McDonald, E. v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc. ( 2015 )

J.A22040/14
2015 Pa. Super. 104
ERIN MCDONALD, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
:
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, INC., AND :
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS OUTDOOR :
ADVENTURE CENTER, T/D/B/A :
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, INC., :
:
Appellants : No. 1221 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered March 28, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division No(s).: 6750-CV-2008
ERIN MCDONALD, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
:
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, INC., AND :
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS OUTDOOR :
ADVENTURE CENTER, T/D/B/A :
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, INC., :
:
Appellees : No. 1400 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered March 28, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division No(s).: 6750-CV-2008
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J. A22040/14
OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 29, 2015
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Erin McDonald, appeals from the order
entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denying her motion
for partial summary judgment adverse to Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
Whitewater Challengers, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, and Whitewater
Challengers Outdoor Adventure Center, trading or doing business as
Whitewater Challengers, Inc. (collectively, “Whitewater”). McDonald, a New
York resident, suggests the trial court erred by holding Pennsylvania law—
and not New York law—applies to this case. Whitewater also appeals from
the order denying their motion for summary judgment. Whitewater
contends the trial court erred by concluding material issues of fact existed
regarding whether McDonald was economically compelled to sign the
contract at issue. We hold that when a New York resident signs an
exculpatory release with a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business
of whitewater rafting in Pennsylvania and is injured while whitewater rafting,
Pennsylvania law applies. We further hold that McDonald cannot invoke
economic compulsion against Whitewater and that judgment should be
entered in Whitewater’s favor on liability. Thus, we affirm in part and
reverse in part.
We state the facts as set forth by the trial court:
[McDonald] filed a complaint on [July] 24, 2008[,]
alleging that on May 19, 2006, she was a school teacher
employed by [t]he School of [the] Holy Child in Rye, New
York.
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She alleges that on [May 19, 2006], she and other
School faculty members chaperoned seventy-two (72)
seventh and eighth grade school children on a whitewater
rafting “field trip” down a portion of the Lehigh River
conducted by [Whitewater].
[McDonald’s] raft struck a large rock situated in the
river bed, ejecting [her] from the raft onto the rock,
allegedly causing her the injuries alleged in her complaint.
[McDonald’s] allegations of negligence, in paragraph 40
of her complaint, are as follows:
40. [Whitewater’s] negligence consisted of but
was not limited to the following:
a. Failing to provide a river guide / instructor
in [McDonald’s] boat;
b. Failing to provide a properly inflated raft;
c. Failing to advise [McDonald] on the grade
and / or class of the whitewater rapids;
d. Failing to properly instruct [McDonald] on
how to safely and effectively maneuver fast
and difficult rapids; and
e. Allowing an unsafe number of
inexperienced rafters to operate a raft.
[McDonald’s Compl., 7/24/08, at 9-10.]
At her place of employment, two (2) days before the
excursion, [McDonald] signed [Whitewater’s] form
“RELEASE OF LIABILITY” . . . .
Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/10, at 1-2.
We reproduce the release in pertinent part:
RELEASE OF LIABILITY – READ BEFORE SIGNING
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In consideration of being allowed to participate in any way
in the Whitewater Challengers program, its related events
and activities, I (print name) Erin L. McDonald the
undersigned, acknowledge, appreciate, and agree, that:
1. The risk of injury from the activities involved in this
program is significant, including the potential for
permanent paralysis and death, and while particular
skills, equipment, and personal discipline may reduce
this risk, the risk of serious injury does exist; and,
2. I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS,
both known and unknown, EVEN IF ARISING FROM THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES or others, and I
assume full responsibility for my participation; and
* * *
5. I, for myself and on behalf of my heirs, assigns,
personal representatives and next of kin, HEREBY
RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS,
WHITEWATER CHALLENGERS, their officers, officials,
agents and/or employees, other participants,
sponsoring agencies, sponsors, advertisers, and, if
applicable, owners and lessors of premises used for the
activities (“Releasees”), WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND
ALL INJURY, DISABILITY, DEATH, or loss or damage to
person or property associated with my presence or
participation, WHETHER ARISING FROM THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, to
the fullest extent permitted by law; and,
6. Any claims or disputes arising from my participation in
this program shall be venued in the Luzerne County
Court in the town of Wilkes-Barre, PA, or in the
Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.
I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AGREEMENT. I FULLY
UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS AND UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE
GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND
SIGN IT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY
INDUCEMENT.
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Ex. D to Whitewater’s Mot. for Summ. J., 12/14/12.
On June 6, 2010, Whitewater filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the court denied on September 15, 2010. Further discovery ensued,
and a few years later, McDonald filed her motion for partial summary
judgment and Whitewater filed a second motion for summary judgment.
McDonald requested that the court void the release based on New York law.
Whitewater asked the court to hold the release was valid under Pennsylvania
law and to enforce the release, thus absolving it of liability.
On April 3, 2013,1 the trial court denied McDonald’s motion for partial
summary judgment and Whitewater’s motion for summary judgment.
Order, 4/3/13. With respect to its holding that Pennsylvania law applied, the
court reasoned that our Supreme Court affirmed the validity of such
exculpatory releases in inherently dangerous recreational activities, such as
downhill skiing. Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/14, at 2-3.2 The trial court also refused to
permit out-of-state customers of Pennsylvania recreational facilities “to bring
their law with them,” because of the increased “financial/liability
uncertainty.” Id. at 3. The court, however, refused to enforce the release
against McDonald, finding material issues of fact existed regarding whether
1
The order was served on this date pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236; the order
was time-stamped on March 28, 2013.
2
On March 13, 2014, this Court ordered the trial court to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) decision explaining the basis for its ruling. Order, 3/13/14. The
trial court complied, and this matter is now ripe for disposition.
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she was economically compelled to sign the release by the School of the
Holy Child. Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/10, at 5.
On April 18, 2013, Whitewater filed a brief in support of their motion
for reconsideration or appellate certification.3 On April 25, 2013, McDonald
filed a motion for reconsideration or appellate certification. The court
granted Whitewater’s motion on May 2, 2013,4 and granted McDonald’s
motion on May 28, 2013.5
On May 28, 2013, Whitewater filed a petition for permission to file an
interlocutory appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1311. McDonald, on June 21, 2013, filed
a petition to file an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s May 28, 2013
order. This Court granted Whitewater’s petition on July 11, 2013, and
McDonald’s petition on August 5, 2013.6
We address McDonald’s appeal first, which raises one issue:
Whether New York law should be applied to the facts of
this case thereby rendering Whitewater’s Release as void
3
The docket and certified record do not reflect the actual motion, although
Whitewater’s certificate of service avers they filed it. The certificate of
service, which did not include a date of service, was time-stamped on April
18, 2013.
4
The order was time-stamped on April 30, 2013, but the trial court did not
serve notice until May 2, 2013.
5
The order was time-stamped on May 23, 2013, and the trial court served
notice on May 28, 2013.
6
This Court consolidated both appeals sua sponte on March 12, 2014.
Further, because the parties filed numerous briefs in both appeals, for ease
of comprehension, we denote the parties’ briefs by docket number.
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and unenforceable under New York’s statutory and
decisional law, where this case poses a legitimate conflict-
of-law question, and New York has a more significant
relationship to this controversy and the outcome of this
case?
McDonald’s Brief, 1400 MDA 2013, at 6.
In support of her sole issue, McDonald argues the trial court erred by
incorrectly applying the standard set forth in Griffith v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). She maintains that because she
signed the release in New York, the contract was formed in New York. As a
New York resident, McDonald asserts she is entitled to the benefit of New
York law. McDonald claims that if Whitewater intended for Pennsylvania law
to apply, then it should have included such a clause in its release. She
points out that most of her medical treatment occurred in New York and that
the New York State Insurance Fund has an interest in recouping her lost
wages and medical expenses. We hold McDonald has not established
entitlement to relief.
Initially, an order denying summary judgment is ordinarily a non-
appealable interlocutory order. See Stewart v. Precision Airmotive, LLC,
7 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2010). As noted above, however, the parties
requested, and this Court granted, permission to file interlocutory appeals.7
Order, 3/12/14.
7
We acknowledge that generally, when the issue is a question of law, an
appellant may be entitled to review of an order denying summary judgment.
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The standard and scope of review is well-settled:
Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may be
granted only in those cases in which the record clearly
shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that
no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining
whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must
view the record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and must resolve all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the
moving party. Thus, summary judgment is proper only
when the uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of
record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum,
only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds
cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary
judgment. With regard to questions of law, an appellate
court’s scope of review is plenary. The Superior Court will
reverse a grant of summary judgment only if the trial court
has committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 100 A.3d 244, 250 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(punctuation and citation omitted).
Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 588 Pa. 405, 421-22, 905 A.2d 422,
432-33 (2006) (holding collateral order doctrine applied to order denying
summary judgment because party raised defense of statutory immunity).
When the issue is a question of fact, appellate jurisdiction is lacking. See
Stewart, 7 A.3d at 272. Thus, if an appellate court grants permission to
appeal an order denying summary judgment, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 702, but
later determines that the underlying issue is a question of fact, appellate
jurisdiction is arguably lacking. See generally id.
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As a prefatory matter, we must ascertain whether to apply a tort or
contract choice of law framework.8 Two cases are instructive: McCabe v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 356 Pa. Super. 223, 514 A.2d 582
(1986), and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walter, 290 Pa. Super. 129, 434
A.2d 164 (1981). In Walter, this Court addressed an exclusionary provision
in an insurance policy issued to a New Jersey resident for a car involved in a
Pennsylvania accident. Walter, 290 Pa. Super. at 133-34, 434 A.2d at 166.
The car’s driver and passenger were both Pennsylvania residents. Id. at
137, 434 A.2d at 168. The exclusionary provision was invalid under New
Jersey law and valid under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 135-36, 434 A.2d at
167. The Walter Court rejected the appellant’s argument that Pennsylvania
law should apply because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania and the
injured occupants of the car were Pennsylvania residents:
[The a]ppellant argues that Pennsylvania had the most
significant contacts as the car was located in Pennsylvania
when the accident occurred having been previously
delivered to Bucks County Imports by [the insured], the
accident occurred in Pennsylvania, and both occupants of
the car at the time of the accident were Pennsylvania
residents. [The a]ppellant overlooks the fact that these
points of contact with Pennsylvania pertained to the
alleged tort involved. We are concerned with the contract
of insurance and as to the insurance policy New Jersey had
the most significant contacts.
Id. at 137-38, 434 A.2d at 168.
8
A statutory choice of law analysis does not apply to this case.
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In McCabe, this Court similarly addressed which state’s law applied in
construing a Connecticut automobile insurance policy issued to a Connecticut
resident. McCabe, 356 Pa. Super. at 225, 514 A.2d at 582. While in
Pennsylvania, the Connecticut resident was involved in a car accident that
injured a Pennsylvania resident. Id. The McCabe appellees argued that
Pennsylvania law applied because, inter alia, the “victim is a resident of
Pennsylvania, and the accident occurred there. Both [insurers] are licensed
to do business in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 232, 514 A.2d at 586. The McCabe
Court rejected that argument based upon the Walter Court’s reasoning. Id.
Both Walter and McCabe stand for the proposition that in a contract
action involving an underlying tort and in which an insurance policy is at
issue, the court will apply a contract law—and not a tort law—choice of law
framework. Id.; Walter, 290 Pa. Super. at 137-38, 434 A.2d at 168; see
also Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 616 Pa. 385, 394, 47 A.3d 1190,
1196 (2012) (applying contract law to interpret clause exculpating defendant
ski resort from liability in negligence action); Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley
Resort, L.P., 607 Pa. 1, 26, 2 A.3d 1174, 1189 (2010) (same). Neither
Chepkevich nor Tayar engaged in a choice of law analysis, but neither case
looked beyond contract law in construing the clause. Thus, in the instant
tort action involving a contractual exculpatory clause, but not involving an
automobile insurance policy, we apply a contract choice of law framework.
See Tayar, 616 Pa. at 394, 47 A.3d at 1196; Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 26, 2
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A.3d at 1189; McCabe, 356 Pa. Super. at 232, 514 A.2d at 586; Walter,
290 Pa. Super. at 137-38, 434 A.2d at 168; cf. Lahey v. Covington, 964 F.
Supp. 1440, 1445 (D. Colo. 1996) (construing exculpatory agreement as
barring plaintiff’s negligence claims for injuries that occurred while
whitewater rafting); Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F.
Supp. 472, 474 (D. Colo. 1992) (invoking contractual standard of review in
ascertaining whether exculpatory clause barred negligence claims).9
Having ascertained a contract choice of law framework applies, we set
forth the following as background10 with respect to choice of law principles
applicable to cases not involving an explicit statutory 11 or a contractual
9
In Budtel Assocs., LP v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 915 A.2d 640 (Pa. Super.
2006), our Court held that the Griffith rule applies to contract cases. Id. at
643-44. Budtel, however, did not involve a negligence claim.
10
See Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 Hastings
L.J. 1041, 1131 (1987) (“No state has a more convoluted, eclectic approach
to choice of law than Pennsylvania. On various occasions, its courts have
applied the First and Second Restatements, the center of gravity approach,
interest analysis and Professor Cavers’ ‘principles of preference.’”); accord
Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064, 1076 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (“The opinions of the Pennsylvania courts both state and federal have
left Pennsylvania’s choice of law rules and methodology with respect to
contract cases in utter disarray; indeed, the courts have used facially
inconsistent legal standards without acknowledging apparently conflicting
precedent.”), rev’d, 584 F.2d 1306, 1313 (3d Cir. 1978) (predicting
Pennsylvania would apply the Griffith choice of law framework to contract
actions).
11
See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 5521(b) (“The period of limitation applicable to a
claim accruing outside this Commonwealth shall be either that provided or
prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of
this Commonwealth, whichever first bars the claim.”).
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choice of law provision:12 “the first step in a choice of law analysis under
Pennsylvania law is to determine whether [an actual] conflict exists between
the laws of the competing states. If no [actual] conflict exists, further
analysis is unnecessary.” Budtel, 915 A.2d at 643 (citation omitted). An
actual conflict exists if “there are relevant differences between the laws.”
Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2007).13
If an actual conflict exists, then we classify it as “true,” “false,” or
“unprovided-for.” Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 565, 267 A.2d 854,
855-56 (1970); Miller v. Gay, 323 Pa. Super. 466, 470, 470 A.2d 1353,
1355 (1983). A “true conflict” occurs “when the governmental interests of
12
Synthes USA Sales, LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 252 (Pa. Super.
2013) (“Choice of law provisions in contracts will generally be given effect.”
(citation omitted)); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. West, 807 A.2d 916, 920
(Pa. Super. 2002) (same).
13
With respect to federal decisions, we acknowledge the following:
[F]ederal court decisions do not control the determinations
of the Superior Court. Our law clearly states that, absent
a United States Supreme Court pronouncement, the
decisions of federal courts are not binding on Pennsylvania
state courts, even when a federal question is involved. . . .
Whenever possible, Pennsylvania state courts follow the
Third Circuit so that litigants do not improperly “walk
across the street” to achieve a different result in federal
court than would be obtained in state court.
NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Secs., 52 A.3d 296, 303 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (citations omitted); accord Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d
682, 693 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations and punctuation
omitted).
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both jurisdictions would be impaired if their law were not applied.” Garcia
v. Plaza Oldsmobile, Ltd., 421 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2005). “A ‘false
conflict’ exists if only one jurisdiction’s governmental interests would be
impaired by the application of the other jurisdiction’s law. In such a
situation, the court must apply the law of the state whose interests would be
harmed if its law were not applied.”14 Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932
F.2d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422
Pa. 620, 624, 222 A.2d 897, 899 (1966). In “unprovided-for” cases,
“neither jurisdiction’s interests would be impaired if its laws are not
14
We are aware that Pennsylvania federal and state courts have defined
“false conflict” inconsistently. Upon reflection, we agree with the rationale
advanced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Hammersmith:
We think it is incorrect to use the term “false conflict” to
describe the situation where the laws of two states do not
differ. If two jurisdictions’ laws are the same, then there is
no conflict at all, and a choice of law analysis is
unnecessary. Thus, the first part of the choice of law
inquiry is best understood as determining if there is an
actual or real conflict between the potentially applicable
laws. See, e.g., [Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Eaton
Metal Prods. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 482, 490 n.9 (E.D. Pa.
2003)] (“Before we even reach the ‘false conflict’ question,
we must determine whether, for lack of better
terminology, a ‘real conflict’ as opposed to ‘no conflict’
exists; that is, we must determine whether these states
would actually treat this issue any differently.”).
Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 230.
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applied.”15 Garcia, 421 F.3d at 220 (footnote omitted). If a true conflict is
found, then we must determine “which state has the greater interest in the
application of its law.”16 Cipolla, 439 Pa. at 566, 267 A.2d at 856.
In Cipolla, our Supreme Court examined whether a true conflict
existed between the tort laws of Delaware and Pennsylvania. Id. at 564,
267 A.2d at 855. The defendant was a Delaware resident and the plaintiff
was a Pennsylvania resident. Id. The defendant, who was driving a car
registered in Delaware, was driving the plaintiff home to Pennsylvania when
they collided with another vehicle in Delaware. Id. The plaintiff sued the
15
We leave for another day a determination of which state’s law applies in
an “unprovided-for conflict” in contract cases. In tort cases, generally, the
law of the state where the injury occurred is applied. See Miller, 323 Pa.
Super. at 470-72, 470 A.2d at 1355-56.
16
If there is more than one issue, then Pennsylvania applies dépeçage, i.e.,
“different states’ laws may apply to different issues in a single case . . . .”
Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted); Broome v. Antlers’ Hunting Club, 595 F.2d 921, 924
(3d Cir. 1979) (predicting Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply law of
different states to separate issues). Although no court in this
Commonwealth has explicitly held that Pennsylvania applies dépeçage,
Pennsylvania federal courts have consistently applied the doctrine.
Furthermore, the doctrine is arguably suggested by, if not harmonious with,
the Griffith Court’s flexible choice of law framework. See Griffith, 416 Pa.
at 21, 203 A.2d at 805. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit observed that dépeçage was implicit in Professor Cavers’ choice of
law analysis, which our Supreme Court approvingly quoted in Cipolla. See
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 167 n.73 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding dépeçage is “implicit in the analysis of Professor Cavers” (citing
David Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process 40-43 (1965))), rev’d on other
grounds, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Cipolla, 439 Pa. at 567, 267 A.2d at 856-57
(quoting Cavers’ treatise, supra, extensively).
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defendant for negligence only, and our Supreme Court examined which
state’s law applied. Id. If Delaware law applied, then the plaintiff could not
recover under a Delaware statute preventing a guest from recovering for the
negligence of the host. Id. If Pennsylvania law applied, then the plaintiff
could recover if he could establish the defendant’s negligence. Id. at 564-
65, 267 A.2d at 855. The Cipolla Court reasoned that a true conflict existed
because the plaintiff “is a resident of Pennsylvania which has adopted a
plaintiff-protecting rule and [the defendant] is a resident of Delaware which
has adopted a defendant-protecting rule” and thus a “deeper analysis” was
required to determine “which state has the greater interest in the application
of its law.” Id. at 565-66, 267 A.2d at 856.
Similarly, in Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa. Super. 226,
582 A.2d 27 (1990), the Superior Court ascertained whether a true conflict
existed between the laws of Pennsylvania and Texas regarding a malicious
prosecution claim. Id. at 231, 582 A.2d at 30. In Pennsylvania, seizure of
the plaintiff’s person or property is not a necessary element for malicious
prosecution. Id. Texas, however, requires that a party alleging malicious
prosecution suffer physical detention of the claimant’s person or property.
Id. The Rosen Court held there was a true conflict because Texas wished
“to assure every potential litigant free and open access to the judicial system
without fear of a countersuit for malicious prosecution.” Id. at 232, 582
A.2d at 30. Pennsylvania, in contrast, provided “greater protection to those
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individuals and entities who may be forced to defend a baseless suit.” Id. at
233, 582 A.2d at 31. Thus, having concluded a true conflict existed, the
Rosen Court then determined which state had “the greater interest in the
application of its law on malicious prosecution to the instant matter.” Id. at
233, 582 A.2d at 31.
In sum, in Pennsylvania, a conflict-of-law analysis not involving a
statutory or contractual choice of law clause, first requires determining
whether the laws in question actually conflict. E.g., Budtel, 915 A.2d at
643. If relevant differences between the laws exist, then we next classify
the actual conflict as a “true conflict,” “false conflict,” or “unprovided-for
conflict.” Cipolla, 439 Pa. at 565, 267 A.2d at 855-56; Miller, 323 Pa.
Super. at 470, 470 A.2d at 1355.
Instantly, a New York statute voids clauses immunizing recreational
facilities from liability for negligence because they violate New York’s public
policy.17 N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-326 (McKinney 2014). Pennsylvania,
however, recognizes the validity of such exculpatory clauses when they
govern voluntary and hazardous recreational activities. See, e.g.,
Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 36, 2 A.3d at 1195. Because relevant differences
17
No party has suggested the statute applies outside of New York. Cf.
Garcia, 421 F.3d at 220 (noting, “In our conflicts-of-law analysis[,] the first
issue that we must address is whether New York’s . . . [l]aw with respect to
the issue at hand has extraterritorial application, and, accordingly, whether
that law by its terms can be applied to determine liability for the
Pennsylvania accident underlying this appeal.”)
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exist between New York and Pennsylvania jurisprudence, see
Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 230, there is an actual conflict that we must
classify as a “true conflict,” “false conflict,” or “unprovided-for conflict.”
Akin to Rosen, which identified a true conflict because of
Pennsylvania’s and Texas’s diametrically opposing views on malicious
prosecution, Pennsylvania provides greater protection to recreational
facilities, unlike New York, which favors protecting participants injured at
such facilities. See Rosen, 399 Pa. Super. at 232-33, 582 A.2d at 30-32.
To paraphrase our Supreme Court in Cipolla, the fact that McDonald is a
resident of New York, which has adopted a plaintiff-protecting rule, and
Whitewater is a resident of Pennsylvania, which has adopted a defendant-
protecting rule, demonstrates a true conflict. See Cipolla, 439 Pa. at 565-
66, 267 A.2d at 856.
We thus ascertain whether New York “or Pennsylvania has the greater
interest in the application of its law to the question now before us.” See id.
at 565, 267 A.2d at 855.
In determining which state has the greater interest in
the application of its law, one method is to see what
contacts each state has with the accident, the contacts
being relevant only if they relate to the “policies and
interest underlying the particular issue before the court.”
[Griffith, 416 Pa. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805]. When doing
this it must be remembered that a mere counting of
contacts is not what is involved. The weight of a particular
state’s contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather
than quantitative scale.
* * *
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Also, it seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely on
his home state law when he is acting within that state.
Consider the response that would be accorded a
proposal that was the opposite of this principle if
it were advanced against a person living in the
state of injury on behalf of a person coming
there from a state having a higher standard of
care or of financial protection. The proposal
thus advanced would require the community the
visitor entered to step up its standard of
behavior for his greater safety or lift its financial
protection to the level to which he was
accustomed. Such a proposal would be rejected
as unfair. By entering the state or nation, the
visitor has exposed himself to the risk of the
territory and should not subject persons living
there to a financial hazard that their law had not
created.
Inhabitants of a state should not be put in jeopardy of
liability exceeding that created by their state’s laws just
because a visitor from a state offering higher protection
decides to visit there.
Id. at 566-67, 267 A.2d at 856-57 (citations, punctuation, and footnote
omitted); accord Myers v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 506 Pa.
492, 496, 485 A.2d 1113, 1115-16 (1984).18
18
We acknowledge that other Pennsylvania state and federal courts have
construed the Griffith interest analysis differently. In Gillan v. Gillan, 236
Pa. Super. 147, 345 A.2d 742 (1975), and Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa.
Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553 (1983), the Superior Court interpreted Griffith as
adopting the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 188, and applied
the Restatement to the contracts at issue. Knauer, 323 Pa. Super. at 215,
470 A.2d at 558; Gillan, 236 Pa. Super. at 150, 345 A.2d at 744. Our
Commonwealth Court in Ario v. Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s of
London Syndicates 33, 205 & 506, 996 A.2d 588 (Pa. Commw. 2010),
similarly opined in an insurance contract case that Griffith “adopted the
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For example, the Walter Court ascertained whether Pennsylvania or
New Jersey law should apply to an automobile insurance policy. Walter,
290 Pa. Super. at 136, 434 A.2d at 167. The Walter Court reviewed each
state’s contacts with the contract:
In this contract case, the state having the most vital
contacts with the policy of insurance involved was New
Jersey. The policy was issued in New Jersey by the
appellant in June, 1972, to Mr. Walter, a resident of New
Jersey. It was issued for the twofold purpose of giving
insurance protection to Mr. Walter and others as set forth
in the policy, and to comply with the requirements set
forth in the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Security
approach of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second to resolving choice
of law questions.” Id. at 595 (citations omitted). “We of course recognize
that a decision of the Commonwealth Court is not binding precedent upon
this Court; however, it may be considered for its persuasive value.”
Holland v. Marcy, 817 A.2d 1082, 1083 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Section 188 identifies several factors in
resolving choice of law:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1971). In contrast, the Third
Circuit has consistently opined that Griffith combined “the ‘approaches of
both the Restatement II (contacts establishing significant relationships) and
interests analysis (qualitative appraisal of the relevant States’ policies with
respect to the controversy).’” Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 231 (punctuation
omitted) (quoting Melville, 584 F.2d at 1311).
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Responsibility Statute . . . . No matter where [Mr. Walter’s
agent] drove [Mr. Walter’s] car or gave consent to others
to operate his vehicle, [Mr. Walter] had the right to expect
that his policy conformed to New Jersey law and that the
laws of New Jersey would apply in interpreting the policy.
Pennsylvania had no contact with the transaction involving
the insurance policy. It was by mere happenstance that
the automobile was involved in an accident while located in
Pennsylvania. As noted in Griffith v. United Airlines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 24, 203 A.2d 806: “(T)he site of the accident
purely fortuitous.”
Id. at 137, 434 A.2d at 167-68. Because, inter alia, the appellant “issued
an insurance policy to [Mr. Walter] to cover an automobile located in New
Jersey,” and he obtained the policy to comply with New Jersey laws, the
Walter Court held New Jersey law applied. Id. at 138, 434 A.2d at 168.
In McCabe, this Court likewise examined each state’s contacts to a
Connecticut insurance contract:
In the instant case, [the insurer] argues that
Connecticut law would apply since [the insured] lived in
Connecticut, and the . . . policy of Insurance was executed
there. It also contends that “underlying these contacts are
Connecticut’s sovereign interests that the rights of its
residents and those who do business in its state are
governed by Connecticut law and that its insurance law, as
applied to the insurance policy, will be given full faith and
credit by a sister state.” Finally, [the insurer] alleges that
Connecticut has an interest in minimizing insurance
premiums for its residents. . . .
Pennsylvania had no contact with the transaction involving
the insurance policy. It was by mere happenstance that
the Connecticut automobile owned and operated by [the
insured] was involved in an accident while located in
Pennsylvania. . . . At this time, we are concerned with
contract of insurance, and, as to the insurance policy,
Connecticut had the most significant contacts.
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McCabe, 356 Pa. Super. at 232, 514 A.2d at 586.
Instantly, similar to McCabe and Walter, whose contracts were
executed outside of Pennsylvania, the exculpatory clause was executed in
New York by McDonald, a New York resident. See id.; Walter, 290 Pa.
Super. at 137, 434 A.2d at 167-68. New York certainly has a sovereign
interest in protecting McDonald and may wish, as she averred, to recoup the
costs of her medical treatment. See McCabe, 356 Pa. Super. at 232, 514
A.2d at 586. But, comparable to the insurance policy in Walter, the instant
release was executed for the purpose of protecting Whitewater, a
Pennsylvania business that “had the right to expect that [the release]
conformed to [Pennsylvania] law and that the laws of [Pennsylvania] would
apply in interpreting the [release].” See Walter, 290 Pa. Super. at 137,
434 A.2d at 167-68. “[I]t seems only fair to permit” Whitewater to rely on
Pennsylvania law when it acted within Pennsylvania. See Cipolla, 439 Pa.
at 567, 267 A.2d at 856. Whitewater should not be placed in jeopardy of
liability exceeding that created by Pennsylvania law just because McDonald
is a visitor from New York, a state offering higher protection. See id.
Unlike McCabe and Walter, the site of the accident was not fortuitous, as
the underlying accident occurred at Whitewater’s place of business in
Pennsylvania on a preplanned outing for which McDonald signed a contract.
Cf. McCabe, 356 Pa. Super. at 232, 514 A.2d at 586; Walter, 290 Pa.
Super. at 137, 434 A.2d at 167-68. After carefully weighing the sovereign
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interests at stake, which include contacts establishing the significant
relationships with each sovereign, we hold that Pennsylvania has the greater
interest in the application of its law to this case. See Cipolla, 439 Pa. at
566, 267 A.2d at 856. Accordingly, we discern no basis for reversing the
trial court’s order on this point. See Charlie, 100 A.3d at 250.
We next address Whitewater’s appeal, which raised the following
issues:
Whether the trial court erred by denying summary
judgment on the basis of [McDonald’s] alleged, and mere
belief, that she was “economically compelled” to sign the
release by her employer?
Whether [Whitewater] was entitled to summary judgment
because the “Release of Liability” is a valid and enforceable
exculpatory clause involving a recreational activity as a
matter of well-established Pennsylvania law?
Whether [McDonald’s] claims against Whitewater are
barred by the valid and enforceable Release, which
[McDonald] signed knowingly and fully conscious of its
meaning, and which contains clear and unambiguous
language expressly releasing [Whitewater] from any
liability for negligent conduct and shows [McDonald’s]
express waiver of her right to bring any such negligence
claims?
Whitewater’s Brief, 1221 MDA 2013, at 5 (reordered to facilitate resolution).
We set forth the following as background.
[McDonald] had testified in her deposition that on May 17,
2006, the Headmaster of the School of the Holy Child
handed the Release form to [McDonald], while she was
between classes and walking through the school hallway
and told her to sign it, since she would be one of the
chaperones for the students on the rafting trip.
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[McDonald] alleges she signed the Release form without
reading it.
Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/10, at 2. McDonald explained “that she did not read the
Release because she had previously been on a whitewater trip in 2004.”
McDonald’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Whitewater’s Second Mot. for Summ.
J., 1/14/13, at 6 (citation omitted).
At her deposition, McDonald testified about the circumstances of her
departure from the School of the Holy Child:
[Whitewater’s counsel]. Why did you leave School of the
Holy Child to go [elsewhere]?
A. Well, due to the accident, I was only able to work part-
time and after—
* * *
A. And when [teaching] contracts were renewed [in
February 2007], I was given a contract, but I only received
a one percent increase and—
* * *
A. . . . despite the fact that I had, you know, superior
evaluation and the fact that I had been hurt on the job, I
was insulted by the one percent increase.
Q. Were you told by one of your supervisors that the
reason you got a one percent increase was because of your
reduced work and the fact that you were injured on the
job?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone tell you that?
A. No.
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Q. That’s something that you surmised—
A. Yes.
Q. —based on the circumstances?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Well, it carried [sic] $5,000. I can’t do the math very
quickly, but.
A. Okay, all right, and this one percent raise turned out to
be what?
A. Approximately $610.
Q. Okay, and your raises, while you were at School of the
Holy Child, were they always consistent with approximately
the $5,000 increase?
A. Three years previous to that, I’d gotten a $20,000
boost because I was seen as being a master teacher.
Q. Okay, all right. And this $600 . . . you didn’t expect
another $20,000 bump, but you thought you might get
something closer to the 5 grand that you had gotten the
previous year.
A. Yes.
Q. And when you didn’t, you surmised it was because of
your injury.
A. Yes, and I wasn’t going to be able to do all the extras
that are pretty much inherent in working in an
independent school.
Q. Extras, such as what?
A. Chaperoning trips to Europe, did that. Attending
trustees, board of trustees and faculty dinners.
Participating in faulty/student games. All the extras that
are just read into our contract.
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Q. Okay, and those are things that you did prior to the
accident.
A. Yeah.
Q. And you did not do them after the accident.
A. No.
Q. Okay, so when you got your one percent raise, is that
when you quit, you resigned?
A. No, I looked for a job first.
Ex. C to McDonald’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Whitewater’s Second Mot. for
Summ. J., at 11-14.
We reproduce the following exchange from the deposition testimony of
Ann Sullivan, the head of the School of the Holy Child, regarding its annual
job evaluations:
[McDonald’s counsel]. And in terms of conducting
evaluations of employees, and in particular teachers, was
participation in afterschool extracurriculars or school trips,
was that a factor looked at in terms of doing the
evaluation?
A. I think it’s discussed during the evaluation. If you look
at the evaluation forms, which are very idiosyncratic, there
are four buckets. One is professional competence, one is
commitment—
Q. I’m going to ask you—
A. Let me give you the background—one is commitment
to the community, the third is leadership, and the fourth is
congruence with the mission. There was a lot of discussion
as to what percent each of those buckets was taken into
consideration, and, frankly, it varies, and there was no
answer to that. And I have to say it was all of those ways,
but to varying degrees. Some people are great community
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people and not so great in the classroom, some people are
great in the classroom and not so great in the community
life. So, you know, it wasn’t meant to be punitive. It was
to recognize different contributions.
Q. All right, I understand. But I just want to make sure I
understand correctly. Even though there were different
ways—you indicated there were different wings [sic]
attached to different factors, you are saying, if I
understand correctly—I’m not trying to put words in your
mouth—that participation in school trips and
extracurricular activities was at least a factor?
A. I’m going to go back to that that it is a broader
discussion of community than going on school trips.
Sometimes it is class trips, sometimes it is attending
events. You know, it’s broader than that. It’s not a quid
pro quo. You don’t get an extra $500 added to your salary
because you are a chaperon [sic].
Q. Right, I understand there wasn’t a specific dollar
amount that was attached for any particular factor
indicated on the evaluation form, but it was at least a
factor that was put into the overall mix in conducting
evaluations of faculty, is that fair to say?
A. But it could be something quite different. It could be
being the moderator of the yearbook or the Model UN.
You are a making this assumption that going on
extracurricular trips was part of your evaluation. It’s only
one of many, many possible factors. I want you to know
many people did not go on trips. There are a lot of young
parents in the school and they are not able to go away
overnight because—
[Sullivan’s counsel]: Parents or teachers?
A. Parents who are teachers. There are teachers who are
young parents, have infants and toddlers and couldn’t do
those trips, and certainly it was great if they would go to a
concert and they would show up at field hockey games.
[McDonald’s counsel]. I understand. No one was
compelled to go on any particular trip, but participation in
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things was at least a factor identified in her evaluation, is
that correct?
A. I read [in McDonald’s employment file] that her
supervisor thanked her for going on trips and going to
athletic events.
Q. Hum-hum.
A. But, you know, I could say that there were wonderful
people who declined to go on the trips and there were no
financial repercussions.
Q. Okay. No one was ever terminated for not going on
any extracurricular trips?
A. Never. And they were not—their salaries were not
reduced for not going on trips.
Q. And there was never an employee who was penalized
in his or her paycheck for not going on a school
extracurricular or participating in afterschool projects.
A. Right.
Ex. I to McDonald’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Whitewater’s Second Mot. for
Summ. J., at 38-41.
In support of their first issue, Whitewater contends that economic
compulsion does not apply because McDonald’s employer—and not
Whitewater—compelled McDonald to sign the release. Regardless,
Whitewater argues that McDonald failed to present evidence establishing her
employer compelled her to sign. Whitewater asserts that the undisputed
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record demonstrated McDonald would have suffered no repercussions by not
participating in rafting.19 We hold Whitewater is entitled to relief.
It is well-settled that the standard of review for an order resolving
summary judgment is abuse of discretion or error of law. Charlie, 100 A.3d
at 250. Our Supreme Court defined duress as follows:
The formation of a valid contract requires the mutual
assent of the contracting parties. Mutual assent to a
contract does not exist, however, when one of the
contracting parties elicits the assent of the other
contracting party by means of duress. Duress has been
defined as:
That degree of restraint or danger, either
actually inflicted or threatened and impending,
which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to
overcome the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness . . . . The quality of firmness is
assumed to exist in every person competent to
contract, unless it appears that by reason of old
age or other sufficient cause he is weak or
infirm . . . . Where persons deal with each
other on equal terms and at arm’s length, there
19
Whitewater also contends McDonald waived her defense of duress by
failing to raise it in her answer to Whitewater’s new matter invoking the
release as a defense. Whitewater’s Brief, 1221 MDA 2013, at 28 (citing only
Tri-State Roofing Co. of Uniontown v. Simon, 187 Pa. Super. 17, 19,
142 A.2d 333, 334 (1958) [hereinafter “Tri-State”]). The Tri-State Court
did not hold that when the defendant invokes a contract as a defense in a
new matter, the plaintiff is bound to raise all affirmative defenses in its reply
to the new matter. Rather, the Court was merely summarizing the
procedural posture in which the defendant filed a reply alleging duress in
response to the plaintiff’s new matter. See id. at 19, 142 A.2d at 335.
Whitewater did not articulate any other basis for waiver, and it is well-
settled that we may not reverse on an argument not raised. See generally
Pa.R.A.P. 302. Accordingly, we decline to hold McDonald waived her
defense.
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is a presumption that the person alleging duress
possesses ordinary firmness . . . . Moreover, in
the absence of threats of actual bodily
harm there can be no duress where the
contracting party is free to consult with
counsel . . . .
Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 543 Pa. 146, 153-54, 669 A.2d 946, 950 (1996)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
Economic duress, i.e., business or economic compulsion, is a form of
duress. Tri-State, 187 Pa. Super. at 20, 142 A.2d at 335. The Tri-State
Court defined economic duress as follows:
To constitute duress or business compulsion there must be
more than a mere threat which might possibly result in
injury at some future time, such as a threat of injury to
credit in the indefinite future. It must be such a threat
that, in conjunction with other circumstances and business
necessity, the party so coerced fears a loss of business
unless he does so enter into the contract as demanded.
Id. at 20-21, 142 A.2d at 335 (citation and punctuation omitted). The Court
applied the above principles in ascertaining “whether [the] plaintiff’s threat
to breach its contract with the defendant, if defendant did not sign the
release . . . , constituted duress.” Id. at 18, 142 A.2d at 334.
In Litten v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 220 Pa. Super. 274, 286 A.2d
913 (1971), this Court addressed whether a prior, favorable oral contract or
a subsequent, unfavorable written contract controlled. Id. at 276-77, 286
A.2d at 914. “Plaintiffs contend they were compelled under the duress and
coercion of the defendant to enter into the written contract because
defendant had maneuvered plaintiffs into an untenable economic crisis from
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which they could extricate themselves only by signing the agreement
prepared by defendant.” Id. at 277, 286 A.2d at 914-15. The jury agreed
with the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, the court
failed to instruct the jury properly regarding duress. Id. at 277, 286 A.2d at
915. This Court affirmed, holding the defendant economically compelled the
plaintiff to execute the subsequent written contract. Id. at 281-82, 286
A.2d at 917. In affirming the jury verdict, this Court approvingly quoted the
trial court’s jury charge, which identified the elements of economic duress:
(1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which
compels the injured party to involuntarily or against his
will execute an agreement which results in economic loss,
and (2) the injured party does not have an immediate
legal remedy. The cases cited by defendant on this point .
. . are inapplicable because in those cases the defendants
did not bring about the state of financial distress in which
plaintiffs found themselves at the time of signing. In the
instant case, the final and potentially fatal blow was
prepared by defendant, which by its actions created the
situation which left plaintiffs with no alternative but to sign
the contract as written.
* * *
Business compulsion is not establish[ed] merely by proof
that consent was secured by the pressure of financial
circumstances, but a threat of serious financial loss may be
sufficient to constitute duress and to be ground for relief
where an ordinary suit at law or equity might not be an
adequate remedy. . . .
Id. at 282-83, 286 A.2d at 917 (citations, punctuation, and footnote
omitted).
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In Chepkevich, our Supreme Court adverted to economic duress in
resolving whether an exculpatory agreement should be construed as a
contract of adhesion:
[D]ownhill skiing—like auto racing—is a voluntary and
hazardous activity . . . . Moreover, an exculpatory
agreement conditioning use of a commercial facility for
such activities has not been construed as a typical contract
of adhesion. The signer is under no compulsion, economic
or otherwise, to participate, much less to sign the
exculpatory agreement, because it does not relate to
essential services, but merely governs a voluntary
recreational activity. See [Schillachi v. Flying
Dutchman Motorcycle Club, 751 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Pa.
1990)] (exculpatory clause valid under Pennsylvania law
where activity is purely recreational); Grbac v. Reading
Fair Co., 521 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff’d,
688 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1982) (exculpatory clause releasing
stock car racing company from liability for death arising
out of recreational race not invalid contract of adhesion
under Pennsylvania law). The signer is a free agent who
can simply walk away without signing the release and
participating in the activity, and thus the contract signed
under such circumstances is not unconscionable. . . .
It is also apparent that the Release here is valid under the
other elements of the [standard governing validity of
exculpatory provisions set forth in Topp Copy Prods.,
Inc. v. Singletary, 533 Pa. 468, 626 A.2d 98 (1993), and
Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Bus.
Men’s Ass’n, 423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966) (referred
to as the Topp Copy/Employers Liability standard)],
aside from adhesion contract concerns. First, the Release
cannot be said to contravene any policy of the law.
Indeed, the clear policy of this Commonwealth, as
embodied by the [Skier’s Responsibility] Act, is to
encourage the sport and to place the risks of skiing
squarely on the skier. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c)(2).
Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have upheld similar
releases respecting skiing and other inherently dangerous
sporting activities. See, e.g., Wang v. Whitetail
Mountain Resort, 933 A.2d 110 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing
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Superior Court panel’s decision in instant case, but
upholding release as applied to snow tubing accident);
[Nissley v. Candytown Motorcycle Club, 913 A.2d 887
(Pa. Super. 2006)] (upholding exculpatory agreement that
released defendant motorcycle club from “all liability”);
[Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness, 253 Pa. Super. 474, 385
A.2d 437 (1978)] (upholding exculpatory clause releasing
ski rental shop from liability for injury suffered when
skier’s bindings failed to release during fall). And, finally,
the Release [the appellee] signed is a contract between
the ski resort and [the appellee] relating to their private
affairs, specifically [the appellee’s] voluntary use of the
resort’s facilities.
Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 28-30, 2 A.3d at 1190-91. Thus, an exculpatory
clause is not typically analyzed within the framework of whether it is an
contract of adhesion. Id. at 29, 2 A.3d at 1191 (“The signer is under no
compulsion, economic or otherwise, to participate, much less to sign the
exculpatory agreement, because it does not relate to essential services, but
merely governs a voluntary recreational activity.”).
The case of Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841 (Pa.
Super. 2012), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 679, 75 A.3d 1282 (2013), is also
instructive. Technical Solutions contractually employed Gillingham to work
full-time on a software development project located at one of Consol
Energy’s properties; Gillingham was considered an independent contractor of
Consol. Id. at 853-54. A few weeks later, Consol asked Gillingham to sign
“a stack of documents,” which included
a waiver of his right to sue Consol in the event he was
injured due to its negligence. He felt that he had to sign
the pages in question since he was contractually obligated
to provide his services on the project through Technical
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Solutions. Mr. Gillingham believed that he was not in a
position to refuse to sign the documents presented to him
by Consol, and he stated, “If I would have not signed
them, I would have to leave the site . . . because it’s like
saying, No, I’m not going to honor your agreement and
protect this technology.” He also would have violated his
contract with Technical Solutions.
Id. at 854 (citation omitted). While exiting a Consol building via an exterior
metal stairway, Gillingham was injured when the stairway collapsed. Id. at
847.
Gillingham successfully sued Consol. Id. On appeal, Consol
contended the trial court should have granted its request for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because of the release Gillingham signed. Id. at
852. Gillingham countered that he felt compelled to sign the Consol release
because (1) “he was contractually obligated to provide his services on the
project through Technical Solutions,” and (2) he would have violated his
employment contract with Technical Solutions, i.e., his employer. Id. at
854. The Gillingham Court held the record was sufficient to have a jury
ascertain whether “Gillingham, who was under contract to provide services
on the project, was compelled to execute the documents due to Consol’s
superior bargaining position.” Id. The Court thus affirmed the jury’s verdict
in favor of Gillingham. Id.
Instantly, we frame Whitewater’s question as whether one party to a
contract can invoke duress when that duress was allegedly imposed by a
non-party and not by the other party to the contract. More precisely, we
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examine whether McDonald can void the release by claiming the School of
the Holy Child economically compelled her to sign the release with
Whitewater. McDonald’s presumption is that economic compulsion, i.e.,
duress, by a non-party to a contract can be “transferred.”
Under these unique facts, we decline McDonald’s apparent invitation to
expand a doctrine traditionally invoked between contracting parties. Our
Supreme Court held that mutual assent is a prerequisite to contract
formation and that such mutual assent is absent “when one of the
contracting parties elicits the assent of the other contracting party by means
of duress.” See Degenhardt, 543 Pa. at 153, 669 A.2d at 950. McDonald
and Whitewater are the contracting parties to the release; the School of the
Holy Child is not a contracting party. It follows that the School of the Holy
Child could not elicit the assent of McDonald by duress. See id.
Further, McDonald does not claim Whitewater economically compelled
her to sign the release. Unlike the plaintiff in Litten, McDonald has not
alleged that Whitewater—a contracting party—maneuvered her into
economic distress and compelled her to sign the contract. Cf. Litten, 220
Pa. Super. at 281-82, 286 A.2d at 917; Tri-State, 187 Pa. Super. at 18,
142 A.2d at 334 (resolving allegation of duress between contracting parties).
Whitewater, which provided recreational services similar to the ski resort in
Chepkevich, did not compel McDonald to participate, “much less . . . sign
the exculpatory agreement.” See Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 29, 2 A.3d at
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1191. In contrast to Gillingham, in which the plaintiff was contractually
obligated to work for Consol, the other contracting party, McDonald was not
contractually obligated to participate in recreational activities at Whitewater.
Cf. Gillingham, 51 A.3d at 854. Nor did she allege that she would have
violated her contract with the School of the Holy Child if she did not sign the
Whitewater release. Cf. id. (stating plaintiff would have violated his
employment contract with Technical Solutions, his direct employer, if he did
not sign Consol release). In sum, given the predicate condition of a threat
by one contracting party against another contracting party, economic duress
by a non-party to a contract does not appear easily amenable to concepts of
“transference” in this case.20
Assuming, however, duress by a non-contracting party could be
invoked to negate mutual assent between contracting parties, and assuming
that the possibility of not receiving a raise greater than 1% is a cognizable
economic loss, McDonald’s suggestion that unless she signed the release,
she could potentially not receive such a raise is, on this record, too
conjectural. See Litten, 220 Pa. Super. at 282, 286 A.2d at 917; Tri-
State, 187 Pa. Super. at 20-21, 142 A.2d at 335 (holding duress is “more
than a mere threat” of possible economic injury in indefinite future).
McDonald notes she received only a 1% raise in February of 2007. See Ex.
20
We do not foreclose the possibility, however, in other cases.
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C to McDonald’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Whitewater’s Second Mot. for
Summ. J., at 13. But a minimal raise, after the fact, does not alone
demonstrate that when McDonald signed the release in May 2006, she did so
because she feared economic injury, i.e., not receiving a raise greater than
1%.
Having resolved that economic compulsion is not available to
McDonald, we address Whitewater’s last two issues together: whether the
release is valid and enforceable and thus bars McDonald’s claims.
Whitewater asserts the release met all the elements of the Topp
Copy/Employers Liability standard governing the validity of exculpatory
clauses. Whitewater thus contends the trial court erred by denying
summary judgment on liability. Whitewater, we hold, is entitled to relief.
In Chepkevich, our Supreme Court resolved “whether a skier may
maintain a negligence action against a ski resort for injuries sustained while
skiing or whether suit is barred by statute and/or a release signed by the
skier.” Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 3, 2 A.3d at 1175.
The Release, printed on a single page and titled
“RELEASE FROM LIABILITY,” stated:
Skiing, Snowboarding, and Snowblading,
including the use of lifts, is a dangerous sport
with inherent and other risks which include but
are not limited to variations in snow and terrain,
ice and icy conditions, moguls, rocks, debris
(above and below the surface), bare spots, lift
towers, poles, snowmaking equipment
(including pipes, hydrants, and component
parts), fences and the absence of fences and
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other natural and manmade objects, visible or
hidden, as well as collisions with equipment,
obstacles or other skiers. . . . All the risks of
skiing and boarding present the risk of serious
or fatal injury. By accepting this Season Pass I
agree to accept all these risks and agree not to
sue Hidden Valley Resort or their employees if
injured while using their facilities regardless of
any negligence on their part.
Id. at 5, 2 A.3d at 1176.
The Chepkevich Court set forth the three elements of the Topp
Copy/Employers Liability standard for determining the validity and
enforceability of an exculpatory clause:
It is generally accepted that an exculpatory clause is valid
where three conditions are met. First, the clause must not
contravene public policy. Secondly, the contract must be
between persons relating entirely to their own private
affairs and thirdly, each party must be a free bargaining
agent to the agreement so that the contract is not one of
adhesion. In Dilks v. Flohr Chevrolet, 411 Pa. 425, 192
A.2d 682 (1963), we noted that once an exculpatory
clause is determined to be valid, it will, nevertheless, still
be unenforceable unless the language of the parties is
clear that a person is being relieved of liability for his own
acts of negligence. In interpreting such clauses we listed
as guiding standards that: 1) the contract language must
be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not
favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the
intention of the parties with the greatest particularity,
beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference
from words of general import can establish the intent of
the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be
construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking
immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing
the immunity is upon the party invoking protection under
the clause.
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Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 26, 2 A.3d at 1189 (citations omitted). Our
Supreme Court held the release was valid and enforceable, and concluded
the release barred the skier’s negligence lawsuit.21 Id. at 3, 31, 35, 2 A.3d
at 1175, 1192, 1195.
In Tayar, the plaintiff was injured while snow tubing at a ski resort.
Tayar, 616 Pa. at 390, 47 A.3d at 1193. She raised claims of negligence
and reckless conduct against the ski resort and one of its employees. Id. at
391, 47 A.3d at 1194 (summarizing trial court’s decision). In response, the
defendants asserted the plaintiff’s claims were barred because she signed
the following release:
CAMELBACK SNOW TUBING
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RISKS AND AGREEMENT NOT TO
SUE
THIS IS A CONTRACT–READ IT
I understand and acknowledge that snow tubing, including
the use of lifts, is a dangerous, risk sport and that there
are inherent and other risks associated with the sport and
that all of these risks can cause serious and even fatal
injuries. I understand that part of the thrill, excitement
and risk of snow tubing is that the snow tubes all end up in
a common, runout area and counter slope at various times
and speeds and that it is my responsibility to try to avoid
hitting another snowtuber and it is my responsibility to try
to avoid being hit by another snowtuber, but that,
21
The Chepkevich Court also held that the skier’s lawsuit was alternatively
barred by the Skier’s Responsibility Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102. See
Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 25, 2 A.3d at 1188.
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notwithstanding these efforts by myself and other
snowtubers, there is a risk of collisions.
* * *
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE AND OF BEING
ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SPORT OF
SNOWTUBING, I AGREE THAT I WILL NOT SUE AND WILL
RELEASE FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY CAMELBACK SKI
CORPORATION IF I OR ANY MEMBER OF MY FAMILY IS
INJURED WHILE USING ANY OF THE SNOWTUBING
FACILITIES OR WHILE BEING PRESENT AT THE
FACILITIES, EVEN IF I CONTEND THAT SUCH INJURIES
ARE THE RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE OR ANY OTHER
IMPROPER CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE SNOWTUBING
FACILITY.
Id. at 388-89, 47 A.3d at 1192-93. The trial court agreed with the
defendants that the release absolved them of liability. Id. at 390-91, 47
A.3d at 1194. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court on, inter alia,
whether the release exculpated defendants from reckless conduct. Id. at
391, 47 A.3d at 1194. The Superior Court, in an en banc decision, held that
the release was limited to negligent conduct only. Id. (summarizing
Superior Court’s holding).
The Tayar Court granted allowance of appeal to address, among other
issues, whether the release barred the plaintiff’s claim for reckless conduct.
Id. at 392, 47 A.3d at 1194. Our Supreme Court initially observed that
“exculpatory clauses releasing a party from negligence generally are not
against public policy.” Id. at 401, 47 A.3d at 1200. The Tayar Court held
that the above release did not exculpate the defendants from reckless
conduct because of the fundamental differences between negligence and
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recklessness. Id. at 403, 47 A.3d at 1201. Thus, our Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff’s claim for reckless conduct could proceed. Id. at 406, 47
A.3d at 1203.
Regarding the first element needed for a valid exculpatory clause,
Pennsylvania courts have affirmed exculpatory releases for “skiing and other
inherently dangerous sporting activities,” such as snowtubing and
motorcycle racing. See Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 30, 2 A.3d at 1191 (citing
Wang, supra, and Nissley, supra). Other activities include automobile
racing,22 paintballing,23 and whitewater rafting.24 Thus, Pennsylvania courts
have held exculpatory clauses pertaining to inherently dangerous sporting
activities do not “contravene any policy of the law.”25 Chepkevich, 607 Pa.
at 29, 2 A.3d at 1191.
22
Seaton v. E. Windsor Speedway, Inc., 400 Pa. Super. 134, 140, 582
A.2d 1380, 1383 (1990) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant
based on valid and enforceable exculpatory agreement signed by plaintiff).
23
Martinez v. Skirmish, U.S.A., Inc., Civ. No. 07-5003, 2009 WL
1676144, *12, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51628, *34 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2009)
(holding release was valid and enforceable against plaintiff’s negligence
claim).
24
Wroblewski v. Ohiopyle Trading Post, Civ. No. 12-0780, 2013 WL
4504448, at *9, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119206, at *30 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22,
2013) (concluding release signed by plaintiff exculpated whitewater rafting
company for plaintiff’s negligence claim).
25
Courts have held invalid exculpatory clauses involving bailees, banks, and
common carriers. Dilks, 411 Pa. at 434 n.9, 192 A.2d at 687 n.9 (citing
cases).
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With respect to the second element, our Supreme Court held “[t]he
validity of a contractual provision which exculpates a person from liability
for his own acts of negligence is well settled if the contract is between
persons relating entirely to their own private affairs.” Dilks, 411 Pa. at 433,
192 A.2d at 687. Lastly, the third element’s reference to “contracts of
adhesion” may be problematic given different facts, as the Chepkevich
Court acknowledged. Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 28 n.18, 2 A.3d at 1190
n.18. The Chepkevich Court conceded that if the plaintiff “could not dicker
over the terms of the form contract,” the release could have been a contract
of adhesion. Id. But our Supreme Court emphasized, “such contracts
executed in the course of voluntary participation in recreational activities
have not been declared unenforceable on these grounds, presumably
because we recognize an inherent policy-based distinction between
‘essential’ activities (such as signing a residential lease) and voluntary, non-
essential ones (such as engaging in dangerous sports).” Id. Finally, absent
fraud, “failure to read [the contract] is an unavailing excuse or defense and
cannot justify an avoidance, modification or nullification of the contract or
any provision thereof.” Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins.
Co., 503 Pa. 300, 305, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983) (citations omitted and
alteration in original).
Instantly, Whitewater’s exculpatory clause addressing negligence does
not contravene Pennsylvania’s public policy. See Tayar, 616 Pa. at 401, 47
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A.3d at 1200; Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 29, 2 A.3d at 1191. Pennsylvania
state and federal courts have affirmed substantively identical clauses in
other dangerous sporting activities, including whitewater rafting. See
Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at 30, 2 A.3d at 1191 (collecting cases); see also
Wroblewski, 2013 WL 4504448, at *9, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119206, at
*30. Second, the release between McDonald and Whitewater related
entirely to her participation in a hazardous recreational activity. See Dilks,
411 Pa. at 433, 192 A.2d at 687. We acknowledge that McDonald
chaperoned this trip and that, in general, chaperoning field trips, among
other duties, was an “extra” duty inherent to working at the School of the
Holy Child. See Ex. C to McDonald’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Whitewater’s
Second Mot. for Summ. J., at 14. But McDonald did not identify any
materials issues of fact contradicting Sullivan’s deposition testimony that no
teacher was compelled to chaperone any particular trip. See Ex. I to
McDonald’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Whitewater’s Second Mot. for Summ.
J., at 40-41. Indeed, McDonald did not dispute that an employee was not
required to participate in extracurricular trips to demonstrate commitment to
the community—one of four areas employees are evaluated in each year.
See id. Lastly, identical to the plaintiff in Chepkevich, McDonald
voluntarily engaged in a non-essential activity. See Chepkevich, 607 Pa. at
28 n.18, 2 A.3d at 1190 n.18. Accordingly, we hold Whitewater’s
exculpatory clause is valid. See id. at 26, 2 A.3d at 1189.
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As for the clause’s enforceability, we examine whether the clause
“spells out the intention of the parties with particularity and shows the intent
to release [Whitewater] from liability by express stipulation.” See id. at 30,
2 A.3d at 1191. The instant clause was titled “RELEASE OF LIABILITY –
READ BEFORE SIGNING” “in capital letters in large font at the top,”
identical to the Chepkevich release. See id. at 31, 2 A.3d at 1192. The
language releasing Whitewater from liability was written in the same size
font as the body of the release and required McDonald’s signature. See id.
Whether or not [McDonald] availed herself of the
opportunity to read the Release she signed, we cannot
agree that a full-page, detailed agreement, written in
normal font and titled “RELEASE [OF] LIABILITY”
constitutes an insufficient effort on the part of
[Whitewater] to inform [McDonald] of the fact that, by
signing [the release], she was giving up any right she
might have to sue for damages arising from injuries
caused even by negligence.
See id. Further, McDonald voluntarily engaged in whitewater rafting and
Whitewater did not compel her to sign the release. See id. McDonald
admittedly did not attempt to negotiate the terms of the release. See id.
Accordingly, we conclude the release is enforceable. See id. Because the
release is valid and enforceable, the trial court erred by denying
Whitewater’s motion for summary judgment on liability and thus,
Whitewater is due relief. See Charlie, 100 A.3d at 250. The order below is
affirmed with respect to its holding that Pennsylvania law applies and
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reversed to the extent it held material issues of fact existed regarding
Whitewater’s liability.
Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded with
instructions to grant judgment in favor of Whitewater and adverse to
McDonald and for further proceedings, as deemed necessary. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/29/2015
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