Com. v. Catlett, W. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A17014-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    Appellant                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WAYNE CATLETT                              :
    :   No. 1431 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004629-2017
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                          FILED OCTOBER 13, 2022
    The Commonwealth appeals from the Delaware County Court of
    Common Pleas’ order granting Wayne Catlett’s motion to suppress, inter alia,
    contraband obtained pursuant to a warrantless search of his vehicle following
    a traffic stop as well as statements made to police before and after that search.
    We affirm, based largely on the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court.
    Catlett filed a suppression motion on January 13, 2021 after Officer
    Nicholas Tokonitz of the Yeadon Borough Police Department found drugs and
    a firearm in his vehicle and drugs on his person after initiating a traffic stop
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A17014-22
    of Catlett’s vehicle in Philadelphia County.1 In the motion, Catlett argued that
    Officer Tokonitz had illegally stopped and searched him and illegally searched
    his car without a warrant in violation of, inter alia, Article I, Section 8 of our
    state constitution. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 31,
    2021.
    The Commonwealth called Officer Tokonitz to the stand. Officer Tokonitz
    testified that on the evening of May 15, 2017, he was on routine patrol by
    himself in Yeadon Borough, Delaware County, when he saw a black Audi go
    through a steady red light. See N.T., 3/31/21, at 14. Without activating his
    lights, Officer Tokonitz pursued the Audi, and was able to catch up to the Audi
    once it crossed over into Philadelphia County and stopped at a red light. Officer
    Tokonitz testified that he stopped behind the Audi at the red light, at which
    time he maintained that he smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating from
    the Audi. See id. at 17, 19. Officer Tokonitz testified that raw, or fresh,
    marijuana has a different odor from burnt marijuana. See id. at 18.
    Officer Tokonitz testified that it was not safe to stop the Audi at that
    intersection, and he therefore followed the Audi as it made a right turn at the
    intersection. Once the Audi approached a safe area, which was residential and
    ____________________________________________
    1 This was the second suppression motion filed by Catlett. Catlett first filed a
    suppression motion on February 11, 2020, alleging, inter alia, that the traffic
    stop made in Philadelphia, and therefore outside of Officer Tokonitz’s
    jurisdiction, violated the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§
    8951-8955. See N.T., 2/21/20, at 37-41. The trial court denied this motion
    on March 30, 2020.
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    lit by streetlights, Officer Tokonitz activated his lights and the Audi
    immediately pulled over. See id. at 20-21, 75. As Officer Tokonitz approached
    the Audi, he testified that he continued to smell raw marijuana. See id. at 23.
    The officer approached the driver of the vehicle, who was alone in the car and
    subsequently identified as Catlett. Officer Tokonitz asked Catlett for his
    paperwork, which Catlett produced. See id. at 23, 77.
    Officer Tokonitz then told Catlett that he had seen him go through a red
    light and had smelled marijuana coming from the Audi. He asked Catlett if
    there was any marijuana in the car. See id. at 24, 25. According to Officer
    Tokonitz, Catlett told him there was marijuana in the car door on the driver’s
    side. See id. at 24. At that point, the officer instructed Catlett to open the
    driver’s door, and when he did so, Officer Tokonitz testified there was a small,
    knotted-up sandwich bag in plain view in the door pocket which contained
    approximately two grams of marijuana. See id. at 24, 27, 66.
    After seizing the marijuana, Officer Tokonitz told Catlett to step out of
    the car. See id. at 27-28, 76, 79. He then instructed Catlett to step to the
    rear of the Audi, which Catlett did. See id. at 27-28, 76. In preparation for
    what Officer Tokonitz described as a “pat-down for officer safety,” he asked
    Catlett if he had any drugs or weapons on his person. Id. at 28-29, 81.
    According to the officer, Catlett indicated he had “Oxys” in his left pant pocket.
    See id. at 29. Officer Tokonitz did not do a full pat-down but rather, only
    patted down the exterior of Catlett’s left pant pocket. See id. at 29, 30-31.
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    The officer testified he felt a pill bottle, and retrieved the bottle from the
    pocket. See id. At 30-32. The bottle had 11 pills in it, only one of which
    matched the description of what was on the prescription bottle’s label. See
    id. at 30
    Officer Tokonitz placed Catlett in handcuffs, and recovered $4,900 in
    cash from Catlett’s pants pocket. See id. at 31, 33. It was at this point that
    two other officers arrived at the scene. See id. at 34-35. Officer Tokonitz
    placed Catlett in the back of his patrol car. See id. at 35. According to the
    officer, he then called a tow truck for the Audi. See id. at 35. At that point,
    Officer Tokonitz testified he conducted a search of the Audi, and did so alone.
    See id. at 41. Officer Tokonitz stated that he found $6,700 in cash in the
    center console of the vehicle, one empty bottle of codeine syrup on the rear
    seat, one half-filled bottle with a torn-off label for codeine syrup, and a firearm
    wrapped inside a folded towel and knit cap in a side pocket of the vehicle’s
    hatchback. See id. at 42-43. According to Officer Tokonitz, when he returned
    to his patrol car, Catlett asked the officer if he had found a gun in his car. See
    id. at 44-45, 59-60 .
    Officer Tokonitz testified that another officer transported Catlett to the
    station while he followed the tow truck to the impound yard and arranged for
    a canine search to be conducted on the Audi. See id. at 44, 46, 48-49. The
    canine alerted positive to the exterior and interior of the Audi. See id. at 107.
    Officer Tokonitz then applied for, and obtained, a search warrant. See id. at
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    51. The officer testified that, while he was later processing Catlett, and after
    he told Catlett what the charges were, Catlett made statements about
    obtaining a firearm for his safety. See id. at 46-47. Officer Tokonitz also
    confirmed he had not read Catlett his Miranda2 rights up to that point and
    that to his knowledge, Catlett had never been given Miranda warnings. See
    id. at 54, 61, 63. The defense did not present any witnesses.
    Following oral argument, the court granted Catlett’s suppression motion
    in an order dated June 22, 2021. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal,
    certifying that the court’s suppression order would substantially handicap the
    prosecution of its case pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). The Commonwealth also
    complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    of errors complained of on appeal.
    In response, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. In its
    opinion, the court recounted Officer Tokonitz’s testimony. The court then
    stated that it found the officer’s testimony credible, but only in part. The court
    explained:
    Officer Tokonitz’s credibility is questionable regarding his
    testimony regarding the smell of fresh marijuana emanating from
    [Catlett’s] vehicle, as well as his ability to smell such marijuana
    when it is sealed in a sandwich bag, [and when] the bag only
    contains approximately two grams of marijuana. Additionally, the
    Officer’s credibility is highly questionable regarding [Catlett’s]
    alleged response to the Officer's interrogation regarding the smell
    of marijuana.
    ____________________________________________
    2   Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    -5-
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    Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/21, at 6.
    The court then explained why it had granted Catlett’s motion to suppress
    the drugs and the firearm. It found, as an initial matter, that Officer Tokonitz
    had probable cause to stop Catlett’s Audi based on his red light violation.
    However, the court then held that the warrantless search of the Audi was
    illegal under the Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander,
    
    243 A.3d 177
    , 181 (Pa. 2020), which held that Article I, Section 8 of our state
    constitution requires police to have both probable cause as well as exigent
    circumstances before they conduct a non-consensual, warrantless search of a
    vehicle.3
    Applying Alexander, the court concluded that Officer Tokonitz had
    neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances to search Catlett’s vehicle.
    To that end, the court noted that, even if Officer Tokonitz had smelled
    marijuana, the odor of marijuana alone is not sufficient to support a finding of
    probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle under
    Commonwealth v. Barr, 
    266 A.3d 25
    , 44 (Pa. 2021). The court also found
    that, in any event, the Commonwealth had not established that Officer
    Tokonitz faced any exigent circumstances:
    The facts of this case show that [Catlett] complied with all of
    Officer Tokonitz‘s commands, was cooperative throughout the
    ____________________________________________
    3The trial court specifically noted that Alexander was applicable retroactively
    given that Catlett had properly raised and preserved the issue. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 11/23/21, at 9. The Commonwealth does not dispute the retroactivity
    of Alexander.
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    entire interaction, and made no furtive movements. Officer
    Tokonitz also waited to initiate the traffic stop at a safe location,
    where [Catlett’s] vehicle was not obstructing the highway. In the
    area of the traffic stop occurred there were homes and streetlights
    and [Catlett] did not give any indication that he had any
    connection to the neighborhood. Furthermore, Officer Tokonitz
    admitted in this testimony that he was within the vicinity,
    approximately seven blocks, from a police station and could have
    called them to make sure the vehicle was secured while he got a
    search warrant, but he did not do so.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/21, at 9.
    The court then rejected the Commonwealth's claim that the warrantless
    search of the vehicle had been a proper inventory search. The court noted
    that in order for an inventory search to be valid, the police must first have
    lawfully impounded the vehicle. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/21, at 10
    (citing Commonwealth v. Peak, 
    230 A.3d 1220
    , 1226 (Pa. Super. 2020).
    The court observed that the authority to impound a vehicle stems from the
    police’s reasonable community care-taking functions, functions which include
    removing a disabled vehicle from the highway, impounding vehicles violating
    parking ordinances, and the protection of the community’s safety. See 
    id.
     The
    court concluded the Commonwealth had not established that there were any
    legitimate reasons for towing Catlett’s vehicle, as it was properly registered
    and insured and not in any way obstructing the roadway or impeding traffic.
    Nonetheless, even assuming the vehicle had properly been impounded,
    the court noted that an inventory search will only be found to have been
    reasonable if the search is conducted pursuant to reasonable police
    procedures, in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation. See
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    id.
     The suppression court then found that an inventory search of Catlett’s
    vehicle was not reasonable because the court “could not overlook” that Officer
    Tokonitz’s motive for the search was to uncover criminal evidence. Trial Court
    Opinion, 11/23/21, at 10.
    The suppression court also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that
    the warrantless search was justified because Officer Tokonitz was simply
    following the Yeadon Borough Police Department’s policy on vehicle towing
    and impoundment, which allows officers to impound and conduct an inventory
    search of a car following a custodial arrest. The court explained: “Such an
    argument is without merit because Alexander was clear that there is a
    heightened standard to vehicle searches, and the policy that was followed here
    did not meet that standard, since it does not require more than probable
    cause.” Id. at 11.
    Likewise, the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the
    drugs and weapon would have inevitably been discovered because of the
    canine search and subsequent procurement of a search warrant for the Audi.
    According to the court, such an argument failed because it was necessarily
    premised on, and not independent of, the illegal arrest and search of the Audi.
    The court therefore found that the warrantless search of Catlett’s vehicle was
    unconstitutional, and that it had therefore properly ordered the suppression
    of the drugs and weapon uncovered pursuant to that illegal search.
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    The court then proceeded to analyze whether Officer Tokonitz had
    conducted a lawful pat-down search of Catlett. In finding he had not, the court
    concluded that the officer did not provide articulable facts to support a finding
    that Catlett was armed and dangerous and put his safety in danger. See id.
    at 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Zahir, 
    751 A.2d 1153
    , 1158 (Pa. 2000)
    (stating that an officer may conduct a pat-down for weapons only if he has a
    reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and presently dangerous to
    the safety of the officer or others)). Accordingly, the court found that it had
    properly suppressed the oxycodone pills found in Catlett’s pocket during the
    pat-down.
    Lastly, the court found that it had properly suppressed any statements
    made by Catlett regarding his knowledge of the marijuana and the gun that
    were found during the illegal search because he had not been Mirandized.
    The court essentially concluded that Catlett reasonably believed he was in
    custody from the inception of the traffic stop and therefore needed to be
    Mirandized before being asked about the marijuana or the firearm. As such,
    the court found that it had, along with the drugs and firearm, properly
    suppressed Catlett’s statements to police.
    In its appeal, the Commonwealth raises two issues:
    A. Did the trial court err by suppressing evidence of a gun and
    illegal drugs recovered by the police from the vehicle after the
    police officer made a lawful car stop in which [Catlett] was the
    sole occupant; lawfully observed a bag of marijuana in plain view;
    properly searched [Catlett] incident to arrest and recovered
    additional illegally possessed drugs; found a loaded handgun
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    pursuant to a valid inventory search; and then after a canine sniff
    search, obtained a valid search warrant?
    B. Did the trial court err by ruling that statements made by
    [Catlett] should be suppressed where [Catlett]t was not in custody
    when he made the first statement and subsequent statements
    were not prompted by any police questioning?
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (trial court’s and suggested answers omitted).
    When this Court reviews a Commonwealth appeal from an order
    granting suppression, as we are tasked to do here, we may only consider the
    evidence produced at the suppression hearing and then, only that evidence
    which comes from the defendant’s witnesses, along with the Commonwealth’s
    evidence which remains uncontradicted. See Barr, 266 A.3d at 39. We must
    determine, in the first instance, whether the suppression court’s factual
    findings are supported by the record and if they are, we are bound to those
    findings. See id. We must always keep in mind that the suppression court, as
    fact-finder, has the exclusive ability to pass on the credibility of witnesses.
    See Commonwealth v. Fudge, 
    213 A.3d 321
    , 326 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    Therefore, we will not disturb a suppression court’s credibility determinations
    absent a clear and manifest error. See 
    id. at 326-327
    .
    We must also determine whether the legal conclusions the suppression
    court drew from its factual findings are correct. See Barr, 266 A.3d at 39.
    Unlike the deference we give to the suppression court’s factual findings, we
    have de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions. See
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    996 A.2d 473
    , 476 (Pa. 2010).
    - 10 -
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    Here, the Commonwealth begins its argument by asserting that Officer
    Tokonitz lawfully recovered the marijuana from the car door after directing
    Catlett to exit his vehicle as a matter of course during a lawful traffic stop, as
    the Commonwealth maintains it was Officer Tokonitz’s prerogative to do so.
    See Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. The problem with this argument is that the
    record shows this was not the way the events unfolded.
    Instead, Officer Tokonitz testified that he smelled raw marijuana
    emanating from the car - testimony which was not credited by the suppression
    court - and specifically asked Catlett about the marijuana odor upon stopping
    him. According to Officer Tokonitz, Catlett confided that he had marijuana in
    the driver door of the car - again, testimony that the suppression court did
    not credit. It was at that point that Officer Tokonitz testified he directed Catlett
    to open the car door, obviously so that he could look for the marijuana, and
    saw the marijuana in the door in plain view. It was only after this search for,
    and seizure of, the marijuana that Officer Tokonitz directed Catlett to step out
    of the car. See N.T., 3/31/21, at 28, 76, 79, 81. Given Officer Tokonitz’s
    testimony about the sequence of events, we see no merit in the
    Commonwealth’s argument that the marijuana was properly seized because
    it was observed in plain view after Officer Tokonitz asked Catlett to step out
    of the car as a matter of course during the traffic stop.
    - 11 -
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    The Commonwealth also maintains that the fact that Officer Tokonitz
    found marijuana in the car makes this case distinguishable from Alexander.
    It argues:
    In Alexander, no controlled substance was found prior to the
    search of the vehicle. In Alexander, the police officer performed
    a motor vehicle stop, observed only the odor of marijuana, was
    told [by] the driver that [he] and [the] passenger had just smoked
    a blunt, took the driver into custody, and then conducted a search
    of the interior of the vehicle including any containers. Here, Officer
    [Tokonitz] smelled marijuana and [Catlett] told him that there was
    marijuana in the driver’s side door pocket. Based on his training
    and experience, Officer Tokonitz observed in plain view a bag of
    suspected marijuana.
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 20.
    This argument is not only premised on factors the suppression court
    found were not supported by credible testimony, i.e. that Officer Tokonitz
    smelled marijuana and Catlett confirmed the presence of that marijuana, but
    fails to explain how the fact that Officer Tokonitz found marijuana in these
    circumstances somehow means Officer Tokonitz did not have to comply with
    Alexander’s clear holding that a warrantless search of a vehicle will only be
    constitutional under our state constitution if it is based on probable cause as
    well as exigent circumstances. Contrary to what the Commonwealth argues,
    we see no error in the suppression court’s conclusions that Officer Tokonitz’s
    warrantless search of Catlett’s car was constitutionally required to comport
    with Alexander, and that the warrantless search failed to do so. We adopt
    the suppression court’s reasoning in support of those conclusions. See Trial
    Court Opinion, 11/23/21, at 7-9.
    - 12 -
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    We also adopt the suppression court’s reasoning in rejecting the
    Commonwealth’s claim, which it recycles in its brief here, that Officer
    Tokonitz’s search of the car after he placed Catlett in handcuffs was a valid
    inventory search. See id. at 10. We see no error in the court’s determination
    that it was not, especially in light of the court’s factual finding that Officer
    Tokonitz’s clear motive for the warrantless search of the car was to uncover
    additional evidence. See id.
    Lastly, we reject the Commonwealth’s final argument under its first
    issue that the contraband found in Catlett’s vehicle need not be suppressed
    because the canine search and eventual issuance of a search warrant meant
    the police would have inevitably discovered the drugs and firearm in the car.
    Once again, we turn to the suppression court’s reasoning as to why this claim
    fails; namely, because it is premised on, and not independent of, Catlett’s
    illegal arrest and the illegal search of the vehicle. See id. at 11; see also
    Commonwealth v. Fulton, 
    179 A.3d 475
    , 489-490 (Pa. 2018) (stating that
    under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally-obtained evidence need not
    be suppressed if the prosecution establishes that the evidence would have
    inevitably been discovered by legal means and without reference to the police
    error).
    In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues the suppression court
    erred by suppressing the initial statement Catlett made to Officer Tokonitz
    about the marijuana in the driver’s door of his car as well as the statements
    - 13 -
    J-A17014-22
    Catlett made about the firearm after he had been arrested but not
    Mirandized. In the first instance, we note that the suppression court
    discredited Officer Tokonitz’s testimony that Catlett made the initial
    statement admitting he had marijuana in his car door, and we are bound by
    that credibility determination. See Fudge, 
    213 A.3d at 326
    . As such, the
    Commonwealth failed to persuade the suppression court that the ensuing
    events were instigated by a voluntary, inculpatory statement.
    However, we agree with the Commonwealth that the suppression court
    erred in finding that the initial statement, had it been made, must be
    suppressed because Catlett reasonably believed he was in custody from the
    inception of the stop. Miranda warnings were necessary only when Catlett
    was “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom[.]” Miranda,
    
    384 U.S. at 478
    . Catlett was taken into custody for purposes of a Miranda
    analysis when his freedom of action was significantly denied or a reasonable
    person would believe his freedom of action is restricted by the officer’s
    conduct. See Commonwealth v. Cooley, 
    118 A.3d 370
    , 376 (Pa. 2015).
    Relevant factors to consider include, but are not limited to, the reason for the
    stop, the location at which it occurs, the length of the stop, whether Catlett
    was transported against his will, whether Catlett was restrained, whether
    Officer Tokonitz threatened or used force, and the investigative methods
    employed by Officer Tokonitz. See Commonwealth v. Whitmayer, 
    144 A.3d 939
    , 948 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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    The analysis is complicated here by the suppression court’s explicit
    credibility findings when contrasted with the sparsity of the suppression
    court’s other explicit findings. While it is clear the suppression court did not
    believe Officer Tokonitz’s testimony that Catlett admitted to having marijuana
    in the car door, it is not clear what the suppression court found to have
    happened instead. We acknowledge it was the Commonwealth’s burden to
    establish that the evidence and statements gained during the stop were not
    the result of a violation of Catlett’s rights, but it still remains that there is no
    evidence of record to support a finding that Catlett was taken into custody
    while he remained seated in his vehicle.
    This may mean that Catlett’s alleged initial statement that he was in
    possession of marijuana may be admissible at trial. However, in light of our
    finding that the suppression court properly suppressed all of the contraband
    found on Catlett’s person and in his vehicle, including the marijuana, we fail
    to see how the admissibility of this statement allegedly admitting to the
    presence of marijuana in the vehicle remains relevant. The same is true for
    the two statements Catlett made about the presence of the firearm in his
    vehicle, given our conclusion that the firearm was properly suppressed. Even
    if the admissibility of these two statements remains relevant in the wake of
    our disposition affirming the suppression of the firearm, the Commonwealth
    has failed to show that the two statements were not the fruit of what we agree
    with the trial court to be the illegal search of his vehicle.
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    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/13/2022
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    Circulated 09/29/2022 01:52 PM
    1_Opinion dated 11-23-21
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY
    CRIMINAL DIVISION
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                                        CP-23-C R-0004629-2017
    V.
    WAYNE CATLETT
    Michael Flowers, Esquire, Attorney for Commonwealth
    Michael Malloy, Esquire, Attorney for Defendant
    OPINION
    PAGANO, J.                                                                 November 23, 2021
    This is an appeal from this Court's Order of June 22, 2021, which granted Defendant's
    motion to suppress evidence. The Commonwealth subsequently filed anotice of appeal,
    certifying that the Court erred in suppressing the statements made by Defendant and erred in
    suppressing the physical evidence recovered from Defendant and from his car. For the
    forthcoming reasons, the suppression of evidence should be affirmed on appeal.
    FACTUAL BASIS
    The following are the factual findings of this Court. Officer Nicholas Tokonitz
    (hereinafter, Officer Tokonitz) is employed at the Yeadon Police Department where he has been
    so employed for the past six years. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 10]. Officer Tokonitz at the time of the
    incident was employed as apatrolman. Prior to his full-time employment with Yeadon Borough,
    Officer Tokonitz worked part-time in Yeadon Borough from 2010 to 2012, and part-time in
    Darby Borough from 2012 to 2015. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 10].
    1
    On May 15, 2017, at approximately 10:40 p.m., Officer Tokonitz was on-duty, alone, in
    full uniform and operating amarked police vehicle, traveling westbound on Chester Avenue in
    Yeadon Borough, Delaware County. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 12-13]. The weather was clear, the
    roadway was dry, and traffic was very light. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 13]. While Officer Tokonitz
    was traveling on Chester Avenue, he observed 2009 Audi A6 traveling southbound on the 1000
    block of Church Lane approaching Chester Avenue, which is in Delaware County. [N.T.,
    3/31/2021 p. 12]. Officer Tokonitz observed the Audi run through asteady red signal at the
    intersection of Church Lane and Chester Avenue that was regulating southbound traffic on
    Church Lane. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 14]. Officer Tokonitz also noted that he believed the vehicle
    was traveling in excess of the speed limit but did not have any speed measuring device with him
    at the time. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 14].
    As aresult of his observations, Office Tokonitz immediately turned left in an attempt to
    catch up to the vehicle with the intent to initiate atraffic stop. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 15]. Due to the
    rate of speed the Audi was traveling, Officer Tokonitz fell back approximately 100 yards at its
    furthest in his pursuit. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 15]. The Audi caught ared traffic light at the next
    intersection of South 70`` h Street and Cobb Street, which is just over the border in Philadelphia.
    [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 15]. The Audi did stop at this light and Officer Tokonitz was able to catch
    up as aresult. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 15]. As Officer Tokonitz caught up to the vehicle while it was
    stopped at the light, he [allegedly] noticed the odor of marijuana emanating from the Audi.
    [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 16]. Officer Tokonitz was positioned directly behind the Audi at the red light
    and recognized that it was [allegedly] clear that the odor was coming from that vehicle. [N.T.,
    3/31/2021 p. 17]. Officer Tokonitz recognized the raw marijuana odor due to his training and
    experience. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 19].
    2
    Due to the busy nature of the intersection of South 70`` h Street and Cobb Street, Officer
    Tokonitz attempted to find asafe location to initiate atraffic stop. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 19]. The
    vehicle then made aright turn onto Cobb Street Parkway, and Officer Tokonitz observed this to
    be atight, curved roadway that is poorly lit. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 19]. As aresult, he waited for
    the vehicle to get to amore open area. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 19]. Once the Audi got through the
    train trestle on Cobb Street Parkway, Officer Tokonitz activated his emergency lights and sirens
    and initiated atraffic stop. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 20]. The Audi complied and stopped
    immediately. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 21]. The roadway at the stop had lighting on the opposite side
    of the street and there was not aton of vehicle traffic at that time. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 21].
    Officer Tokonitz positioned his vehicle approximately six feet behind the Audi. [N.T., 3/31/2021
    p. 22].
    Prior to exiting his patrol vehicle, Officer Tokonitz again observed the smell of fresh
    marijuana from his vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 22, 78]. Officer Tokonitz then exited his patrol
    vehicle and approached the vehicle, where he continued to recognize the smell of fresh
    marijuana. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 22-23]. Officer Tokonitz made adriver's side approach and
    observed amale in the driver's seat, later identified as Wayne Catlett. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 22].
    There were not any of additional occupants in the vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 23]. Officer
    Tokonitz asked Mr. Catlett for his credentials, his driver's license, vehicle registration, and
    insurance information, to which it was produced with no apparent issues. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 23,
    25]. Officer Tokonitz then initiated conversation with Mr. Catlett and advised him that he
    observed ared- light violation and spoke to him about the odor of marijuana emanating from the
    vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 23]. Officer Tokonitz continued by asking if there was anything in
    the vehicle to which Mr. Catlett [allegedly] admitted that there was abag of weed in the door.
    3
    [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 24]. As aresult, Officer Tokonitz had Mr. Catlett open the driver's door, at
    which time there was asmall knotted-up sandwich bag that was then in plain view in the door
    reservoir. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 24]. The bag contained aleafy green vegetable-like substance
    consistent with marijuana. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 24]. At this time, there were no additional law
    enforcement officers at the scene. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 25].
    After seizing the bag of marijuana, Officer Tokonitz requested that Mr. Catlett step out of
    the vehicle, to which he complied. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 28]. Officer Tokonitz then prepared to
    conduct apat-down for officer safety. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 28]. Officer Tokonitz then asked Mr.
    Catlett if there was anything else that he needed to be aware of, at which point Mr. Catlett
    indicated that he had OxyContin. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 29]. At this point, Officer Tokonitz never
    Mirandized Mr. Catlett. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 47]. Officer Tokonitz then patted the exterior of Mr.
    Catlett's pocket and retrieved aprescription pill bottle that contained 11 pills, only one of which
    matched the description on the prescription bottle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 29-30]. In addition to the
    pills, Officer Tokonitz also seized approximately $4,900 in cash off Mr. Catlett. [N.T., 3/31/2021
    p. 31].
    Officer Tokonitz then placed Mr. Catlett in handcuffs, at which point in time Officer
    Erby and Officer Curry arrived at the scene. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 33]. Mr. Catlett was then
    secured in Officer Tokonitz's patrol vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 35]. Officer Tokonitz then
    notified atow truck, per department policy, to respond and remove avehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p.
    35].
    Following this, Officer Tokonitz began searching the vehicle for contents. [N.T.,
    3/31/2021 p. 35]. The vehicle search revealed another large amount of U.S. currency found in the
    center console area, approximately $6,700, and ahalf-filled bottle with atorn-off label for
    4
    codeine syrup underneath the driver's seat. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 42, 43]. Officer Takonitz then
    continued his search and found aloaded Springfield XTS .45 caliber handgun. [N.T., 3/31/2021
    p. 43].
    Mr. Catlett was then brought to Darby Borough's police station in order to be processed
    and fingerprinted. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 46]. Subsequently, while he was being explained what his
    charges were, Mr. Catlett started making open, unsolicited statements about how he had been
    shot aweek prior, and he had gotten the gun to protect himself. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 47]. Mr.
    Catlett was still never Mirandized at this point in time. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 47].
    Officer Tokonitz stayed at the scene and waited for the Audi to be towed to Seiple's
    Collision, where he followed. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 50]. A K-9 unit was also ordered by Officer
    Tokonitz to do asniff for narcotics on the vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 49]. Officer Cardell and
    his K-9 partner arrived at Seiple's Collision to do the K-9 sweep. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 51]. During
    the sweep, the K-9 alerted to two different areas of the vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 107]. After
    the sweep, the vehicle was secured with the intent of obtaining asearch warrant for amore
    thorough search of the vehicle. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 51].
    On cross, Officer Tokonitz testified that while secured in the back of the patrol vehicle,
    Mr. Catlett began asking if the officer's found agun. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 59]. Officer Tokonitz
    continued to acknowledge that Mr. Catlett was never Mirandized at all during this incident.
    [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 60].
    On cross, Officer Tokonitz was also asked how much marijuana was found, to which he
    approximated was around two grams. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 66]. Officer Tokonitz testified that he
    placed Mr. Catlett under arrest for possession of marijuana and that he searched the vehicle
    incident to arrest. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 87].
    5
    On cross, Officer Tokonitz testified that he conducted the pat-down for officer safety
    based off of the totality of the circumstances based on his training, experience, and knowledge of
    the area being known for high-crime and high-drug activity. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 82, 84].
    Officer Tokonitz agreed on cross that other than the search warrant that occurred after the
    vehicle was searched and towed, asearch warrant prior to Officer Tokonitz's initial search of the
    vehicle was never obtained. [N.T., 3/31/2021 p. 88].
    DISCUSSION
    On review from an order suppressing evidence, the reviewing court shall consider only
    the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that,
    when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The reviewing court is
    bound by the factual findings of the suppression court where the record supports those findings
    and may only reverse when the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error.
    Commonwealth v. Wright, 2021 WL2345903 (Pa. Super. 2021). Moreover, it is within the
    suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight to be given their testimony. Commonwealth v. Mattis, 
    2021 WL 1707124
     (Pa. Super.
    2021). The suppression court is free to believe all, some of none of the evidence presented at the
    suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 
    246 A.3d 879
     (Pa. Super. 2020).
    This court finds the testimony provided by Officer Tokonitz to be credible, in part.
    Officer Tokonitz's credibility is questionable regarding his testimony regarding the smell of
    fresh marijuana emanating from the defendant's vehicle, as well as his ability to smell such
    marijuana when it is sealed in asandwich bag, for which the bag only contains approximately
    two grams of marijuana. Additionally, the Officer's credibility is highly questionable regarding
    defendant's alleged response to the Officer's interrogation regarding the smell of marijuana.
    6
    THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE
    THAT A MOTOR VEHICLE VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THEREFORE WAS
    A LAWFUL STOP.
    The law of the Commonwealth is settled that when it is not necessary to stop avehicle to
    establish that aviolation of the motor vehicle code has occurred, an officer must possess
    probable cause to stop the vehicle. Commonwealth v. lVilson, 
    237 A.3d 572
     (Pa. Super. 2020).
    To establish probable cause to stop amotor vehicle, the police officer must be able to articulate
    specific facts possessed by him at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable
    cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in some violation of some provision of the
    Motor Vehicle Code. 
    Id.
     The Court in Shaw stated, "Probable cause does not require certainty,
    but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most
    likely inference." Commonwealth v. Shaw, 
    246 A.3d 897
    , 884 (Pa. Super 2021). Here, the
    testimony of Officer Tokonitz supports afinding that he had probable cause to believe that the
    defendant's conduct, as the driver, violated the motor vehicle code. Officer Tokonitz testified
    that he saw the defendant's vehicle run asteady red light. Accordingly, the stop of the vehicle
    was lawful.
    THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS ILLEGAL AS IT WAS NOT
    BASED UPON CONSENT, WAS WITHOUT PROBABLE CASUE AND ABSENT
    EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WAS NOT A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH.
    The Commonwealth contends that this case should be distinguished from the facts of
    Commonwealth v. Alexander, 
    243 A.3d 177
     (Pa. 2020), and that the holding in Alexander should
    7
    not be binding. This Court disagrees and holds that Alexander provides aheightened standard for
    all warrantless vehicle searches in the Commonwealth.
    A non-consensual, warrantless search of avehicle for contraband may not, as ageneral
    rule, be undertaken by police in the absence of probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
    evidence of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 
    173 A.3d 733
    , 737 (Pa. 2017).
    On December 22, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that warrantless vehicle
    searches require both probable cause and exigent circumstances under Article 1, Section 8of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Alexander, 
    243 A.3d 177
    , (Pa. 2020).
    Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Barr, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the odor
    of marijuana emanating from avehicle during apolice traffic stop, alone, is not sufficient to
    establish probable cause to conduct awarrantless search. Commonwealth v. Barr, 
    240 A.3d 1263
    . (Pa. Super. 2020). The court stated that "the odor of marijuana may contribute to afinding
    of probable cause, as possession of marijuana remains illegal generally, but the odor alone does
    not imply individualized suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 1288. As aresult, the "plain smell
    doctrine" had been altered and diminished by Pennsylvania's Medical Marijuana Act, 35
    Pa. C. S. A. § 1023 1. 101 et seq.
    The Alexander Court in its discussions pertaining to exigent circumstances did not offer a
    definition of such circumstances that will apply to all scenarios. Alexander, 243 A.3d at 208. The
    Court stated, "No case law suggests that the exigency requirement in other scenarios is subject to
    precise definition." Id. The Court continued by noting, "The basic formulation of exigencies
    recognizes that in some circumstances the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
    enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
    Amendment. That inquiry is not amenable to per se rules and requires aconsideration of the
    8
    totality of the circumstances." Id. An exigent circumstance will arise, "where the need for
    prompt police action is imperative, either because evidence is likely to be destroyed, or because
    there exists athreat of physical harm or to police officers and other innocent individuals."
    Commonwealth v. Stewart, 
    740 A.2d 712
    , 717 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    In applying to the aforementioned rules of law to this case, it is important to note that
    Alexander is controlling law for this Court's analysis even though the incident occurred before it
    had been decided. The Court in Alexander discussed how its ruling shall apply retroactively
    where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages of adjudication, up to and including
    any direct appeal.
    Applying the new law, Officer Tokonitz needed probable cause in addition to exigent
    circumstances to conduct the warrantless search; neither of which were present. The odor of
    marijuana to support probable cause is not enough under Barr, and the marijuana found was
    visible after Officer Tokonitz asked the defendant to open the door to get avisual of the
    marijuana that was admitted to being in the vehicle. On the other hand, there were no exigent
    circumstances present. The facts of this case show that the defendant complied with all of Officer
    Tokonitz's commands, was cooperative throughout the entire interaction, and made no furtive
    movements. Officer Tokonitz also waited to initiate the traffic stop at asafe location, where the
    defendant's vehicle was not obstructing the highway. In the area of the traffic stop occurred there
    were homes and streetlights and the defendant did not give any indication that he had any
    connection to the neighborhood. Furthermore, Officer Tokonitz admitted in his testimony that he
    was within the vicinity, approximately seven blocks, from apolice station and could have called
    them to make sure the vehicle was secured while he got asearch warrant, but he did not do so.
    9
    Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends that the above analysis not applicable because
    the search of the vehicle was completed pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement, an
    inventory search. In determining whether aproper inventory search has occurred, the first
    inquiry is whether the police have lawfully impounded the vehicle, i.e., have lawful custody of
    the vehicle. The authority of the police to impound vehicles derives from the police's reasonable
    community care-taking functions. Such functions include removing disabled or damaged
    vehicles from the highway, impounding vehicles which violate parking ordinances (thereby
    jeopardizing public safety and efficient traffic flow) and protecting the community's safety.
    Commonwealth v. Peak, 
    230 A.3d 1220
     (Pa. Super. 2020). In addition, the second inquiry is
    whether the police have conducted areasonable inventory search. An inventory search is
    reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable police procedures and in good faith and not
    for the sole purpose of investigation. Id. at 1227. The second inquiry by acourt concentrates on
    whether the inventory search is alegitimate one; that the purpose of an inventory search can
    never be to uncover criminal evidence; rather it is designed to safeguard seized items in order to
    protect the defendant and the police. Commomvealth v. Hennigan, 
    753 A.2d 245
     (Pa. Super.
    2000). In the instant case, there were not legitimate reasons for towing the vehicle. As
    mentioned, the vehicle was properly registered and insured. The vehicle was not obstructing the
    roadways or impeding the flow of traffic, but rather it was safely parked in aresidential area with
    streetlights. Regardless, even assuming that the tow was legal, and Officer Tokonitz has the
    lawful authority to impound the defendant's vehicle, the warrantless search was not based solely
    upon police procedure before towing the vehicle. This Court cannot overlook the motive for the
    warrantless search, i.e. to uncover criminal evidence.
    10
    The Commonwealth also contends that the warrantless search is justified because Officer
    Tokonitz is following department policy. Such an argument is without merit because Alexander
    was clear that there is aheightened standard to vehicle searches, and the policy that was followed
    here does not meet that standard, since it does not require more than probable cause. More
    specifically, the Alexander court noted that, "If it is clear that apractice is unlawful, individuals'
    interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement entitlement to its
    persistence." Alexander, 243 A.3d at 189.
    Overall, the inventory search conducted in this case was unlawful as there was not an
    exigent circumstance to trigger the warrant exception, and the drugs and weapons uncovered as a
    result are due to an illegal search. The Commonwealth's argument of inevitable discovery is also
    without merit as it is premised on the defendant's arrest and search of the vehicle, which is
    determined to be illegal.
    THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH CONDUCTED WAS UNLAWFUL.
    Officer Tokonitz noted in his testimony that he conducted apat-down of the defendant
    for officer safety. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that once apolice officer has
    reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to conduct an investigation, to conduct apat-
    down he must possess afurther "justified belief that the individual, who's suspicious behavior he
    is investigating at close range, is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.
    Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 
    751 A.2d. 1153
    , 1158 (Pa. 2000). The officer need not be absolutely
    certain the individual is armed; the issue is whether areasonably prudent man in this
    circumstance would be warranted in his belief in his safety or the safety of others was in danger.
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 2d. 1261, 1269 (Pa. 2001). If asuspect engages in hand
    movements that police know, based on their experience, are associated with the secreting of a
    11
    weapon, those movements will buttress the legitimacy of aprotective weapon search of the
    location where the hand movements occurred. Commonwealth v. Foglia, 
    979 A.2d 357
    , 361 (Pa.
    2009). However, an officer needs to articulate the specific facts that would justify his suspicion
    that his safety was at risk. 
    Id.
    Here, as noted above, the defendant complied with Officer Tokonitz's commands and
    was cooperative throughout the entire incident. In addition, the defendant produced valid
    information on the vehicle and license and insurance information related to the vehicle. Also, the
    stop occurred in aneighborhood with streetlights, the vehicle was not obstructing traffic, and the
    defendant gave no indication of any ties to the neighborhood to warrant safety concerns. Aside
    from this, Officer Tokonitz did not provide any other articulable facts to indicate his safety was a
    concern. Accordingly, coupled with the lack of the defendant being given his Miranda warnings,
    the defendant's alleged statements made to Officer Tokonitz for the pat down and the subject of
    the pat down where alleged illegal items were seized were properly suppressed.
    DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS MIRANDA
    RIGHTS.
    Throughout this incident, the defendant allegedly made unsolicited statements regarding
    his knowledge of the gun that was uncovered by the illegal search. The Supreme Court in its
    consideration of the voluntariness of aconfession gives great weight to the fact that the
    defendant was fully apprised and expressly waived his Miranda rights before any substantive
    questioning began and before any alleged inducement to confess. Commonwealth v. Templin,
    
    795 A.2d 959
    , 966 (Pa. 2002).
    For determining whether the Miranda requirements are triggered, an individual must be
    "in custody." Generally, the usual traffic stop is analogous to aTerry Stop and does not require
    12
    Miranda warnings. However, if during the course of the stop, aperson is "physically deprived of
    their freedom or placed in asituation in which the person believes his or her movement or
    freedom of action is restricted, the person is custody and Miranda warnings are required."
    Commonwealth v. Oppel, 
    754 A.2d. 711
     (Pa. Super. 2000).
    Officer Tokonitz in his testimony confirmed that the defendant was in the back of his
    patrol vehicle and in handcuffs when he allegedly made unsolicited statements about the
    potential finding of agun. The defendant was also in custody later at the police station when he
    was being processed and fingerprinted, where he made addition statements regarding the gun.
    Notwithstanding Officer Tokonitz's recollection that the defendant made unsolicited statements
    that there was asmall amount of marijuana in the vehicle's door pocket; this Court finds that
    from the inception of the stop the defendant reasonably believed he was in custody. Accordingly,
    Miranda warnings were required and since none were ever given, all of the defendant's
    statements should be suppressed.
    CONCLUSION
    For the abovementioned reasons, this Court properly granted Appellee's motion to
    suppress.
    BY THE COURT:
    George A. Pagano,       J.
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