In the Interest of: K.O., Appeal of: C.O. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S72032-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.O., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: C.O., MOTHER               :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1225 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Dispositional Order, Entered June 21, 2018,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County,
    Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000013-2018,
    FID: 59 FN-000008-2018.
    IN THE INTEREST OF: A.O., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: C.O., MOTHER               :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1226 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered, June 21, 2018,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County,
    Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-DP-0000014-2018,
    FID# 59-FN-000008-2018.
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED JANUARY 16, 2019
    C.O. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders adjudicating dependent her two
    children, 10-year-old son K.O. and 3-year-old daughter A.O., pursuant to 42
    J-S72032-18
    Pa.S.C.A. § 6302.1        Mother challenges both the substantive finding and
    whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction. After careful review, we affirm.
    Since late 2017, the family had been on the radar of Tioga County’s
    Department of Human Resources (DHS) in Pennsylvania.2 See N.T., 5/14/18,
    at 41. The pertinent history began on March 1, 2018, when Mother and the
    children left the home they shared with Father after Mother obtained a
    Protection From Abuse order against him. Mother and the children had found
    a new residence, and lived there for approximately three weeks when a fire
    started in the garage and burned the residence down. Fortunately, Mother
    and the children were visiting Mother’s friend in New York. They remained in
    New York thereafter.
    On April 3, 2018, the day after the fire – and the day after Mother and
    the children went to New York – DHS in Tioga County, Pennsylvania filed
    dependency petitions for each child. They did not seek emergency custody at
    that time, however, and the juvenile court scheduled a hearing for those
    petitions for April 24. The court rescheduled the hearing for May 14 due to
    Mother’s unavailability. On May 3, DHS applied for and obtained emergency
    custody. DHS then filed amended dependency petitions. Mother indicated
    that she intended to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. She argued that she
    ____________________________________________
    1   S.R. (“Father”) does not appeal.
    2 We observe that the family was also the subject of an investigation
    conducted by the child protective services agency in Tioga County, New York.
    We specify which Tioga County in each instance.
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    was now a New York state resident; after briefly staying with a friend, Mother
    was in the process of securing services and housing through a domestic
    violence shelter.
    On May 14, 2018, the trial court held a combined jurisdiction and
    adjudicatory hearing; the adjudicatory portion of the hearing extended into a
    second day of testimony and was completed on May 24, 2018. The court
    determined that Tioga County, Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to hear the
    dependency petitions. The court then adjudicated the children dependent.
    Mother filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a Concise Statement of Errors
    Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter, the trial
    court filed its Rule 1925(a) Opinion. Mother raises the following questions for
    our review:
    1.   Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining
    that the children were dependent?
    2.   Did the trial court have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
    children dependent?
    See Mother’s Brief, at 5.
    We apply the following standard of review in dependency cases:
    We must accept the facts as found by the trial court unless
    they are not supported by the record. Although bound by
    the facts, we are not bound by the trial court's inferences,
    deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise
    our independent judgment in reviewing the court's
    determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, and must
    order whatever right and justice dictate. We review for
    abuse of discretion. Our scope of review, accordingly, is of
    the broadest possible nature. It is this Court's responsibility
    to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive
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    inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the
    appropriate legal principles to that record. Nevertheless, we
    accord great weight to the trial court's fact-finding function
    because the trial court is in the best position to observe and
    rule on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.
    In Interest of K.S., 
    159 A.3d 535
    , 537 (Pa. Super. 2017)(citation and
    brackets omitted).
    We address the procedural question first.
    A dependency proceeding is commenced by, inter alia, the filing of a
    dependency petition. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1200(1) (“Commencing Proceedings).
    A dependency proceeding may be commenced in the county in which the child
    resides or which the child is present when it is commenced. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    §   6321(b)    (“Commencement       of   proceedings”);   see   also   Pa.R.J.C.P.
    1300(a)(1-2). The term “residence” is not defined in the Juvenile Act, but we
    are not without guidance. In In Interest of J.S.M., 
    514 A.2d 899
    (Pa. Super.
    1986), we stated:
    “Residence” is defined as, “Personal presence at some place
    of abode with no present intention of definite and
    early removal and with purpose to remain for undetermined
    period, not infrequently, but not necessarily combined with
    design to stay permanently.” Black's Law Dictionary 1176
    (rev. 5th ed. 1979). “Residence” is compared and
    distinguished from “domicile” in the following manner,
    As “domicile” and “residence” are usually in the same
    place, they are frequently used as if they had the same
    meaning, but they are not identical terms, for a person
    may have two places of residence, as in the city and
    country, but only one domicile. Residence means living
    in a particular locality, but domicile means living in that
    locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent
    home. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
    inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
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    presence in that place and also an intention to make it
    one's domicile.
    Black’s Law Dictionary.
    In Interest of 
    J.S.M., 514 A.2d at 900
    . (Affirming the juvenile court’s denial
    of the request to transfer jurisdiction).
    In this matter, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the children
    were residents of Tioga County, Pennsylvania when, on April 3, 2018,
    proceedings commenced with DHS’s filing of dependency petitions. Mother
    and the children were residing in Tioga, Pennsylvania, for a period of eight
    months when they left on April 2, 2018 to visit a friend for an “evening visit
    to ride four wheelers.” Mother clarified that the visit was only meant to be
    temporary and that she had no intention of relocating to New York. 
    Id., at 28.
    Unfortunately, the fire left their residence uninhabitable and destroyed a
    considerable amount of their personal possessions. 
    Id., at 6-7.
    DHS had been
    working with the family since late 2017, and Mother knew DHS intended to
    file dependency petitions. 
    Id., at 23-24.
    K.O. was also enrolled in school in
    Tioga County, Pennsylvania.
    Mother essentially asserts that the Commonwealth’s border with New
    York is a force field, shielding her from DHS’ dependency actions. Mother
    testified that the DHS caseworker “crossed state lines [into New York] and
    came to her [temporary New York] address, triggering an exacerbated
    meltdown event in my son because he was scared at the threat that had been
    given that he was going to be put into a residential treatment center, which is
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    not the type of medical care that my son needs.” 3 
    Id., at 26.
              She also
    testified: “It appears as though the [Commonwealth] has used [dependency
    petitions] as a power grab to steal my children across state lines.” 
    Id., at 28.
    On April 3, Mother did not have a residence in New York, she did not
    register K.O. for school in New York, nor was she receiving any services.
    Indeed, in May 2018, a New York child protective services agency in New York
    became aware of the family, after Mother refused to leave K.O.’s hospital
    bedside for five days. Mother claimed that she thought she was required to
    stay there, per the mandate of the doctors. In all likelihood, she had no other
    place to go. In any event, Mother’s intention to stay in New York after the
    commencement of the proceedings in Pennsylvania is irrelevant to the
    question of where the children resided when DHS filed its dependency
    petitions. We discern no abuse of discretion.
    Having concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the adjudication
    petitions, we now address Mother’s other contention, namely, that the children
    were not dependent for purposes of the Juvenile Act. Section 6302 of the
    Juvenile Act defines a dependent child, in relevant part, as one who:
    is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
    education as required by law, or other care or control
    necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
    morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper
    parental care or control may be based upon evidence of
    conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that
    places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk,
    including evidence of the parent's, guardian's, or other
    ____________________________________________
    3   As discussed below, K.O. has significant special needs.
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    custodian's use of alcohol or a controlled substance that
    places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
    “The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care and
    control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete questions:
    whether the child presently is without proper care or control, and if so,
    whether such care and control are immediately available.” 
    K.S., supra
    , 159
    A.3d at 538 (citing In re D.A., 
    801 A.2d 614
    , 619 (Pa. Super. 2002)). The
    trial court must make a “comprehensive inquiry” with regard to these two
    questions, and the petition must present evidence of a clear and convincing
    nature. Id; see also In re R.W.J., 
    826 A.2d 10
    , 14 (Pa. Super. 2003). Clear
    and convincing evidence requires that a finding be based on testimony by
    credible witnesses who clearly relate facts that are “so clear, direct, weighty,
    and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
    without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In Interest of
    J.M., 
    166 A.3d 408
    , 427 (Pa. Super. 2017). Moreover, a child should not be
    found to be dependent merely because a sibling has been adjudicated
    dependent. In Re G.T., 
    845 A.2d 870
    , 872 (Pa. Super. 2004)(citation
    omitted).
    Here, we restate the trial court’s thorough analysis:
    At the adjudicatory hearing the court heard testimony from
    a number of witnesses, primarily regarding K.O. K.O. was
    previously diagnosed with Autism, ADHD, ODD, and
    Klinefelter Syndrome. N.T., at 78. He had severe behavioral
    problems both at home and at school including an incident
    at his school where he hit a teacher over the head with an
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    object and then verbally attacked school staff and
    responding police. This incident led to K.O. being enrolled in
    the Partial Hospital Program through Concern Counseling on
    January 31, 2018. K.O. did not make progress during his
    time in the program as he continued to have significant
    behavioral problems and outbursts. Due to being either
    absent or arriving later on more than half the school days
    while he attended the program, K.O. missed a lot of the
    therapeutic group sessions at the partial program. On
    March 26, 2018 K.O. ran away from the program
    necessitating the police to respond.            The doctor’s
    recommendation at that time was for K.O. to be taken to
    the emergency room to see if an inpatient stay was in K.O.’s
    best interest but Mother refused to allow him to go.[4]
    After the March 26th incident Mother signed a contract
    stating if K.O. amassed two more unexcused absences he
    would be discharged from the program. That was the last
    day K.O. attended the partial program. Mother also signed
    a contract when K.O. first enrolled in the program agreeing
    to meet with the doctor, comply with recommended
    medication      management      for    K.O.,    and   other
    requirements.  [5]
    While Mother and the children were in New York, Mother
    took K.O. to St. Joseph’s Hospital in Chemung County due
    to his continuing acting out. A.O. stayed at the hospital with
    Mother and K.O. the entire five days they were there. K.O.’s
    and A.O.’s behavior at the hospital resulted in a report being
    called into Tioga County, New York Child Protective
    Services. The subsequent investigation discovered that
    while at the hospital Mother failed to adequately supervise
    both K.O. and A.O. In one incident K.O. ran out of the
    hospital while Mother did nothing to attempt to stop him or
    get him once he was outside. In another, A.O. was jamming
    a pencil into her [own] groin area while Mother sat there
    and did nothing to stop her.         These incidents led to
    “indicated” reports against Mother for inadequate
    guardianship and lack of supervision for both K.O. and A.O.
    ____________________________________________
    4 The program coordinators recommended that K.O. be evaluated at the
    hospital, because K.O. threatened to kill himself. 
    Id., at 50;
    53.
    5   Mother had not complied with these requirements.
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    In New York, an “indicated” report means the investigator
    found credible evidence to support the allegations.
    On May 3, 2018, the court granted Human Services
    temporary emergency custody of both K.O. and A.O. At that
    point, neither child had attended school at least since April
    2nd. Human Services then placed the children in foster care.
    K.O., however, did not stay in foster care long due to his
    continued behavioral issues and he was ultimately admitted
    to Southwood Psychiatric Hospital in Pittsburgh, where he
    remained at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.
    At the adjudicatory hearing the family’s caseworker,
    Candace Chase, testified. Ms. Chase took over the family’s
    case on March 8, 20[1]8 and during that time Mother was
    uncooperative.     Mother active aggressive towards Ms.
    Chase, denied Ms. Chase access to the children, and often
    appeared confused.       Mother’s noncooperation kept Ms.
    Chase from properly investigating two Child Line reports
    that named Mother as the alleged perpetrator and due to
    Mother’s noncooperation the investigations remained open
    at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.[6] Mother also
    testified at the adjudicatory hearing and her testimony was
    often rambling and nonsensical.        [Mother’s] testimony
    supported the testimony of other witnesses regarding their
    respective interactions with Mother.
    Based on Mother’s actions and inactions, both K.O. and A.O.
    were without proper care and control needed at the time of
    the adjudicatory hearing and such care and control was not
    readily available to them making them both dependent
    children under the Juvenile Act. […]
    A.O. does not have the same behavioral problems as her
    brother but also did not receive the individualized proper
    care and control she needed from Mother. Everything
    revolved around K.O. and A.O. was just brought along.
    Mother brought A.O. to the hospital in New York for five days
    and then failed to supervise her to the point A.O. was
    observed jamming a pencil into her groin area[…]. Mother’s
    lack of cooperation and failure to realize a problem exists
    demonstrate that removing K.O. from her custody but
    allowing her to retain custody of A.O. would not result in
    ____________________________________________
    6   Mother left the state with the children.
    -9-
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    Mother suddenly gaining the ability and willingness to
    provide A.O. with the proper care and control she needs.
    At the time of the adjudicatory hearing Father was the
    subject of an active Protection From Abuse order which
    granted him only supervised visits with both K.O. and A.O.
    As he was barred from having unsupervised contact with his
    children Father was not a ready and willing parent able to
    provide them proper care and control.
    See Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/20/18, *5-8 (not paginated) (internal citations
    to the record omitted).
    Mother does not contest much of the court’s factual findings. Rather,
    she largely takes issue with the court’s inferences from those findings, and
    attempts to place those findings in the proper context. For example, Mother
    acknowledges K.O.’s behavioral issues and her own struggle managing them.
    She contends that she has attempted to address them, but that the services
    available to her in Pennsylvania were inadequate for K.O. See Mother’s Brief,
    at 22. She admits that she did not enroll K.O. in school from March to May,
    but she argues that this was because she could not find a “school setting
    environment that could adequately accommodate” him. 
    Id., at 22-23.
    Mother
    reasons that the fire had placed on the family a significant amount of stress.
    
    Id., at 16.
    No doubt, she is correct. However, this does not change the fact
    that she was unable to provide the children with parental care.
    We also note our deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations.
    The trial court explicitly found Mother to be an unreliable narrator. Clearly the
    trial court did not believe Mother’s reasons for allowing K.O. to go without
    schooling, for refusing to take him to the emergency room following his
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    suicidal threats, and for failing to supervise A.O. All told, we conclude the trial
    court’s findings and inferences were supported by the record. We discern no
    abuse of discretion.
    Orders affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/16/2019
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1225 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 1/16/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024