth was required to file a
formal request to extradite Appellant to Pennsylvania even before his
Maryland charges had been resolved, this Court was careful to note in Booze
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that there is no basis to suggest that the Commonwealth was under a legal
duty to file a formal detainer pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, between the filing of the charges in Pennsylvania and the
defendant’s sentencing date on the out-of-state charges.
This Court noted in Booze that Section 9101 provides for the filing of
formal detainer papers “whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment.” Id. at 1292
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, art. iii(a)). As a result, the Booze Court found
that this statute “does not require a filing of formal detainers until a term of
imprisonment has been imposed in the asylum state.” Id. at 1292.
Based on the circumstances of this case, we find it was reasonable for
counsel to conclude that the trial court had correctly found that the
Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in promptly filing a detainer after
learning of Appellant’s incarceration in Maryland and in promptly seeking his
extradition after his Maryland charges had been resolved.
As a result, we find that it was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases for counsel to advise Appellant that
he could not confidently say that Appellant’s Rule 600 challenge would be
successful on appeal and told Appellant that he would have to “make the call”
on whether to take the plea. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/30/21, at 8-9, 53-54.
Atty. Gregory also cautioned Appellant that if he rejected the Commonwealth’s
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plea deal, he would run the risk of facing a much longer sentence if convicted
at trial on all six dockets and sentenced consecutively on several charges. Id.
When Appellant was presented with this advice and given several days
to contemplate this decision, Appellant clearly asserted under oath that he
was guilty of the crimes charged and wished to plead guilty. Appellant signed
a written colloquy in which he acknowledged that by entering such guilty
pleas, he was waiving his right to raise any “procedural or fundamental error”
before the trial court or on appeal. Written Plea Colloquy, 3/8/19. at 5. The
trial court also conducted an oral plea colloquy on the record to ensure that
Appellant understood the rights he was giving up and the consequences
surrounding the entry of the guilty plea. N.T. Plea Hearing, 3/11/19, at 5-7.
Based on these facts, we conclude that the trial court correctly found
that Appellant was not entitled to collateral relief on his ineffectiveness claim
as he entered a voluntary, intelligent and knowing guilty plea after receiving
reasonable advice from counsel.
Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his Rule 600 motion and thus, caused him to enter an involuntary,
unintelligent, and unknowing guilty plea. However, under the PCRA, “an issue
is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial,
at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction
proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544.
After the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s Rule 600 motion and
entered an order denying the motion, Appellant chose to plead guilty and
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waived his right to appeal the Rule 600 motion on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 626 Pa. 512, 525, 98 A.3d 1268, 1275
(2014) (“upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and
defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity
of the plea, and what has been termed the ‘legality’ of the sentence imposed”).
Appellant did not ask his counsel to file a motion to withdraw his plea and did
not file a notice of appeal. As such, this challenge is waived.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the PCRA court correctly denied
Appellant’s motion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2022
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