In Re D.M.W ( 2014 )

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2014 PA Super 228IN RE: D.M.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 270 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order January 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Civil Division at No(s): 3-14 MH
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 10, 2014
Appellant, D.M.W., appeals from the January 8, 2014 order continuing
his involuntary civil commitment for a period of one year. After careful
review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case
as follows. On February 17, 2009, the Commonwealth filed a petition in
juvenile court, alleging Appellant was delinquent for committing acts that if
committed by an adult would constitute the crimes of involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and
indecent exposure.1 The juvenile court conducted a hearing at which
Appellant admitted committing the delinquent acts. The juvenile court
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123, 3125, 3126 and 3127, respectively.
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adjudicated Appellant delinquent and in need of treatment. As a result,
Appellant was committed to a juvenile treatment facility.
At some point, the Juvenile Probation Office requested that the
juvenile court conduct a review of Appellant’s file. The juvenile court
directed Appellant’s file be forwarded to the Sexual Offenders Assessment
Board (SOAB). The SOAB conducted an assessment, the results of which
were sent to the juvenile court on May 13, 2012. On June 8, 2012, the
juvenile court found prima facie evidence that Appellant “was in need of
involuntary treatment[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 4/8/14, at 2; see also 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6358(f), 6403(b)(1). On July 6, 2012, Berks County (the
County) filed a petition, with juvenile court, for involuntary treatment
pursuant to Section 6403(b). On January 8, 2013, the civil division 2 of the
trial court conducted a hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court
concluded Appellant met the criteria necessary for involuntary civil
commitment under Section 6403(d). Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal to this Court on February 6, 2013. On February 14, 2014, this Court
affirmed the commitment order. In re D.M.W., 86 A.3d 235 (Pa. Super.
2014), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 169 MAL 2014 (Pa. 2014). Our Supreme
Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on August 14,
2014. Id.____________________________________________
2
The certified record does not reveal how the case was reassigned to the
civil division of the trial court.
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Meanwhile, on January 5, 2014, the trial court received the SOAB’s
new assessment and evaluation of Appellant. On January 8, 2014, the trial
court conducted an annual review hearing pursuant to Section 6404(b)(2).
At the conclusion of said hearing, the trial court renewed the commitment
order for a period of one year. On February 6, 2014, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal.3
On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for our review.
A. [Whether] the trial court erred by failing to
hold a timely review hearing pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6404(b)(2) or [whether] 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6404(b)(1) [was] violated by the
failure of the [SOAB] and Torrence State
Hospital to provide the [trial] court the
necessary reports/assessments 60 days prior
to the review hearing?
Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal pertains to the time
constraints set forth in Section 6404(b) of Act 21 of 2003 (Act 21). We
therefore begin by noting our well-settled standard of review regarding
issues of statutory interpretation.
When “the question [is] one of statutory interpretation, our scope of
review is plenary and the standard of review is de novo.” Commonwealth
v. Kerstetter, 94 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “Under the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972, … our paramount interpretative task is
to give effect to the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular
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3
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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legislation under review.” Commonwealth v. Spence, 91 A.3d 44, 46 (Pa.
2014) (citation omitted). “We are mindful that the object of all statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly … and the best indication of the legislature’s intent is the plain
language of the statute.” Commonwealth v. Walter, 93 A.3d 442, 450
(Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “When the words of a statute are clear and
unambiguous, we may not go beyond the plain meaning of the language of
the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id., citing 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(b). However, only “when the words of the statute are ambiguous
should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent of the General
Assembly through considerations of the various factors found in Section
1921(c) of the [Statutory Construction Act].” Id. at 450-451, citing 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
Instantly, Appellant argues that the mandates of Section 6404(b) were
not followed in this case. We begin with the statutory text. Section 6404 of
Act 21 provides, in relevant part, as follows.
§ 6404. Duration of inpatient commitment and
review
(a) Initial period of commitment.--The person
shall be subject to a period of commitment for
inpatient treatment for one year.
(b) Annual review.--
(1) Sixty days prior to the expiration of
the one-year commitment period, the
director of the facility or a designee shall
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submit an evaluation and the board shall
submit an assessment of the person to the
court.
(2) The court shall schedule a review hearing
which shall be conducted pursuant to section
6403(c) (relating to court-ordered involuntary
treatment) and which shall be held no later
than 30 days after receipt of both the
evaluation and the assessment under
paragraph (1). Notice of the review hearing
shall be provided to the person, the attorney
who represented the person at the previous
hearing held pursuant to this subsection or
section 6403, the district attorney and the
county solicitor or a designee. The person and
the person’s attorney shall also be provided
with written notice advising that the person
has the right to counsel and that, if he cannot
afford one, counsel shall be appointed for the
person. If the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the person continues
to have serious difficulty controlling sexually
violent behavior while committed for inpatient
treatment due to a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in an act of sexual violence,
the court shall order an additional period of
involuntary inpatient treatment of one year;
otherwise, the court shall order the
department, in consultation with the board, to
develop an outpatient treatment plan for the
person. The order shall be in writing and shall
be consistent with the protection of the public
safety and appropriate control, care and
treatment of the person.
…
(d) Prohibition on discharge.--The court shall not
order discharge from involuntary treatment until the
person has completed involuntary outpatient
treatment pursuant to section 6404.2 (relating to
duration of outpatient commitment and review).
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6404 (emphases added). Section 6403(c) specifies the
manner in which the review hearing shall be conducted.
In this case, Appellant argues that the dictates of Section 6404(b)(1)
were violated. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Specifically, Appellant argues that
the SOAB’s assessment and the facility’s evaluation were submitted to the
trial court only three days before the previous commitment order was to
expire. Id. Because the assessment and evaluation were not submitted on
time pursuant to the dictates of Section 6404(b)(1), Appellant argues that
he should be discharged and released from involuntary civil commitment.
Id. at 11, 15. Alternatively, Appellant argues that if the assessment and
evaluation were timely, then the annual review hearing was untimely held
pursuant to Section 6404(b)(2). Id. at 13. Appellant further avers that an
untimely annual review hearing mandates his discharge and release from
commitment. Id. at 9, 13, 15.
The County acknowledges that the “reports were not received until
January 5, 2014 … [and that] a hearing [was] held on January 8, 2014[.]”
County’s Brief at 5. However, the County argues Appellant has failed to
show any prejudice arising from the untimely filing and is therefore not
entitled to be discharged from commitment. Id. at 6. We note that our
research has garnered no published cases on point pertaining to the
interplay between Sections 6404(b)(1), 6404(b)(2), and the remedy to be
afforded in the event the procedures are not followed.
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At the January 8, 2014 hearing, Meghan Dade, the executive director
of the SOAB testified that the Board’s assessment was sent from the SOAB
on November 4, 2013, and delivered via United Parcel Service on November
6, 2013. N.T., 1/8/14, at 12. The report was addressed to the Honorable
Scott E. Lash of the juvenile division of the trial court. Id. The judge who
presided over the previous commitment hearing was the Honorable Arthur E.
Grim of the civil division of the trial court.
Dr. Stacie Barnes, the clinical director of the Sexual Responsibility and
Treatment Program, conducted the required ten-month evaluation of
Appellant. Id. at 15. Dr. Barnes testified that she completed her evaluation
on October 25, 2013. Id. She further explained that the secretary in her
office routinely mails such evaluations to the court within one week of the
report’s completion, which in this case would be November 1, 2013. Id. at
16. Dr. Barnes also testified that her secretary confirmed that this
procedure was followed in this case, by sending it to Judge Grim, though Dr.
Barnes could not be specific as to the date of actual mailing. Id.
As noted above, Section 6404(b)(1) requires the clinical evaluation
and SOAB’s assessment be submitted to “the court” within 60 days of the
current commitment order’s expiration. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6404(b)(1). Section
6404(b)(2) requires “[t]he court” to hold a hearing no later than 30 days
after the assessment and evaluation are received. Id. § 6404(b)(2). Thus,
in this case, if we were to accept that the receipt of the SOAB’s assessment
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by Judge Lash on November 6, 2013, was receipt by “the court,” Section
6404(b)(1) would be satisfied as the submission occurred more than 60 days
before the expiration of the commitment order. However, the hearing on
January 8, 2014, was more than 30 days after this date, so the time
constraints of Section 6404(b)(2) would not have been met. Conversely, if
we treat January 5, 2014, the date Judge Grim received the evaluation and
assessment as the submission date, the hearing would be timely for
purposes of Section 6404(b)(2). However, the evaluation and report would
be untimely for purposes of Section 6404(b)(1).
Whichever characterization is proper, we nevertheless agree with the
County that Appellant is not entitled to relief because Appellant has not
shown prejudice. This Court has previously noted that “Act 21 implicates a
juvenile’s right to physical freedom.” In re S.A., 925 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citations omitted). In addition, these statutes “evidence[] a
desire by the General Assembly to establish civil commitment procedures
designed to provide necessary treatment to sexually violent delinquent
children and to protect the public from danger.” Id. at 847. This Court
went on to conclude that the Commonwealth’s interests forwarded by Act 21
are “compelling.” Id. When read together, as noted above, the time
constraints in Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) envision the documents being
submitted to the trial court 60 days prior to the expiration of the
commitment order, and the hearing being held not later than 30 days after
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said receipt. That leaves at least 30 days for any continuances or additional
hearings.
In our view, the existence of these extra 30 days, reveal a policy to
complete all proceedings prior to the expiration of the existing commitment
order, to further both the committed person’s liberty interest to be free from
government restraint and the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the
public. This additional time allows the trial court flexibility in conducting
annual review proceedings, permitting it to grant continuances and extra
hearings if needed, so that it can have all of the materials necessary to
render a decision prior to the expiration of the commitment order.
This 30-day window serves several important interests. It protects a
person from being committed without a valid court order. It also prevents
circumstances where time constraints might coerce the committed party to
ask for a continuance beyond the expiration date of the commitment order.
The 30-day window also reinforces the requirement of allowing the trial
court up to five days to render its decision, protecting against the trial court
needing to rush its decision, if the prior commitment order is about to
expire. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6403(c)(6) (stating, “[a] decision shall be
rendered within five days after the conclusion of the hearing[]”). It also
helps avoid situations in which the County might request a continuance
beyond the expiration date of the commitment order. In our view, the
central date of importance in these proceedings is the expiration date of the
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commitment order, as the interests served by the two subsections, are
measured in reference to that date as described above.
To further illustrate this point, one of the main tenants of statutory
construction in this Commonwealth is “[t]hat the General Assembly does not
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1). Appellant’s proposed construction of the statute
encourages the illogical result that the trial court is required to release a
committed person who otherwise qualifies for continued commitment, based
solely on untimely filed documents that are otherwise accurate. Indeed, as
Appellant no longer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his
continued commitment, Appellant argues for such a result in this very case.
See Appellant’s Brief at 4 n.1. In our view, this would be an absurd result
that the General Assembly could not have intended. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §
1922(1). Based on these considerations, we conclude that to warrant relief,
a committed person subject to Section 6404(b) proceedings must show
prejudice from any untimely filing of the required evaluation and assessment
under Section 6404(b)(1). We similarly conclude that prejudice must be
shown for the untimeliness of a hearing under Section 6404(b)(2). See,
e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Domtar Paper Co., 77 A.3d 1282, 1286
(Pa. Super. 2013) (permitting appellee’s untimely preliminary objections
where the appellant “admit[ted] there was no prejudice, and
[a]ppellees’ preliminary objections were only two days late[]”) (emphasis
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added), appeal granted, 92 A.3d 809 (Pa. 2014); accord Peters Creek
Sanitary Auth. v. Welch, 681 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. 1996) (stating, “late
pleadings may be filed if the opposite party is not prejudiced and justice
requires[]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
Appellant cites to a provision in the Mental Health Procedures Act
(Mental Health Act), pertaining to judicial review of a mental health review
officer’s certification. Appellant’s Brief at 13-14; see also generally 50
P.S. § 7109(b) (requiring judicial review of a mental health review officer’s
certification within 72 hours). The provisions of the Mental Health Act have
been interpreted to mean that an untimely hearing requires the patient be
discharged. See, e.g., In re J.K., 595 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 1991)
(stating, “[t]his court has concluded that where the [timeliness]
requirements are not fulfilled the commitment is unlawful[]”) (citation
omitted). However, we decline Appellant’s invitation to compare Act 21 with
the Mental Health Act. The purposes of the two statutes are distinct and to
require them to be construed similarly would be inappropriate.
Turning to the case at bar, the record reflects that Appellant was
initially offered a continuance but ultimately declined it. N.T., 1/6/14, at 6;
N.T., 1/8/14, at 3. Importantly, as Appellant’s hearing took place prior to
the expiration of the original commitment order, there was a valid court
order in place at all times authorizing Appellant’s commitment. Therefore,
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Appellant suffered no unauthorized loss of his personal liberty. Appellant
does not argue that he suffered any other prejudice resulting from the
timeliness issues in this case. Consequently, we conclude that Appellant’s
argument on appeal that he is entitled to discharge fails under either
characterization of the proceedings below.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s sole issue on appeal
is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s January 8, 2014 order is
affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/10/2014
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