In the Int. of: J.M.C., a Minor ( 2016 )


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  • J. A09012/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF:                     :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    J.M.C., A MINOR                         :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF              :        No. 1265 MDA 2015
    PENNSYLVANIA                            :
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Juvenile Division at No. CP-21-JV-0000086-2015
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS AND PLATT,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:           FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2016
    The Commonwealth appeals from the June 30, 2015 order granting
    J.M.C.’s omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress inculpatory statements that
    he made during the course of a court-ordered sex offender treatment
    program, as well as any evidence stemming from these admissions. After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case, as gleaned from
    the certified record, are as follows.   On September 14, 2010, J.M.C. was
    adjudicated delinquent of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”)
    and attempted rape of a child.    (Notes of testimony, 6/1/15 at 3-5.)    On
    May 12, 2014, the juvenile court modified the disposition for J.M.C. and
    ordered that he successfully complete the sex offender treatment program
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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    at Adelphoi Village Secure Treatment Center (“Adelphoi Village”). (Id. at 4.)
    As part of his treatment, J.M.C. was required to disclose his sexual history
    and submit to a polygraph administered by the treatment providers at
    Adelphoi Village. (Id. at 7.) On June 23, 2014, J.M.C. disclosed during a
    pre-polygraph examination that he had sexually assaulted a number of
    juveniles, including an autistic boy, S.J. (“the victim”). (Id. at 7, 12, 55.)
    Based upon this disclosure, it was later determined that these sexual
    assaults occurred between February and August 2009 at a Cumberland
    County foster home where both J.M.C. and the victim resided.       (Id. at 9,
    18-19; see also “Written Allegation,” 3/17/15 at 3.) At the time of these
    sexual assaults, J.M.C. was approximately 14 years old and the victim was
    between the ages of 8 and 9 years old. (“Written Allegation,” 3/17/15 at 3.)
    J.M.C. was not provided constitutional rights or Miranda1 warnings prior to
    the polygraph examination and associated interview. (Juvenile court opinion
    and order, 6/30/15 at 2; findings of fact nos. 8, 9.)
    As a result of J.M.C.’s disclosure, this incident was reported to the
    Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”) and the State Police
    commenced an investigation. (Notes of testimony, 6/1/15 at 9-11, 17-18.)
    On November 20, 2014, J.M.C. was interviewed at Adelphoi Village by
    Trooper David Rush (“Trooper Rush”) and Mark Schrode (“Schrode”), a
    program representative with the Office of Children and Youth and Family
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
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    Services (“CYS”). (Id.) During this interview, the only individuals present
    in the room were Schrode, Rush, and J.M.C. (Id. at 13.) Trooper Rush was
    unable to affirmatively recall whether J.M.C. was given Miranda warnings
    prior to this interview, and no written waiver was ever obtained from J.M.C.
    (See notes of testimony, 6/1/15 at 19-20, 29.)            The juvenile court,
    however, indicated in its June 30, 2015 opinion that Trooper Rush did in fact
    issue constitutional rights warnings to J.M.C. on November 20, 2014, prior to
    speaking with him.      (See juvenile court opinion and order, 6/30/15 at 7
    (stating, “[t]he second interrogation of [J.M.C.] does not overcome the
    evidentiary taint by Trooper [Rush]’s issuance of a constitutional rights
    warning.”).)
    Thereafter,   on    December   1,   2014,   State   Trooper   Nicole   Mark
    (“Trooper Mark”) and Schrode went to the victim’s home in Cumberland
    County and spoke with the victim and his foster parents.             (Notes of
    testimony, 6/1/15 at 52-53, 61-63.) During the course of this interview, the
    victim confirmed that he and J.M.C. had sexual contact when they resided in
    the same foster home. (Id. at 9, 61; see also “Written Allegation,” 3/17/15
    at 1-3.)   On December 16, 2014, Rebecca Voss (“Voss”), a staff member
    with the Over the Rainbow Children’s Advocacy Center, interviewed the
    victim at the request of Schrode.    (Notes of testimony, 6/1/15 at 37-39.)
    Voss testified that she conducted a “blind” interview of the victim, noting
    that she did not utilize any information about the incident, asked
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    open-ended questions, and did not specifically bring up J.M.C.’s name. (Id.
    at 42-44.) The victim, however, was aware of why he was being interviewed
    based upon his contact with Trooper Mark and Schrode two weeks earlier.
    (Juvenile court opinion and order, 6/30/15 at 3; finding of fact no. 13.) The
    victim was more forthcoming about the incidents in question during this
    interview. (Notes of testimony, 6/1/15 at 55.)
    On March 17, 2015, J.M.C. was charged with IDSI, unlawful contact
    with a minor, and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.2
    On April 21, 2015, J.M.C. filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the
    statements he made during treatment, as well as any evidence derived from
    his admissions, including the statements of the victim.       (See “Omnibus
    Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress Evidence,” 4/21/15 at ¶¶ 19-20.) On June 1,
    2015, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on J.M.C.’s suppression
    motion.      Following the hearing, the juvenile court granted J.M.C.’s
    suppression motion on June 30, 2015. In reaching this decision, the juvenile
    court reasoned as follows:
    [J.M.C.’s] initial statement [on June 23, 2014]
    was made without the protection of a constitutional
    rights warning in derogation from criminal law
    practice. The second interrogation of [J.M.C. on
    November 20, 2014] does not overcome the
    evidentiary taint by Trooper [Rush]’s issuance of a
    constitutional rights warning. In essence, [J.M.C.]
    was directed if he wanted to complete his court
    supervision he had to come clean about this sexual
    past. No amount of law enforcement warning would
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 6318, and 3126(a)(7), respectively.
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    nullify the Judge’s Order to [J.M.C.] to be compliant
    with the people he dealt with while at Aldephoi
    [Village]. The Aldephoi [Village] statements were
    made in a confrontational style setting, which is to
    say a custodial interrogation within the court
    mandated facilities for [J.M.C.] This is a violation of
    both the [Juvenile Act] and the Constitution;
    therefore, the statements and all derivative evidence
    obtained as a result of this interrogation must be
    suppressed.
    Juvenile court opinion and order, 6/30/15 at 7-8.
    On July 23, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal,
    certifying, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), that the June 30, 2015 order will
    terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. On July 27, 2015, the
    juvenile court directed the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.          The
    Commonwealth filed its timely Rule 1925(b) statement on August 6, 2015.
    The record reflects that the juvenile court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues for our
    review:
    I.    Whether     the    juvenile court  erred  in
    suppressing      [J.M.C.’s]  statements   to
    [Trooper Rush] and CYS worker [Schrode]
    regarding [J.M.C.’s] sexual abuse of another
    juvenile victim?
    II.   Whether      the   juvenile   court   erred    in
    suppressing the juvenile victim’s statements
    and testimony regarding J.M.C.’s sexual abuse
    because the statements and testimony relate
    to the victim’s personal experience and
    recollection    which   dissipates   any    taint
    associated with [J.M.C.’s] disclosures?
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    Commonwealth’s brief at 2 (emphasis in original).      For the ease of our
    discussion, we have elected to address the Commonwealth’s claims
    simultaneously.
    “When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an appellate
    court is required to determine whether the record supports the suppression
    court’s factual findings and whether the inferences and legal conclusions
    drawn by the suppression court from those findings are appropriate.”
    In re O.J., 
    958 A.2d 561
    , 564 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 
    989 A.2d 918
     (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).     “Since Juvenile prevailed below, we
    consider only the evidence of Juvenile and so much of the Commonwealth’s
    evidence that is un-contradicted when read in the context of the entire
    record.” In re T.P., 
    78 A.3d 1166
    , 1169 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
    
    93 A.3d 463
     (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “Where the suppression court’s
    factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound
    by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
    erroneous.”     Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    121 A.3d 524
    , 526 (Pa.Super.
    2015), appeal denied, 
    135 A.3d 584
     (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted; brackets
    in original).     However, “where the questions presented concern legal
    questions, we are not bound by the suppression court’s determinations and
    our standard of review is de novo.” In re T.P., 78 A.3d at 1169 (citation
    omitted).
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    “The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301[,] et seq., is designed to
    effectuate the protection of the public by providing children who commit
    ‘delinquent acts’ with supervision, rehabilitation, and care while promoting
    responsibility and the ability to become a productive member of the
    community.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    26 A.3d 485
    , 491-492 (Pa.Super.
    2011), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(2). Section 6338 of the Juvenile Act
    (“the Act”) codifies by statute the rights to confront witnesses, present
    evidence, remain silent, and to be free from self-incrimination, as set forth
    in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
    Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Specifically, Section 6338(c)
    governs statements and information obtained from juveniles during a
    screening or assessment. This section provides, in relevant part, as follows:
    No statements, admissions or confessions
    made by or incriminating information obtained
    from a child in the course of a screening or
    assessment that is undertaken in conjunction with
    any proceedings under this chapter, including, but
    not limited to, that which is court ordered, shall
    be admitted into evidence against the child on
    the issue of whether the child committed a
    delinquent act under this chapter or on the issue of
    guilt in any criminal proceeding.
    Id. at § 6338(c)(1) (emphasis added).
    This court has recognized that allowing these types of statements to
    be admitted into evidence would frustrate the Act’s underlying goals of
    treatment and rehabilitation. See In re T.P., 78 A.3d at 1173.
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    The language of the Juvenile Act provisions in
    question reveals that the Juvenile Act is intended to
    foster truthfulness and full disclosure by a juvenile in
    order to further treatment.             By prohibiting
    incriminating statements made during assessments
    from being used in delinquency and adult
    prosecutions, this goal is served—a juvenile can
    freely disclose any transgressions without fear of his
    statements being used in connection with additional
    juvenile     delinquency      proceedings.          The
    Commonwealth’s position [that these statements
    should be admissible] would defeat a critical
    component of juvenile rehabilitation, foster suspicion
    and the potential withholding of information by
    juveniles, violate a duly-enacted statutory provision,
    and give rise to possible constitutional concerns.
    Id. at 1175-1176.
    Instantly, the Commonwealth concedes that the statements J.M.C.
    made during his court-ordered pre-polygraph interview and polygraph
    examination were properly suppressed, pursuant to Section 6338(c)(1).
    (Commonwealth’s brief at 7-10; see also notes of testimony, 6/30/15 at
    68.)   The Commonwealth, however, contends that J.M.C.’s post-polygraph
    statements [on November 20, 2014], as well as those of the victim, were
    admissible. (Commonwealth’s brief at 9-16.) In support of this contention,
    the Commonwealth maintains that J.M.C.’s subsequent disclosures to
    Trooper Rush and Schrode during the November 20, 2014 interview were
    not illegally obtained in violation of Miranda, were not involuntary or
    coerced, and were not inadmissible as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
    (Commonwealth’s brief at 9-16.) The Commonwealth further contends that
    the juvenile court erred in suppressing the statements the victim made
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    during the December 1 and December 16, 2014 interviews because “[they]
    relate to the victim’s personal experience and recollection which dissipates
    any taint associated with [J.M.C.’s] disclosures.”     (Id. at 17.)     For the
    following reasons, we disagree.
    In In re C.O., a panel of this court recently addressed whether a
    juvenile court erred in suppressing incriminatory statements that a juvenile
    made to a youth counselor and CYS caseworker during the course of a
    court-ordered treatment program. In re C.O., 
    84 A.3d 726
    , 731 (Pa.Super.
    2014), appeal denied, 
    97 A.3d 742
     (Pa. 2014).              In ruling that the
    questioning of the juvenile while in custody at a residential treatment facility
    constituted an “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda, the In re
    C.O. court reasoned as follows:
    To safeguard an uncounseled individual’s Fifth
    Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
    suspects subject to custodial interrogation by law
    enforcement officers must be warned that they have
    the right to remain silent, that anything they say
    may be used against them in court, and that they
    are entitled to the presence of an attorney.
    Juveniles, as well as adults, are entitled to be
    apprised of their constitutional rights pursuant to
    Miranda. If a person is not advised of his Miranda
    rights prior to custodial interrogation by law
    enforcement officers, evidence resulting from such
    interrogation cannot be used against him. A person
    is deemed to be in custody for Miranda purposes
    when [he] is physically denied of his freedom of
    action in any significant way or is placed in a
    situation in which he reasonably believes that his
    freedom of action or movement is restricted by the
    interrogation.
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    In order to trigger the safeguards of Miranda,
    there must be both custody and interrogation.
    Interrogation is defined as police conduct calculated
    to, expected to, or likely to evoke [an] admission.
    Moreover,     [u]nder      certain   circumstances,
    individuals who are not law enforcement
    personnel nevertheless possess the status of
    law enforcement for purposes of custodial
    interrogation.
    In re C.O., 
    84 A.3d at
    731–732 (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted; brackets in original; emphasis added). The In re C.O. court held
    that the juvenile’s statements were properly suppressed, noting that the
    treatment counselor and CYS caseworker, while not police officers, were
    required to provide Miranda warnings to the juvenile because they were
    investigating him and their questions elicited incriminating responses that
    formed the basis for the prosecution. In re C.O., 
    84 A.3d at 736
    .
    Similarly, in the instant matter, the June 23, 2014 pre-polygraph
    interview and examination wherein J.M.C. disclosed to the Adelphoi Village
    treatment providers that he sexually assaulted the victim was the functional
    equivalent of an interrogation, sufficient to trigger the protections of
    Section 6338(c)(1). As in In re C.O., a component of J.M.C.’s court-ordered
    sex offender treatment program required that he fully cooperate with the
    treatment providers and disclose his past sexual history. During the course
    of this examination, the treatment providers elicited inculpatory responses
    from J.M.C., without the benefit of Miranda warnings.     These statements
    were subsequently reported to the DPW and led directly to a state police
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    investigation.     Consequently, it logically follows that any statements or
    evidence derived from this illegal interrogation, including those by J.M.C. in
    a subsequent interview with Trooper Rush and Schrode, as well as any of the
    allegations of the victim obtained as a direct result of J.M.C.’s court-
    mandated disclosure, should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
    “The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained
    from,    or     acquired   as   a   consequence     of,   lawless   official   acts.”
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    68 A.3d 930
    , 946 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations
    omitted).      “A fruit of the poisonous tree argument requires an antecedent
    illegality.”    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).    Courts in this Commonwealth have
    repeatedly recognized that,
    [w]e need not hold that all evidence is “fruit of the
    poisonous tree” simply because it would not have
    come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.
    Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
    whether, granting establishment of the primary
    illegality, the evidence to which instant
    objection is made has been come at by
    exploitation of that illegality or instead by
    means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
    of the primary taint.
    Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 
    128 A.3d 806
    , 815 (Pa.Super. 2015)
    (emphasis added), citing Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 
    370 A.2d 1172
    ,
    1176-1177 (Pa. 1977), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 471
    ,
    487-488 (1963).
    Here, an antecedent illegality occurred, as the Adelphoi Village
    treatment providers “possess[ed] the status of law enforcement for purposes
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    of custodial interrogation” at the time J.M.C. made the incriminating
    statements.      See In re C.O., 
    84 A.3d at 732
    .     Moreover, the statements
    given by J.M.C. on November 20, 2014, as well as any evidence derived
    from this interview, were not purged of the primary taint of this initial illegal
    interrogation.    As the juvenile court aptly recognized in its opinion, “[t]he
    second interrogation of [J.M.C. on November 20, 2014] d[id] not overcome
    the evidentiary taint by Trooper [Rush]’s issuance of a constitutional rights
    warning.” (See juvenile court opinion and order, 6/30/15 at 7.)
    The state police were able to secure the victim’s statements about the
    abuse as a direct result of J.M.C.’s initial disclosure that he sexually
    assaulted a number of juveniles in 2009, and not through any independent
    investigation or source.       The application of the “independent source
    doctrine” is only proper “where the independent source is to be truly
    independent from both the tainted evidence and the police or investigative
    team which engaged in the misconduct by which the tainted evidence was
    discovered.”      Commonwealth v. Henderson, 
    47 A.3d 797
    , 799 (Pa.
    2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S.Ct. 435
     (2012) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). Herein, the state police possessed no information as to any
    victims or witnesses in this case, or that J.M.C. had even committed the
    crimes in question, prior to the disclosures he made as part of his
    court-ordered      sex   offender   treatment   program.        Permitting   the
    Commonwealth to utilize J.M.C.’s statements under these circumstances, as
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    well as any evidence directly derived from these statements, would frustrate
    the juvenile court’s ability to order sexual offender treatment that requires
    full disclosure and render the protections afforded by Section 6338(c)(1) of
    the Act futile. See In re T.P., 78 A.3d at 1175-1176.
    Accordingly, we discern no error on the part of the juvenile court in
    suppressing the inculpatory statements J.M.C. made during the course of a
    court-ordered sex offender treatment program, as well as any evidence or
    statements stemming from these admissions, including those of the victim.
    Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s June 30, 2015 suppression order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/21/2016
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