Com. v. Jones, J. ( 2022 )

J-A17044-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 2278 EDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 5, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0006302-2016,
CP-51-CR-0006303-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 2279 EDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 5, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0006302-2016,
CP-51-CR-0006303-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2022
Appellant, John Jones, appeals from the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia that dismissed his first petition filed under the Post
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A17044-22
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 He challenges the denial of his claims
requesting the recusal of the PCRA judge, asserting that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance, and alleging the existence of newly discovered
evidence. Upon review, we affirm.
On direct review, we previously adopted the trial court’s following
summary of the facts of the case:
On October 24, 2011, [Appellant’s] brother, Shaquille Jones, was
murdered on the 2600 block of Silver Street in Philadelphia. While
Shaquille Jones’s murder was under investigation by the police,
[Appellant] believed that a group of men from Hollywood Street
in Philadelphia were responsible. [Appellant] vowed to kill his
brother’s murderers once he was released from prison for an
unrelated conviction.
On the evening of March 8, 2016, Rasheen Jay Holden, Dionte
Jones (also known as “D”), Don Smith (also known as “Pookie”),
and Phillip Miller, were outside drinking and playing spades on the
2400 block of North Hollywood Street in Philadelphia. While they
were playing, [Appellant] walked up to the group and said, “Give
that shit up. Don’t run, D.” Dionte Jones ran off, and [Appellant]
began to fire shots at him. In the meantime, the other men also
attempted to flee.
While Miller was trying to escape, [Appellant] began to fire shots
at him. Miller was struck two times in the back. Philadelphia
Police Officer Carlos Rodriguez responded to the scene and found
Miller on the ground. Miller was put into Officer Rodriguez’s
vehicle and transported to Temple University Hospital, where he
was pronounced dead.
The next day, on March 9, 2016, a memorial was held for Miller at
a speakeasy on 28th and Huntingdon Streets in Philadelphia.
During the evening, Eric Bright, Jeffrey Best, and three women,
left the speakeasy to go outside and drink. In the meantime,
someone called [Appellant] and told him that Bright was standing
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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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outside on 28th and Huntingdon. [Appellant] subsequently drove
to the location, and upon spotting Bright, ran up to the group with
a gun in his hand. [Appellant] told everyone to not move and put
his hands in Bright’s pockets. He then began to fire multiple shots
at Bright. While [Appellant] was shooting, the rest of the group
ran for safety. When the shots stopped, Best returned to the
scene, and found Bright lying on the ground showing little signs
of life.
Philadelphia Police Officers, who were in the area, heard the
gunshots and responded to the scene. Upon arriving, they found
Bright lying in between two parked cars and suffering from
multiple gunshot wounds. Bright was shot seven times: twice in
the back, and once in the chest, face, left arm, left palm, and right
ring finger. The officers put Bright into their vehicle and
transported him to Temple University Hospital, where he was
pronounced dead.
Philadelphia Police Detectives then conducted investigation of the
two shootings. During the course of the investigations, Aikeem
Corley positively identified [Appellant] as Phillip Miller’s shooter.
Further, Jeffrey Best positively identified [Appellant] as Eric
Bright’s shooter. Additionally, police recovered a Smith and
Wesson nine-millimeter semiautomatic in an unrelated incident
approximately five months after the shootings. Ballistics
confirmed that the weapon was used in both murders.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 2018 WL 4907581, *1 (Pa. Super., filed Oct. 10,
2018) (unpublished memorandum), quoting Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/18, 2-4
(citation to notes of testimony and exhibits omitted; formatting in brackets).
At a non-jury trial, held on April 24-27, 2017, several police officers and
detectives, the Philadelphia Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, and eyewitnesses
to the shootings testified. Appellant did not take the stand or present evidence
on his own behalf. On both docket numbers, the court found Appellant guilty
of two counts each of first-degree murder and carrying a firearm on public
streets or public property in Philadelphia, and one count of carrying a firearm
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without a license.2 The court imposed an aggregate sentence of life
imprisonment without parole.3 After the denial of a post-sentence motion,
Appellant filed a direct appeal in which he challenged the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence.4 Jones, 2018 WL 4907581 at *2. On October
10, 2018, our Court affirmed the judgments of sentence. Commonwealth
v. Jones, 200 A.3d 544 (Pa. Super. 2018) (table). Appellant sought further
review. On March 12, 2019, our Supreme Court denied allocatur.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 204 A.3d 359 (Pa. 2019) (table).
On November 18, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel
was appointed and filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), that addressed the claims
presented in the pro se petition.5 Appellant subsequently filed a counseled
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2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1),
respectively.
3 The aggregate term included concurrent imprisonment terms of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each murder conviction, one
to two years of imprisonment for each conviction for carrying firearms on
public streets or public property in Philadelphia, and one and one-half to three
years of imprisonment for carrying a firearm without a license.
4 Our Court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights after an initial appeal
was dismissed due to Appellant’s failure to file a docketing statement pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 3517.
5 The no-merit letter appears to only have been included in the lower court’s
docket at CP-51-CR-0006302-2016, however, a “condensed” identification of
the docket numbers for both cases on appeal appears on the letter. No-Merit
Letter, 4/21/20, 1 (“CP-51-CR-6302/3-2016”). The PCRA court advises in its
opinion that it found that the no-merit letter was inadequate and that it
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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motion requesting the recusal of the PCRA judge who originally sat as the trial
judge and an amended PCRA petition in which counsel raised the ineffective
assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence claims that are presented
in this appeal. Amended PCRA Petition, 11/14/20, ¶ 12(a)-(b). The PCRA
court denied the recusal motion. Order, 11/20/20. After the Commonwealth
filed a responsive brief, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss
the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Rule 907 Notice,
9/8/21. Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 dismissal notice challenging
the adequacy of his jury trial waiver colloquy to advance his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Response to Rule 907 Notice, 10/29/21, ¶¶ 4-6.
The PCRA court dismissed the petition on November 5, 2021. Order, 11/5/21.
Appellant timely filed notices of appeal and voluntarily filed a statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).6 Notices of
Appeal, 11/5/21; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 11/17/21.
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ordered counsel to either file a supplemental Finley letter or an amended
petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 2.
6 Appellant’s counsel filed two notices of appeal and each notice of appeal
listed both trial court docket numbers. The notices, while identical in content,
were distinct filings that were docketed at different times. See Notice of
Appeal for 2278 EDA 2021, 1 (time-stamped as electronically filed at 11:24:40
p.m); Notice of Appeal for 2279 EDA 2021, 11/5/21, 1 (time-stamped as
electronically filed at 11:22:18 p.m.). The notices comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341,
which “requires that when a single order resolves issues arising on more than
one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each
docket.” Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021). See
also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1145-48 (Pa. Super.
2020) (en banc) (finding a single defendant appealing from multiple dockets
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the PCRA [court] err by denying [Appellant’s] claim that
[the PCRA court judge], as the waiver court judge, should
have recused himself from reviewing [Appellant’s] PCRA
petition?
2. Did the PCRA court err when it denied [Appellant’s] claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for coercing him into a
bench trial by claiming the Commonwealth would withdraw
its pursuit of the death penalty in exchange for said waiver?
3. Did the PCRA court err when it denied [Appellant’s] newly
discovered evidence claim regarding lead Detective
Nathaniel Williams’ qualifying misconduct[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (answers of the lower court omitted; formatting in
brackets).7
“We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is
supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of
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may include multiple docket numbers on each notice of appeal, but still must
file separate notices of appeal for each docket); Pa.R.A.P. 105(a) (the Rules
of Appellate Procedure are to be liberally construed to effectuate, inter alia,
justice).
7 After Appellant voluntarily filed a Rule 1925(b) statement, the court issued
an order directing him to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Order, 11/10/21, 1.
He then filed a second Rule 1925(b) statement. In his first Rule 1925(b)
statement, he only identified his ineffective assistance and newly discovered
evidence claims. Rule 1925(b) Statement, 11/9/21, 1. In the second
statement, he identified those claims along with his recusal claim. Rule
1925(b) Statement, 11/17/21, 1. The trial court’s opinion only addresses the
ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence claims. PCRA
Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 4-9. Because the court ordered Appellant to file a Rule
1925(b) statement after he already voluntarily filed one, and the second
statement was filed within the time period set forth by the court’s Rule 1925
order, we will decline to find that Appellant waived his recusal claim by not
including it in his first Rule 1925(b) statement.
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a PCRA court’s legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar,
154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings
will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified
record.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 266 A.3d 56, 62 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred by denying
his recusal motion. Appellant’s Brief at 11-13. He acknowledges that it is
preferable for the same judge who presided at trial to also preside over PCRA
proceedings, that the standard for recusal provides that judges should recuse
themselves if they doubt their ability to preside impartially or where their
impartiality can be reasonably questioned, and that the burden of persuasion
for recusal rested with him as the moving party. Id. at 11-12. He argues
that recusal was appropriate because he was convicted after a non-jury trial
and the two homicide verdicts “evidence the [c]ourt’s belief in [his] criminal
culpability.” Id. at 13. As further support for recusal, he cites that the lower
court indicated that his sentence was “well deserved” and “appropriate under
all circumstances,” and that the murders in this case were “a great loss to the
[victims’] families” and a “senseless crime.” Id., citing N.T. 4/27/17, 140-
141.
When a motion for recusal is denied, an appellate court’s function is to
determine whether the judge abused his or her discretion in denying recusal.
Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern PA. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1300
(Pa. 1985). In filing a motion for recusal, the moving party must allege facts
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tending to show bias, interest, or other disqualifying factors. Id. A party
moving for recusal need not demonstrate actual prejudice, but rather an
appearance of impropriety or factors or circumstances that reasonably
question a jurist’s impartiality. In re Lokuta, 11 A.3d 427, 435-36 (Pa.
2011). On appeal following the denial of a recusal motion, we place the
burden on the party requesting recusal to establish that the judge abused his
or her discretion. See Commonwealth v. White, 734 A.2d 374, 384 (Pa.
1999) (“It is Appellant’s burden to establish that [the judge] abused his
discretion by denying her recusal motion.”). We presume that judges are fair
and competent. Commonwealth v. Shannon, 184 A.3d 1010, 1018 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
As acknowledged by Appellant, our Supreme Court has expressed a
strong preference for a trial judge to preside over a petitioner’s post-conviction
review proceedings to promote judicial efficiency. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 90 (Pa. 1998) (“Generally, it
is deemed preferable for the same judge who presided at trial to preside over
the post-conviction proceedings since familiarity with the case will likely assist
the proper administration of justice.”). That preference, however, yields to
the decisions of the sitting jurist on matters of disqualification. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(C) (“The trial judge, if available, shall proceed with and
dispose of the [post-conviction review] petition in accordance with these rules,
unless the judge determines, in the interests of justice, that he or she should
be disqualified.”).
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In this instance, we cannot find that the PCRA court abused its discretion
by denying Appellant’s recusal motion. The arguments made in favor of the
motion below mirror the arguments in Appellant’s appellate claim: that the
trial court was supposedly biased against Appellant by virtue of the verdicts
reached by the court and the court’s comments at sentencing concerning the
appropriateness of the sentence imposed, the fact that the court felt that the
sentence was “well-deserved,” the characterization of the crime committed as
“senseless,” and the court’s indication that the murders resulted in “a great
loss to the [victims’] families.” Recusal Motion, 9/3/20, ¶ 10.
We are unable to infer that the verdicts by themselves were any proof
of bias. See Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d at 90 (“Adverse rulings alone do not,
however, establish the requisite bias warranting recusal, especially where the
rulings are legally proper.”). Moreover, we cannot consider that the court’s
statements at sentencing were improper and evidence of bias because – even
though Appellant was subject to mandatory life imprisonment terms – the
court was required by the Sentencing Code to consider the need for crafting a
sentence that was consistent with, inter alia, the protection of the public and
the gravity of the offenses as they related to the impact on the life of the
victims and on the community. Because the cited comments at sentencing
reflected the court’s consideration of the mandatory sentencing factors under
42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), we do not find that they provided any basis for recusal.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(judge’s statement at sentencing that a twenty-year imprisonment sentence
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was insufficient reflected careful consideration of the sentencing factors set
forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), as required by statute and case law, and did
not furnish a basis for a recusal claim on PCRA review).
Having reviewed the record in this case, we are unpersuaded that
Appellant’s recusal claim revealed any proof of bias on the part of the lower
court or hinted at an appearance of impropriety. Given the stated preference
for trial judges sitting as post-conviction review jurists and our presumption
that judges are fair and competent, we are unable to conclude that the denial
of Appellant’s recusal claim was an abuse of discretion.
In his second issue, Appellant claims that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by “coercing him into a bench trial by claiming [that]
the Commonwealth would withdraw its pursuit of the death penalty in
exchange for” a waiver of his right to a jury trial. Appellant’s Brief at 10, 13-
15.
As to a claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, we are guided
by a well-settled set of precepts:
We presume counsel’s effectiveness, and an appellant bears the
burden of proving otherwise. To establish ineffectiveness of
counsel, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove: his underlying
legal claim has arguable merit; counsel’s actions lacked any
reasonable basis; and counsel’s actions prejudiced him. Failure
to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires dismissal
of the claim. Arguable merit exists when the factual statements
are accurate and could establish cause for relief. Whether the
facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.
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Commonwealth v. Urwin, 219 A.3d 167, 172 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen a defendant claims that his
jury waiver was not knowing and voluntary due to his counsel’s
ineffectiveness, to prove actual prejudice the defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the result of the waiver proceeding would have
been different absent counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v.
Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 702 (Pa. 2008).
When a defendant choses to waive the right to a trial by a jury,
Pa.R.Crim.P 620 provides, as follows, that a colloquy shall appear of record:
In all cases, the defendant and the attorney for the
Commonwealth may waive a jury trial with approval by a judge of
the court in which the case is pending, and elect to have the judge
try the case without a jury. The judge shall ascertain from the
defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent waiver, and
such colloquy shall appear on the record. The waiver shall be in
writing, made a part of the record, and signed by the defendant,
the attorney for the Commonwealth, the judge, and the
defendant’s attorney as a witness.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 620. The essential elements of a jury waiver “are the
requirements that the jury be chosen from members of the community (a jury
of one’s peers), that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be
allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 312 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. 1973). “[T]he use of a written jury trial
waiver form has been deemed sufficient in the absence of an oral jury trial
waiver colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 870 (Pa.
Super. 2013), citing Williams, 312 A.2d at 599-600.
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When a presumptively-valid waiver is collaterally attacked under
the guise of ineffectiveness of counsel, it must be analyzed like
any other ineffectiveness claim … [T]he analysis must focus on the
totality of relevant circumstances. Those circumstances include
the defendant’s knowledge of and experience with jury trials, his
explicit written waiver (if any), and the content of relevant off-
the-record discussions counsel had with his client.
Mallory, 941 A.2d at 698.
On PCRA review, Appellant asserted that his counsel coerced him into
waiving his jury trial rights by improperly telling him that the Commonwealth
would forgo a pursuit of a capital sentence if he entered a jury trial waiver:
He was informed by trial counsel that this was a death penalty
case. It was for this reason, and this reason only, that he waived
his right to a jury trial, believing that, by waiving his right to a
jury trial, he would no longer be eligible for the death penalty if
convicted. Based on the transcripts, it appears there was
discussion between the Commonwealth and defense counsel
about a possible waiver, but there is nothing in the record to
indicate or suggest why the Defendant waived his right to a jury
trial, in a double murder case, before [the trial judge]. The
undersigned can think of no reason for why the Defendant, before
th[e trial c]ourt, would waive his waive his right to a jury trial, in
a double murder case, without consideration for said waiver.
Amended PCRA Petition, 11/14/20, ¶ 12(a) (emphasis in original; formatting
in brackets; record citation omitted). The PCRA court denied this claim for
lack of merit because it was contradicted by the statements made under oath
by Appellant in his jury waiver colloquy, and Appellant made no proffer to
support his assertion of coercion. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 5-7.
Here, the certified record includes separate written jury trial waiver
colloquies for each of Appellant’s underlying cases. Each addressed all the
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essential elements for a jury trial waiver that were addressed in Williams.
Notably, Appellant agreed in the written jury trial waiver colloquies that the
maximum sentence for his murder charges was life imprisonment. Written
Jury Trial Waiver Colloquies, 4/24/17, ¶ 38. The trial court also conducted an
oral jury trial waiver colloquy in which Appellant confirmed that his waiver of
his jury trial rights was not the product of threats, coercion, or promises.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 7. The Commonwealth included the following
pertinent section of the oral colloquy in its motion to dismiss the PCRA
petition:
THE COURT: Understanding all of those things; how a jury trial
would work; how a judge trial would work; is it still your decision
to adhere to your decision to have a judge trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. That is what I want.
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything or anybody
threaten you in any way or used any kind of force against you to
get you to give up your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: You’re doing it of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Commonwealth Motion to Dismiss, 8/16/21, 5, quoting N.T. 4/24/17, 15-16.
A criminal defendant should not be permitted to extricate himself from
an otherwise valid jury trial waiver premised upon a sentencing issue unless
he can prove that his jury waiver was part of an explicit agreement for a
sentencing concession. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Houck, 948 A.2d 780,
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788 (Pa. 2008) (“[I]f a defendant seeks to invalidate an otherwise valid jury
waiver based on a trial court’s recitation of his or her potential sentence, the
defendant should be required to demonstrate that his or her understanding of
the length of the potential sentence was a material factor in making the
decision to waive a jury trial.”). In this instance, the oral and written jury
waiver colloquies show that Appellant waived his jury trial rights without any
agreement as to a potential sentence and that he entered that waiver with the
knowledge that the Commonwealth was only seeking life imprisonment
sentences for his murder charges.
Appellant could not prevail on the instant claim in the absence of an
additional proffer of evidence concerning the prior advice of his counsel
because he could not obtain post-conviction relief by merely claiming that he
lied during his jury waiver colloquy. See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 645
A.2d 274, 277 (Pa. Super. 1994) (relying, in the context of a claim of
ineffectiveness in connection with an alleged jury waiver based on coercion,
on caselaw addressing claims of coerced guilty pleas and maintaining that a
defendant cannot prevail by claiming that he lied previously while under oath
during a guilty plea colloquy). The PCRA court properly appreciated that
Appellant could only succeed on his claim by proffering independent
corroboration that his trial counsel had improperly induced his jury trial
waiver. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 6-7, citing Commonwealth v. Carey,
340 A.2d 509, 511 (Pa. Super. 1975) (“Since it is rather common for a
disappointed defendant to claim that he was induced to waive a constitutional
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right because of some promise by his counsel … it has been held that ordinarily
no relief will be granted unless the defendant’s testimony is ‘corroborated by
some other source which is accepted as truthful.’”) (citations omitted). In
the absence of a proffer of extrinsic evidence concerning the advice of his prior
counsel, Appellant was bound by the statements he made during his jury trial
waiver colloquies.8 Accordingly, the PCRA court properly denied the instant
claim as meritless.
In his last issue, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred by denying
him relief on his claim of newly discovered evidence of misconduct by the lead
detective in his cases, Nathaniel Williams. Appellant’s Brief at 15-19. He does
not address the nature of the evidence supporting the claim other than to
refer to “Police Misconduct Disclosure Notices” about Detective Williams and
another detective (Philip Nordo) that he notes are “referenced but not
attached.”9 Id. at 15. He asserts that Detective Williams’ “position as lead
detective on both cases and trial testimony raises significant issues given his
now known history of misconduct,” and that, if that “history [had] been known
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8 While it was not acknowledged by Appellant in any of his filings, we note
that Appellant’s ability to proffer additional evidence in support of the instant
claim was obviously affected by the untimely passing of his trial counsel prior
to the filing of his amended PCRA petition. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 7 n.1
(acknowledging that trial counsel passed away on April 15, 2020).
9 Appellant referred to a disclosure of “qualifying misconduct” by Detective
Williams in his amended PCRA petition, but never appended a copy of that
disclosure to his petition. Amended PCRA Petition, 11/14/20, 12(b).
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at the time of trial,” he would not have opted for a non-jury trial and would
have been acquitted by a jury. Id. at 19.
In the absence of any discussion of the nature of the “newly discovered
evidence” at the focus of Appellant’s claim in his appellate brief or his amended
PCRA petition, the PCRA court has offered us the following summary of the
“evidence:”
From October to November of 2017, Detective Nathaniel Williams
is alleged to have used his authority as a police officer to access
a police database in order to investigate a woman who had
accused his cousin of stalking and harassment. He is also alleged
to have then lied to his superior officers about his actions. See
Commonwealth v. Nathaniel Williams, MC-51-CR-0030428-
2019, Trial Court Opinion of Crystal Bryant-Powell, J., filed
October 18, 2021, at pp. 2-5. Detective Williams was arrested in
November of 2019, on charges of tampering with public records,
obstruction of the administration of law, unsworn falsification to
authorities, and tampering with evidence. See Docket No. MC-
51-CR-0030428-2019. On September 11, 2020, the case was
dismissed for lack of evidence. Id. The Commonwealth refiled
the original complaint, which was again dismissed for lack of
evidence. Id. The Commonwealth appealed and the case is
currently pending in the Superior Court. See Docket No. 980 EDA
2021.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 8-9.10
After-discovered evidence is a recognized ground for relief under the
PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). To prevail on a claim of after-
discovered evidence, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that the evidence:
“(1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the
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10As of the drafting of this memorandum, the Commonwealth’s appeal from
the dismissal of the charges against Williams remains pending.
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exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or
cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness;
and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.”
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008). Failure to satisfy
one prong of this four-part test is fatal to the claim. See Commonwealth v.
Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1180 (Pa. 2015) (“As this test is conjunctive, failure
to establish one prong obviates the need to analyze the remaining ones.”).
The PCRA court’s denial of this claim is two-fold. First, the court advises
that, because the alleged misconduct at the focus of the “evidence” did not
take place until six months after Appellant’s trial, the “evidence” at issue could
not be considered after-discovered evidence for purposes of a claim under 42
Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 8. Second, the court
noted that, even if the “evidence” of alleged misconduct by Detective Williams
were available at trial, it would not have likely compelled a different trial
verdict because the evidence “had no nexus to [Appellant’s] case, and little
probative value regarding Detective Williams’s work as a homicide detective
generally.” Id. The Commonwealth separately argues that any evidence of
misconduct by Detective Williams would not have affected the trial verdicts
because Detective Williams did not participate in the interviews of any of the
eyewitnesses regarding the murder of victim Miller, and “there
was ample untainted evidence to find [Appellant] guilty of murdering victim
Bright.” Appellee’s Brief at 19-21.
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We discern multiple reasons for denying the after-discovered evidence
claim as meritless. As an initial matter, the presently-dismissed criminal
charges against Detective Williams could not constitute evidence for purposes
or an after-discovered evidence claim because criminal indictments or criminal
charges are based upon allegations, not proven facts. See Commonwealth
v. Delbridge, 859 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Pa. 2004) (stating “[a]llegations are not
evidence”); see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 137 A.3d 605, 609-10 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (explaining that, allegations or accusations contained in a
criminal indictment, or criminal charges, are not evidence), appeal denied,
157 A.3d 476 (Pa. 2016); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 2022 WL 1087379,
*7 (Pa. Super., filed Apr. 12, 2022) (rejecting an after-discovered evidence
claim based on the criminal charges against Detective Williams and noting that
“neither the criminal indictment nor criminal charges constitutes evidence for
purposes of an after-discovered evidence claim”) (unpublished memorandum
cited for persuasive value).
Next, even if the criminal allegations against Detective Williams could
be considered evidence, this claim would fail because the evidence, which was
not alleged to have stemmed from misconduct in Appellant’s case, would be
solely used to impeach the credibility of the detective with respect to his
accounts of the interviews he conducted and the witness statements he
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recorded.11 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1123 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (holding that the criminal conviction of a police detective, who
was involved in the questioning of a witness that identified the petitioner as
the perpetrator of a fatal shooting, did not constitute after-discovered
evidence because evidence of the conviction would only be used for
impeachment purposes and there was no evidence that the police detective
committed misconduct in the petitioner’s case), appeal denied, 197 A.3d
1174 (Pa. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537
(Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that, “new evidence” of the filing of criminal
charges against a police detective in an unrelated matter does not satisfy the
after-discovered evidence test because the “new evidence” would be used
solely for impeachment purposes and would not likely result in a different
verdict); Griffin, 137 A.3d at 610 (stating that, even if the allegations
contained in an indictment or criminal complaint were “evidence,” a petitioner
would still not satisfy the after-discovered evidence test because the alleged
evidence would be used solely for impeachment purposes); Shelley, 2022 WL
____________________________________________11 With respect to the case of victim Bright, Detective Williams interviewed
and took a statement from Jeffrey Best. N.T. 4/25/17, 16-40, 45-73; N.T.
4/27/17, 7-8; Commonwealth Exhibit 271 (Jeffrey Best Statement, 5/11/16).
With respect to the case of victim Miller, Detective Williams interviewed and
took a statement from Zsahniah Jones, and attempted to interview Nasir
Brown Simpson, the person who had been caught with the gun used in the
murders. N.T. N.T. 4/26/17, 9-36; N.T. 4/27/17, 9-16, 67-70, 85-86;
Commonwealth Exhibit 51 (Zsahniah Jones Statement, 5/13/16). Detective
Williams also testified that he received a letter from Reginald Hutson and
spoke to him about inculpatory statements made by Appellant, though he did
not conduct a formal interview of Mr. Hutson. N.T. 4/26/17, 80-83; N.T.
4/27/17, 17-18, 30.
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1087379 at *8 (denying an after-discovered evidence claim based on the
criminal charges against Detective Williams on the grounds that the
“evidence” would be used only to impeach the credibility of Detective Williams
and another detective to demonstrate that the detectives falsified police
statements implicating Shelley as the perpetrator of a fatal shooting)
(unpublished memorandum cited for persuasive value).
Lastly, the PCRA court could not have erred by concluding that the
allegations of misconduct involving Detective Williams likely would not have
resulted in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. Here, the focus of
Appellant’s claim was alleged conduct by the detective that supposedly took
place six to seven months following Appellant’s trial and had no apparent
connection to the investigation of Appellant. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/1/22, 8-
9. The allegations involved supposed efforts of the detective to investigate a
woman who had made accusations of stalking and harassment against the
detective’s cousin and that the detective then lied to his superior officers about
his actions. Id. Even if the underlying allegations of misconduct were
accepted as true, they suggested that the detective embarked on a retaliatory
investigation and then was dishonest about his efforts to engage in that
investigation. The instant case has no apparent connections with the basis of
the allegations at the focus of the claim: the detective was not alleged to have
engaged in a retaliatory investigation of Appellant and the misconduct
allegations were based on events that took place months after Appellant’s
trial. Thus, Appellant could not establish a nexus between his case and the
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purported after-discovered evidence and thus could not establish the
likelihood of a different outcome in his case. See Foreman, 55 A.3d at 537-
38 (Pa. Super. 2012) (Foreman’s “new evidence” regarding criminal charges
against a detective who testified at his criminal trial did not justify a new trial;
Foreman failed to show any nexus between his case and the detective’s
alleged misconduct in an incident which occurred more than two years after
Foreman’s conviction and the evidence would be used solely to impeach the
detective); Commonwealth v. Soto, 983 A.2d 212, 215-216 (Pa. Super.
2009) (holding that the discovery of a series of thefts committed by a police
chemist following appellants’ convictions failed to provide a basis for awarding
new trials on narcotics charges where appellants failed to show to show that
the evidence of the chemist’s improper activities would have compelled
different results at their trials, and noting that the assertions that the chemist
likely stole drugs years before or that she added weight to the contraband in
evidence was conjecture).
For these reasons, we cannot conclude the PCRA court erred or abused
its discretion in denying relief on Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/17/2022
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