Com. v. Smith, V. ( 2022 )

J-S34036-22
2022 PA Super 179COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
VINCENT SMITH :
:
Appellant : No. 1256 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0008964-2018
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 17, 2022
Vincent Smith (Smith) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) following his
entry of an open guilty plea to two counts of voluntary manslaughter and four
counts of arson ─ endangering persons.1 Smith challenges the legality of the
multiple sentences the trial court imposed on his arson convictions where he
set a single fire. Because we agree with Smith that only one sentence should
have been imposed for arson, we reverse three of his arson convictions,
vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2503, 3301(a)(1).
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I.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
February 26, 2018, four police officers from the Allegheny County and
Swissvale Police Departments responded to Smith’s residence to conduct a
welfare check in an effort to locate a person who had been reported missing,
John Van Dyke. The officers entered the residence through the basement and
climbed up the stairs towards the sound of a voice. They came upon Smith
and observed him striking matches and tossing them to the floor, igniting a
fire that spread throughout the home. The officers quickly exited the
residence and took up position outside, while Smith remained inside.
Firefighters arrived at the scene and rescued Smith, who was taken to the
hospital and treated for smoke inhalation. Police recovered the bodies of John
Van Dyke and Steven Pariser from Smith’s residence; both men had suffered
obvious trauma to the backs of their heads.
Smith reported to police that Pariser had been his longtime friend, but
that on the night of the incident, the men became involved in an altercation
where he acted in self-defense. According to Smith, he threw the victims
down the stairs after Pariser bit and grabbed at him and Van Dyke hit him on
the head and hand with a hammer. Smith claimed that he had ingested pills
and spread lighter fluid throughout the residence to ignite the fire because he
wanted to kill himself.
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On April 5, 2021, Smith entered an open guilty plea to two counts of
voluntary manslaughter and four counts of arson ─ endangering persons. The
persons who were endangered were the police officers who had entered the
building to investigate the crime. The trial court accepted the plea as
voluntary and deferred sentencing for preparation of a pre-sentence
investigation report (PSI). At the June 30, 2021 sentencing hearing, the trial
court noted that it had considered the PSI, victim impact statements,
materials submitted by the defense, and Smith’s statement to the court on his
behalf. The trial court sentenced Smith to consecutive terms of 5 to 10 years’
incarceration on each of the voluntary manslaughter convictions, followed by
consecutive terms of 4 to 8 years of imprisonment on each of the arson counts.
Smith filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking withdrawal of his
guilty plea and modification of the sentence, claiming it was excessive. At the
August 23, 2021 hearing on the motion, the parties discussed the issue of
whether Smith could receive multiple sentences for violating Section 3301, as
this incident involved a single fire. The trial court deferred ruling on the
motion pending the submission of briefs.
At the September 2021 hearing, the trial court denied Smith’s motion
and concluded that the separate sentences it had imposed on each arson count
were lawful. Smith timely appealed from the judgment of sentence and he
and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b). In
its opinion, the court explained its rationale for the ruling as follows:
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The Arson Endangering Persons statute at issue in this case
specifically focused on the individual risk of death or serious injury
caused to individual persons identified in the statute by the
defendant’s conduct. This Court believes that the unit of
prosecution for this offense is the commission of an arson that
specifically recklessly places another person in danger of death or
bodily injury. The unit of prosecution is not limited solely to the
commission of an arson, otherwise subsection(A)(1)(i) would be
superfluous. On the contrary, the legislature intended that the
unit of prosecution include consideration of the individual risk of
harm caused by arson. As set forth in Satterfield,2 it was “solely
the involvement in an accident that triggers the obligation to stop
and remain at the scene.” Id. at 448. In this case, it isn’t the
arson that triggers the crime. To be found guilty of Arson
Endangering Person, the statute specifically requires proof of both
an arson and that an enumerated person be placed in danger of
death or bodily injury from the arson. Accordingly, the unit of
prosecution provides for separate counts if multiple persons are
victimized by an arson. The proper interpretation of the statute,
therefore, permitted this Court to impose separate sentences for
each victim endangered by the defendant’s conduct.
(See Trial Court Opinion, 4/06/22, at 6-7) (emphasis added; original
emphasis maintained).
II.
Smith’s issue on appeal challenges the legality of the multiple sentences
imposed on his arson convictions. Smith maintains that contrary to the trial
court’s assessment, the “unit of prosecution” for Section 3301(a)(1) is
properly construed as each arson rather than each endangered person.
Because Smith committed one arson by starting a single fire, he contends that
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2 Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438 (Pa. 2021) (discussed in
detail infra).
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his judgment of sentence as to three of the four arson counts should be
reversed. (See id. at 23).3
A.
We begin by observing that the best expression of legislative intent is
found in the plain language of a statute. See Commonwealth v. Peck, 242
A.3d 1274, 1279 (Pa. 2020). “When the words of a statute are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext
of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Additionally, “penal statutes are
always to be construed strictly, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1), and any ambiguity in
a penal statute should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 258 A.3d 474, 478 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(case citation omitted).
In this case, we must consider what the General Assembly set as the
“unit of prosecution” for a violation of Section 3301(a)(1). Satterfield, on
which the trial court relies, is instructive. In Satterfield, our Supreme Court
addressed the legality of the three sentences imposed on the defendant after
he pled guilty to three counts of leaving the scene of an accident involving
death or personal injury, codified at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.4 The charges
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3 Because statutory interpretation raises a question of law, our scope of review
is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. See Commonwealth v.
Arroyo, 991 A.2d 951, 955 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2010).
4 § 3742. Accidents involving death or personal injury
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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stemmed from Satterfield’s causing of a multi-vehicle crash that resulted in
three fatalities. The Court determined that two of Satterfield’s three sentences
were illegal and in doing so explained:
The unit of prosecution is the actus reus that the General
Assembly intended to punish. Put otherwise, the unit of
prosecution is the minimum conduct that must be proven to obtain
a conviction for the statute in question. Only a single conviction
and resulting punishment may be imposed for a single unit of
prosecution. . . To determine the correct unit of prosecution,
the inquiry should focus on whether separate and distinct
prohibited acts have been committed.
Satterfield, supra at 445-46 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
The Court vacated the multiple sentences imposed on Satterfield based
on the number of victims killed in the accident and held that he “may only be
punished for one violation of Section 3742, regardless of the number of
persons killed or injured.” Id. at 451. Although the statute sets increased
penalties for not remaining at the scene based on the severity of the
consequences of the accident, (i.e., where the accident results in only injury,
the violator commits a first-degree misdemeanor, but when the accident
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(a) General rule.─The driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as
close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in
every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has
fulfilled the requirements of section 3744 (relating to duty to give
information and render aid). Every stop shall be made without
obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(a).
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results in death, the defendant commits a second-degree felony), the Court
nonetheless determined that “the statutory language unambiguously provides
that the obligation to stop and remain at the scene results solely from the
driver’s involvement in the accident, regardless of the number of victims or
the severity of their injuries.” Id. at 449 (citations omitted) (describing the
statute as “accident focused” rather than “victim focused.”). Because there
was only one accident scene at which Satterfield had a duty to remain, he
violated Section 3742 once and, therefore, could only be sentenced for the
single violation.
B.
Turning to the statute at issue in the instant case, the Crimes Code
defines the offense of Arson - endangering persons in relevant part as follows:
§ 3301. Arson and related offenses
(a) Arson endangering persons.─
(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he
intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids,
counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or
explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, and
if:
(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger
of death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a firefighter,
police officer or other person actively engaged in fighting the fire.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The statute goes on to define the offense of Arson in various other
contexts including starting a fire to a historic resource; starting a fire
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endangering property; and multiple-related offenses, including reckless
burning. See id. (grading arson of a historic resource and arson endangering
property as second-degree felonies and reckless burning as a third-degree
felony). The focus of the provision is on criminalizing the intentional starting
of fire, and similar to the statute at issue in Satterfield, it provides for
increases in grading as the level of severity of the consequences as the fire
escalates.
Based on the plain language of Section 3301(a)(1), we conclude that
the unit of prosecution or actus reus that the General Assembly intended to
punish is the act of intentionally starting a fire. Contrary to the trial court’s
conclusion, the key element of the statute is not endangerment, which is
addressed separately in the Crimes Code for which charges were not brought.5
Although the language of Section 3301 concerning grading of the offense
makes clear the legislature intended to view arson - endangering persons as
a particularly egregious type of arson, the statute’s key element is arson, not
endangerment.
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5 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, Recklessly Endangering Another Person (REAP) (“A
person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages
in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.”). Moreover, if arson would result in death of a person,
in addition to the arson charge, nothing precludes the Commonwealth
charging the person who perpetrated the arson with each death caused by the
arson.
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The trial court sentenced Smith to four consecutive terms of
imprisonment for arson - endangering persons. However, because Smith set
a single fire, he committed one prohibited act, see Satterfield, supra at 446,
and, therefore, may only be punished for one violation of Section 3301,
despite the presence of four police officers at the scene, making three of
Smith’s arson sentences illegal.
Accordingly, we reverse three of the arson convictions, vacate the
judgment of sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing, as our
disposition may upset the trial court’s overall sentencing scheme.6
Voluntary manslaughter convictions and one arson conviction affirmed;
three arson convictions reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case
remanded for resentencing in accordance with this Opinion. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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6 The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098(Pa. 1984) to support its position that Smith’s sentence is legal. (See
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 9). In Frisbie, our Supreme Court examined the
REAP statute and held that imposition of multiple sentences for that offense
was lawful for the defendant’s act of driving his vehicle through a crowded
intersection, causing serious injury to nine pedestrians. However, given that
the REAP statute on its face is expressly aimed at criminalizing Endangerment
rather than a separate offense such as Arson, the analysis of its plain language
is not controlling in this case.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/17/2022
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