Com. v. Copeland, L. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S14014-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee             :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    LINWOOD CHESTER COPELAND               :
    :
    Appellant            :        No. 1297 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order July 19, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0005742-2012
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                  FILED MARCH 15, 2017
    Appellant, Linwood Chester Copeland, appeals pro se from the order
    entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Peas, which dismissed his
    second petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On June 10, 2013, Appellant entered a negotiated
    guilty plea to indecent assault (victim less than 13 years of age), unlawful
    contact with a minor, and corruption of minors.         The court sentenced
    Appellant that day in accordance with the plea bargain, to an aggregate
    term of 5-10 years’ imprisonment plus two years’ probation. Appellant did
    not pursue direct review. On December 4, 2013, Appellant timely filed a pro
    se PCRA petition. The court appointed counsel on December 12, 2013. On
    January 24, 2014, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and “no-merit” letter
    _____________________________
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S14014-17
    per Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    518 Pa. 491
    , 
    544 A.2d 927
    (1988) and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). The
    court issued appropriate notice per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on February 3, 2014,
    and granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. Appellant responded pro se on
    February 21, 2014, and the court denied PCRA relief on March 4, 2014. On
    October 23, 2014, this Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief.          See
    Commonwealth v. Copeland, 
    108 A.3d 121
    (Pa.Super. 2014).
    Appellant filed the current pro se second PCRA petition on April 27,
    2016, seeking relief under Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d 314
    (2013). On June 6, 2016, the court issued Rule
    907 notice; Appellant responded pro se on June 13, 2016.          On July 19,
    2016, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of
    appeal on July 27, 2016. On August 8, 2016, the court ordered Appellant to
    file a concise statement per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant timely complied.
    Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
    requisite. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 
    148 A.3d 849
    (Pa.Super. 2016). A
    PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
    one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).    A judgment of sentence is deemed final “at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
    Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
    expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The
    -2-
    J-S14014-17
    statutory   exceptions    to   the   PCRA    time-bar   allow   for   very   limited
    circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be excused; a
    petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 days
    of when the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2).
    Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on July 10,
    2013, upon expiration of the time to file a direct appeal with this Court. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 903. Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on April 27, 2016,
    which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant now
    attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the statutory
    time-bar per Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), insisting Alleyne and its progeny
    declared unconstitutional the mandatory minimum sentencing statute under
    which Appellant was allegedly sentenced.        Nevertheless, the court did not
    impose a mandatory minimum sentence here so Alleyne would not apply in
    any event. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/15/2017
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Copeland, L. No. 1297 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 3/15/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024