In Re: C.M.M., Appeal of: V.M. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: V.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 1014 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000264-2020,
CP-51-DP-0002011-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: V.M., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1015 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile
Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000265-2020,
CP-51-DP-0002012-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2022
V.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her son, C.M.M., and her daughter, A.S.C (collectively, “the
Children”). She also appeals from the orders changing the Children’s
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permanency goals from reunification to adoption.1 After careful review, we
affirm the decrees and dismiss as moot the appeals from the goal change
orders.
C.M.M. was removed from Mother’s physical custody on May 23, 2017,
when he was six years old, due to a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report
alleging that he appeared at school that day with excessive bruising on his
face and behind his ears. Trial Court Opinion, 6/21/21, at 1. The report alleged
that Mother told C.M.M. not to disclose how he sustained his injuries, but he
had said that they occurred after Mother hit him with a hairbrush and scissors.
Id. He also stated that his nose and mouth were bleeding from his injuries.
Id. at 2.
That same day, Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
workers interviewed C.M.M. in school and observed “bruising around both of
[his] eyes, on both cheeks, and both arms, as well as scratches behind his ear
and on his shoulder blade.” Id. C.M.M. went to his maternal aunt’s home that
day, and DHS developed a safety plan for the child while in her care. Id.
A.S.C., who was three years old, remained in Mother’s home, and DHS
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1These appeals are presently before us following this Court’s remand for
Mother to file amended notices of appeal, pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2021). See In re C.M.M., 1014 EDA 2021, 2022
WL 2825437 (Pa.Super. July 20, 2022) (unpublished memorandum). Because
Mother’s appeals arise from the same proceeding and raise similar arguments,
we consider them together.
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referred Mother to the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) for in-home
services. Id.During its investigation of C.M.M.’s injuries, DHS learned that the
incident between Mother and C.M.M. occurred when Mother found him cutting
A.S.C.’s hair. DHS Exhibit 6. DHS concluded that the CPS report was an
indicated report. In the course of the investigation, DHS learned that C.M.M.
was truant; A.S.C. displayed aggressive behaviors; Mother had a history of
substance abuse; and there was a history of domestic violence in the home.
Id. at 2.
The trial court adjudicated the Children dependent, and they were
placed together with foster parents (“original foster parents”). The court
referred the Children for mental health assessments, and ordered Mother to
attend the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for domestic violence
counseling. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. It also directed Mother to see the Clinical
Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for drug screens and a dual diagnosis assessment,
and to undergo a parenting capacity evaluation (“PCE”). Id.
Following a child abuse and permanency review hearing, the trial court
found that Mother had perpetrated “child abuse” against C.M.M. (“child abuse
order”). Mother did not appeal. The court also ordered that the CPS report be
upgraded from indicated to founded. Id.
The Children were diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), and have participated consistently and separately in trauma-
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focused cognitive behavioral therapy from the time of their adjudication
through the subject proceedings. N.T., 2/22/21, at 42, 174-75. According to
C.M.M.’s therapist from Children’s Crisis Treatment Center (“CCTC”), Kaitlyn
Monaghan, C.M.M. receives this treatment because of his history of physical
abuse by Mother and emotional abuse by Mother’s paramour, J.Z. Id. at 42.
C.M.M. recounted in therapy that J.Z. “would duct tape him and his sister to
the couch and make them watch scary movies.” Id. at 46-47. He also
recounted that J.Z. “put bugs in his food . . . [and] killed his pet turtle and put
it in his bed.” Id. at 47. Monaghan testified C.M.M. initially presented with
a lot of hypervigilance, fear and anxiety, particularly around
[M]other’s . . . paramour. . . . So — feeling like he was around,
seeing a red car and having triggers and memories related to that,
nightmares. Overall, a lot of fear. Additionally, [C.M.M.] did have
some fear around mom, his experiences of whether or not mom
was telling the truth or not, a lot of hesitation around his
attachment with her at that time.
Id. at 43.
Likewise, A.S.C.’s therapist from CCTC, Molly Reeves, testified that
A.S.C. suffered emotional abuse by J.Z. Id. at 177. A.S.C. disclosed that J.Z.
“forc[ed] her and her brother [C.M.M.] to watch scary movies.” Id. A.S.C. also
disclosed sexual abuse by J.Z. Id. Reeves reported that A.S.C. initially
presented with “anxiety, described as frequently discussing fears of [J.Z.] and
fears about scary movies . . . and intrusive thoughts and memories about
[J.Z.]. . . .” DHS Exhibit 6.
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Monaghan and Reeves have discussed the Children’s trauma history
with Mother and have assessed her “readiness to move forward with
accountability, responsibility, and understanding [her] role in the [Children]’s
trauma, validating the [Children]’s symptoms, and moving toward repairing
the relationship between parent and child.” N.T., 2/22/21, at 48-49. However,
both therapists agree that Mother has consistently failed to take responsibility
for the Children’s trauma. Id. at 70, 180-82. For instance, with respect to
C.M.M.’s physical injuries that led to the Children’s placement, Monaghan
testified that Mother attributed the injuries to a television falling on him and/or
he ran into a counter. Mother subsequently “said she had tapped C.M.M. on
the hand two times, and then he ran and fell.” Id. at 51. With respect to J.Z.,
Monaghan testified Mother initially stated that the Children’s allegations could
not be true because they were never alone with him. Id. at 52. However,
Mother subsequently indicated that she was starting to believe the Children.
Id.
In October of 2018, Erica Williams, Psy.D., submitted her first PCE
report. DHS Exhibit 9. With respect to J.Z., Dr. Williams reported that Mother
claimed she was no longer in contact with him. Id. at 5. Further, Dr. Williams
reported that Mother did not admit having abused C.M.M., and she did not
acknowledge the injuries he had sustained to his face. Id. at 8. Dr. Williams
was aware that family therapy was one of her permanency goals, but she did
not recommend that it occur until Mother “demonstrat[ed] accountability for
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her behavior leading to [C.M.M.’s] placement.” Id. Dr. Williams concluded her
report with the following recommendations:
(1) Mother engage in individual therapy for the purpose “of
identifying [the] mechanism of abuse, developing accurate
narratives of the events, . . . developing ongoing plans to ensure
safety of the [C]hildren. . . .”;
(2) family therapy should not commence without the approval of
the Children’s therapists and until Mother demonstrates
accountability for her behavior leading to the Children’s
placement; and
(3) visitation remain supervised until Mother enrolls in individual
therapy, develops a plan to ensure the Children’s safety in her
care, and family therapy is established.
Id. at 9.
Mother complied engaged in individual therapy and developed a plan for
the Children’s safety, and the trial court permitted her to have unsupervised
visitation with the Children in November 2018. Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
In November 2019, the trial court found that Mother had moderately
complied with her permanency plan and had made minimal progress in
alleviating the circumstances necessitating the Children’s placement. For
instance, A.S.C.’s therapist reported that the first family session was
scheduled for November 2019, but it was canceled “due to concern that
[Mother] was verbalizing perspectives that would be emotionally damaging to
[A.S.C.], such as it was [C.M.M.]’s fault that [A.S.C.] was in foster care.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 7; DHS Exhibit 6. The court reduced Mother’s visitation to weekly
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line-of-sight/line-of-hearing at either the agency or in the community, which
continued through the time of the subject proceedings. Id. at 6.
Monaghan began working with C.M.M. in March 2019, at which time he
was living, along with A.S.C., with the original foster parents. N.T., 2/22/21,
at 62. Monaghan stated that, prior to mid-2020, C.M.M. had “a positive
attachment” to the original foster parents. Id. at 64. However, in mid-2020,
C.M.M. began to blame the original foster parents for his not being reunified
with Mother. Id. at 76. Monaghan testified that C.M.M. “oscillates a lot
between self-blame and having a more accurate understanding of why he’s in
placement.” Id. at 60. C.M.M. made unspecified allegations against the
original foster parents, which were ultimately deemed unfounded, and he was
placed in a different foster home. Id. at 62-65, 112-13. C.M.M. was later
moved again to a respite placement, where he resided at the time of the
subject proceeding. Id. at 62, 195.
The record reveals that A.S.C. was also removed from the original foster
parents in 2020, for unspecified reasons, and hospitalized at Belmont Hospital
for mental and behavioral issues. Upon discharge, he was placed in a respite
foster home. Id. at 175-76. At the time of the subject termination proceeding,
A.S.C. was again with the original foster parents, with whom Reeves testified
she has “a very stable and positive attachment.” Id. at 188.
The Children’s trauma therapists reported in June 2020 that, to resolve
their PTSD symptoms, the Children need to “live with a safe, consistent,
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supportive caregiver, who is able to validate and support [the] Children
around their exposure to trauma and [who] can respond appropriately to their
symptoms and needs, as well as prioritize their emotional and physical needs.”
Trial Ct. Op. at 8; DHS Exhibit 6.
On July 30, 2020, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). It also petitioned for a goal change from
reunification to adoption. A hearing on the petitions occurred on February 22,
2021, and April 23, 2021, by video conference due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
By the conclusion of the hearing, C.M.M. was ten years old, and A.S.C. was
seven years old. The Children’s best interests were represented during the
hearing by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), and their legal interests were
represented by counsel.
At the hearing, in addition to the testimony of Monaghan, Reeves, and
Dr. Williams, DHS presented testimony from CUA caseworker Denise Jenkins,
and Tiffany Tillman, the DHS caseworker for the family since September of
2020. Tillman testified that Mother’s outstanding permanency goals involved
still needing to make the necessary progress in her individual therapy as
recommended by Dr. Williams in the PCE reports and then commencing family
therapy at the discretion of the Children’s therapists. N.T., 2/22/21, at 193.
DHS also presented an updated report from Dr. Williams following her
evaluation of Mother in August of 2020. Dr. Williams expressed concern that
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Mother had consistently been “shifting in the information she reports and what
she is accountable for regarding [the C]hildren’s placement and ongoing
placement.” DHS Exhibit 10 at 10. For instance, Dr. Williams found that,
although Mother denied any history of mental health, arrests and/or legal
issues, and substance abuse, her records proved otherwise. Id. at 7-9; DHS
Exhibit 9 at 5-6. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Williams recommended that
Mother’s mental health treatment be expanded to “include developing an
accurate narrative of events in her life to best develop areas of need and
support her in developing a larger capacity for accuracy and accountability in
her life events.” DHS Exhibit 10 at 10.
The Children’s counsel presented the testimony of Roya Paller
concerning their preferred outcome in the involuntary termination matter. She
said that C.M.M. “was extremely clear on what adoption was and [he] really
defined it quite well, and [A.S.C.] seemed to discuss adoption in terms of a
forever home.” Id. at 15. Paller testified that C.M.M. “was fine with adoption.”
Id. She testified that C.M.M.’s “real stress . . . came from knowing that he is
in a home that doesn’t really want him there[.]” Id. at 16. She explained that
C.M.M. is in a respite home, and that his foster father is “very vocal” in front
of C.M.M. that he is not interested in being a permanent resource. Id. at 17-
18. With respect to A.S.C., Paller testified that she “was very clear she did not
want to leave [her] foster home and wanted to live there forever, but also
wanted to talk to mom once in awhile [sic].” Id. at 15.
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Finally, Mother testified on her own behalf. The GAL recommended, and
the Children’s legal counsel argued, that Mother’s parental rights be
terminated. N.T., 4/23/32, at 45-46.
The trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to both
Children, in April 2021, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
2511(b). It also changed the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Mother
timely appealed and contemporaneously filed concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
Mother raises the following issues for review in her appeals relating to
C.M.M.:
1. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
terminating Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and changing the goal to adoption
because Mother is fully compliant with her goals and
objectives.
2. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
terminating Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)
and changing the goal to adoption because there is evidence
that [C.M.M.] is bonded to nobody except to Mother.
3. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
terminating Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), (5), (8) because the therapeutic services
offered by [DHS] are egregiously inappropriate.
4. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
terminating Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) when it denied the right to
cross[-]examine the DHS witnesses based on medical
evidence.
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Mother’s Brief I at 5.2
Mother raises the following issues for review in her appeals relating to
A.S.C.:
1. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
terminating Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and changing the goal to adoption
because Mother is fully compliant with her goals and
objectives.
2. Whether the trial court erred or abused [its] discretion when
terminating Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)
and changing the goal to adoption because there is evidence
that [A.S.C.] is bonded to Mother.
Mother’s Brief II at 5.
We first review Mother’s issues regarding the involuntary termination
decrees. They are interrelated, and we review them together. “In cases
concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is
limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is
supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343,
358 (Pa. 2021). We accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256
A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s
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2In this disposition, we identify Mother’s brief relating to C.M.M. as “Mother's
Brief I” and A.S.C. as “Mother’s Brief II.”
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ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re
Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).
“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support
an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” Id. at 826.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must
balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs
for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358. As such,
the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the
statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is
so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come
to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.” Id. (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds describing
particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary termination.”
Id. at 359; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In evaluating whether
the petitioner proved grounds under subsection 2511(a), the trial court must
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focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best interest
approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(citation omitted). If the trial court determines the petitioner established
grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and convincing
evidence, the court then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b),
which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,
267 (Pa. 2013).
Instantly, we analyze the involuntary termination decrees pursuant to
subsections 2511(a)(8) and (b):3
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
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3 This Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in
addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental
rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).
Therefore, we need not review Mother’s issues with respect to Section
2511(a)(1), (2), and (5).
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control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
To satisfy subsection 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove: (1) that
the child has been removed from the care of the parent for at least 12 months;
(2) that the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child still
exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943
(Pa.Super. 2018). Subsection 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to
evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to
the placement of the children. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super.
2017). “[T]he relevant inquiry” regarding the second prong of subsection
2511(a)(8) “is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied
and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of
the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009). Further, the court
may not consider, as part of the subsection 2511(a)(8) analysis, the parent’s
efforts initiated after the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
With respect to subsection 2511(b), the court “shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The “emotional needs and welfare of
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the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has made clear that Section
2511(b) requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of the bond
between a parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 1993).
The existence of a bond does not necessarily result in denial of a termination
petition. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Instead, the court must examine the effect
on the child of severing such bond. Id. “When examining the effect upon a
child of severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental
rights will destroy a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a
child to suffer ‘extreme emotional consequences.’” J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944(quoting E.M., 620 A.2d at 484-85).
“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect
of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one
of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the
best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014).
“[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize
the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such
as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent.” Id. (citation omitted; alteration in original).
Instantly, Mother’s arguments are premised on the bald assertion that
the initial DHS investigation was flawed regarding her alleged physical abuse
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of C.M.M., and this resulted in the trial court improperly issuing the child abuse
order. Mother’s Br. I at 12; Mother’s Br. II at 11. Mother acknowledges that
she “temporarily lost her control when she caught [C.M.M.] using a pair of
scissors to cut his sister’s hair” and “hit the child,” but maintains that her
conduct did not amount to “child abuse.” Mother’s Br. I at 12-13; Mother’s Br.
II at 11. She then contends that the Children’s therapists based their
treatment plans erroneously on the finding of physical abuse. Likewise, Mother
asserts that Dr. Williams, who performed the PCE, “worked from the premise
of the physical abuse as the cause for the [Children’s] placement.” Mother’s
Br. I at 13. Mother argues, “Though [she] could no longer appeal the child
abuse finding, the Court can still review the issue of the appropriateness of
the behavioral or mental health treatments which form the backbone of
incapacity against [her].” Mother’s Br. I at 12; Mother’s Br. II at 11.
We disagree. Mother never appealed from the child abuse order. It was
not only appropriate but necessary for the Children’s therapists and Dr.
Williams to base their treatments and/or recommendations on whether Mother
acknowledged her physical abuse of C.M.M. As such, the premise underlying
Mother’s arguments is flawed.
With respect to subsection 2511(a)(8), Mother asserts that the trial
court relied upon prejudicial and speculative evidence related to the second
prong, i.e., the conditions that led to the removal or placement of the child
still exist. She argues, “When [the court] sees no progress from Mother, it’s
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[sic] reasoning is that things stay[ed] the same over a period of forty[-]five
months.” Mother’s Br. I at 20; Mother’s Br. II at 18. Mother asserts that this
finding is not supported by the record because she made progress with her
permanency plan during the first two years of the Children’s dependency, and
that the court erred in failing to consider that progress. Id. With respect to
her lack of current progress, Mother baldly asserts, “The present state of
conditions resulted from a change of treatment team. The case had been
progressing until the current treatment team took over. The conditions
actually worsened gradually under the current treatment team.” Id.This line of argument is meritless. Although the record indicates that
Mother complied with her permanency plan and was granted unsupervised
visitation at certain times during the first two years of the Children’s
dependency, her visitation was later reduced to supervised in November 2019,
and remained so at the time of the subject proceeding, as a result of her lack
of progress, which was detrimental to the Children. Upon review, there is no
evidence in the certified record to support Mother’s claim that her lack of
progress was due to a change in the treatment team.4
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4 Monaghan provided the only testimonial evidence regarding a change in
treatment teams, specific to C.M.M. She testified:
Q: [In] 2020, did you have concerns . . . whether service providers
that pre[-]dated the current team were giving [C.M.M.]
information about how much control he had over the permanency
decision?
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Moreover, contrary to Mother’s argument, the trial court did consider
her progress in the first two years of the Children’s dependencies, but it was
not a relevant consideration under subsection 2511(a)(8). What was relevant
was the state of Mother’s progress at the time of the hearing and whether
reunification was imminent at that time. See I.J., 972 A.2d at 11.
Furthermore, in addition to Mother’s physical abuse of C.M.M., the
Children have remained in placement because they were traumatized by J.Z.,
and Mother initially denied their allegations against him. Mother started to
believe the Children’s allegations at an unspecified point in 2019, including,
but not limited to, that J.Z. sexually abused A.S.C. However, she then
misrepresented that he was no longer in her life. N.T., 2/22/21, at 52, 181.
However, Mother admitted on cross-examination by the GAL:
____________________________________________
A: Yes, I do believe that was a factor.
...
A: (inaudible) before this team, I do think that caused a lot of
pressure to [C.M.M.], and it did cause a significant amount of
harm in his relationship with the [original foster parents]. . . . [I]t
has taken some time to really regain that positive feeling toward
the [original foster parents].
N.T., 2/22/21, at 64-65. Although none of the parties’ counsel inquired further
about C.M.M.’s prior treatment team, the foregoing testimony does not
support Mother’s argument that the new treatment team is responsible for her
lack of progress. Rather, Monaghan’s testimony indicates that the prior team
harmed C.M.M.’s positive relationship with the original foster parents in a
manner unspecified in the record.
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Q. [Y]ou’re aware of all the concerns that have been brought up
in regard to [C.M.M.]’s fear of [J.Z.]; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And even with that information, you decided to renew your
relationship with him; is that correct?
...
A. Correct.
N.T., 4/23/21, at 29-30. In fact, Mother subsequently gave birth to J.Z.’s child.
N.T., 2/22/21, at 53. Monaghan testified that this caused C.M.M. to suffer “an
increase in confusion, an increase in anxiety, and really not knowing what’s
true and what’s not true.” Id. at 59.
Monaghan testified that, in early 2020, C.M.M. “had new experiences of
anxiety,” which she attributed to Mother telling C.M.M. that she was dating
J.Z., but that “he was not to say anything about it.” Id. at 55-56. Monaghan
testified that Mother told her there were two men with the same name and
that throughout her treatment of C.M.M., the child was identifying the wrong
man. Id. at 55. Monaghan also said that Mother had recently told C.M.M. that
J.Z. was dead, which was also untrue. Id. at 57. Monaghan related that
Mother’s history of “inconsistencies related to what’s being said to [C.M.M.]”
included C.M.M. “being told to lie or experiencing pressure to say things that
haven’t happened or [not] say things that have happened. . . .” Id. at 60. She
testified that Mother’s conduct in this regard presented a barrier to
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unsupervised visitation and, ultimately, to reunification with C.M.M. Id. at 58-
60.
Significantly, Monaghan indicated that C.M.M.’s negative behavior in
mid-2020 toward the original foster parents was caused by Mother’s
inconsistencies about her involvement with J.Z. She testified:
Q: [Y]ou indicated there was a period of emotional stability
[C.M.M.] had with [the original foster parents].
In your testimony, you also talked about him learning about
[M]other’s pregnancy, . . . some allegations that he made
(unintelligible) [toward] [the original foster parents], and then
some statements that he made in regard to being pressured to
hid[e] [M]other’s relationship with [J.Z.].
Did I state those in the chronological sequence of when you
understood that they occurred . . .?
A. [T]hat is the chronological order in which I have heard that
from [C.M.M.].
Q. Would it be fair to say that [C.M.M.]’s behavioral disruption in
2020 came after the birth of [Mother’s new child]?
A. Yes.
Id. at 112-13.
Based on the foregoing, the record supports the trial court’s findings.
Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court’s determination that the
conditions that led to the removal of the Children continue to exist.
Likewise, with respect to the final prong of subsection 2511(a)(8) – that
termination would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare – we discern
no abuse of discretion. The Children’s therapists and the DHS caseworker,
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Tiffany Tillman, testified that the Children needed permanency. N.T., 2/22/21,
at 78-81, 100-01, 183, 194. Tillman testified that it would be detrimental to
A.S.C. to remove her again from the home of the original foster parents, who
desire to adopt her. Id. at 191-92. With respect to C.M.M., Tillman testified
that the plan is to return him to the original foster parents after providing
therapy for him and the foster mother. Id. at 195-96. Monaghan similarly
testified that C.M.M. has been “exhibiting symptoms related to crisis in recent
weeks.” Id. at 100. She explained:
[C.M.M.] has historically exhibited stability with [the original foster
parents]. He exhibited positive attachment with them at the time
of residing with them.
[C.M.M.] currently is exhibiting more crisis-prone behaviors and
symptoms, I believe, in relation to his various placements, and
this being a respite care provider [where he currently resides].
In relation to [C.M.M.]’s relationship with [M]other, I believe that
the inconsistencies related to statements that are being made to
[C.M.M.] actually increased his feelings of instability and
decreased emotional safety for him, between himself and his
mom.
Id. In addition, Tillman testified that C.M.M. should be adopted because
Mother could not meet his emotional and physical needs. Id. at 199. The
record amply supports the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights
to the Children pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(8).
Turning to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the trial court erred in
terminating her parental rights because C.M.M. “is bonded to nobody but” her,
“and the plan for [him] is uncertain and speculative.” Mother’s Br. I at 21.
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Mother argues that A.S.C. is bonded to her as well, and that the court erred
by not examining whether the termination of her parental rights will have a
detrimental effect on A.S.C.’s developmental needs. Mother’s Br. at II at 19-
20. We disagree.
With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), our
Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment
of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination
petition.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In considering the affection which a child
may have for his or her natural parents, this Court has stated:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is
not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s
feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis,
the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and
abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and
completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the opinion
that the biological connection between [the parent] and the
children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in
connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and its mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural
parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the record reveals that the Children have suffered tragically
due to the lack of stability and permanency in their lives since August of 2017,
when they were adjudicated dependent. Mother’s inconsistencies and/or
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misrepresentations regarding her physical abuse of C.M.M. and whether she
continued to be involved with J.Z. have had a detrimental effect on C.M.M.,
causing him to be in crisis at the time of the subject proceeding. At the time
of the hearing, C.M.M. was residing in a respite home. N.T., 2/22/21, at 78-
80. Monaghan testified:
[C.M.M.]’s emotional well-being has disintegrated over the last
few months in relation to his various placements.
I think continuing this process much longer will lead to irreparable
harm for [C.M.M.]. He does need stability[;] he does need
emotional and physical safety, as well as validation of his feelings,
and someone who can appropriately attune to his needs.
Id. at 69.
Furthermore, Paller testified that C.M.M. “was fine with adoption,” and
“was very clear” about it. Id. at 15, 18. Paller explained,
He defined it completely. He defined it as knowing that, “Your
mom and dad don’t take care of you anymore. You go live with
someone else forever.” Those were his words. And so I said, “Well,
if that happens, [C.M.M.], you know that mom and dad may not
be able to see you anymore?” And he said, “That’s fine. Maybe I’ll
call her.” And I said, “That might not always be allowed when
you’re adopted,” and he just shrugged his shoulders.
...
— it was very flat, very straight answers and the only time I saw
(inaudible) emotion was, again, the nervousness of [not] knowing
where he’s going.
Id. at 18-19.
Tillman testified regarding the permanency plan for C.M.M. as follows.
Q. [D]o you believe it’s in [C.M.M.]’s best interest to be freed for
adoption at this time?
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A. Yes.
Q. Is that based upon [his] need for a caregiver that can provide
him with safety — emotional and physical — as well as to
consistently meet his behavioral health needs (inaudible)?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would agree that [M]other is not able to provide that,
in total, at this time?
A. Yes, at this time, no.
Q. And you believe that it has been harmful for [C.M.M.] to remain
without clarity on what his permanency would be at this point?
A. Yes.
Q. And he has indicated that he is strongly bonded to his sister?
A. Yes, he is.
Q. And he indicates that he has a willingness to explore
permanency through adoption, either with the [original foster
parents] or an appropriate placement, correct?
A. Yes. . . . I recently talked to [C.M.M.] about returning to the
[original foster parents], and he expressed that he did not, but it
seems like [C.M.M.] may be (inaudible) like, in the sense he still
loves the [original foster parents].
He (inaudible) says that he still loves them, he still prays for them.
So, I think that (inaudible) in therapy that that’s something we
could continue to explore. . . .
Q. Do you believe that, although it might be painful if [M]other’s
[parental] rights were terminated, it would be in his best interest
to have some closure around permanency and be freed for
adoption?
A. Yes.
Id. at 199-201.
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With respect to A.S.C., Paller testified that she “was very clear she did
not want to leave the foster home and wants to live there forever, but also
wanted to talk to mom once in a while.” Id. at 15. Tillman testified that A.S.C.
shares a parent-child bond with the original foster parents, who are a pre-
adoptive resource. Id. at 191, 193. She recommended that A.S.C. be adopted
because Mother “still has the therapy piece that needs to be worked on, and
it is important that [A.S.C.] . . . reaches permanency.” Id. at 194. A.S.C.’s
therapist, Reeves, testified that A.S.C. has a parent-child bond with the
original foster parents, and to remove her again from their home would be
detrimental. Id. at 183.
Based on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court
pursuant to Section 2511(b) with respect to the Children. See In re Adoption
of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1220 (Pa.Super. 2015) (concluding that the
mother’s bond with the child was outweighed by the mother’s “repeated failure
to remedy her parental incapacity,” and by the child’s need for permanence
and stability).
The Children have been without permanency and stability for a period
of forty-five months, Mother had not progressed enough for the Children to
be reunified with her at the time the subject proceeding, and we discern no
error in the conclusion that terminating her parental rights will serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children. We
therefore affirm the decrees.
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Finally, although Mother filed notices of appeal from the goal change
orders, she omits any discussion of them in her briefs. She thus waived any
claim concerning the goal change orders. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d
462, 465-66 (Pa.Super. 2017). In addition, given our disposition of Mother’s
appeals from the involuntary termination decrees, her appeals from the goal
change orders would be moot even if she had preserved them. See In the
Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.Super. 2020).
Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/15/2022
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