Roadman, K. v. Phantom Enterprises ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KELLIE ROADMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PHANTOM ENTERPRISES, LP AND : No. 1333 WDA 2021
LESLIE BAUM ROSSI, T/D/B/A THE :
TRUMP HOUSE :
:
v. :
:
:
PAULA D. MILLER
Appeal from the Order Entered October 22, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 1499 of 2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 22, 2022
Kellie Roadman (“Roadman”) appeals from the October 22, 2021 order
granting summary judgment in favor of Phantom Enterprises, LP (“Phantom
Enterprises”) and Leslie Baum Rossi (“Rossi”) (collectively, “Defendants”) with
respect to Roadman’s negligence claims. We affirm.
The trial court authored an apt summary of the factual history of this
controversy, which provides as follows:
On October 25, 2016, Paula Miller was driving to a property owned
by Phantom Enterprises, which had principal members including
Leslie Baum Rossi and Michael Rossi. The property is located
along State Route 982 and is known to the public as the “Trump
House” because it is painted red, white, and blue, has a 14-foot-
tall likeness of former president Donald Trump, and is open to the
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public to obtain campaign materials. On the day in question,
Savannah Logan (“Logan”) was a front-seat passenger in Miller’s
vehicle. While making a left-hand turn into the driveway of the
Trump House, Miller’s vehicle was hit by a vehicle driven by
Roadman, which was approaching straight in the oncoming lane
of traffic on State Route 982. . . .
Logan filed a lawsuit claiming negligence against Defendants and
Roadman. Roadman brought a lawsuit claiming negligence
against [Defendants, arguing they] violated multiple provisions of
the vehicle code regarding driveway maintenance and conspicuity,
which create[s] an issue of fact as to the elements of duty and
breach of duty, and these violations led to the resulting collision
between the two vehicles.[1] Defendants argued that Miller was
the only one [who] breached a duty by neglecting to yield the
right-of-way . . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/21, at 1-2 (cleaned up).
In pertinent part, Roadman alleged that “[a]s a result of the poor
conspicuity of the single driveway to the Trump House, as well as the
numerous signs, posters, and displays located on Defendants’ property,
[Miller] was distracted and not able to . . . safely locate the driveway entrance
for the Trump House.” Roadman’s Complaint, 4/6/18, at ¶ 16; see also id.
at ¶ 19 (detailing the alleged legal deficiencies of Defendants’ driveway and
the signage on the property). Defendants filed an answer and new matter
arguing, inter alia, that the traffic collision was not proximately caused by the
condition of the driveway and property. See Defendants’ Answer and New
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1 The separate lawsuits filed by Roadman and Logan were consolidated solely
for discovery purposes pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 213(a). See Order, 9/21/18, at
1 (unpaginated). Logan has filed a statement of no interest pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 908 in this Court and, thus, has not participated in this matter.
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Matter, 6/15/18, at ¶¶ 23-38. Defendants also filed a praecipe to join Miller
as an additional defendant.2 Thereafter, the parties engaged in extensive
discovery that took place over the next three years.
On July 16, 2021, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting, inter alia, that Roadman had not, and could not, establish the
necessary causal connection between Defendants’ property and the accident.
See Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/16/21, at ¶ 24 (“[N]either the house
or property or anything going on there contributed to the accident. . . . The
accident was due to the failure of the operator of the left turning unit to wait
until the way was clear to proceed and there was no oncoming traffic.”).
Roadman filed a response in opposition, which misstated the legal standard
for negligence by indicating that the presence of a breach of duty of care
established a prima facie case, and did not respond to Defendants’ arguments
concerning the absence of proof of the causal element of negligence. See
Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 8/12/21, at 12.
On October 22, 2021, the trial court filed an order and opinion granting
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Roadman’s
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2 In conformity with this praecipe, Roadman filed a complaint joining Miller
as an additional defendant. See Complaint to Join Additional Defendant,
9/10/18, at 1-3. Following joinder, Miller filed a copy of a release executed
between herself and Roadman. In exchange for a total sum of $25,000,
Roadman agreed to discharge “any and all actions, causes of action, claims,
demands, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, compensation, and all
consequential damage” against Miller in connection with the October 25, 2016
accident. See Exhibit to Answer, 10/15/18, at 1.
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negligence claims. On November 9, 2021, she filed a timely notice of appeal.
Both the trial court and Roadman have complied with the mandates of
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This matter is now ripe for our consideration.3
Roadman has raised two issues, which are framed as follows:
1. Whether the trial court’s finding that Roadman failed to
adduce sufficient evidence on the element of proximate causation
to establish a prima facie case of negligence against Defendants
was in error or against the weight of the evidence?
2. Whether there are disputed issues of material fact relative
to Roadman’s claims of negligence against Defendants, such that
summary judgment was not proper?
Roadman’s brief at 17 (cleaned up). Although stated as two separate issues,
Roadman’s arguments essentially present a single argument, namely, that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment due to the existence of
material facts with respect to an element of negligence, i.e., causation. Id.
at 24 (“[T]he trial court erred in finding that [Roadman] did not adduce
sufficient facts to create a question for the jury as to whether [Defendants’]
breach . . . proximately caused the subject motor vehicle incident.”).
Therefore, we shall address these claims collectively.
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3 Although the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants
disposed of all of Roadman’s claims against Defendants, her additional claims
against Miller remained unresolved. On March 3, 2022, this Court initially
quashed this appeal due to the existence of these outstanding claims. See
Order, 3/3/22, at 1. Upon application from Roadman, we vacated that order
and permitted her leave to file a praecipe to settle and discontinue this matter
with respect to Miller. See Order, 3/8/22, at 1. On March 11, 2022, Roadman
filed proof of the filing of the praecipe. See Response to Order, 3/11/22, at
1-7. Thus, the underlying order here is now final. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
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The following legal principles will guide our review. Summary judgment
is only appropriate in “those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d
1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. Thus,
[w]hen considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences
therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In
so doing, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party, and,
thus, may only grant summary judgment where the right to such
judgment is clear and free from all doubt. On appellate review,
then, an appellate court may reverse a grant of summary
judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. But the issue as to whether there are genuine issues
as to any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore,
on that question our standard of review is de novo.
Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, “[t]o the extent that this Court must resolve
a question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
context of the entire record.” Id.As noted above, Roadman’s claims sound in negligence, which has four
elements that must be established by a petitioning plaintiff: (1) a duty to
conform to a certain standard for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks; (2) the defendant’s failure to conform to that standard;
(3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4)
actual loss or damage to the plaintiff. Jones v. Plumer, 226 A.3d 1037,
1039-40 (Pa.Super. 2020). This case turns upon the issue of causal
connection, or “proximate causation,” which “is defined as a wrongful act
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which was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.” Eckroth
v. Pennsylvania Elec., Inc., 12 A.3d 422, 428 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned
up). In this context, “[a] determination of proximate or legal causation . . .
essentially regards whether the alleged negligence was so remote that as a
matter of law, the defendant cannot be held legally responsible for the
subsequent harm.” Id. (cleaned up).
Instantly, Roadman’s claims focus upon various legal and physical
deficiencies that allegedly existed upon Defendants’ property, which can be
reasonably broken down into three broad categories: (1) the driveway leading
to the property was not clearly marked and violated numerous provisions of
Pennsylvania traffic law;4 (2) signage and other objects maintained on the
property were erected without a permit; and (3) the lack of traffic control
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4 Roadman relies upon a number of different statutes in support of this
position. See 36 P.S. § 670-420(2) (“No person, municipality or municipality
authority shall open a driveway onto a State highway . . . without a permit.”);
67 Pa. Code §§ 441.6(12) (“All driveways . . . within the highway right-of-way
shall be continuously maintained by the property owner so as to conform to
the permit and so as not to interfere or be inconsistent with the design,
maintenance, and drainage of the highway, or the safe and convenient
passage of traffic upon the highway.”); 441.7(a) (“Driveways shall be located,
designed, constructed and maintained in such a manner as not to interfere or
be inconsistent with the design, maintenance and drainage of the highway.”);
441.7(f)(1) (“The location and angle of an access driveway approach in
relation to the highway intersection shall be such that a vehicle entering or
leaving the driveway may do so in an orderly and safe manner and with a
minimum of interference to highway traffic.”); 441.8(a) (“The ability of a
driveway to safely and efficiently function as an integral component of a
highway system requires that its design and construction be based on the
amount and type of traffic that it is expected to serve and the type and
character of roadway which it accesses.”).
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devices at the intersection between the driveway and the highway. The trial
court aptly summarized Roadman’s theory of liability, as follows: “Defendants
materially altered their property by opening it to the public and did so without
proper planning or maintenance to the driveway to the property, resulting in
a foreseeable risk that the volume of traffic would exceed the scope of the
existing driveway.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/21, at 4-5.
The trial court credited these allegations and concluded that Roadman’s
arguments and evidence had readily established issues of material fact with
respect to duty and breach. Id. However, even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Roadman, the trial court ultimately concluded that
causation was lacking:
Since the facts established by [Roadman] do not support a finding
that the accident at issue in this case occurred as a result of the
inadequacies of [Defendants’] driveway, this [c]ourt cannot find
that [Defendants] would have foreseen that their failure to adhere
to the Vehicle Code provisions cited would result in a vehicle
turning left against the right-of-way. There is nothing of record
that establishes proximate cause between the failure to maintain
the driveway and the accident that occurred in this case, . . . . As
a result, [Roadman has] failed to establish the necessary element
of proximate cause to support [her] negligence claim and
summary judgment must be entered.
[E]ven if the court accepts as true that Defendants had a duty to
obtain a permit and breached that duty by putting up large signs
and a likeness of Donald Trump, [Roadman] once again fail[s] to
establish the requisite causal connection between that breach and
the . . . accident. There is no evidence of record that either of the
drivers were distracted by any of the signs when operating their
vehicles immediately prior to the accident . . . . There is also no
evidence of record that the signs impeded or obstructed the view
of a motorist existing or entering the driveway[,] or impeded or
obstructed the view of vehicles on the roadway . . . .
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Finally, [Roadman argues] that Defendants should have used
traffic cones or signals to assist traffic in exiting and entering the
driveway. . . . However, none of the statutory provisions relied
upon impose a duty to direct traffic or install or seek to have
installed traffic devices before inviting the general public to one’s
property.
Id. We agree with the trial court.
In particular, the deposition testimony attached to both Roadman’s and
Defendants’ summary judgment filings speak definitively regarding the issue
of causation. Roadman testified at her deposition that there were no unusual
traffic activities at the entrance to Defendants’ property at the time of her
accident. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/16/21, at Exhibit F at 28.
Additionally, Roadman stated that her driving that led to the accident was not
affected by anything on Defendants’ property. Id. at 29. Finally, Roadman
also stated that Defendants’ driveway was “well marked.” Id. at 51. The
other driver, Miller, similarly testified that she had no trouble locating the
driveway, which was readily observable. See Motion for Summary Judgment,
7/16/21, at Exhibit H at 21-22, 69. Miller also stated that nothing in the
design of, or traffic across, the driveway affected her driving that day. Id.
Finally, Miller testified that she was not distracted by the signage on the
property at the time of the accident. Id. at 20.
Furthermore, deposition testimony from members of the Pennsylvania
State Police also support such a conclusion. Trooper Donald R. Ament, Jr.
testified that he concluded that the accident had been caused solely by driver
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error. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/16/21, at Exhibit I at 34 (“[I]t
wasn’t any type of environmental factor or anything that occurred with the
vehicle . . . . It was the driver making the decision to turn the vehicle.”).
Trooper Ament concluded that Defendants’ property had not caused, or
otherwise contributed to, the accident. Id. at 71-72. Corporal Scott Myers
similarly opined that the driveway leading to Defendants’ property had played
no role in the accident. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/16/21, at
Exhibit J at 16-17. Our review of the foregoing testimony confirms that there
is simply no evidence of record to suggest that this accident was caused by
some condition present on Defendants’ property.
Roadman’s substantive argument suggests that the issue of causation
must be submitted to the jury simply because the trial court concluded that
material issues of fact exist with respect to duty and breach:
The trial court found genuine issues of material fact relative to
[Defendants’] duty to [Roadman], . . . . Similarly, the trial court
found genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not
[Defendants] breached that duty, . . . . As a result of those
findings, the trial court erred in finding that [Roadman] did not
adduce sufficient facts to create a question for the jury as to
whether [Defendants’] breach of these duties proximately caused
the subject motor vehicle incident.
Appellant’s brief at 24. Thus, Roadman seems to believe that she is not
required to adduce independent evidence of causation. She is mistaken.
We emphasize that, “even when it is established that the defendant
breached some duty of care owed the plaintiff, it is incumbent on a plaintiff to
establish a causal connection between defendant’s conduct, and it must be
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shown to have been the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Lux v. Gerald
E. Ort Trucking, Inc., 887 A.2d 1281, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2005) (cleaned up).
Although proximate causation is often left for the jury to determine, see
Mucowski v. Clark, 590 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa.Super. 1991), Pennsylvania
courts “must be mindful that a jury may not be permitted to reach its verdict
on the basis of speculation or conjecture[.]” InfoSAGE, Inc. v. Mellon
Ventures, L.P., 896 A.2d 616, 626 (Pa.Super. 2006). Thus, it is appropriate
to enter summary judgment on the proximate cause grounds in a case where
no material dispute exists. See Mucowski, supra at 351 (“Where only one
conclusion may be drawn from the established facts, however, the question of
legal cause may be decided as a matter of law.”); see also Cuthbert v. City
of Philadelphia, 209 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1965) (“[M]ere existence of negligence
and the occurrence of injury are insufficient to impose liability upon anyone
as there remains to be proved the link of causation.”).
Based on the foregoing discussion, this is a case that warranted entry
of summary judgment due to a lack of evidence of causation. Thus, we discern
no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s holding.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2022
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