Com. v. Henderson, L. ( 2017 )

J. S02008/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
LAMONT G. HENDERSON, : No. 2986 EDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, September 4, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0710351-1981
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND MOULTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017
Lamont G. Henderson appeals from the September 4, 2015 order
dismissing his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely. After careful review,
we affirm.
The underlying facts and procedural history of this case were
summarized by the PCRA court and need not be reiterated here. (See PCRA
court opinion, 4/25/16 at 1-4.) In sum, appellant filed the instant PCRA
petition, his fifth, on August 5, 2013, alleging that he was entitled to relief
with respect to his December 20, 1981 conviction for the shooting death of
J. S02008/17
Philadelphia Police Officer Jack E. Holcomb, Jr.1 Appellant is currently
serving a sentence of life imprisonment that was imposed by the trial court
on March 2, 1982. On July 31, 2015, the PCRA court provided appellant with
notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), of its intention to dismiss his
petition without a hearing. Thereafter, on September 4, 2015, the PCRA
court dismissed appellant’s petition as untimely. This timely appeal
followed.
On appeal, appellant presents the following issue for our review:
WHETHER THE [PCRA] COURT ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT’S PCRA PETITION TO BE UNTIMELY?
Appellant’s brief at 10.
The timeliness of appellant’s PCRA petition implicates the jurisdiction
of this court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883,
887 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). All PCRA petitions, including
second and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of when a
defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for
seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). If a PCRA petition is untimely, a
1
Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and possessing
instruments of crime in connection with this incident. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2502, 3701, and 907, respectively.
-2-
J. S02008/17
court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101
A.3d 118, 120-121 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Here, it is undisputed that appellant’s August 5, 2013 PCRA petition is
patently untimely. As noted, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term
of life imprisonment on March 2, 1982. On March 6, 1984, a panel of this
court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our supreme court denied
appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on October 15, 1984. See
Commonwealth v. Henderson, 472 A.2d 211 (Pa.Super. 1984), appeal
denied, A.2d (Pa. 1984). Appellant did not seek certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. Thus, appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on December 14, 1984, 60 days after the time for filing a
petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See
(former) U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (providing “a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review[]”). As a
result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition,
unless appellant alleged and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the
time bar, as set forth in Section 9545(b)(1). See Commonwealth v.
Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa.Super. 2014).
The three exceptions to the PCRA time-bar are as follows:
“(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim;
-3-
J. S02008/17
(2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.”
Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa.Super. 2012),
citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Appellant bears the burden of
pleading and proving the applicability of any exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1). In addition, a petition invoking any of the timeliness
exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claim first could have
been presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2).
Instantly, appellant contends he satisfied Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
because his claims are predicated on a “fact” of which he was previously
unaware; namely, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin
v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). (Appellant’s brief at 14, 38-39.) In
McQuiggin, the Supreme Court held that in federal habeas corpus
proceedings, strict compliance with the one-year statute of limitations
imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) will not be required when the petitioner
advances a convincing claim of actual innocence. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at
1928. Under McQuiggin, petitioners who assert a convincing actual
innocence claim may invoke the miscarriage of justice exception to
overcome the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations. Id. Appellant
contends it is unconstitutional to apply the PCRA timeliness provisions to his
instant petition in light of the McQuiggin holding. (Appellant’s brief at 14.)
Upon review, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in
dismissing appellant’s petition as untimely. Contrary to appellant’s claim,
-4-
J. S02008/17
the record reflects that appellant failed to file his August 5, 2013 petition
within 60 days of the date McQuiggin was decided, May 28, 2013, as
required by Section 9545(b)(2).
Moreover, we have recognized that McQuiggin is inapplicable to the
instant matter because that decision pertained to timeliness requirements
for federal habeas corpus review, and not PCRA petitions. In
Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418 (Pa.Super. 2016), a panel of this
court recently addressed the applicability of McQuiggin to the timeliness
provisions set forth in the PCRA. The Brown court declined to follow
McQuiggin on state-law grounds, reasoning as follows:
Our jurisprudence, however, has already deemed
such decisions pertaining to federal habeas corpus
law irrelevant to our construction of the timeliness
provisions set forth in the PCRA. See
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165
(Pa.Super. 2013) (“While Martinez [v. Ryan,
U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012)]
represents a significant development in federal
habeas corpus law, it is of no moment with respect
to the way Pennsylvania courts apply the plain
language of the time bar set forth in section
9545(b)(1) of the PCRA.”). While McQuiggin
represents a further development in federal habeas
corpus law, as was the case in Saunders, this
change in federal law is irrelevant to the time
restrictions of our PCRA.
Brown, 143 A.3d at 420-421 (citations and brackets in original).
Lastly, we note that our supreme court has held that “subsequent
decisional law does not amount to a new ‘fact’ under section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
-5-
J. S02008/17
of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266, 271 (Pa.
2016), citing Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the merits of appellant’s fifth PCRA petition and
properly dismissed it as untimely filed. Accordingly, we affirm the
September 4, 2015 order of the PCRA court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2017
-6-