Commonwealth v. Walker ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-S21012-16
    
    2016 PA Super 100
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DERRICK TT WALKER,
    Appellant                  No. 485 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 23, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-51-CR-0007470-2011
    CP-51-CR-0007471-2011
    CP-51-CR-0007472-2011
    CP-51-CR-0007473-2011
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                               FILED MAY 13, 2016
    Appellant, Derrick TT Walker, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    of an aggregate term of 4 to 10 years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury
    convicted him, in four separate cases, of four counts of unlawful contact with
    a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1), four counts of corruption of minors, 18
    Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i), and one count each of unlawful restraint, 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 2902(a)(1), luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure, 18 Pa.C.S.
    2910(a), and simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). On appeal, Appellant
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S21012-16
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The facts of Appellant’s cases, which were consolidated for trial, can be
    summarized as follows:1
    On May 4, 2011, four days shy of her [tenth] birthday,
    Z.A. was walking to school at around 7:15 a.m. when she
    stopped at a store at 29th and Moore Streets to buy juice and
    chips. While inside shopping, she looked up at a mirror hanging
    on the wall and noticed [A]ppellant,[2] whom she did not know,
    staring at her. She went to the counter to pay for her items,
    and [A]ppellant followed her, stood next to her, and continued to
    stare at her. Appellant left the store, and when Z.A. walked
    outside shortly thereafter, she saw [A]ppellant in a parked red
    car. As she walked down 29th Street, [A]ppellant drove up next
    to her, stopped the car and said “Come here[.]” Z.A. ran to
    school and [A]ppellant drove off. After school, Z.A. told her aunt
    … what happened. Her aunt called the police, who came to the
    house and took a statement from Z.A.
    L.C. testified that she was nine years old on May 6, 2011.
    On that date at around 6:45 a.m., she was standing alone at the
    school bus stop at 12th Street and Lehigh Avenue when
    [A]ppellant, whom she did not know, pulled up in a car. He
    asked L.C. if she had “hair on her pussy[.]” L.C. ran to school.
    Later that day, L.C. told a teacher, her mother, and her
    grandmother what had happened. She also spoke with police
    and identified [A]ppellant from a group of photos shown to her.
    K.B. testified that on May [11], 2011, she was eleven
    years old. On that date at about 7:45 a.m., she and her six
    year-old brother were walking to Frederick Douglas Charter
    School near Ditman Street. As they walked, a red car drove up
    ____________________________________________
    1
    We do not have the benefit of a trial court opinion in this case, as the
    judge who presided over Appellant’s trial retired. The factual summary
    provided herein was set forth by Appellant in his brief.
    2
    Appellant was 41 years old in May of 2011.
    -2-
    J-S21012-16
    beside her and the driver, [A]ppellant, whom she did not know,
    asked her if she had “hair on her pussy[.]” She and her brother
    quickly walked to school and [A]ppellant drove off. K.B. told a
    teacher, who notified K.B.’s mother and the police. K.B. later
    identified [A]ppellant from a group of photos shown to her by
    police.
    T.H. testified that on May 11, 2011, she was eleven years
    3
    old. On that date at around 7:15 a.m., she was on a bus
    heading to school near Cleveland and Susquehanna Streets
    when she realized she forgot something at home. She got off
    the bus and began to walk home. A red car pulled up beside her
    and the driver, [A]ppellant, whom she did not know, asked her if
    she had “hair on her pussy[.]” Appellant then reached out the
    car window with his left hand and grabbed T.H.’s wrist. She put
    her foot against the car and pulled her wrist free. T.H. testified
    that [A]ppellant had “a good grip” and that it hurt, but that she
    was not cut or bruised. She ran home and [A]ppellant drove
    away. At home she told her grandmother, … who called the
    police. Officers came to their house and, as T.H. was outside
    speaking to them, she saw [A]ppellant’s car drive by. She
    pointed out the car to the officers, who then pursued [A]ppellant
    and arrested him.
    3
    Other Commonwealth evidence, including T.H.’s own
    testimony [about] her birthdate … indicate[d] that T.H.
    was actually twelve years old on the day in question.
    Corporal Eric Reiser testified that he was the officer who
    arrested [A]ppellant as he was stopped at a red light. He
    ordered [A]ppellant out of the car, and when [A]ppellant got out,
    his loose sweatpants fell down. [Appellant] was not wearing
    underwear and the officer leaned down to pull [A]ppellant’s
    pants up. T.H. then identified [Appellant] as the man who had
    approached her.
    Police Officer Michael O’Brien testified that he took
    photographs of items found inside [A]ppellant’s car on the day of
    his arrest. The items included binoculars and a camera in its
    case on the rear floor, newspapers and a trash bag on the
    driver’s seat. These items, in addition to a mirror, were later
    seized pursuant to a search warrant.
    Detective Linda Pace testified that she showed photo
    arrays on separate occasions to each of the four complainants.
    Each girl identified [A]ppellant. She also stated that the four
    -3-
    J-S21012-16
    incidents occurred within a ten- to twenty-block radius in the
    22nd Police District.
    Appellant’s Brief at 6-8 (citations to the record and some footnotes omitted).
    Appellant was charged in four separate cases pertaining to each of his
    four victims. The cases were consolidated and he proceeded to a jury trial in
    June of 2013.     At the close thereof, the jury convicted Appellant of the
    above-stated offenses.    On January 23, 2014, he was sentenced to an
    aggregate term of 4 to 10 years’ imprisonment. He filed a timely notice of
    appeal. As the presiding trial judge had retired, Appellant was not ordered
    to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal, and no trial court opinion was filed. Appellant raises the following
    four issues for our review:
    1. Was not [A]ppellant erroneously convicted of four counts of
    unlawful contact where the trial court instructed the jury that, to
    be convicted of that offense, [A]ppellant must have contacted
    each of the four complainants with the specific intent to commit
    indecent assault or sexual assault, and there was insufficient
    evidence he contacted the complainants for that particular
    purpose?
    2. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict [A]ppellant of
    luring as to the complainant T.H. as his act of grabbing her wrist
    was not calculated to entice or induce her to get in his car?
    3. Was not [A]ppellant erroneously convicted of simple assault
    as to the complainant T.H. where there was insufficient evidence
    that [A]ppellant specifically intended to put T.H. in fear of
    serious bodily injury by physical menace?
    4. Was not [A]ppellant erroneously convicted of corruption of
    minors as to the complainant Z.A. where there was insufficient
    evidence that his conduct tended to produce or encourage
    delinquent behavior on Z.A.’s part?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    -4-
    J-S21012-16
    Appellant’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
    his convictions.
    In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
    determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
    elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 
    14 A.3d 133
     (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
    evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
    finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 
    988 A.2d 141
     (Pa. Super.
    2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
    links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Moreno, 
    supra at 136
    .
    Commonwealth v. Koch, 
    39 A.3d 996
    , 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    In his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient
    to sustain any of his four counts of unlawful contact with a minor.         That
    offense is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he is
    intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement
    officer acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed
    the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity
    prohibited under any of the following, and either the person
    initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this
    Commonwealth:
    (1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating
    to sexual offenses).
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1).
    The Commonwealth charged Appellant, generally, with committing
    unlawful contact as defined by section 6318(a)(1); it did not define what
    specific Chapter 31 offense(s) Appellant intended to commit when he
    -5-
    J-S21012-16
    contacted the victims in this case.3 However, the trial court instructed the
    jury that, to find Appellant guilty of unlawful contact, it must conclude, inter
    alia, that Appellant “was intentionally in contact with a minor, and that the
    contact was for the purpose of engaging in an unlawful act; that unlawful act
    being sexual assault and/or indecent assault with a child under 13 years of
    age….”       N.T.    Trial,   6/5/13,    at    127-28   (emphasis   added).     The
    Commonwealth did not object to the trial court’s instruction.
    According to Appellant, the court’s instruction narrowed the scope of
    his unlawful contact charges and required the Commonwealth to prove,
    “beyond a reasonable doubt[,] that [he] contacted the complainants with
    that specific intent, that is, to commit indecent assault or sexual assault.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 13.       Appellant then discusses why the evidence was
    inadequate to prove that he contacted the victims with this intent.           Id. at
    14-16.
    Appellant offers no binding, legal authority to support his argument
    that the trial court’s jury instruction required the Commonwealth to prove
    that he intended to commit indecent assault or sexual assault, rather than
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Appellant does not argue that the Commonwealth was required to specify,
    in the criminal information, the underlying crime that Appellant intended to
    commit when unlawfully contacting the minor victims. Case law supports a
    conclusion that no such specificity in the charging document was necessary.
    See Commonwealth v. Reed, 
    9 A.3d 1138
    , 1146 (Pa. 2010) (clarifying
    that for purposes of section 6318(a)(1), a defendant need not be separately
    convicted of, or even charged with, the Chapter 31 offense for which he
    contacted the minor).
    -6-
    J-S21012-16
    any Chapter 31 offense. For instance, Appellant relies on the Third Circuit
    Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. McElroy, 
    644 F.2d 274
    , 280
    (3d Cir. 1981) (concluding that where the trial court’s jury charge, to which
    the prosecutor did not object, narrowed the definition of the charged crime,
    the conviction must rest on proof of the crime as defined by the court).
    Appellant’s reliance on McElroy is unavailing.      “Absent a United States
    Supreme Court pronouncement, decisions of federal courts are not binding
    on state courts….”    Commonwealth v. Lambert, 
    765 A.2d 306
    , 315 n.4
    (Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Ragan, 
    743 A.2d 390
     (Pa.
    1999); Cambria-Stoltz Enterprises v. TNT Investments, 
    747 A.2d 947
    (Pa. Super. 2000)).
    Moreover, the decisions by this Court that Appellant cites in support of
    his argument are distinguishable.       For instance, Appellant relies on
    Commonwealth v. Lambert, 
    313 A.2d 300
     (Pa. Super. 1973), where the
    Commonwealth specifically charged Lambert with corrupting the morals of a
    minor “by furnishing dangerous drugs.”     Id. at 301.   This Court held that
    “[b]y specifically charging the manner by which [Lambert] was alleged to
    have corrupted the morals of these minors, the Commonwealth was required
    to prove that [he] did furnish them with dangerous drugs.” Id. In reaching
    this decision, we stressed that, “[i]n criminal trials[,] the proof offered by
    the Commonwealth must measure up to the charge made in the indictment.”
    Id. (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Aurick, 
    19 A.2d 920
    , 924
    (Pa. 1941)).
    -7-
    J-S21012-16
    Similarly, in the second case cited by Appellant, Commonwealth v.
    March, 
    551 A.2d 232
     (Pa. Super. 1988), the Commonwealth added to the
    criminal information four general charges of corruption of a minor, without
    any statement of specific facts underlying those charges. On appeal, March
    argued that his defense counsel was ineffective for not asking for a bill of
    particulars, and this Court agreed. Our reason for this determination rested,
    in part, on the fact that “[w]here the bill of particulars specifically limits
    proof to be adduced at trial to specific acts, the Commonwealth is not
    permitted to obtain a conviction on the offense charged by proof of acts
    other than those specified in the bill.”   March, 551 A.2d at 236. We also
    stressed that “where an accused is charged with corruption by one act, and
    the Commonwealth does not prove that act, but proves some other act, a
    conviction for corruption based upon the other act cannot stand.”         Id.
    (emphasis added)
    The   holdings    of   Lambert       and   March   both   involve   the
    Commonwealth’s burden of proof when offenses are charged with specificity
    regarding the facts underlying those charges. Neither decision involves the
    circumstances of the present case, where the trial court’s jury instruction
    narrowed the scope of offenses that had been charged, more generally, in
    -8-
    J-S21012-16
    the criminal information.       Appellant does not explain why the holdings of
    Lambert and March should extend to the specific scenario before us.4
    From our review of those cases, it is apparent that both decisions rest
    on the principle that the defendant must be put on notice of the offenses
    charged against him “in order to permit him to prepare a defense, avoid
    surprise, and be placed on notice as to any restrictions upon the
    Commonwealth’s proof.” March, 551 A.2d at 235-36; see also Lambert,
    313 A.2d at 301 (“An ‘indictment is the star and compass of a criminal trial
    … [and it] must be a notification to the defendant of the charge he has to
    meet.’”) (citation omitted).        Here, Appellant was on notice that he was
    charged with four counts of unlawful contact with the intent to commit a
    Chapter    31    offense.      Again,    Appellant   does   not   contend   that   the
    Commonwealth was required to specify, in the criminal information, the
    Chapter 31 offense(s) he intended to commit when contacting the minor
    victims.    Further, Appellant’s argument that this Court is constrained to
    assessing only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he committed the
    specific crimes stated by the court in its jury instruction is not supported by
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Instead, Appellant simply cites those cases, with parentheticals explaining
    their holdings, after stating, “a conviction for unlawful contact required proof
    beyond a reasonable doubt that [A]ppellant contacted the complainants with
    that specific intent, that is, to commit indecent assault or sexual assault.
    Proof of contact with a different unlawful intent would not support a
    conviction for this offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 13 (citing Lambert, 
    supra
    and March, supra).
    -9-
    J-S21012-16
    any binding legal authority. Accordingly, his first challenge to the sufficiency
    of the evidence is unconvincing.5
    Next, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
    him of luring a child (specifically, T.H.) into a motor vehicle. That offense is
    defined as:
    (a) Offense.--Unless the circumstances reasonably indicate that
    the child is in need of assistance, a person who lures or attempts
    to lure a child into a motor vehicle or structure without the
    consent, express or implied, of the child's parent or guardian
    commits an offense.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2910(a).
    As Appellant recognizes, section 2910 does not define what it means
    to “lure” a child. However, in Commonwealth v. Hart, 
    28 A.3d 898
     (Pa.
    2011), our Supreme Court assessed the meaning of that word in
    determining “whether the mere offer of an automobile ride to a child
    constitutes an attempt to ‘lure’ the child under [s]ection 2910….”       
    Id.
     at
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Appellant offers no discussion of how the evidence was insufficient to
    sustain his convictions of unlawful contact with the intent to commit any
    Chapter 31 offense. Indeed, Appellant suggests that the evidence was
    sufficient to prove that he contacted the victims with the intent to commit
    indecent exposure, which is a Chapter 31 crime. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3127;
    see also Appellant’s Brief at 14 (“[I]t was purely speculative whether he
    intended to commit the two specified crimes or whether his intent was to
    commit a different offense, such as indecent exposure….”); id. at 16 (“While
    [A]ppellant contacted the complainants for an illicit purpose, the evidence
    did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did so for the purpose of
    committing the crimes of sexual assault or indecent assault rather than, for
    example, indecent exposure, open lewdness or harassment.”).
    - 10 -
    J-S21012-16
    900.   Initially, the Court determined that the plain meaning of the word
    “lure” necessarily “involves the making of a promise of pleasure or gain, the
    furnishing of a temptation or enticement, or the performance of some other
    affirmative act calculated to strongly induce another individual to take a
    particular action, usually and most often likely to result in his or her harm.”
    Id. at 909.   The Hart Court then elaborated how that definition of “lure”
    applied to the issue before it, i.e., whether Hart had “lured” two young boys
    by simply offering them a ride on two separate occasions, without saying
    anything more to the boys.      In holding that the facts of Hart were not
    sufficient to constitute a “lure” under section 2910, the Court explained:
    Consistent with the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term
    “lure,” we therefore hold that an attempt to lure under Section
    2910 does not occur upon the mere offer of a ride in a motor
    vehicle to a child, but, rather, involves only situations where a
    child is provided a further enticement or inducement to enter the
    vehicle, in addition to the offer of the ride, particularly under
    such circumstances which suggest the child is being led into a
    potentially harmful situation. … [T]his enticement or inducement
    may be the promise of a pleasurable reward for entry into the
    vehicle such as receiving money or a treat such as candy or ice
    cream. Likewise, a similar attractive temptation could be created
    with the promise of the opportunity for the child to view an
    object of interest like a toy, a game, or a puppy. The enticement
    or inducement need not necessarily be express, but could also
    arise where the enticement and inducement is evident from the
    circumstances accompanying the making of the offer.
    Id. at 910.
    Appellant seemingly construes the Hart decision as holding that the
    only way in which to “lure” a child under section 2910 is to order, command,
    or threaten the child to enter the vehicle, while also offering the child
    - 11 -
    J-S21012-16
    inducement or enticement to do so. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19 (arguing
    that he did not lure T.H. because he “employed no form of inducement or
    influence to convince T.H. to enter his car. He did not order or threaten her
    to get in his car, nor did he make any implied or explicit promises to
    persuade her to do so.      He never pressured her to avoid unpleasant
    consequences by complying with a command because he never issued such
    a command.”). However, Appellant’s interpretation ignores the Hart Court’s
    holding that the broader definition of the term “lure” includes “the
    performance of some other affirmative act calculated to strongly induce
    another individual to take a particular action….” Hart, 28 A.3d at 909. The
    Court did not expound on this portion of the definition of “lure” because the
    facts in Hart did not call for such an analysis.   The facts here, however,
    clearly satisfy that particular component of the definition of “lure” under
    section 2910. Namely, T.H. testified that Appellant pulled his car alongside
    her while she was walking, asked her if she had “hair on her pussy,” and
    then grabbed her wrist and tried to pull her toward his car.       N.T. Trial,
    6/4/13, at 140, 142-43. Appellant pulled T.H. with such force that she had
    to “put [her] foot on the car and push[] back” to escape from his “good
    grip.” Id. at 143. By this conduct, Appellant committed an “affirmative act
    calculated to strongly induce” T.H. to enter his vehicle, which satisfies the
    Hart Court’s definition of “lure.”   Hart, 28 A.3d at 909.     Therefore, the
    evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction under section 2910.
    - 12 -
    J-S21012-16
    In Appellant’s third issue, he avers that the evidence was insufficient
    to prove that he committed a simple assault of T.H. Appellant was convicted
    of simple assault as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3):
    (a) Offense defined.-- Except as provided under section 2702
    (relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of assault if
    he:
    …
    (3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
    imminent serious bodily injury[.]
    Serious bodily injury is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial
    risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
    protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
    organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
    Appellant contends that the evidence failed to demonstrate that he
    specifically intended “to put, by physical menace, T.H. in fear of imminent
    serious bodily injury.” Appellant’s Brief at 20 (citation omitted). Appellant
    explains:
    Although T.H. testified that she was “scared” when
    [A]ppellant grabbed her arm, that fact does not establish that
    [A]ppellant had the specific intent required under [section]
    2701(a)(3). It is reasonable to infer from his actions that
    [A]ppellant specifically intended to prevent her from walking or
    running away. That he frightened her in his attempt to do so
    does not establish that his specific intention in grabbing her wrist
    was to put her in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
    Appellant’s Brief at 20.
    - 13 -
    J-S21012-16
    Appellant further argues that this Court’s decision in Commonwealth
    v. Fry, 
    491 A.2d 843
     (Pa. Super. 1985), “is directly on point.” Appellant’s
    Brief at 20. In Fry,
    a ten year old female child was walking to school with a younger
    brother and two friends. When she reached the school grounds,
    Eric Fry, age eighteen, approached her from behind, grabbed her
    by putting his arms around her and lifted her off the ground.
    When she started to kick and scream, Fry said, “shut up, you're
    coming with me.” The child had not been acquainted previously
    with Fry. Two children who were serving as safety patrol
    members saw what was happening and ran toward Fry;
    whereupon, he put the child down and walked away. At trial, the
    child surmised that Fry intended to pull her toward a flight of
    stairs leading to a locker room, but she conceded that she wasn't
    certain about that.
    Fry, 491 A.2d at 844.
    This Court held in Fry that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
    Fry’s conviction of simple assault under section 2701(a)(3), reasoning:
    In the instant case, … the only evidence of physical menace was
    that Fry put his arms around the child and picked her up. He did
    not strike or attempt to subdue her by physical means. He did
    not threaten to inflict bodily injury upon her. There was no
    evidence that serious bodily injury was imminent or that
    appellant intended to put the child in fear thereof.
    The evidence did show that [Fry] told the child to “shut up” and
    that he was taking her with him. The child speculated that
    perhaps [Fry] intended to take her toward the steps leading to
    the locker room. Certainly one can infer from this that a young
    child would be alarmed and frightened by [Fry’s] conduct.
    However, that is not the conduct which was made criminal by 18
    Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3). The statute required a specific intent on
    the part of [Fry] to put the child in fear of imminent serious
    bodily injury. This the Commonwealth failed to prove.
    Id. at 845 (internal citations omitted).
    - 14 -
    J-S21012-16
    We find the present case distinguishable from Fry. Namely, Appellant,
    a 41 year-old man, clearly attempted to subdue T.H., an 11 year-old child,
    by grabbing her wrist and pulling her to his car.       Appellant made a very
    explicit, sexual comment to T.H. just prior to gripping her wrist, and held
    T.H. with such force that she had to put her foot against his car to gain
    leverage to escape his grasp. T.H. could have fallen backward and struck
    her head, or injured herself in some other serious manner, due to
    Appellant’s physically restraining her in this way. Moreover, Appellant was
    sitting in the driver’s seat of an idling vehicle when he grabbed T.H., who
    was standing on the sidewalk.        At any moment, Appellant could have
    accelerated his vehicle and dragged or struck T.H., which certainly would
    have caused serious bodily injury to the 11-year-old child. These facts were
    sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Appellant had a specific intent to
    place T.H. in fear of immediate, serious bodily injury.       Thus, the evidence
    was sufficient to sustain his conviction of simple assault.
    In his fourth and final issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support his conviction of corrupting the morals of a minor,
    specifically relating to victim Z.A. That offense is defined, in pertinent part:
    (a) Offense defined.--
    (1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever,
    being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act
    corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less
    than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or
    encourages any such minor in the commission of any
    crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor
    - 15 -
    J-S21012-16
    in violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits
    a misdemeanor of the first degree.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
    Appellant maintains that his conduct of “staring at and following [Z.A.]
    in a store, and beckoning her to approach him in his car” does not amount to
    acts which would “tend to produce delinquent behavior in Z.A.” Appellant’s
    Brief at 23. As the Commonwealth points out, however,
    it was not required to prove that Z.A. may engage in delinquent
    behavior as a result of [Appellant’s] conduct.                See
    Commonwealth v. Slocum, 
    86 A.3d 272
    , 279 (Pa. Super.
    2014) (rejecting argument that evidence was insufficient to
    convict appellant of corrupting a minor because he supposedly
    never “encouraged the victim to commit a delinquent act”).
    Indeed, this Court has specifically cautioned against the “use of
    the term ‘delinquent’ in this context” as “a child under ten years
    of age,” like Z.A., “cannot commit a delinquent act.” Slocum,
    
    86 A.3d at
    280 n.11. A person is guilty under 18 Pa.C.S. §
    6301(a) if he corrupts the morals of a minor or encourages a
    minor to commit a crime.
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 19.
    We agree with the Commonwealth that our decision in Slocum
    negates Appellant’s argument herein. We also note that in Commonwealth
    v. Decker, 
    698 A.2d 99
     (Pa. Super. 1997), this Court explained:
    In deciding what conduct can be said to corrupt the morals of a
    minor, the common sense of the community, as well as the
    sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people
    entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular
    case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered
    criminal by it. Furthermore, corruption of a minor can involve
    conduct towards a child in an unlimited number of ways. The
    purpose of such statutes is basically protective in nature. These
    statutes are designed to cover a broad range of conduct in order
    to safeguard the welfare and security of our children. Because of
    the diverse types of conduct that must be proscribed, such
    - 16 -
    J-S21012-16
    statutes must be drawn broadly. It would be impossible to
    enumerate every particular act against which our children need
    be protected.
    
    Id. at 101
     (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, at the time of Z.A.’s encounter with Appellant, she was a 9 year
    old girl.    She was unaccompanied in a convenience store when she saw
    Appellant “peeking around the corner” and staring at her. N.T. Trial, 6/4/13,
    at 43. Z.A. did not know Appellant. Id. at 44. When Z.A. took the items
    she was purchasing to the counter to pay, Appellant “walked up” and “was
    staring right at [her].” Id. at 45. Appellant did not have any items in his
    hands to purchase, yet he stood “extra close” to Z.A., and was nearly
    touching her, as she paid for her things.     Id. at 46, 47.   Z.A. stated that
    Appellant was facing her so that the “front part” of his body was almost
    against her right side. Id. at 46. Z.A. felt scared and “just wanted to get
    out of the store.”   Id. at 47.   Appellant exited the store before Z.A., and
    when she, too, went outside, she saw Appellant sitting in his car “just
    staring” at her. Id. at 47-48. Appellant then pulled up “right next to [her]”
    and said, “Come here.” Id. at 51. Z.A. ran and Appellant drove away. Id.
    at 52.      We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s “conduct was
    plainly offensive to any common sense of decency, propriety, and morality.”
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. Accordingly, his conviction for corruption of a
    minor was supported by sufficient evidence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    - 17 -
    J-S21012-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/13/2016
    - 18 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 485 EDA 2014

Judges: Bender, Lazarus, Stevens

Filed Date: 5/13/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024