Com. v. Stoughton, R. ( 2022 )

J-S25030-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT JAMES STOUGHTON :
:
Appellant : No. 26 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 10, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-16-CR-0000437-2020
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2022
Appellant, Robert James Stoughton, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 10, 2021, after the trial court convicted him
of, inter alia, Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) and DUI—Highest Rate.1
After review, we affirm.
On September 2, 2020, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the
above offenses for driving an all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) on a highway while
intoxicated. On March 4, 2021, Appellant filed a pretrial motion to quash the
DUI charges. As discussed in greater detail below, Appellant argued that the
“general/specific rule” of statutory construction required that the
Commonwealth charge Appellant with Unsafe Operation of an ATV under 75
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1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and (c), respectively.
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Pa.C.S. § 7726 and barred it from charging him with DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. §
3802.
On April 19, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion
to quash. On April 27, 2021, the court denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant’s
case proceeded to a non-jury trial where, on September 29, 2021, the court
found Appellant guilty of the above offenses.2 On December 10, 2021, the
court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 72 hours to 6 months’
incarceration. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both he and the
trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents a single issue for our review:
Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying
[Appellant’s] Motion to Quash the information?
Appellant’s Br. at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
“A motion to quash a criminal information or indictment is addressed
within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 188
A.3d 1217, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We will reverse only
where the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Finley, 860 A.2d 132, 135 (Pa. Super. 2004). “[T]he
court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies
the law or rules in a manner lacking reason.” Id. (citation omitted).
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2 The court also convicted Appellant of several summary offenses that do not
impact our analysis. Additionally, the court found that Appellant’s DUI
convictions merged for sentencing.
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Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to
quash based on the “general/specific rule” of statutory construction.
Appellant’s Br. at 9-11. The rule requires that “[w]henever a general provision
in a statute shall be in [irreconcilable] conflict with a special provision in the
same or another statute . . . the special provisions shall prevail and shall be
construed as an exception to the general provision[.]” Id. at 10-11 (citing 1
Pa.C.S. § 1933).3 Under this rule, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth
was required to charge him solely with violating the “more specific” offense of
Unsafe Operation of an ATV, not the “more general” offense of DUI. Id.
The trial court found that Appellant’s issue lacked merit. Trial Ct. Op.,
4/27/21, at 4-5 (unpaginated). It reasoned that no conflict exists between
Sections 7726 and 3802 and, therefore, the “general/specific rule” did not
apply. Id.
While we agree with the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion,
we have identified an even more basic error with Appellant’s argument: “the
‘general/specific rule’ of statutory construction in the context of criminal
prosecutions has been abrogated.” Commonwealth v. Kriegler, 127 A.3d
840, 844 (Pa. Super. 2015). In 2002, the legislature enacted 42 Pa.C.S. §
9303, which specifically provides:
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3As recognized by our Supreme Court, “[b]y its terms, Section 1933 does not
speak to the propriety of government pursuing prosecutions[.] That
consequence of the provision [arose] solely from the case law.”
Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 538 (Pa. 2005).
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Notwithstanding the provisions of 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933 (relating to
particular controls general) or any other statute to the contrary,
where the same conduct of a defendant violates more than one
criminal statute, the defendant may be prosecuted under all
available statutory criminal provisions without regard to the
generality or specificity of the statutes.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9303. Therefore, Appellant’s reliance on the “general/specific
rule” is erroneous, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying Appellant’s motion to quash.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/21/2022
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