Com. v. Al-Ghizzi, Z. ( 2022 )

J-A25027-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ZENAP MARIA AL-GHIZZI :
:
Appellant : No. 1168 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 2, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0003142-2021
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 06, 2022
Appellant Zenap Maria Al-Ghizzi appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following her conviction for possession of a controlled substance.1
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress
because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:
On September 25, 2020, Port Authority Allegheny County Police
[O]fficer William Luffey was patrolling a bus station area in the
East Liberty area of Pittsburgh. The officer testified that he
witnessed [Appellant] approximately fifty (50) feet away, loitering
around the bus station with one male individual for approximately
five (5) minutes. The officer witnessed the male remove a “white
object from his pockets” that [the officer] knew from his training
and experience to be [“]stamp bags of heroin.” [Appellant] took
the object from the male and placed it in her bra. As the officer
proceeded toward [Appellant] and her male companion, a bus
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1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16).
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approached the station and both individuals got on the bus.
Officer Luffey immediately notified dispatch and the bus stopped.
When the bus came to a stop, Officer Luffey along with Port
Authority Officer Wroblewski[2] entered the bus and advised
[Appellant] of Officer Luffey’s observations. When [Appellant]
claimed the object was a “Connect Card,” the officers asked
[Appellant] if she would speak to the officers off of the bus as to
avoid alarming the other passengers. [Appellant] willingly agreed.
When Officer Luffey again asked [Appellant] what she placed in
her bra, she confessed that it was a “bun,” which the officer knew
to be slang for a bundle of heroin. [Appellant] then removed the
contraband from her person and gave it to the officer.
Trial Ct. Op., 1/12/22, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
The trial court held a suppression hearing on August 26, 2021. Officer
Luffey was the only witness who testified at the hearing. The trial court held
its decision under advisement and permitted the parties to supplement their
arguments with case law. N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 8/26/21, at 22-23.
On September 2, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to
suppress. That same day, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial,
and the trial court convicted her of the sole charge. The trial court then
sentenced Appellant to a term of six months’ probation.
Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions, but she filed a timely
notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial
court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant’s claims.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress the drugs recovered by the police officers where the
officers subjected [Appellant] to an investigative detention
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2 The record does not contain Officer Wroblewski’s first name.
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without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in violation of her
federal and state constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.3
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
suppress because Officer Luffey lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the bus
or detain her for questioning. Appellant’s Brief at 16-28. Appellant claims
that unlike the officer in Commonwealth v. Valentin, 748 A.2d 711 (Pa.
Super. 2000), Officer Luffey did not see Appellant and the male exchange any
cash for a small object. Instead, Officer Luffey testified that he saw the male
hand a white object to Appellant, who then placed the item in her bra. Id. at
24-25 (citing Valentin, 748 A.2d at 712-15). Appellant also argues that
unlike Valentin, Officer Luffey did not testify that the East Liberty bus station
was a high drug trafficking area. Id. at 25-26. Further, Appellant contends
that while an officer’s training and experience is relevant to determining
reasonable suspicion, there must be “a nexus between his experience and the
search, arrest, or seizure of evidence.” Id. at 27 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 935 (Pa. 2009)). Therefore, Appellant
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3 We note that in her Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant argued that the trial
court erred in denying her motion to suppress with respect to her statements
to the police officers because the officers did not advise her of her rights to
remain silent and to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/2/21, at 3 (unpaginated). Appellant has not
raised this claim in her appellate brief; therefore, Appellant has abandoned
this issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see also
Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding
waiver where the appellant abandoned claim on appeal).
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concludes that the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion because
Officer Luffey’s suspicion that Appellant “was in possession of drugs was not
reasonable; it was based on a hunch rather than specific, articulable, and
objective facts.” Id. at 28.
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a
suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d
649, 654 (Pa. 2010).
Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only
if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression
court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,
whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly
applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the
courts below are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
It is well settled that
Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution both protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence
arising under both charters has led to the development of three
categories of interactions between citizens and police. The first,
a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or
carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an
“investigative detention,” permits the temporary detention of an
individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. The third is an
arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by
probable cause.
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Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
The stopping of a bus to investigate whether a passenger possesses
illegal drugs is an investigative detention that must be supported by
reasonable suspicion “that illegal activity was occurring on the bus.”
Commonwealth v. Polo, 759 A.2d 372, 376 (Pa. 2000); see also
Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 802 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(explaining that “the forcible stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative
detention such that there must be reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is
occurring” (citation omitted)).
[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must
articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion
existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be
answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual
stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court
must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the [stop] warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 547 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (stating that “[t]o judge whether the incriminating nature of an
object was immediately apparent to the police officer, reviewing courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances” (citation omitted)). To conclude
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that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion, the officer “must be able to
articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 768-69 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(en banc) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court explained:
Regarding the incident at hand, Officer Luffey credibly testified
that while on patrol he witnessed [Appellant] take a white,
rectangular object from a male individual and slip it into her bra.
The officer emphasized that it was his extensive training and
experience on the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Narcotic
Enforcement Team that allowed him to recognize the object as
“stamp bags of heroin.” As the officer said he was approaching
[Appellant] to question her with another officer, both parties fled
by boarding a bus. The officer stated that he notified police
dispatch to stop the movement of the bus, so that he could board
the bus to further investigate. In his testimony, the officer stated
that when he made contact with [Appellant], she denied
possessing contraband and insisted it was a Connect Card for
transportation, which the officer strongly suspected to be false.
The officer requested [Appellant] step off the bus to avoid any
further embarrassment and alarm by other passengers. Once
[Appellant] willingly consented to exit the bus, the officer told her
he believed the object was not a Connect Card. [Appellant] then
admitted she was in possession of a bundle of heroin and gave it
to the officer.
Although [Appellant] agrees that the evidence presented at [the
suppression hearing] indicates an “investigative stop” occurred,
she argues that Officer Luffey did not have reasonable suspicion
to do so. To have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative
stop, law enforcement must show that they have “specific,
articulable facts which would indicate to a reasonable officer that
criminal activity is afoot.” The evidence presented at [the
hearing] established that Officer Luffey had the necessary
reasonable suspicion based on him observing [Appellant] conceal
what appeared to be a stamp bag of heroin. In turn, Officer
Luffey’s conduct in questioning [Appellant] amounted to an
investigative stop, which was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Officer Luffey is currently employed in the Narcotics Enforcement
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Unit and has over a decade of experience in law enforcement.
Additionally, Officer Luffey testified that he has at least one
thousand (1,000) arrests involving narcotics possession. The
officer credibly testified that when he witnessed [Appellant] obtain
a “white rectangular object” and stick it in her bra, he recognized
it to be a stamp bag of heroin. This evidence was sufficient to
establish that criminal activity was afoot. Based on this evidence,
the “seizure” of [Appellant’s] person and the seizure of the drugs
were lawfully obtained. Therefore, the court properly denied
[Appellant’s] motion to suppress the evidence.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4-6 (footnotes omitted and formatting altered).4
Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings
are supported by the record. See Jones, 988 A.2d at 654; see also
Shreffler, 201 A.3d at 763. The trial court credited Officer Luffey’s testimony
concerning the circumstances of the stop. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4, 6. As noted
by the trial court, Officer Luffey observed Appellant receive a “white
rectangular object” and conceal it in her bra. N.T. Suppression Hr’g, at 6-7.
Officer Luffey testified that based on his training and experience, he
recognized that the white rectangular object as a “stamp bag of heroin.” Id.
The officer then observed Appellant board a bus, which was subsequently
stopped by police. See id. at 7, 12.
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4 We note that the trial court did not include a statement of its findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the record or in its order denying Appellant’s motion
to suppress as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). See Trial Ct. Order, 9/2/21.
However, because the trial court includes findings of fact and conclusions of
law in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, this Court can review the merits of Appellant’s
claim. See Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super.
2003).
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Further, we discern no error of law in the trial court’s legal conclusions.
See Jones, 988 A.2d at 654; see also Shreffler, 201 A.3d at 763. Based
on the totality of the circumstances, including Officer Luffey’s training and
experience, we agree with the trial court that Officer Luffey had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Appellant possessed drugs at the time he observed
her receive the stamp bag from her male companion.5 See Green, 168 A.3d
at 184; see also Luczki, 212 A.3d at 547-48. Further, Officer Luffey’s
observations and inferences were more than a mere hunch. See Carter, 105
A.3d at 768-69. Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that
Officer Luffey had a sufficient basis to stop the bus and detain Appellant for
questioning. See Polo, 759 A.2d at 376; Washington, 63 A.3d at 802; see
also Lyles, 97 A.3d at 302. For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to
relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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5 As noted above, Appellant argues that Officer Luffey did not have reasonable
suspicion for the stop because, unlike in Valentin, Officer Luffey did not testify
that he saw an exchange of cash for the drugs or that the East Liberty bus
station was a high drug trafficking area. See Appellant’s Brief at 24-26; see
also Valentin, 748 A.2d at 712-15. However, Appellant’s reliance on
Valentin is misplaced. A determination of reasonable suspicion is based on
the totality of the circumstances. See Green, 168 A.3d at 184; see also
Luczki, 212 A.3d at 547-48. Therefore, although the Valentin Court
considered factors that are not present in the instant matter, it does not
prevent us from finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion under the
specific circumstances of this case.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/06/2022
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