In Re: C.M.C., A Minor, Appeal of: C.L.C. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: C.M.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.L.C.
No. 1460 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2015 AD 32
BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED MARCH 06, 2017
Appellant C.L.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the order granting the
petition of the Blair County Children, Youth, and Families (“BCCYF”) agency
to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to C.M.C., born March of 2009,
(“Child”). This case returns to us after we vacated the decree voluntarily
terminating Mother’s parental rights and remanded “with instructions to
proceed on the involuntary termination petition or for Mother to file a proper
voluntary petition under Subchapter A of the Adoption Act.” In re C.M.C.,
140 A.3d 699, 711 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“C.M.C. I”). We affirm.
We state the facts and procedural history set forth by this Court in
C.M.C. I:
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Mother resides in Altoona, Pennsylvania. After a special
relief hearing, on May 25, 2010, the court ordered that
G.C., Child’s maternal grandfather (“Maternal
Grandfather”), have legal and physical custody of Child. On
July 29, 2014, [BCCYF] received a phone call alleging that
Maternal Grandfather was neglecting Child; it implemented
BCCYF services for the family that same day. On August 7,
2014, BCCYF obtained an emergency protective custody
order, which directed BCCYF would have legal and physical
custody, removed Child from Maternal Grandfather’s
home, and placed Child in foster care.
On October 3, 2014, the trial court adjudicated Child
dependent under Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act,
removed Child from Maternal Grandfather’s home, directed
that BCCYF have legal and physical custody, and stated
Child’s placement would remain in foster care. On
December 24, 2014, the trial court entered a four-month
permanency review order maintaining BCCYF’s legal and
physical custody of Child and his placement with his foster
parents. On February 2, 2015, the trial court entered a
permanency order that changed Child’s permanency goal
to adoption and maintained his placement with his foster
parents. Subsequently, on June 10, 2015, the trial court
modified Child’s placement from foster care home to the
home of Paternal Grandmother in Alabama. [Mother has
not seen the Child since June 3, 2015.]
On July 31, 2015, BCCYF filed a petition for
involuntary termination of the parental rights of Mother
and Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (8),
and (b). On August 18, 2015, the trial court held a joint
twelve-month permanency review hearing and hearing on
the involuntary termination petition. At the
commencement of the hearing, Father and Maternal
Grandfather were present in the courtroom and Paternal
Grandmother was present via telephone, but Mother was
not present. . . .
. . . Subsequently, Mother’s counsel, in Mother’s
absence, stipulated to some of the facts averred in the
involuntary termination petition, specifically the names,
dates, and ages of the individuals, but did not stipulate to
the remainder.
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BCCYF first presented the testimony of Krista Gorman,
who is employed by Kids First in the New Steps Program in
Altoona, Pennsylvania. Ms. Gorman testified about
Mother’s interaction with reunification services and the
visits between Mother and Child [that occurred prior to
February 2015]. Ms. Gorman testified that she would
support BCCYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights.
Next, BCCYF questioned Rachel Steinbugl, a BCCYF
caseworker assigned to Child beginning in June of 2015.
Ms. Steinbugl testified as to the involvement of BCCYF with
Child and his parents. During Ms. Steinbugl’s testimony, at
9:50 a.m., Mother arrived in the courtroom, and the trial
court granted a brief recess for her to speak with her legal
counsel. When the court resumed proceedings on the
record, counsel for BCCYF stated that Mother was willing to
voluntarily relinquish her parental rights.
On the record, Mother’s counsel and the trial court
asked Paternal Grandmother if she adopted Child, would
she allow Mother two telephone calls per week with Child
and mutually agreed-upon visitation. Paternal
Grandmother agreed to the requested telephone calls and
visitation.
Mother’s counsel then conducted a colloquy of Mother
regarding her decision to voluntarily relinquish her parental
rights . . . . [Mother stated that termination of her
parental rights was best for Child, as she was struggling
herself and Child was progressing with Paternal
Grandmother.]
The trial court then continued on to the permanency
review portion of the proceeding. The [guardian ad litem]
stipulated that if called to testify, the BCCYF witnesses
would testify consistent with the contents of the twelve-
month permanency review petition, without admitting to
the veracity of the facts set forth in the petition. Counsel
for BCCYF presented the testimony of Paternal
Grandmother regarding Child’s status in her home in
Alabama, where he resides. Paternal Grandmother testified
that Child was doing well in her home. She stated she
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intends to adopt Child, and the adoption proceedings
would take place in Blair County, Pennsylvania.
C.M.C. I, 140 A.3d at 701-03 (second emphasis added and citations and
footnote omitted). The trial court entered a decree voluntarily terminating
Mother’s parental rights.
This Court vacated the decree because Mother failed to file a written
petition voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights, the trial court denied
Mother the statutory ten-day period to deliberate on her decision to
voluntarily terminate her parental rights, and Mother did not waive the ten-
day period. C.M.C. I, 140 A.3d at 710. As noted above, this Court
instructed that on remand Mother could file a petition for voluntary
termination and, if she did not do so, the trial court was to proceed on
BCCYF’s petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights.
On remand, the trial court proceeded on BCCYF’s petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights involuntarily. The court held a hearing on
August 25, 2016, at which the parties agreed to incorporate by reference the
testimony of Ms. Gorman, who testified at the August 18, 2015 permanency
review hearing.
Ms. Gorman, a reunification worker, testified that she observed weekly
visits between Mother and Child from December 2014 through February
2015. According to Ms. Gorman, at the visits, Mother would be “very
stressed” if Child did not obey her instructions, would inappropriately place
Child in “timeout” if he was upset or crying, and did not act in a “loving”
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manner to Child. N.T., 8/18/15, at 10. Mother was “very resistant” to
BCCYF’s attempts to teach Mother how to interact with Child appropriately,
and, in Ms. Gorman’s view, did not improve. Id. Indeed, Ms. Gorman noted
that Mother would cancel or end her visits with Child early on multiple
occasions. Mother also declined to attend group and one-on-one parenting
classes. Id. at 13. Mother eventually requested that BCCYF stop providing
reunification services in February 2015 because she believed that adoption
was an appropriate goal.
At the August 2016 hearing, Ms. Steinbugl testified that since Child
moved to Alabama in June of 2015, Mother has not addressed BCCYF’s
concerns about Mother’s parenting skills, specifically Mother’s lack of “age
appropriate expectations” for Child. N.T., 8/25/16, at 16, 25. After the trial
court removed Child from Maternal Grandfather in October 2014,1 BCCYF
began helping Mother in November of 2014 to reunify with Child. Ms.
Steinbugl, like Ms. Gorman, testified that Mother asked BCCYF to stop
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1
Mother testified that from 2010 to 2014, Maternal Grandfather had custody
of Child and would deny her permission to visit. N.T., 8/25/16, at 39-40, 46.
Mother testified, however, that she filed for custody of Child in 2011 or
2012. Id. at 50. She said she successfully obtained custody without
appearing in court, but that Maternal Grandfather recovered custody of Child
because Mother was in an abusive relationship. Id. at 49. The complete
record was not transmitted to this Court and we therefore are unable to
ascertain whether Mother ever had custody of Child. The record does show
that in 2014, Mother pleaded guilty of falsely reporting to the police that an
ex-boyfriend abused Child and served a sentence of six months’
imprisonment. Id. at 52.
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providing services in February of 2015, as Mother believed that adoption—
and not reunification—was an appropriate goal. Mother stated she was
under a great deal of stress and that the medicine she was taking for her
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic attacks, mood swings, and
bipolar disorder was not helping her. Id. at 45. Ms. Steinbugl did not know if
Mother participated in any other programs to improve her parenting skills.
Based upon Mother’s representation that adoption was best for Child,
BCCYF arranged for once-weekly visits between Mother and Child,2 until the
court held a hearing finalizing Child’s adoption and placement with Paternal
Grandmother in Alabama. However, as she had done with respect to the
reunification visits, Mother began rescheduling, cancelling, or prematurely
terminating the visits. At Mother’s request, BCCYF then switched the
visitation schedule to once every other week. N.T., 8/25/16, at 19-20. The
last visit occurred on June 3, 2015, and was designated a “closure visit.” 3 A
few days later, Child moved to reside with his Paternal Grandmother in
Alabama, and Child has not seen Mother since.
Ms. Steinbugl stated that Mother informed BCCYF that she obtained
her own apartment on June 1, 2015 (shortly before Mother’s last visit with
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2
These visits were different than the reunification visits that occurred
between December 2014 and February 2015.
3
At a “closure visit,” the child is informed that this is the last, foreseeable
visit with the parent.
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Child), but BCCYF was unable to verify this information. N.T., 8/25/16, at
32, 34.4 Mother testified that she stayed at that apartment until February 1,
2016, at which time she moved to a different, larger apartment in the same
complex with her fiancé. Ms. Steinbugl testified that BCCYF prefers to see a
parent reside at one address for an extended period of time before
concluding that the parent has “stable housing.” Id. at 34. Other than
housing, Ms. Steinbugl stated that Mother had not addressed any of the
conditions that led to Child being removed from her care. Id. at 25.
Ms. Steinbugl testified that after removing Child from Maternal
Grandfather’s care, Child had “poor speech and social peer interaction skills.”
N.T., 8/25/16, at 22. She said Child had issues with “aggression[,]
communication and identifying safety.”5 Id. Subsequently, Child improved
in all of these areas. He no longer needs speech and language therapy, but
continues to receive other individual therapy. Id. at 23. Child is thriving,
according to Ms. Steinbugl, and has strongly bonded with and is very
affectionate towards Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 24.
Mother testified that she would like one more chance to prove she can
be a parent. N.T., 8/25/16, at 43. Noting that Child has never been in her
care, Mother expressed her belief that Child, who was six years old at the
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4
The record does not explain the reasons for BCCYF’s inability to verify.
5
The parties did not clarify Ms. Steinbugl’s testimony regarding “identifying
safety.”
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time of the hearing, could tell her if he wanted to live with her or not. Id.6
Mother stated that if Child expressed a wish to live with Paternal
Grandmother, she would respect that wish. In response to the court’s
question asking Mother if she was putting Child in a difficult position by
deciding whether to stay with Mother or Paternal Grandmother, Mother said
she could not answer the question. Id. at 44. Mother acknowledged Child’s
speech has improved but would not say Child was thriving in Alabama
because she has not witnessed that result personally. Id. at 48. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and 8, and 2511(b).
Mother timely appealed and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Mother raises the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Mother’s Brief at 4.
We consider Mother’s issue in light of our established standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they
are supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
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6
Mother’s testimony that she has never cared for Child raises doubt about
her assertion that she briefly had custody of him. See n.1, supra.
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upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101–2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights
does the court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and
welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close
attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently
severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is on the petitioner seeking termination to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are met. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.
Super. 2009).
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We will affirm if we agree with the trial court’s decision as to any one
subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), and its decision as to Section 2511(b).
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal
denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004); see In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa.
Super. 2011). Here, we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate
Mother’s parental rights under subsections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which
provide:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds: . . .
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).7
“[T]ermination under subsection (a)(8) ‘does not require an evaluation
of [the parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to
placement of the children.’ Instead, subsection (a)(8) ‘requires only that the
conditions continue to exist’ after the twelve month period has elapsed.” In
re R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679-80 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). On
appeal, Mother, referencing Section 2511(a)(8), argues that she has severed
all ties with her father and thus would like the opportunity to know Child.
Mother stated that if Child was happy living with his paternal grandmother,
then Mother would permit Child to stay with Paternal Grandmother. We
conclude that Mother is not entitled to relief.
Child has been living in Alabama since June 2015, which is when
Mother last saw him. Although Mother obtained independent housing, Mother
has not established that she has taken any steps to improve her parental
skills in the twelve months after Child’s placement. Mother’s assertion that
she has severed ties with her father and her request for “one last chance”
does not address BCCYF’s evidence that the conditions that led to Child’s
placement in Alabama have continued to exist after June 2016. See M.T.,
101 A.3d at 1179. Indeed, Mother was unreceptive to BCCYF’s instructions
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7
Mother also challenges the sufficiency of evidence with respect to
termination under Section 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2). Because we affirm the
trial court’s decision under subsection (a)(8), we need not address her other
subsection (a) arguments. See B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
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and efforts to improve her parenting skills, and she reduced the frequency
and duration of her visits with Child — opportunities for correcting the skill
deficiencies that led to Child’s placement with Paternal Grandmother.
Further, Child is thriving: while in Alabama, he has bonded with Paternal
Grandmother and has improved his speech and ability to interact with his
friends and family. Child’s placement in Alabama has afforded him much
needed stability, and accordingly, termination would serve Child’s needs and
welfare. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that
BCCYF met its burden of proving the requirements under Section
2511(a)(8).
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained that,
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in
the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 897 A.2d
1183 (Pa. 2006). The trial court must “discern the nature and status of the
parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of
permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted).
Instantly, Mother broadly claims that insufficient evidence exists to
terminate under Section 2511(b). She concedes that she has not been
involved in Child’s life, but says she has wanted an opportunity to parent
Child. Mother’s Brief at 11. Mother’s argument under Section 2511(b) is
substantially similar to her argument under Section 2511(a), which we have
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rejected above. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
Mother’s request for “one last chance” comes too late. Having discerned no
abuse of discretion or error of law, we affirm. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/6/2017
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