Com. v. Mann, M. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S25043-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    MARQUICE BRUSSARD MANN                     :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 125 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-32-CR-0000282-2020
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                        FILED: DECEMBER 05, 2022
    Appellant, Marquice Broussard Mann, appeals from the order entered in
    the Indiana County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition
    filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    Appellant had charges at two criminal docket numbers pending against him—
    the instant case and a separate matter, in which Appellant pled guilty to
    robbery. At the docket number at issue in this appeal, the court conducted a
    bench trial on September 22, 2020, and convicted Appellant of kidnapping and
    false imprisonment.         On November 2, 2020, the trial court sentenced
    Appellant to an aggregate term of 48 to 96 months’ incarceration across both
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S25043-22
    docket numbers, with the respective sentences at each docket running
    concurrent to one another. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
    On July 26, 2021, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition,
    requesting reinstatement of his post-sentence and direct appeal rights nunc
    pro tunc.    Appellant claimed that trial counsel failed to file an appeal on
    Appellant’s behalf despite Appellant’s repeated requests that he do so. The
    PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on
    September 24, 2021.
    The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 10,
    2021.     Appellant testified that he had a conversation with trial counsel
    immediately after trial or sentencing, during which trial counsel informed him
    that he would file a direct appeal. Several months later, Appellant left trial
    counsel voice messages inquiring about the status of the appeal.           When
    Appellant did not hear back from trial counsel directly, Appellant’s father
    reached out to trial counsel and learned that an appeal had not been filed.
    Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he had a discussion with
    Appellant about his appellate rights after the trial. Trial counsel told Appellant
    that he did not believe there were any meritorious appellate issues.
    Additionally, trial counsel communicated his concerns that pursing an appeal
    may be to Appellant’s detriment because a new trial may result in sentences
    that were not concurrent to Appellant’s second case. After this conversation,
    Appellant understood trial counsel’s concerns and did not request to file an
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    J-S25043-22
    appeal. Trial counsel testified that Appellant did not contact him at any point
    after this discussion to request that an appeal be filed on his behalf.
    After hearing all the evidence, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA
    petition on January 6, 2022. On January 13, 2022, Appellant filed a timely
    notice of appeal and a voluntary Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    The [PCRA] court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition
    in regards to his contention that his prior counsel failed to
    file an appeal of his conviction that he requested.
    (Appellant’s Brief at 4).
    “Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
    examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
    and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,
    
    207 A.3d 957
    , 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 
    655 Pa. 428
    , 
    218 A.3d 850
     (2019). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the
    PCRA court if     the   record contains any support for        those      findings.
    Commonwealth v. Boyd, 
    923 A.2d 513
     (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied,
    
    593 Pa. 754
    , 
    932 A.2d 74
     (2007).               “The PCRA court’s credibility
    determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court.”
    Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    610 Pa. 17
    , 
    18 A.3d 244
    , 259 (2011).                 “[W]e
    review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,
    
    256 A.3d 1274
    , 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, __ Pa. __, 268 A3.d
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    J-S25043-22
    386 (2021).
    Appellant argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
    to file a direct appeal as Appellant requested.         Appellant asserts that he
    presented evidence at the PCRA hearing to demonstrate that he wished to file
    a direct appeal and attempted to contact trial counsel multiple times and
    through multiple means for this purpose.           Appellant claims trial counsel’s
    failure to file an appeal was unjustified and Appellant was prejudiced by the
    loss of his right to appellate review. Appellant concludes trial counsel was
    ineffective, and this Court should reinstate Appellant’s post-sentence and
    direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc.2 We disagree.
    “Counsel     is   presumed     to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”
    Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 
    231 A.3d 855
    , 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal
    denied, ___ Pa. ___, 
    242 A.3d 908
     (2020).
    [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
    ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
    of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
    process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
    could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
    prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
    ____________________________________________
    2 We note that Appellant limited his argument at the PCRA hearing to a claim
    that trial counsel failed to file a requested direct appeal. He did not make an
    argument concerning trial counsel’s failure to file post-sentence motions.
    Likewise, Appellant does not advance a separate argument on appeal
    concerning trial counsel’s alleged failure to file post-sentence motions,
    notwithstanding Appellant’s general mention of counsel’s failure to do so.
    Consequently, we deem any argument related to the failure to file post-
    sentence motions abandoned on appeal and confine our review to whether
    trial counsel failed to file a direct appeal.
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    J-S25043-22
    claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
    reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
    and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
    a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
    proceedings would have been different.
    Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 
    203 A.3d 1033
    , 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),
    appeal denied, 
    654 Pa. 568
    , 
    216 A.3d 1029
     (2019) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for
    ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 
    612 Pa. 333
    , 
    30 A.3d 1111
     (2011).
    “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the
    issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis
    for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth
    v. Smith, 
    167 A.3d 782
    , 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 
    645 Pa. 175
    ,
    
    179 A.3d 6
     (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 
    537 Pa. 514
    , 524,
    
    645 A.2d 189
    , 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing
    to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,
    
    852 A.2d 323
    , 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).
    “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to
    determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his
    client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 
    136 A.3d 1007
    , 1012
    (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, 
    supra at 524
    , 
    645 A.2d at 194-95
    ).
    The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
    basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
    counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
    alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
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    J-S25043-22
    potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
    considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
    interests.  We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
    comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
    have taken.
    Commonwealth v. King, 
    259 A.3d 511
    , 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting
    Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).
    “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
    of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a
    probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
    proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    624 Pa. 4
    , 33-34, 
    84 A.3d 294
    , 312
    (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).            “[A] criminal
    defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious
    as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
    Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
    570 Pa. 3
    ,
    22, 
    807 A.2d 872
    , 883 (2002)).
    Our Supreme Court has held that where “there is an
    unjustified failure to file a requested direct appeal, the
    conduct of counsel falls beneath the range of competence
    demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” and denies the
    accused the assistance of counsel that is guaranteed by the
    Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
    Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
    Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 
    558 Pa. 214
    , 
    736 A.2d 564
    ,
    572 [(1999)]. Such an oversight constitutes prejudice and
    per se ineffectiveness under the PCRA. 
    Id.
     However,
    “[b]efore a court will find ineffectiveness of trial counsel for
    failing to file a direct appeal, Appellant must prove that he
    requested an appeal and that counsel disregarded this
    request.” Commonwealth v. Touw, 
    781 A.2d 1250
    , 1254
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    J-S25043-22
    (Pa.Super. 2001) (emphasis added).
    Commonwealth v. Mojica, 
    242 A.3d 949
    , 955 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal
    denied, ___ Pa. ___, 
    252 A.3d 595
     (2021).
    Instantly, the PCRA court credited trial counsel’s testimony that he
    advised Appellant that there were no meritorious appellate issues and
    pursuing a direct appeal may be against Appellant’s interests. The court also
    found that trial counsel credibly testified that Appellant understood trial
    counsel’s concerns and did not ask trial counsel to file a direct appeal on
    Appellant’s behalf after this conversation. Additionally, the court noted that
    Appellant’s own testimony established that Appellant did not reach out to trial
    counsel to request that counsel file an appeal on Appellant’s behalf until seven
    months after the trial.        The record supports the court’s credibility
    determinations. See Beatty, supra. Essentially, Appellant argues that we
    should disregard the PCRA court’s credibility determination in favor of trial
    counsel; we decline to do so. See Spotz, supra; Boyd, 
    supra.
     Therefore,
    we discern no error in the court’s decision that Appellant failed to establish
    that he requested an appeal, and that trial counsel disregarded Appellant’s
    request. See Mojica, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim fails, and we affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA
    petition.
    Order affirmed.
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    J-S25043-22
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/05/2022
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