Commonwealth v. Secreti , 2016 Pa. Super. 28 ( 2016 )

J-S17011-16
2016 Pa. Super. 28
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUSTIN SECRETI
Appellant No. 578 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 1, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-MD-0001637-1994
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2016
Appellant, Justin Secreti, appeals from the order entered in the
Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his serial petition
brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We reverse
the PCRA court’s order, vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and
remand for resentencing.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Appellant was born on June 23, 1977. On August 22, 1993, when he was
sixteen years old, Appellant and two co-defendants committed a home
invasion, and then robbed and murdered the victims (husband and wife) in
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1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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their home. Appellant pled guilty on November 1, 1995, to two counts each
of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and robbery, and one count each
of burglary, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, receiving stolen property,
and criminal conspiracy. On January 5, 1996, the court sentenced Appellant
to automatic life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on each
murder offense, to be served concurrently, with no further penalties on the
remaining offenses. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition pro se on January 3, 1997.
The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. On April
9, 1999, the PCRA court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s amended
petition, which the court denied on June 18, 1999. This Court affirmed, and
our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on April 3, 2001. See
Commonwealth v. Secreti, 760 A.2d 433 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal
denied, 565 Pa. 642, 771 A.2d 1282 (2001). Appellant filed a second PCRA
petition pro se on April 29, 2005, which the PCRA court ultimately denied on
February 21, 2006. This Court affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal on February 28, 2007. See Commonwealth v.
Secreti, 913 A.2d 947 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 700, 918
A.2d 745 (2007).
Appellant filed his current PCRA petition pro se on August 15, 2012,
asserting a new constitutional right under the United States Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183
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L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), as an exception to the statutory timeliness
requirements. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended
petition on July 2, 2013, and a second amended petition on January 6, 2014.
The PCRA court issued, on September 10, 2014, notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907,
based on our state Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 622 Pa. 543, 81 A.3d 1 (2013) (holding Miller’s prohibition
against mechanical mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole
(“LWOP”) sentences for juvenile offenders was not available on collateral
review). The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on December 1, 2014.
Thereafter, counsel filed a petition to withdraw, which the PCRA court
granted on January 22, 2015. Appellant subsequently filed, on February 3,
2015, a pro se petition objecting to counsel’s withdrawal and seeking
reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. On March 24, 2015, the
PCRA court vacated its order permitting counsel to withdraw and reinstated
Appellant’s right to appeal nunc pro tunc. Appellant timely filed a notice of
appeal on April 7, 2015.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
DID THE [PCRA] COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
[APPELLANT’S] PCRA PETITION, AS HE CURRENTLY
SERVES A SENTENCE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL, AND WHOSE PROHIBITION MUST BE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
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Appellant argues the Miller decision held that an automatic mandatory
LWOP sentence, for those who are under the age of eighteen at the time of
their crimes, violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. Appellant claims Miller created a new constitutional
rule of law, which the Supreme Court intended to apply retroactively to
cases on collateral review. To support this contention, Appellant asserts the
Supreme Court applied this new rule in Miller to its companion case,
Jackson v. Hobbs, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012),
which was decided at the same time. Appellant contends the Supreme Court
made no distinction between the Miller and Jackson cases, regarding
application of the new rule, which were on direct and collateral review,
respectively. Appellant claims Miller imposed a categorical bar to automatic
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles. Appellant maintains that Miller’s
ban on uncompromising sentences for a specific class of persons constitutes
substantive law that compels retroactivity of Miller on collateral review.
Appellant concludes this Court should reverse the PCRA court’s order
denying relief, vacate his judgment of sentence, and remand for
resentencing. For the following reasons, we agree.
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s
determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Lane, 81 A.3d 974 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied,
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625 Pa. 658, 92 A.3d 811 (2014). This Court grants great deference to the
findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those
findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such deference,
however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44
A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Initially, we examine whether Appellant timely filed his current PCRA
petition. Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196 (Pa.Super. 2009),
appeal denied, 603 Pa. 684, 982 A.2d 1227 (2009). Pennsylvania law
makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003). The
most recent amendments to the PCRA, effective January 16, 1996, provide
that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed
within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Bretz, 830 A.2d 1273
(Pa.Super. 2003). A judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA
allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition
will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a
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petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, a petitioner asserting a
timeliness exception must file a petition within sixty (60) days of the date
the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “As such,
when a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the expiration of direct
review, or not eligible for one of the three limited exceptions, or entitled to
one of the exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date that the claim
could have been first brought, the trial court has no power to address the
substantive merits of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.” Commonwealth v.
Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (2000).
When the exception asserted is Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), the 60-day
rule runs from the date of the germane decision. Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 35 A.3d. 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 616 Pa. 625, 46
A.3d 715 (2012). Subsection (iii) of Section 9545 requires a petitioner to
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prove “there is a ‘new’ constitutional right and that the right ‘has been held’
by ‘that court’ to apply retroactively.” Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam,
571 Pa. 219, 226, 812 A.2d 497, 501 (2002). “[T]he language ‘has been
held’ in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) means that a retroactivity determination
must exist at the time that the petition is filed.” Id. at 228, 812 A.2d at
502 (emphasis added). A mere clarification of existing law, however, does
not constitute a new set of rules. Id. at 229, 812 A.2d at 503.
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court said: “[C]hildren are
constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes.” Miller,
supra at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2458, 183 L.Ed.2d at ___. The Miller Court
recognized these differences lead to a “diminished culpability and greater
prospects for reform” for juvenile offenders. Montgomery v. Louisiana,
___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 280758 *12 (filed January 25, 2016, as revised on
January 27, 2016) (quoting Miller, supra at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464, 183
L.Ed.2d at ___).
First, children have a “lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” leading to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Second, children “are more vulnerable to negative
influences and outside pressures,” including from their
family and peers; they have limited “control over their own
environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves
from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s
character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits
are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence
of irretrievable depravity.”
Montgomery, supra (quoting Miller, supra). “‘[T]he distinctive attributes
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of youth diminish the penological justifications’ for imposing [LWOP] on
juvenile offenders[.]” Montgomery , supra (quoting Miller, supra at ___,
132 S.Ct. at 2465, 183 L.Ed.2d at ___). “These considerations underlay the
Court’s holding in Miller that mandatory [LWOP] sentences for children
‘pos[e] too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.’” Montgomery,
supra at *13 (quoting Miller, supra at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d
at ___).
Moreover, “[a] substantive rule…forbids criminal punishment of certain
primary conduct or prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense.” Montgomery, supra at
*11.
Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to
[LWOP] is excessive for all but “the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” it rendered
[LWOP] an unconstitutional penalty for “a class of
defendants because of their status”—that is, juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth. As a result, Miller announced a substantive rule of
constitutional law. Like other substantive rules, Miller is
retroactive because it “necessarily carr[ies] a significant
risk that a defendant”—here, the vast majority of juvenile
offenders—“faces a punishment that the law cannot
impose upon him.”
Id. at *13 (internal citations and some quotation marks omitted). Thus,
Miller retroactively applies to cases on collateral review. Id. at *11.
Additionally, giving Miller retroactive effect does not require or overly
burden the states to retry every case where a juvenile offender received
mandatory LWOP. Id. at *16. “Miller requires only that there be judicial
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consideration of the appropriate age-related factors set forth in that decision
prior to the imposition of a sentence of [LWOP] on a juvenile.”
Commonwealth v. Batts, 620 Pa. 115, 131-32, 66 A.3d 286, 296 (2013)
(citing Miller, supra at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2467-68, 183 L.Ed.2d at ___).
[A]t a minimum [the court] should consider a juvenile’s
age at the time of the offense, his diminished culpability
and capacity for change, the circumstances of the crime,
the extent of his participation in the crime, his family,
home and neighborhood environment, his emotional
maturity and development, the extent that familial and/or
peer pressure may have affected him, his past exposure to
violence, his drug and alcohol history, his ability to deal
with the police, his capacity to assist his attorney, his
mental health history, and his potential for rehabilitation.
Batts, supra at 133, 66 A.3d at 297 (quoting Commonwealth v. Knox, 50
A.3d 732, 745 (Pa.Super. 2012)) (citation omitted). Thus, “the imposition of
a minimum sentence taking such factors into account is the most
appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that occurred
when a [LWOP] sentence was mandatorily applied to [a]ppellant.” Batts,
supra. Furthermore, “[a]llowing those offenders to be considered for parole
ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—
and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate
sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Montgomery, supra at
*16. In sum, Montgomery has clarified Miller with regard to its
substantive law and retroactivity. Consequently, we must also conclude that
Cunningham, supra no longer controls in this context. We now turn our
attention to the implications arising from Abdul-Salaam, supra at 228, 812
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A.2d at 502 (holding: “[T]he language ‘has been held’ in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(iii) means that a retroactivity determination must exist at the
time that the petition is filed”) (emphasis added).
The instant case represents an example of the unique situation
implicating those PCRA petitions seeking Miller relief which were filed in the
time gap following Miller but before Montgomery. Here, Appellant filed his
current petition within 60 days of the Miller decision and asserted Miller’s
substantive law as an exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements under
subsection (b)(1)(iii). When Appellant filed his petition, the various
jurisdictions were still trying to decide if Miller was available on collateral
review but were doing so without the benefit of Montgomery. Appellant’s
petition was ultimately decided under Cunningham, supra and denied. We
recognize that similar “gap” cases are in the appellate system awaiting
disposition and include petitions filed later than 60 days after Miller.
Therefore, we now hold that the best resolution of this dilemma is to
interpret Montgomery as making retroactivity under Miller effective as of
the date of the Miller decision. In this way, we satisfy the “has been held”
conditional language enunciated in Abdul-Salaam, supra. Because the
Montgomery decision was needed to clarify Miller, however, we will use
the date of the Montgomery decision solely to measure the 60-day rule of
Section 9545(b)(2) (requiring petitioner asserting timeliness exception to file
petition within 60 days of date claim could have been presented); Gamboa-
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Taylor, supra. In all other respects, Miller remains the lodestar for
substantive constitutional law on this subject such that the retroactivity
determination will be deemed to have existed at the time the pending
petitions were filed. Thus, we harmonize the PCRA requirements with
Montgomery, Miller, and Abdul-Salaam and simultaneously achieve the
justice this law was designed to promote.
Based on the foregoing, we hold the Miller rule of law “has been held”
to be retroactive for purposes of collateral review as of the date of the Miller
decision on June 25, 2012. The date of the Montgomery decision (January
25, 2016, as revised on January 27, 2016) will control for purposes of the
60-day rule in Section 9545(b)(2). Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court’s
order, vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand for
resentencing in accord with Batts, supra.
Order reversed; case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/9/2016
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