Com. v. Ballard, T. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S34007-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    TODD DARRELL BALLARD                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1533 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0001382-2006
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED: December 2, 2022
    Appellant Todd Darrell Ballard appeals from the order entered March 9,
    2022, by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying his petition
    for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1.1 After careful
    review, we affirm the lower court’s order denying relief.
    In 2006, the Commonwealth charged Appellant in the fatal shooting of
    the mother of his child (“Victim”). During his 2007 bench trial, the defense
    argued that the shooting was accidental, resulting from a struggle between
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 While the court denied Appellant’s petition on September 30, 2021, it did
    not enter the order on the docket until March 9, 2022. We have changed the
    caption accordingly and deem timely Appellant’s premature notice of appeal.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of
    a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated
    as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”).
    J-S34007-22
    Appellant and Victim. Nevertheless, the trial court found Appellant guilty of,
    inter alia, First-Degree Murder and sentenced him to a term of incarceration
    of life without parole.2 In his direct appeal, Appellant again did not contest
    his presence at the crime but argued that “the shooting occurred during a
    ‘heat of the passion’ struggle.”3 This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence
    in May 2009, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States
    Supreme Court denied further review.4
    Appellant filed his first PCRA petition in 2010, which the PCRA court
    denied following the submission of counsel’s no-merit letter.        This Court
    affirmed the denial of PCRA relief in 2013.5
    On February 22, 2021, Appellant filed pro se a “Petition for DNA Testing
    Pursuant to the [PCRA] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1[.]” He sought DNA and forensic
    testing of evidence gathered at the crime scene, including Victim’s fingernail
    ____________________________________________
    2 As gleaned from the trial court’s 2008 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, Appellant
    fatally shot Victim and took their infant child.         Victim’s stepfather
    (“Stepfather”), who knew Appellant as Victim’s paramour, witnessed the
    crime. Relevantly, Stepfather cut his foot on broken glass on the floor as he
    attempted to evade Appellant prior to Appellant shooting Victim. Police
    apprehended Appellant as he was allegedly attempting to flee to New York to
    change his identity.
    3   Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 6/5/08, at ¶ 9.
    4 Commonwealth v. Ballard, 
    976 A.2d 1198
     (Pa. Super. 2009) (non-
    precedential decision); 
    983 A.2d 725
     (Pa. 2009); 
    559 U.S. 1074
     (2010).
    5 Commonwealth v. Ballard, 
    83 A.3d 1075
     (Pa. Super. 2013) (non-
    precedential decision).
    -2-
    J-S34007-22
    clippings.    Appellant alleged that although detectives seized forensic and
    ballistic evidence from the crime scene, the Commonwealth did not provide
    the defense with DNA testing results nor introduce any results at trial, other
    than stipulating that blood traces matched Stepfather’s DNA. In contrast to
    his past defenses alleging that the shooting occurred during a struggle
    between himself and Victim, Appellant asserted that DNA testing of the
    evidence would “exonerate him, and reveal/identify the perpetrator.”6
    The PCRA court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed a Motion for
    Leave to Withdraw and a Turner/Finley No Merit Letter.7 After reviewing the
    No-Merit Letter, the PCRA court issued a Notice of Intention to Dismiss
    Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) on August 25, 2021.         Viewing Appellant’s
    petition as a standard PCRA Petition, the court concluded that the petition was
    untimely under the PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar.
    The court additionally addressed the merits of his petition. The court
    opined that Appellant had not met the requirements for DNA testing pursuant
    to Section 9543.1(a)(2).         The court also recognized that the Appellant’s
    strategy at trial was that the shooting was accidental, such that the case did
    not involve a claim that he was not present at the crime scene. Accordingly,
    ____________________________________________
    6 Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for DNA Testing, 2/22/21,
    “Statement of Verification” (emphasis removed).
    7Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -3-
    J-S34007-22
    the court noted its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing and granted
    counsel permission to withdraw. On September 30, 2021, the PCRA court
    dismissed Appellant’s petition seeking DNA testing.8
    Appellant filed pro se a notice of appeal. Subsequently, both Appellant
    and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following
    “claim for review[:]”
    Did the newly appointed court err in misconstru[ing the] petition
    (motion) for DNA/forensic testing into a Post-Conviction Relief Act
    Petition; and circumventing the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.
    [§ ]9543.1(b)(1) in dismissing said petition based on a No-Merit
    Letter, instead of giving the Commonwealth an opportunity to
    respond to the action?
    Appellant’s Br. at 5.
    A.
    Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s dismissal of his petition for DNA
    testing. When reviewing an order denying postconviction DNA testing, we
    consider whether the court’s determination “is supported by the evidence of
    record and whether it is free from legal error.” In re Payne, 
    129 A.3d 546
    ,
    554 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). In doing so, “this Court determines whether
    the movant satisfied the statutory requirements listed in Section 9543.1.”
    Commonwealth v. Walsh, 
    125 A.3d 1248
    , 1253 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
    omitted). We will affirm the lower court’s denial of testing “if there is any
    basis to support it, even if we rely on different grounds to affirm.” 
    Id.
    ____________________________________________
    8 In its September 30, 2021 Order, the court referenced Appellant’s
    September 9, 2021 response to the Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The
    response is not included in either the docket entries or the record.
    -4-
    J-S34007-22
    Section 9543.1 details numerous requirements for petitioners seeking
    postconviction DNA testing.     Relevant here, Section 9543.1(a)(2) provides
    that if the evidence was available at trial, as in this case, then the applicant
    must demonstrate, inter alia, that the evidence had not been “subject to the
    DNA testing requested because the technology for testing was not in existence
    at the time of the trial . . . , or [that] the evidence was subject to the testing,
    but newer technology could provide substantially more accurate and
    substantially probative results . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(2)
    The statute also requires the applicant to “present a prima facie case
    demonstrating that the . . . identity of or the participation in the crime
    by the perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings that resulted in the
    applicant’s conviction and sentencing” and that “DNA testing of the
    specific evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish . . . the
    applicant’s actual innocence of the offense[.]” Id. at § 9543.1(c)(3)(i), (ii)(A)
    (emphasis added); see also Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1254–55.
    B.
    The PCRA court denied Appellant’s request for DNA testing based upon
    Appellant’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Section 9543.1. Specifically,
    the PCRA court observed that DNA testing technology was available at trial.
    It also found no indication that new technology would provide more accurate
    or probative results. The court additionally opined that DNA testing would not
    be “in furtherance of any claim that he was not involved in the murder[,]”
    given that his defense strategy was that the shooting was accidental. Notice
    -5-
    J-S34007-22
    of Intention to Dismiss, 8/25/21, at ¶ 13.       After review, we agree that
    Appellant did not satisfy Section 9543.1.
    Appellant asserts that the court erred in denying his petition for
    postconviction DNA testing.9 He argues that because the crime lab collected
    evidence “to link an assailant to the shooting in this matter,” testing the
    evidence “is extremely important to establish [his] innocence.” Appellant’s
    Br. at 7 (emphasis removed). Appellant cites his plea of “not guilty” in support
    of his claim of innocence and baldly asserts that “the forensic results would
    exonerate” him. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1-2, 4. Appellant also references
    the development of a new testing method of “microbial sampling of bacteria,”
    asserting that this new, more accurate technology would identify the “actual
    shooter in this matter[.]” Id. at 2, 5.
    Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant failed to
    satisfy the requirements for postconviction DNA testing under Section 9543.1.
    Most significantly, despite his bald statements, Appellant does not “present a
    prima facie case demonstrating that the . . . identity of or the participation in
    ____________________________________________
    9 Appellant first contends that the PCRA court erred in treating his petition for
    postconviction DNA testing as a standard PCRA petition and subjecting it the
    PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar. We agree. While petitions for postconviction
    DNA testing fall “under the general rubric of the PCRA[,]” the petitions are not
    subject to the “one-year jurisdictional time bar of the PCRA.”
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    35 A.3d 44
    , 50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
    omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(1). Nevertheless, we affirm the
    PCRA court’s order based upon its alternative conclusion that Appellant failed
    to satisfy Section 9543.1.
    -6-
    J-S34007-22
    the crime by the perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings that resulted in
    the applicant’s conviction and sentencing.”      42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(c)(3)(i).
    Rather, the record reveals that Appellant stipulated to his identity at trial and
    asserted a defense claiming that the shooting resulted from a struggle
    between himself and Victim.10 Thus, DNA testing would be irrelevant because
    there is no dispute that Appellant was present at the crime scene. Moreover,
    the presence of someone else’s DNA would not change the fact that Appellant
    participated in the shooting that resulted in Victim’s death. Accordingly, we
    conclude that the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s Petition for Postconviction
    DNA Testing is supported by the record as Appellant failed to satisfy the
    requirements of Section 9543.1.11
    ____________________________________________
    10 Appellant attempts to call into question his counsel’s stipulation to his
    identity at trial, claiming that he “was under the influence of sedative
    medication during trial proceedings” and, thus, was “unable to assist in his
    defense.” Appellant’s Reply Br., at 2, 4. We reject this argument based upon
    this Court’s previous rejection of this same assertion raised in his 2010 PCRA
    Petition in which we noted that Appellant failed to support his bald allegations
    that his medication interfered with his ability to assist in his defense.
    11Appellant also asks this Court to remand to allow the Commonwealth to file
    a response to his petition for DNA testing because the PCRA court did not
    “afford the Commonwealth an opportunity to respond to the motion,” as
    required by Section 9543.1(b)(1). Appellant’s Br. at 7. We deem Appellant’s
    remand request moot, given that the Commonwealth filed a brief to this Court,
    arguing in favor of the PCRA court’s resolution, and Appellant responded to
    the Commonwealth in his Reply Brief. With regard to Appellant’s Reply Brief,
    we grant his “Request to Make a Reduction of Required Copies [of his Reply
    Brief],” filed October 17, 2022.
    -7-
    J-S34007-22
    Order affirmed. Appellant’s Request to Make a Reduction of Required
    Copies granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/2/2022
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1533 WDA 2021

Judges: Dubow, J.

Filed Date: 12/2/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/2/2022