Kuipers, P. v. Kuipers, A. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PAUL KUIPERS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
ANGELA Y. KUIPERS :
:
Appellee : No. 1024 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 2, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County
Civil Division at No(s): 2018-CV-0000700-DU
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: AUGUST 23, 2022
Appellant, Paul Kuipers (“Husband”) appeals from the divorce decree
entered in the Columbia County Court of Common Pleas, which ordered
Husband to pay alimony and counsel fees to Appellee, Angela Y. Kuipers
(“Wife”). We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Husband was born on December 14, 1983, and he possesses an engineering
degree. Wife was born on July 18, 1970, and she earned her high school
diploma. The parties married on November 26, 2005, and they are the
parents of two sons.1 During the marriage, Husband worked as a service
engineer earning $150,000.00 in 2018. COVID-19 temporarily decreased
____________________________________________
1At the time of the master’s hearing, one son was thirteen (13) years old,
and one son was twenty (20) years old.
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Husband’s income; however, his income level rebounded in the second half of
2020. Wife did not work outside of the home during the marriage and served
as the children’s primary caretaker. Wife owned her own home prior to the
marriage, but the parties sold the house and invested the proceeds into a new
marital residence.
The parties separated on May 10, 2018. On June 13, 2018, Husband
filed a divorce complaint. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim on August
10, 2018. In her counterclaim, Wife petitioned the court for alimony, alimony
pendente lite, and counsel fees. On October 18, 2018, the court referred
Wife’s claim for alimony pendente lite to the Domestic Relations Office. On
December 18, 2018, Wife obtained alimony pendente lite and child support.
On May 31, 2019, the court appointed a special master to oversee
equitable distribution. The master conducted a hearing on December 3, 2020.
On March 31, 2021, the master submitted a report recommending that
Husband pay Wife’s counsel fees and $1,500.00/month in alimony for
seventy-two (72) months following the entry of the final divorce decree.
Husband filed exceptions to the master’s report on April 19, 2021.
On July 2, 2021, the court entered the divorce decree. The decree also
granted Husband’s exceptions in part. Specifically, the court ordered Husband
to pay Wife’s counsel fees and $1,500.00/month in alimony for sixty (60)
months following entry of the final divorce decree.
Husband timely filed a notice of appeal on July 28, 2021. On August 4,
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2021, the court ordered Husband to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal. Husband timely filed his Rule 1925(b)
statement on August 16, 2021.
Husband raises the following issues for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error
of law when it awarded alimony to [Wife] at an amount
higher than that which had been previously calculated by
Domestic Relations?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error
of law when the court awarded alimony for a duration of five
(5) years following [Wife] receiving nearly three (3) years
of alimony pendente lite?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit an error
of law when it required [Husband] to pay [Wife’s] attorney
fees?
(Husband’s Brief at 7).
Husband’s issues are related, and we address them together. Husband
argues that proper consideration of the statutory alimony factors dictates that
the instant award be reduced. Husband contends that Wife is physically
capable of earning income, and Wife receives child support payments.
Husband asserts that the combination of alimony and child support payments
exceeds Wife’s monthly expenses. Moreover, Husband insists that Wife could
use her pre-marital experience as a respiratory therapy aid to increase her
income without attending college.
Husband emphasizes that he paid alimony pendente lite to Wife during
the divorce proceedings, and the current alimony payments should not exceed
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the alimony pendente lite payments. Further, Husband avers that he should
not be required to pay Wife’s counsel fees because he paid alimony pendente
lite and did not purposefully prolong the litigation. Husband concludes the
court abused its discretion by awarding counsel fees and the specific amount
of alimony at issue. We disagree.
Our standard of review for challenges to alimony awards is whether the
trial court abused its discretion. See Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194,
200 (Pa.Super. 2004). When examining whether an abuse of discretion has
occurred, we examine
not whether the trial court has merely committed an error
of judgment, but rather whether the trial court has
overridden or misapplied the law, or has exercised judgment
which is manifestly unreasonable, or the product of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will as demonstrated by the
evidence of record.
Lawson v. Lawson, 940 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied,
597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal brackets omitted).
“To determine whether alimony is necessary and to establish the
appropriate nature, amount, and duration of any alimony payments, the court
is required to consider all relevant factors, including the 17 factors that are
expressly mandated by statute.” Id. (emphasis in original). The statutory
factors include:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the
parties.
(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional
conditions of the parties.
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(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but
not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other
benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education,
training or increased earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or
financial obligations of a party will be affected by
reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during
the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate
employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during
the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the
parties from the date of final separation shall not be
considered by the court in its determinations relative
to alimony, except that the court shall consider the
abuse of one party by the other party. As used in this
paragraph, “abuse” shall have the meaning given to it
under section 6102 (relating to definitions).
(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the
alimony award.
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(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient
property, including, but not limited to, property
distributed under Chapter 35 (relating to property
rights), to provide for the party’s reasonable needs.
(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of
self-support through appropriate employment.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b).
“[T]he purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to
punish the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable
needs of the person who is unable to support himself or
herself through appropriate employment, are met. Alimony
is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the
lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties
during the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.
Moreover, alimony following a divorce is a secondary
remedy and is available only where economic justice and
the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved by
way of an equitable distribution award and development of
an appropriate employable skill.
Conner v. Conner, 217 A.3d 301, 315-16 (Pa.Super. 2019).
When reviewing a challenge to the award of counsel fees, we also
examine whether the court abused its discretion. See Gates v. Gates, 933
A.2d 102, 109 (Pa.Super. 2007).
The purpose of an award of counsel fees is to promote fair
administration of justice by enabling the dependent spouse
to maintain or defend the divorce action without being
placed at a financial disadvantage; the parties must be “on
par” with one another.
Counsel fees are awarded based on the facts of each case
after a review of all the relevant factors. These factors
include the payor’s ability to pay, the requesting party’s
financial resources, the value of the services rendered, and
the property received in equitable distribution.
Id. (quoting Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2007)).
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“Counsel fees are only to be awarded upon a showing of need.” See id.Additionally, a “dependent spouse may be entitled to alimony pendente lite
and counsel fees because both are necessary to maintain the divorce
proceeding and a certain standard of living.” DeMasi v. DeMasi, 530 A.2d
871, 880 (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 631, 539 A.2d 811 (1988).
Instantly, the record reflects that Wife does not have many significant
personal assets. Wife sold the home that she owned prior to the marriage
and invested the proceeds into the marital residence. Although the trial court
awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of the marital estate to Wife, the total
marital property was worth $13,321.99. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed
11/15/21, at 2). Further, the record confirms that Wife earns $11.85/hour
working forty (40) hours each week as a customer service clerk at Home
Depot. (See N.T. Hearing, 12/3/20, at 107).
While Husband insists that Wife’s earning capacity is that of a registered
nurse, Wife has not applied to nursing programs or completed the courses
necessary for admission. (Id. at 141-42). Moreover, Wife is thirteen (13)
years older than Husband. (Id. at 104). Thus, the record supports the court’s
conclusions that Wife has a limited ability to acquire assets, a lower earning
potential, and a shorter “work-life expectancy” than Husband. (See Trial
Court Opinion at 3).
Additionally, at the time of the hearing, Wife’s reasonable needs
summary revealed total expenses of $2,985.00/month. (See Wife’s
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Supplemental Pretrial Statement at D-16). Wife testified that her expenses
would increase after the divorce, because she would have to buy her own
health insurance. (See N.T. Hearing at 125). Wife estimated that it would
cost $175.00/month to buy health insurance from her employer. (Id.)
In comparison, the court found that Husband’s earning potential is
higher, as he possesses an engineering degree and is currently employed in
the field. Even with the fluctuation in Husband’s income due to the COVID-
19 pandemic, his earnings far exceed Wife’s earnings. (See Husband’s Pre-
Hearing Statement, filed 3/31/21, at P2). Husband also possesses a
retirement account and receives healthcare benefits through his employer.
(See N.T. Hearing at 21, 31). Thus, the record supports the court’s conclusion
that “Husband’s economic future is far brighter.” (See Trial Court Opinion at
3).
Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the court
abused its discretion in its consideration of the alimony factors set forth in
Section 3701(b). See Lawson, supra. Given the modest size of the marital
estate, Wife’s limited earning potential, and Wife’s relative needs, the amount
and duration of alimony are proper. See Conner, supra; Teodorski, supra.Regarding the award of counsel fees, Husband’s payment of alimony
pendente lite during the divorce proceedings does not preclude Wife from
receiving counsel fees. See DeMasi, supra. Here, the record reflects that
the parties are not financially “on par” with one another, and Husband’s
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financial resources exceed those of Wife. See Gates, supra. Considering
Wife’s limited assets and earning potential, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding counsel fees. Accordingly, we affirm the
divorce decree.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/23/2022
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