Martinez v. Christian Financial v. Accessabilities , 125 A.3d 809 ( 2015 )

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2015 PA Super 215LISA MARTINEZ, ELIZABETH SIEBER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
JENNIFER DARAZIO AND DEBRA TINKEY, PENNSYLVANIA
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED
v.
CHRISTIAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CORP., INDIA CHRISTIAN AND COREY
CHRISTIAN
v.
ACCESSABILITIES, INC. AND
COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR
INDEPENDENCE
APPEAL OF: CHRISTIAN FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT CORP., INDIA CHRISTIAN No. 766 WDA 2014
AND COREY CHRISTIAN
Appeal from the Order Entered April 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD-12-018763
LISA MARTINEZ, ELIZABETH SIEBER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
JENNIFER DARAZIO AND DEBRA TINKEY, PENNSYLVANIA
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED
v.
CHRISTIAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CORP., INDIA CHRISTIAN AND COREY
CHRISTIAN
v.
ACCESSABILITIES, INC. AND
COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR
J-A19003-15
INDEPENDENCE
APPEAL OF: CHRISTIAN FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT CORP., INDIA CHRISTIAN No. 1445 WDA 2014
AND COREY CHRISTIAN
Appeal from the Order Entered August 20, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD-12-018763
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2015
Christian Financial Management Corp. (CFM), India Christian, and
Corey Christian (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the orders entered
April 30, 2014, and August 20, 2014, which granted the class action
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining Appellants from issuing
amended W-2 statements for Tax Year 2012 until further order of the trial
court.1 We affirm.
CFM provided payroll services for attendant caregivers, who provided
care to disabled persons receiving Medicaid benefits administered by the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. Its responsibilities included
withholding payroll taxes, making tax payments to the appropriate taxing
authorities, and issuing paychecks to the caregivers. Sometime in 2012,
following an influx of several thousand new accounts, discrepancies began to
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1
An appeal may be taken as of right from an order that grants an injunction.
See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). The above-listed dockets were consolidated sua
sponte by this Court on October 30, 2014. See infra at n.4.
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appear in CFM payroll services. Thereafter, caregivers Lisa Martinez,
Elizabeth Sieber, Jennifer Darazio, and Debra Tinkey, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated (collectively, Appellees),
commenced this class action in October 2012, alleging violations of the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collections Law,2 unjust enrichment,
breach of contract – third party beneficiary, and breach of fiduciary duty.
In December 2012, the trial court appointed a receiver to protect and
administer the records and assets of CFM, including the accurate reporting
and payment of tax obligations.3 See Trial Court Order, 12/13/2012
(appointing receiver); Trial Court Order, 01/10/2013 (regarding 2012 W-2
statements). In February 2013, the receiver issued W-2 statements to
former CFM caregivers, thus reporting estimated 2012 gross earnings and
tax obligations for those caregivers. See Receiver’s Final Report,
08/22/2013. However, according to the receiver, CFM records were in
disarray, and complete, accurate payment records could not be re-
assembled. Id. Regarding tax obligations, the receiver paid approximately
$4.5 million in pre-receivership federal, state, and local taxes, but estimated
CFM owed approximately $2 million in additional, pre-receivership,
employee-related taxes. Id. According to the receiver, this discrepancy
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2
43 P.S. §§ 260.1 – 260.9a.
3
Incidentally, in January 2013, the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare transferred CFM caregivers to another financial services company.
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arose due to CFM’s failure to withhold properly the tax obligations incurred
by its caregivers. Id. Following submission of the receiver’s final report, the
trial court terminated the receivership. See Order of Court, 08/26/2013. At
no point prior to the termination of the receivership did CFM object to the
receiver-issued W-2 statements.
In January 2014, Appellants submitted an expert report (Krieger
Report), challenging the methodology applied by the receiver to generate
2012 W-2 statements. See Krieger Report, 01/16/2014. Based upon the
Krieger Report, CFM filed amended IRS Forms 940 (regarding federal
unemployment tax) and 941 (regarding employer’s federal tax return). CFM
also informed the trial court of its intention to issue amended 2012 W-2
statements. Nevertheless, Appellants acknowledged that the amended W-2
statements remained inaccurate. See Krieger Report at 32 (acknowledging
that its analysis did not consider potential tax exemptions based on family
relationship).
In April 2014, Appellees filed a motion for preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin CFM from issuing amended 2012 W-2
statements. The trial court conducted a hearing on April 30, 2014, at the
conclusion of which, the court granted Appellees’ motion for a preliminary
injunction.
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Appellants timely appealed, and filed two, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statements. The trial court issued responsive opinions.4
Appellants raise the following issues:
1. Does federal law preempt a state court from enjoining [CFM]
from issuing amended W-2 tax statements?
2. Did sufficient evidence exist to support the trial court’s entry
of an injunction preventing [CFM] from issuing amended W-2 tax
statements?
Appellants’ Brief at 4.
Initially, Appellants contend that federal law preempts the trial court
from enjoining CFM from issuing amended W-2 tax statements, thus
depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Werner v.
Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 787 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“Federal preemption
is a jurisdictional matter for a state court because it challenges subject
matter jurisdiction and the competence of the court to reach the merits of
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4
The trial court issued its order granting Appellees’ motion from the bench
on April 30, 2014. Appellants timely appealed on May 9, 2014, docketed in
this Court at No. 766 WDA 2014. The trial court entered a written order,
again granting Appellees’ motion, on May 21, 2014. On June 4, 2014,
Appellants filed a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court
issued a responsive opinion on August 20, 2014. However, following its
opinion, the trial court entered another order. The new order again granted
Appellees’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief, but clarified its previous
ruling, enjoining Appellants from issuing amended W-2 statements “until
further order on this matter.” Trial Court Order, 08/20/2014. The modified
order prompted Appellants to file a second notice of appeal on September 5,
2014, docketed here at No. 1445 WDA 2014, and a second, court-ordered
Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court re-issued its opinion on December
10, 2014. This Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals. See Order of
Court, 10/30/2014.
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the claims raised.”). Appellants raise two arguments in support of this
contention.
First, Appellants suggest that the federal Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a), expressly preempts the trial court from enjoining CFM from
issuing amended W-2 tax statements. See Werner, 799 A.2d at 787
(“Express preemption arises when there is an explicit statutory command
that state law be displaced.”). As noted by Appellants, the Anti-Injunction
Act (AIA) prohibits any court from entertaining an action filed with “the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” 26 U.S.C. §
7421(a). According to Appellants, this prohibition extends to those activities
that may culminate in the assessment or collection of taxes, citing in support
Blech v. United States, 595 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1979).5
Second, Appellants also contend that the injunction is preempted
because it conflicts with Congressional objectives, manifest in the Internal
Revenue Code. See Werner, 799 A.2d at 787 (noting that conflict
preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). Appellants
note CFM’s obligation to report accurately federal withholding taxes and to
correct perceived errors in its reporting. See Appellants’ Brief at 24-30
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5
Appellant also cites to several, sister-state court decisions.
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(citing federal statutes and case law, detailing its obligations under the
Internal Revenue Code).
Here, Appellants seek to issue amended, 2012 W-2 statements that
comport with the tax analysis set forth in its expert report but are contrary
to the tax analysis previously adopted by the receiver. Appellants suggest
that amended W-2 statements would more accurately report caregivers’
wages and the taxes withheld from them. Moreover, according to
Appellants, the issuance of amended W-2 statements would facilitate the
“assessment” and “collection” of federal taxes. Thus, Appellants conclude,
we should vacate the injunction.
We disagree. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed the proper interpretation of the terms “assessment” and
“collection,” relevant to the Federal Tax Code. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v.
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).6 In Brohl, a trade association brought a
federal suit against the Colorado Department of Revenue, asserting that
certain notice and reporting requirements were unconstitutional. Id. at
1128. The federal district court enjoined the requirements, pending
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6
At issue in Brohl was the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), not the AIA. See 28
U.S.C. § 1341 (depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to “enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law”).
However, the Supreme Court “assume[-d] that words used in both Acts are
generally used in the same way” and “discern[-ed] the meaning of the terms
in the AIA by reference to the broader Tax Code.” Brohl, 135 S. Ct. at
1129. Thus, the Supreme Court’s interpretation is instructive.
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outcome of the underlying litigation. Id. at 1128-29. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
district court was without jurisdiction pursuant to the TIA; however, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the circuit
court. Id. at 1129.
The Court observed that “the Federal Tax Code has long treated
information gathering as a phase of tax administration procedure that occurs
before assessment, levy, or collection.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the
Court concluded, the injunction did not “restrain” the assessment or
collection of taxes. Id. at 1132 (adopting a narrow definition of the word
“restrain,” meaning, “to prohibit from action”). According to the Supreme
Court:
[A]dopting a narrower definition is consistent with the rule that
jurisdictional rules should be clear. The question—at least for
negative injunctions—is whether the relief to some degree stops
“assessment, levy or collection,” not whether it merely inhibits
them. The Court of Appeals' definition of “restrain,” by contrast,
produces a vague and obscure boundary that would result in
both needless litigation and uncalled-for dismissal, all in the
name of a jurisdictional statute meant to protect state resources.
Applying the correct definition, a suit cannot be understood to
“restrain” the “assessment, levy or collection” of a state tax if it
merely inhibits those activities.
Id. at 1133 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In our view, W-2 statements are sufficiently similar to the notice and
reporting requirements at issue in Brohl. A W-2 statement, issued by an
employer, merely reports an employee’s wages and those taxes withheld by
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the employer over the course of the preceding year. See 26 U.S.C. § 6051;
see also, generally, Bachner v. Comm’r, 81 F.3d 1274, 1280 (3d Cir.
1996) (“W-2 information is not independently sufficient for tax-
computational purposes.”). Thus, even were we to accept Appellants’
position, that amended statements would more accurately report its former
caregivers’ wages and taxes, the trial court’s injunction merely postpones or
inhibits the assessment and collection of the caregivers’ taxes, it does not
restrain assessment or collection. Accordingly, pursuant to Brohl, we
conclude that the trial court was not jurisdictionally barred from enjoining
Appellants from issuing amended W-2 statements for Tax Year 2012.
On the merits, Appellants also contend that there was insufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s injunction. Our standard of review,
though nominally characterized as an abuse of discretion, is highly
deferential:
We recognize that on an appeal from the grant or denial of a
preliminary injunction, we do not inquire into the merits of the
controversy, but only examine the record to determine if there
were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the
court below. Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support
the decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably
erroneous or misapplied will we interfere with the decision of the
trial court.
This Court set out the reasons for this highly deferential
standard of review almost a hundred years ago:
It is somewhat embarrassing to an appellate court to
discuss the reasons for or against a preliminary decree,
because generally in such an issue we are not in full
possession of the case either as to the law or testimony—
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hence our almost invariable rule is to simply affirm the
decree, or if we reverse it to give only a brief outline of our
reasons, reserving further discussion until appeal, should
there be one, from final judgment or decree in law or
equity.
Summit Towne Centre v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d
995 (Pa. 2003) (internal punctuation and formatting modified; internal
citations omitted) (quoting Hicks v. Am. Natural Gas Co., 57 A. 55, 55-56
(Pa. 1904)).
We have reviewed the trial court’s analysis. Following a hearing, the
court concluded that an injunction was appropriate. See Notes of Testimony
(N.T.), 07/01/2014, at 115-18; see also Trial Court Opinion, 08/20/2014,
at 5-8 (analyzing the six prerequisites set forth in Warhime v. Warhime,
860 A.2d 41, 46-47 (Pa. 2004)); Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/2014, at 5-8
(same). In particular, we note the court’s reliance upon evidence that
Appellants’ proposed, amended W-2 statements remain inaccurate. See,
e.g., N.T. at 113-114 (referencing Krieger Report at 32). Based upon this,
we conclude that the court had reasonable grounds for enjoining the
issuance of amended W-2 statements, at least until the Internal Revenue
Service makes a determination as to their validity and accuracy. See Trial
Court Opinion, 08/20/2014, at 8 (noting that the IRS will ultimately resolve
this dispute). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.
Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2015
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